

***MODERN
RUSSIAN HISTORY***

*This work has been translated
from the original Russian by
ALEXANDER S. KAUN
who is also the author of the
last chapters dealing with the
reign of Nicolas II.*

MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY

*Being an authoritative and detailed history of Russia
from the Age of Catherine the Great to the Present*

By ALEXANDER KORNILOV

*Professor at the
Polytechnicum of Peter the Great in Petrograd*

Volume Two

SKEFFINGTON & SON, Ltd.

*34 Southampton Street
Strand, W. C. 2*

COPYRIGHT, 1917, BY
ALFRED A. KNOPF

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PREFACE

(To the Third Part)

In my preface to the first part of my "History of Russia in the Nineteenth Century" I announced that the third part would contain the internal history of Russia for the last thirty years. But the abundance of material which I have come upon in the course of my taking up that period has forced me to change my mind. The decisive turn in the national outlook that has taken place after the famine of 1891-92, and also a series of new factors and circumstances in the economic and social life of the country which had been crystallised at that time and had in their turn conditioned new tendencies and aspirations in our national policy and in the governmental activity (e.g., the construction of the Siberian railroad and the Far-Eastern policy),—these facts form a sufficient basis for the treatment of the last eight years of the nineteenth century together with the first years of the twentieth century as a separate period serving as a direct prelude to the great events that were displayed before our very eyes in 1904-1906.

Whether this period will form the contents of a fourth part of my work, I cannot state definitely at present. But, at any rate, the construction of such a fourth part appears to me as a logical possibility.

This third part of the history expounds the reactionary period of our internal modern history, which began in 1866 and continued till the famine of 1891-92, with a brief, bright intermission in 1880-81. No systematic investigations of that epoch have been made thus far, and for this reason the composition of this part has been for me a far more difficult and responsible task than that of the first two parts.

Petrograd, 1914.

A. KORNILOV.

CONTENTS

PART II

CHAPTER XX I

The Crimean campaign and its significance.—Characteristics of Alexander II.—His education, political views and tastes.—The influence of the Crimean campaign on the Tzar. His first steps.—The attitude of society towards Alexander in 1855-56.—The conclusion of peace and the manifesto of March 19, 1856.—The address to the nobles in Moscow.—Preparations for the peasant-reform.—The activity of Lanskoï and Levshin.—The relationship of the nobles.—Circulating monographs.—The formation of the Secret Committee.—Rostovtzev.—The course of activities in the Secret Committee during 1857.—The petition of the Lithuanian nobles and the Imperial Rescript to Adjutant-General Nazimov, November 20, 1857.—The programme of the government.—The publication of the November Rescript.

CHAPTER XXI 20

The nobility and the reform-programme of the government.—The differing interests of landowners in the agricultural and industrial provinces.—The attitude of the *Intelligentsia*; the articles of Chernyshevsky and Herzen; the Moscow Banquet.—The address of the nobility of Nizhni-Novgorod.—The hesitation in Moscow.—Addresses of other provinces.—Provincial committees.—The point of view of Unkovsky and of the Tver committee.—The sanctioned programme of activities.—The attitude of the press.—The evolution of Rostovtzev's views.—The opening of the Zemstvo department.—Miliutin.—The examination of the governmental programme by the Main Committee and the opening of the Editing Commissions.—The composition of the commissions.—Rostovtzev's programme.—The first assembly of the delegates of the provincial committees.—The addresses of the nobles.—The death of Rostovtzev.—Panin.—The second assembly of the delegates.—The inner struggle in the Editing Commissions.—The summary of their work.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XXII 42

The Course of work in the Main Committee and in the State-Council, the discussions of the projects of the Editing Commissions.—Their conflicts.—The manifesto of February 19, 1861.—Its analysis.—Its legal, administrative, and economic significance for the peasants, for the nobles, and for the country.

CHAPTER XXIII 55

The influence of the peasant-reform on society and the press.—The conditions of the press in 1855.—The exceptional position of Herzen, his prophecy in 1853, and his programme in 1855-1858.—The attitude of the liberals towards Herzen.—The rôle of the *Bell* in the work of reform and in the development of public opinion in Russia.—The differentiation of tendencies in society and press after 1858.—The position of various press-organs.—The radicalisation of the *Contemporary*, and its relation to Herzen in 1859-60.—The *Russian Messenger* and other liberal organs.—The position and rôle of the Slavophiles.—Social demands crystallized during 1859-61.—Their comparison with the government's views of that moment.

CHAPTER XXIV 65

The attitude of the peasants towards the reform of February 19, 1861.—Disturbances and uprisings accompanying the introduction of the new order of things.—The Besdna catastrophe.—The impression of these facts on society.—Reaction in governmental circles in 1861.—Valuiev's policy.—The relationship of the public and the government.—First appearances of Nihilism in 1861.—The *Russian Word*.—The oppositional tendencies of the nobility.—Its two wings.—The Tver incident of 1862.—The constitutional movement and the differing opinions in nobility circles.—The attitude of the industrial-commercial spheres.—The evolution of this class after the Crimean campaign and the reasons of its oppositional tendencies.

CHAPTER XXV 80

The development of a general opposition and the first manifestations of a revolutionary spirit.—The proclamations of 1861-62.—"Young Russia" and the conflagrations of 1862.—Arrests and exiles of radical writers.—The impressions of these facts on the public.—The schism between the liberals and radicals.—Herzen on the latter side.—The impression in Western Europe.—The circular of Gorchakov.—

CONTENTS

The Polish movement.—The policy of Marquis Velepolsky, its failure.—The uprising of 1863.—Its impression on the Russian public.—The significance of the intervention of foreign powers.—Its resultant outburst of patriotism in Russia.—The fall of the *Bell*.—The triumph of Katkov and the general reaction.—Continuation of reforms.—Tatarinov's financial reform.—The excise reform.—The university-movement and the decree of 1863.—Other reforms in the ministry of education.—Secondary schools, education of women, primary schools.—The statute of 1864.

CHAPTER XXVI 96

The Zemstvo-reform.—Its connection with the peasant-reform.—Its analysis.—The attitude of the public and press towards the zemstvo-reform.—Conditions under which the zemstvo-institutions had to function.—The judicial reform.—Its significance and content.—The first steps of the new courts.—Press legislation.—The vacillation of the government in this sphere.—Two commissions of Prince Obolensky.—The policy of Golovnin and Valuiev.—The temporary laws of 1865.—The mood of the nobles in 1865. The address of the Moscow nobles.—The position of the radical press and circles.—The attentate of Karakosov.—The end of the reform-epoch and general conclusions about it.

PART III

CHAPTER XXVII III

The attentate of Karakosov. The subsequent reaction.—The internal development of Russia in spite of the reaction.—Continuation of certain reforms.—The completion of the peasant reform.—The general picture of land-ownership among various groups of the population after the reforms of 1861, 63, 66.—The amount of soil-property among the liberated peasants.

CHAPTER XXVIII 123

The immediate results of the peasant-reform.—The growth of population before and after the reform.—The distribution of population before and after the reform.—The growth of the urban population before and after the reform.—The industrial crisis and its causes.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XXII 42

The Course of work in the Main Committee and in the State-Council, the discussions of the projects of the Editing Commissions.— Their conflicts.— The manifesto of February 19, 1861.— Its analysis.— Its legal, administrative, and economic significance for the peasants, for the nobles, and for the country.

CHAPTER XXIII 55

The influence of the peasant-reform on society and the press.— The conditions of the press in 1855.— The exceptional position of Herzen, his prophecy in 1853, and his programme in 1855-1858.— The attitude of the liberals towards Herzen.— The rôle of the *Bell* in the work of reform and in the development of public opinion in Russia.— The differentiation of tendencies in society and press after 1858.— The position of various press-organs.— The radicalisation of the *Contemporary*, and its relation to Herzen in 1859-60.— The *Russian Messenger* and other liberal organs.— The position and rôle of the Slavophiles.— Social demands crystallized during 1859-61.— Their comparison with the government's views of that moment.

CHAPTER XXIV 65

The attitude of the peasants towards the reform of February 19, 1861.— Disturbances and uprisings accompanying the introduction of the new order of things.— The Besdna catastrophe.— The impression of these facts on society.— Reaction in governmental circles in 1861.— Valuiiev's policy.— The relationship of the public and the government.— First appearances of Nihilism in 1861.— The *Russian Word*.— The oppositional tendencies of the nobility.— Its two wings.— The Tver incident of 1862.— The constitutional movement and the differing opinions in nobility circles.— The attitude of the industrial-commercial spheres.— The evolution of this class after the Crimean campaign and the reasons of its oppositional tendencies.

CHAPTER XXV 80

The development of a general opposition and the first manifestations of a revolutionary spirit.— The proclamations of 1861-62.— "Young Russia" and the conflagrations of 1862.— Arrests and exiles of radical writers.— The impressions of these facts on the public.— The schism between the liberals and radicals.— Herzen on the latter side.— The impression in Western Europe.— The circular of Gorchakov.—

CONTENTS

The Polish movement.—The policy of Marquis Velepolsky, its failure.—The uprising of 1863.—Its impression on the Russian public.—The significance of the intervention of foreign powers.—Its resultant outburst of patriotism in Russia.—The fall of the *Bell*.—The triumph of Katkov and the general reaction.—Continuation of reforms.—Tatarinov's financial reform.—The excise reform.—The university-movement and the decree of 1863.—Other reforms in the ministry of education.—Secondary schools, education of women, primary schools.—The statute of 1864.

CHAPTER XXVI 96

The Zemstvo-reform.—Its connection with the peasant-reform.—Its analysis.—The attitude of the public and press towards the zemstvo-reform.—Conditions under which the zemstvo-institutions had to function.—The judicial reform.—Its significance and content.—The first steps of the new courts.—Press legislation.—The vacillation of the government in this sphere.—Two commissions of Prince Obolensky.—The policy of Golovnin and Valuiev.—The temporary laws of 1865.—The mood of the nobles in 1865. The address of the Moscow nobles.—The position of the radical press and circles.—The attentate of Karakosov.—The end of the reform-epoch and general conclusions about it.

PART III

CHAPTER XXVII III

The attentate of Karakosov. The subsequent reaction.—The internal development of Russia in spite of the reaction.—Continuation of certain reforms.—The completion of the peasant reform.—The general picture of land-ownership among various groups of the population after the reforms of 1861, 63, 66.—The amount of soil-property among the liberated peasants.

CHAPTER XXVIII 123

The immediate results of the peasant-reform.—The growth of population before and after the reform.—The distribution of population before and after the reform.—The growth of the urban population before and after the reform.—The industrial crisis and its causes.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XXIX 136

The financial conditions during the reform-epoch and in the next years.—The financial policy and activity of Reiter.—The effort to raise the productive capacity of the country, and particularly the export commerce.—The question of railroad-building.—Its course up to the middle of the 70-ies.—Organisation of commercial credit.—Opening of private banks.—Deficits in the state budget.—The question of continuing internal reforms and the report of Reiter in 1866.

CHAPTER XXX 151

The new municipal statute.—Former legal and actual status of cities.—The measures of the 40-ies.—The statute of 1870. Its substance and criticism thereof.—The question of military reorganisation.—The reforms of Milutin.—The abrogation of recruitments and the law of universal service, 1874.—The general educational significance of Milutin's military reforms.

CHAPTER XXXI 163

The activity of the Ministry of Education after 1866.—Count Dmitry Tolstoy and Milutin as representatives of two antagonistic camps in the reign of Alexander II.—The views of Tolstoy.—Tolstoy and Katkov.—The question of the reform of the secondary school.—The struggle for the introduction of classicism.—The importance of the reform of 1871.—Tolstoy's plans and measures in regard to the universities.—The development of woman education in the period of 1866–78.—Primary education.—The statutes of 1864 and 1874.—The struggle of the ministry of education with the zemstvo.—History of the zemstvo-schools from 1866–1880.

CHAPTER XXXII 176

The development of zemstvo-institutions from 1866 to 1878.—The region of their activity.—Their aims and means.—Their budgets.—Their effort to tax commerce and industry, and conflict with the government on the question.—The zemstvo expenses and their growth.—Class interests within the zemstvo.—The question and natural taxation and its distribution.—The struggle of the government with the zemstvo and the limitation of the latter's activity.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XXXIII 181

The establishment of new courts and their first steps.—Valuiev's fight against them.—The reactionary activity of Count Pahlen.—The beginning of the work of the new statutes.—The position and tendency of the procuratorship.—Special order of deciding cases of crimes against the state.—Changes in the institution of jurists, and exemption of certain cases from the jurisdiction of juries.—The position of the press in the post-reform period.—Leading organs and literary tendencies after 1866.—The public mood.

CHAPTER XXXIV 196

The conditions of the masses and of the rural communities in the 60-ies and 70-ies.—The course of the redemption-process.—Poor portions.—"Cut-offs"—Rent in the southern and northern provinces.—Growth of rent.—Indebtedness of landowners.—Intensive cultivation of the soil owing to the increasing export and prices of grain.—Landownership in the north and in the south.—Sale of land.—The buyers.—The condition of peasant-estates.—Insufficient property.—Burden of taxes and payments.—Lack of equity in taxation.—The famine of 1868.—Investigations by the zemstvo.—Tax-arrears.—The condition of the peasant-estates in the black-soil region.—The famine in Samara in 1872-73.—Provision-loans.—The conclusions of Yanson and Prince Vasilchikov about the status of the peasants in the 70-ies.

CHAPTER XXXV 207

The attitude of the government and of the public towards the position of the masses.—Popular tendencies in literature.—Student-disorders in 1869.—Niechaiev and Niechaievism.—The circle of Chaikovsky in Petrograd; their ideas and plans.—Bakunin and Lavrov abroad.—Lavrists and Bakunists.—*Forward*.—The beginnings of the movement "Into the People."—Arrests.—The report of Pahlen.—The society "Land and Freedom."

CHAPTER XXXVI 224

The government's policy in the borderlands.—Oppressions in Little Russia and Poland.—Foreign policy.—The Eastern question.—Rivalry between Russian and British interests in Asia.—The conquest of the Caucasus and of Central Asiatic Khanates.—Disorders in Turkey.—Balkan Slavs.—The Servian war and the Bulgarian Atrocities.—The conven-

CONTENTS

tions of the Powers.—The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78.—Its course and outcome.—The congress in Berlin.—Economic and financial results of the war.—The resignation of Reiter.—The impression of the war and the Congress on the Russian public—Slavophiles.—The zemstvo movement.—The revolutionary movement.—The appeal of the government to the public.—The declarations of the zemstvos.—The formation of the party "The Will of the People."

CHAPTER XXXVII 239

Series of revolutionary attempts to assassinate Alexander II.—Confusion and vacillation in the upper spheres.—The explosion in the Winter Palace and the establishment of the Supreme Commission under the leadership of Loris-Melikov.—Loris-Melikov's programme and its realisation—Relations of liberals and revolutionists towards him.—The resignation of Tolstoy.—The reforms of Loris-Melikov.—Senatorial revisions and the peasant question.—The constitutional movement.—Loris-Melikov's report about the appointment of a special preparatory commission.—The catastrophe of March 1, 1881.

CHAPTER XXXVIII 249

Alexander III. His education.—Public attitude towards him before his accession.—His views.—His first steps.—The conflict of two tendencies in the upper spheres.—The council of March 8, 1881.—Vacillation.—Katkov and Aksakov.—The agitation of Pobiedonostzev. The manifesto of April 29, 1881.—The resignation of Loris-Melikov and other ministers.—The ministry of Ignatiev.—His programme.—Measures for the improvement of the economic conditions of the people. Compulsory redemption.—Agitation of the nobles.—Lowering of redemption-payments.—The policy of Bunge.—The abolition of poll-tax.—The introduction of tax-inspectors.

CHAPTER XXXIX 256

Early measures of Alexander III for the solution of the land-dearth problem among the peasants.—The peasant-bank and its first steps under Bunge.—The facilitation of renting state land.—Organisation of peasant-migrations.—The rules of 1881.—The law of July 13, 1889.—The introduction of factory inspectors and the law for the protection of minors and women in factories.—Taxes on inheritance and bonds.—The question of administrative peasant-re-

CONTENTS

form—The commission of Kokhanov.—Its participators and the liquidation of their work.—The collapse of Ignatiev's régime.

CHAPTER XL 260

The decisive turn towards reaction.—The rôle of Pobiedonostzev.—Count D. Tolstoy.—Reaction in the Ministry of Education.—Reactionary policy of the nobility in internal affairs.—The jubilee of the granting of the nobility-charter in 1885—Pazukhin's programme.—The liquidation of the question of reorganising the peasant-institutions after the dismissal of Kokhanov's commission.—The law of July 12, 1889, about the Zemsky Chiefs.—The zemstvo-statute of June 12, 1890.—Judicial restrictions.—The new press-law of 1882.—Persecution of non-Orthodox Christians.—The Jewish question.—New orders in the army.

CHAPTER XLI 267

The financial policy in the second half of Alexander's reign. Vishnegradsky and his system.—Extreme protectionism in custom policies and in railroad-tariff legislation.—The results of this system.—Foreign policy of Alexander III.—Conquest of Turcomania.—Russo-British relations in Central Asia.—The Balkan affairs.—Bulgarian troubles.—The Franco-Russian alliance and its significance.

RUSSIA UNDER NICOLAS II, 1894-1916.

I	THE REACTION UNDER NICOLAS II	275
II	WAR AND REVOLUTION	293
III	THE "CONSTITUTIONAL" RÉGIME	317
IV	RUSSIA IN ARMS	337
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	353
	INDEX	357

MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY

CHAPTER XX

THE military failures experienced by Russia in the Crimean Campaign, which revealed to all the inadequacy of Nicolas' policy, had been foretold by Nicolas Turgeniev back in 1847, a prediction that required considerable perspicacity and a profound understanding of the general course of affairs in Russia and in Europe. Until the Crimean Campaign the might of the Russian Government appeared colossal, and the strength of Nicolas' system seemed undisputable not only in his own eyes, but in the eyes of all his entourage, including the Heir. After the quick suppression of the Hungarian uprising by Paskevich's superior forces, the military power of Russia was deemed enormous even in Western Europe, and it is astonishing how rapidly that power vanished at the first collision with regular troops of civilised countries, though those forces were not very considerable. Moreover, Russia's unpreparedness had begun to appear even in her war with Turkey, and that unpreparedness was made still more apparent when Turkey was joined by England, France, and later by Sardinia.

Properly speaking, despite the apparent formidableness of the Coalition, the Allies did not disembark a very big army; in view of the sea-transport facilities of that time they were not able to bring ashore more than seventy thousand men. Yet although Nicolas possessed an army of a million men he proved unequal to those seventy thousand — partly because of the

chaotic conditions of the military equipment and to the backwardness of Russian ammunition, partly because of the lack of convenient roads of communication, partly because of the astonishing absence of military leaders and generals accustomed to independent action. The provision of the Sebastopol army was carried on by the same means and methods as in 1812; the amount of the requisitioned carts, of transporting accommodations, of oxen and horses, was enormous and out of proportion to the amount of supplies delivered. The southern provinces groaned under the burden of that obligation and were ruined, while the army suffered want in every respect. The disorder was augmented by the terrible theft and all sorts of abuses which greatly increased the expenses of the State.

Medical and sanitary affairs were equally unsatisfactory, and the struggle with the diseases that spread in the South was very inadequately carried on. The strategic plans were below criticism. The most powerful man in the upper spheres at that time was Paskevich, and he brought great harm by delaying the sending of reinforcements to Crimea, as he feared an invasion by Austria who, in gratitude for Nicolas' aid in 1849, had mobilised her army and held it in readiness to join the Allies. Prince V. I. Vassilchikov, the former Chief of Staff at Sebastopol, definitely stated that had Paskevich sent the reinforcements without delay, Sebastopol could have been saved. The actions of other land-commanders also proved to be below criticism; they showed no initiative, no independence. The troops alone appeared above reproach in regard to endurance and bravery, and some naval commanders, educated in the school of Admiral Lazarev, demonstrated sufficient heroism and enterprise. The aggravation of the defeats was emphasised the more when with such an excellent spirit in the army, and with comparatively small forces of the enemy, the Russians could not defend their own territory. The glory of Russian arms, renowned since the days of Catherine, was

dimmed with unusual rapidity. Nicolas I who used to like to end his manifestoes with self-confident exclamations, as, for instance, in 1848: "God is with us! Take heed, O nations, for God is with us!" was forced to see the inadequacy of that system which he had considered absolutely faultless, to which he had devoted all his powers, and by virtue of which he was wont to deem himself a great historical personality. Nicolas felt that he was bequeathing his son a deranged heritage; his last words to him on his death-bed were: "I am not handing over the command to you in good order." We may say that Nicolas died at the right time, for had he had to reign after the Sebastopol Campaign he would have been bound first of all to relinquish his thirty years' system, and to renounce his system would have meant to renounce himself.

But the Heir, Alexander II, was also completely unprepared for the reformatory activity that awaited him. In this respect there are a great many false legends and conceptions in Russian historical literature.

Generally the personality of Alexander II, the Tzar-Liberator, appears in the writings of panegyric historians and naive contemporary memoirists as that of an ideal reformer, humanistically inclined, who wished, so to speak, by virtue of his inner impulses and motives, to promulgate those reforms which he carried out. This is entirely untrue, and to dispose of these false notions appears to me in this case particularly important. True, Alexander's tutor, Zhukovsky, was a humanist, and he wished to imbue his pupil with humanistic ideas; but it is a mistake to consider Zhukovsky a liberal. He was an honest, good-hearted man, and hoped to make out of Alexander a good monarch, of the type of Henry IV, as he pictured him.¹ Zhukovsky acted quite courageously in his

¹ Vassili Zhukovsky was the father of the short-lived German pseudo-Romanticism in Russian literature. In spite of his sentimental leanings toward Western liberal minds, he remained all his life a

sphere: he straightforwardly declared to his parents that if they intended to make out of Alexander not a military commander but an enlightened Monarch who would see in his fatherland not a barrack but a nation, he must be set free from the "military parade" atmosphere which prevailed at the Court. Alexander's mother sympathised with Zhukovsky's views, and even Nicolas allowed him to express them freely, but in the end Nicolas' views prevailed: he wanted the future Emperor to be first of all a military man, in the *real* sense of the word. However, the "parade"-ideals triumphed in Alexander's education. From an early age he had a liking for display; he was greatly flattered at being able when ten years old to caracole splendidly, to command well, to ride past his grandfather, the king of Prussia, in a ceremonial march at Berlin. Those inclinations and feelings had become deeply rooted in his nature. It may be that he had received from Zhukovsky a general predilection for the good, but on the whole he emulated his father, and when he was admitted in the forties to state-affairs, he felt deep respect for Nicolas' system, and never attempted to criticise it. The more power Nicolas allowed him in managing various state-matters, the more strictly he adhered to the former's ideas. The reaction that took hold of the Government after 1848 was shared by Alexander not less than by his father. A great part of the reactionary measures of that time were carried through with the participation and even at times upon the initiative of Alexander. Thus, for instance, the famous Buturlin-Committee was founded with his direct co-operation. In the peasant-question Alexander was even more conservative than Nicolas, and in all the committee-

staunch Conservative and upholder of Autocracy. In a letter to Pushkin he reproached the Poet for having had connections with "the despicable scoundrels and villains"—the Decembrists. At the end of his life he plunged into pietistic Mysticism, and was one of the few who sided with Gogol's obscurantist views.—Tr.

meetings concerning peasant-matters he invariably upheld the rights and interests of the landowners.

When he ascended the throne, persons who stood close to court circles thought that a real "gentry-era" had come to stay. The antagonists of serfdom regretted that now all hope for progress in the peasant-problems was gone (as may be seen from the correspondence between Miliutin and Kavelin); on the other hand, the proserfdom nobles were ready to celebrate their triumph: they knew that Alexander was opposed to the "Inventories" introduced in the southwestern region; they knew that he was responsible for the exemption of the Lithuanian provinces in 1853 from Bibikov's "Inventory Regulations," in spite of the fact that Bibikov was then Minister of Interior, and that those regulations had been confirmed for Lithuania by Nicolas on December 22, 1852. This incident aroused a disagreement between Alexander and Bibikov, and at the former's accession the latter was the first minister to go. The victim had been an adherent of Nicolas' system and a very contumacious person, but in the eyes of the public he had lost his post not as such, but as one who sided with the peasants against the views of the new Tzar.

Thus we see that Alexander's personal tastes and prejudices had shown little promise of his carrying through reforms, particularly the main reform—the abolition of serfdom. It seems to me important to emphasise this circumstance, for it illustrates the power, inevitableness and unavoidableness of the course events were taking; it is very important to make clear that the reforms took place not because of the Tzar's inclination for them, but rather in spite of his convictions; he had to yield to the developing socio-political process, since he saw that if he should struggle against that process, as his father did, Russia might be brought to disruption. Those reforms, then, began not by virtue of the humanistic ideas implanted in him by Zhukovsky; he did not side with the reforms because he

sympathised with the Men of the Forties who had announced their Hannibal-oaths against serfdom,² but by reason of the conviction that had grown up within him during the Crimean War, that the Russian State, if it was to be preserved and strengthened, had need of fundamental reforms. Of course this does not in the least diminish Alexander's merits, but makes them more significant and valuable inasmuch as he succeeded in carrying through the great work staunchly, bravely, and honestly, disregarding all difficulties, and not considering his personal inclinations and sympathies, but retaining exclusively the point of view of the exigency of the State.

But the first problem that confronted Alexander on his accession, February 19, 1855, was the Crimean War; all the thoughts of the Government and society were directed towards its ending and the conclusion of peace, which were finally made possible by some Russian successes on the Caucasus, and particularly by the perseverance of the army in Sebastopol. The Allies also were tired, and after the capture of Kars by the Russians, peace was concluded in March, 1856, not quite as humiliating for Russia as one might have expected from her defeats.

During the war Alexander was able to take only a few steps on the road of internal reforms. These were such as did not require particular efforts and yet demonstrated to all his new progressive tendencies. To them belonged the dismissal of the Buturlin-Committee, the permission to issue passports for going abroad, and the abolition of the university restrictions

² The author refers to Turgeniev who, in his own words, "took a Hannibal oath not to rest until serfdom would disappear from Russia." The Men of the Forties is a name applied to the idealistic, altruistic *intelligentzia* brought up on the teachings of Bielinsky and other champions of freedom during the iron régime of Nicolas I. In Russian literature the Man of the Forties, or the Superfluous Type, is most characteristically presented in Turgeniev's *Rudin* and in Herzen's *Who Is To Be Blamed?* — Tr.

introduced after 1848. The public regarded these first rays of a liberal policy with the same enthusiasm as it did the first steps of Alexander I. An optimistic, unusually rosy mood reigned. For thirty years society had experienced terrible repression, and having been weakened at the very beginning through the annihilation of its best representatives — the Decembrists, it was naturally humble and incapable of expressing its thoughts. The dominating feeling was that of liberation from the heavy Nicolaevian régime, and an expectation of a more liberal policy, supported by Alexander's first measures.

Alexander at once achieved the reputation of being a sincere friend of liberal reorganisations. Every hesitation or change in the activity of the Government was ascribed not to the young Monarch, but to the intrigues and hostility of his functionaries. At first the people manifested very little inclination for self-action and initiative; having become accustomed to expect everything from above, they now as well awaited everything from the progressive Government, and did not in the least try to secure for themselves some rights to participate in national affairs. It is curious that all the programmes that emanated at that time from the public were quite unanimous, whether they were composed by moderate liberals of the type of Granovsky (who died in October, 1855), or by subsequent radicals like Chernyshevsky, or by such free and experienced European revolutionists as Herzen who lived in London, outside of the pressure of Russian conditions. All those programmes, as formulated by Chernyshevsky in 1856, aspired for the following desiderata: the spread of education, the increase of the number of students and teachers, the improvement of censorship conditions (about the complete abolition of censorship nobody dared even dream), the building of railroads, as an important means for the development of industry, and finally, a "rational distribution of the economic forces," by

which was understood the abolition of serfdom — the question was not allowed as yet to be openly discussed.

In written memoranda the matter was argued more directly; it was indicated that one of the immediate needs was the abolition of bondage, but the idea was expressed rather moderately; namely it was recommended to do away with the institution gradually, without "shocking the country," as Granovsky expressed himself in a Memorandum published in 1856 by Herzen in *Voices from Russia*. Herzen himself spoke considerably more openly and vigorously, in the inspired tone which he had been accustomed to employ, being free from the oppression of the censorship in London. But even his programme was quite moderate; it was expressed in his famous letter to Alexander II, published in the first number of the *Polar Star*, in 1855. Herzen considered as the most urgent needs of Russia: the liberation of the peasants from the landowners, the liberation of the tax-paying classes from corporal punishment, and the liberation of the press from censorship. Further Herzen did not go; he only desired the mitigation of the oppression, and for the time being did not even demand constitutional guarantees.

Such was the mood of the Russian public at the beginning of Alexander's reign, during 1855-56. As a matter of fact, the Tzar himself had at that moment no definite programme of reforms, and the final words in his peace-Manifesto, which had attracted general attention, was his only declaration of any programme at all.

As the Treaty of Paris was concluded after an unfortunate campaign for Russia, which had revealed her internal disorder, one could have expected considerable concessions on the part of the defeated party, but after all they were not so very big. The Russian diplomats succeeded in obtaining quite honourable terms, utilising the disagreements and misunderstandings that had arisen between Napoleon III and England.

Napoleon, who had started the war with the idea of weakening Russia, considered that the Campaign should have a definite, practical purpose, and as such he placed the liberation of Poland, or at least her return to a semi-independent constitutional order. He based his argument on the Congress of Vienna and on the Constitution of 1815, and had logically figured that if Poland would be restored by the will of the European Powers, dictated to Russia, it would serve as an important political precedent for the intervention of European Powers in the internal affairs and relations of Russia, which circumstance would signify the political decline of Russia. But when Napoleon noticed that England was not disposed to intervene energetically in favour of Poland, he quickly moderated his bellicose spirit, and began to seek round-about ways for inducing Russia to start peace negotiations. Prince Gorchakov, at that time Ambassador at Vienna, wittily characterised the state of his Government's mind, remarking that although Russia was by necessity dumb, she would not remain deaf, meaning that while Russia, as the defeated party, would feel awkward about opening peace conversations, she would by no means decline to take part in them. The negotiations progressed quite favourably, in view of Napoleon's attitude, but here Austria again interfered, and continuing to ignore the services rendered her by Nicolas in 1849, she lowered Russia's international chances. At any rate the Congress of Paris, assembled in 1856, treated Russia comparatively mildly, and of the two chief demands of the Russian diplomats — that there should be no war-contribution and no decrease of territory — the first was granted; as for the second, Russia had to yield the estuary of the Danube to Roumania.

Declaring the terms of the Treaty, Alexander remarked in his Manifesto that the concessions were not important in comparison with the burdens of war and with the advantages of peace, and ended the Manifesto with the following significant

words: "With the aid of the Divine Providence, forever gracious to Russia, may her internal welfare be established and perfected; may truth and kindness reign in her courts; may the aspiration for enlightenment and for all useful activities develop all over with new force, and may every one peacefully enjoy the results of honest labour under the shelter of laws equally just for all, equally protecting all. . . ."

The programme of internal reforms hinted in those words perfectly corresponded with the hopes and aspirations of the public, that had been awakened with the advent of the new reign. The last words of the sentence quoted clearly implied the equalisation of all classes, and could naturally be interpreted as hinting at the liberation of the serfs. The adherents of bondage became greatly alarmed. One of them, Count Zakrevsky, Governor-General of Moscow, asked Alexander during his stay at Moscow to reassure the nobles in regard to the disquieting rumours. Alexander consented, but his speech to the nobles was of a nature quite unexpected either by them or by Zakrevsky. He said that he did not intend to abolish serfdom at once, with one stroke of the pen, but that he considered it impossible to continue the existing conditions, so that "it would be better to abolish serfdom from above than wait till it will begin to liberate itself from below," and he ended his speech with a request that the gentry should "deliberate on the way by which this can be accomplished."

That speech was such a general surprise that even the Minister of Interior, Lanskoï, did not at first believe it, until Alexander himself assured him that he had not only actually delivered it but that he had no regrets for what he had said. Then a hurried preparation began in the Ministry of Interior for the elaboration of the peasant-reform, since Lanskoï was convinced that the Government had given out a watch-word, from which it was impossible to retreat.

Lanskoï began his Ministerial career in 1855 with a strange

circular on the name of the Marshals of Nobility, in which he had spoken in the name of the Tzar about the sacred rights of the nobles, granted to them by the crowned predecessors of the reigning Monarch; the nobles naturally interpreted the Circular as a promise that the institution of serfdom would not be touched. But Lanskoï himself was not an upholder of serfdom; on the contrary, in his youth he belonged to the liberal movement of the Tenth and Twenties, and was probably a member of the Union of Welfare. He undoubtedly sympathised with the idea of liberating the serfs, and was glad to direct the activity of the Ministry of Interior in the preparation of the reform; but he had no definite views, and he warned Alexander that it was a question of such a nature that once started it could not be stopped, and he therefore recommended the working out in the first place of a definite programme which should be followed to the end. He invited as an assistant A. I. Levshin, who was considered well prepared through his work in the Ministry of State Domains; but Levshin also had no definite views, and was furthermore very undecisive and timid in matters of such national importance. For this reason all the work under his direction was reduced to gathering materials about the peasant-projects presented during the preceding reigns, and about the opinions and memoranda that were then circulating in public. We should remember that until 1857 the censorship had not allowed the slightest mention of the bondage-problem, and when Constantine Aksakov hinted in the newspaper *Molva* at the advantages of free over forced labour, in reference to American slavery, he was reprimanded in a friendly way by the Deputy-Minister of Education, Prince P. A. Viazemsky, himself a writer who had been known some time before as a great liberal.

Yet unofficial memoranda continued to circulate freely, especially in regard to the peasant-question, and under the influence of those memoranda the Ministry of Interior came to

the conclusion that there were three ways in which to solve the problem.

One was to abolish serfdom in one general ukase, without allotting any land to the peasants.

Or serfdom might be abolished with the retention by the peasants of their portions, through redeeming them by some financial operation, as it appeared clear that the peasants were not in a position to pay at once to their landowners the price of the allotments, and the landowners would not be willing to postpone the payments for many years. Theoretically this way was feasible.

The Ministry of Interior, however, considered both those ways hardly realisable, and at any rate combined with great difficulties and dangers for the State. It argued that the landless liberation of the peasants would gravely threaten the peace of the country; on the other hand, any financial measure for the redemption of the peasants' allotments with the aid of the Treasury would, in view of the deplorable state of the finances at that moment, threaten the country with bankruptcy. The Government could pay out at once to the landowners the redemption price, which was about one billion rubles, and collect it from the peasants in the form of delayed payments, only by making a special loan. But after the Crimean Campaign, because of the enormous issues of paper-money, Russian funds were extremely low, and such a big loan appeared almost impossible.

Thus there remained only a third way out—a series of preparatory measures which would convert the peasants into Obligatory Peasants for a definite or indefinite term (similar to the Ostsee Statute of 1804, or according to the system introduced by Kiselev in Moldavia and Wallachia, or like Bibikov's Inventory Regulations in the western provinces). The Ministry favoured the last system most of all, as it led to a

liquidation of serfdom without any expenditures on the part of the Government.

The Ministry had to consider, however, what would be the results of the reforms in different provinces. Levshin, who possessed estates in various provinces, could dimly provision that if the peasants were freed and became Obligatory, those landowners who had been getting the larger part of their income not from agriculture but from the side-earnings of their serfs, would fall into a difficult position, as the obligation of the peasants to perform some *barshchina* or to pay certain *obrok* for their lands would by no means compensate the landowners for the exploitation of the side-earnings of their bondmen. Levshin sought means for the elimination or at least mitigation of such difficulties which were bound to arise in the industrial, not black-soil provinces. The Ministry of Interior and Alexander himself considered that the redemption of the personal freedom of the peasants was out of question, that the person of the peasant should be freed without any compensation.

For this reason Levshin proposed a "covert" compensation for the landowners of the industrial provinces, in the form of obliging the peasants of those provinces to redeem their abode on the estates on the basis of a special estimation of the industrial advantages connected with their place. Under such a pretext it was possible to include in the redemption a compensation for the loss of the landowners' right to exploit the person of the peasant. Such were the original propositions of the Ministry of Interior.

But Alexander II did not want to consider those propositions before first hearing from the nobles, whose initiative he preferred to that of the Government. He had been aware of the movement among the nobles in the black-soil provinces, who even during the preceding reign had pointed out the disad-

vantages of serfdom in densely populated regions. On the other hand he could see from the circulating unofficial memoranda that among the gentry elements ready to show an initiative in the matter existed. Negotiations with the nobles began, which were referred to the time of the Coronation, when the Marshals of Nobility assembled at Moscow.

In his first negotiations Lanskoï suffered a complete fiasco. Not one official representative of the nobility was willing to demonstrate any initiative; they said that they did not know the intentions of the Government, and had no plans of their own to suggest,—as a matter of fact they feared that the Government would make use of their initiative for promulgating the measure to their disadvantage, not to mention the fact that to the mass of the nobility the limitation of the bondage-right appeared as an extremely dangerous measure in every respect.

This, however, did not prevent individual progressive representatives of the nobility from expressing their views in private memoranda, as I have already mentioned. Most conspicuous among these was the memorandum of Kavelin, a well known professor, and at the same time a landowner in the province of Samara, a historian and a jurist, who knew well the economic condition of the country, and was inclined to a quite radical handling of the peasant-question. He advocated the second way, the redemption course. His idea was that the landowners should be compensated for the losses they would suffer through the liquidation of serfdom, whether those losses would result from the transfer of land to the peasants, or from the discontinuation of the exploiting of the serfs' earnings. In order to equalise the chances of agricultural and industrial estates, Kavelin proposed to base the redemption not on the estimation of the land value, but on the estimation of the selling value of the estates.

One of the memoranda was presented by Yuriï Samarin,

the famous Slavophile, a man who undoubtedly stood for the peasants' interests. Sharing the apprehensions of Levshin in regard to the financial side of the question, Samarin advocated the third way. He desired first of all the limitation of the power of the landowner over the peasant, especially over the person of the peasant; he insisted on retaining of his land by the peasant and on the compensation of the landowner either through regulated *barshchina*-work, or through definite *obroks*, according to local conditions. Of the same nature was the memorandum of another Slavophile, Prince Cherkassky. A memorandum presented by a landowner from the province of Poltava, a certain Posen, enjoyed serious consideration among governmental circles. He manipulated skilfully with liberal phrases, and even mentioned redemption, but his whole plan was actually reduced to voluntary agreements between landowners and peasants. Posen personally presented his memorandum to Alexander, and was supported by General Rostovtzev who was impressed with his financial and economic erudition.

The memorandum of Grand Duchess Yelena Paulovna, his aunt, and a very enlightened woman, made a strong impression on Alexander. She upheld the liberation of the peasants. Her memorandum was worked out with the aid of N. A. Miliutin and with the co-operation of Kavelin; it was, properly speaking, a project for the liberation and establishment of the peasants on her big estate, Karlovka, in the province of Poltava.

Grand Duchess Yelena Paulovna asked the Government for definite instructions as to how she should carry out her idea, and requested permission for organising councils with the landowners of adjacent provinces. Alexander answered that he awaited the initiative of the nobles, and while giving her no instructions expressed his approval of her intention to organise regular consultations among the landowners of the neighbouring provinces. At the same time a special secret committee

was formed in January, 1857, for the examination of the projects presented; the members consisted largely of ministers and dignitaries of the preceding reign.

Among the members of the Committee Minister Lanskoï was unconditionally in favour of the reform. Of the same standing was General Rostovtzev, chief of the military schools, personally devoted to Alexander; he was quite inexperienced in the peasant-question, and when he was appointed with two other members, Baron M. A. Korf and Prince P. P. Gagarin, to examine the memoranda and projects which circulated among the public, he even tried to elude the appointment. On the other hand Rostovtzev was not an attractive figure in the eyes of the public: on his name lay a spot—a rumour existed that he had informed upon and betrayed the Decembrists. The truth of the matter was distorted. In 1825 Rostovtzev was a twenty-two years old officer, very friendly with the influential leaders of the Conspiracy of December 14—Ryleiev, and particularly Prince Obolensky, with whom he shared rooms. During the interregnum in 1825 Rostovtzev not only was able to hear accidental phrases from the conspirators about their intentions, but he was evidently directly solicited by Ryleiev and Obolensky to join them. Rostovtzev, however, was absolutely loyal in his views and did not sympathise with the plans of the Decembrists or with any secret political societies. He categorically refused to take part in the conspiracy, even tried to dissuade Ryleiev and Obolensky from their intentions, and finally warned them that if they would not give up their plans he would consider it his duty to inform the Government of the threatening danger. Seeing that the plot was proceeding, Rostovtzev fulfilled his threat, came to Nicolas and told him that there was an opposition to his accession, that something was brewing, and pleaded with Nicolas either to abdicate himself or to persuade Constantine to come to Petrograd and publicly abdicate. Rostovtzev mentioned no names, and after

his meeting with Nicolas (on December 10) he immediately informed Ryleiev and Obolensky, neither of whom had changed their attitude of respect for him, about it; on his return from exile Obolensky at once renewed his friendship with him. But at that time the details were not generally known; Rostovtzev was suspected, and Herzen systematically pursued him to his very death, in his *Bell*.

Rostovtzev's real rôle in the peasant-question began later; his participation in the works of the Secret Committee was neither decisive, nor important. The other members of the Committee were either indifferent or hostile towards the reform, although they dared not openly oppose Alexander's statement that the time had ripened for the limitation of the landowners' rights. The work progressed very slowly; only the Ministry of Interior made active progress, owing to its chief, Lanskoy, and to its possession of collected materials.

In the summer of 1857 Levshin presented a definite plan for the reform, which consisted in declaring the peasants personally free, but bound to the soil, under a temporary or indefinite obligation to perform their duties for their allotments, the latter to be eventually bought by the peasants into personal property; the landowners of not black-soil provinces were allowed to add "industrial advantages" to the value of their lands.

Dissatisfied with the slow work of the Committee whose chairman, Prince Orlov, was opposed to the reform, Alexander introduced his brother, Constantine, well known for his liberal views, into the Committee. Indeed, he enlivened the spirit of the Committee, but in view of his inexperience he was inclined too readily for compromises in order to accelerate the business. Among other measures he suggested publicity, claiming that the declaration of the Government's views would reassure the peasants and would give the public a chance to co-operate in the working out of the details of the reform. The Committee

decisively rejected the idea of giving publicity to the Government's views, and resolved to carry on the work gradually and deliberately, dividing it into periods, the first period to be devoted to the collecting of materials, and so forth. Competent persons, Levshin for example, asserted that the Committee intended to prolong the matter indefinitely, in the hope that it would finally be tabled.

But soon after this decision of the Secret Committee the Government found at last that initiative on the part of the nobility for which it had sought so long. It came from the Lithuanian nobles who had been under the sword of Damocles every since the Inventory Regulations were postponed in 1853; that question rose again in the Ministry of Interior, and the Lithuanian landowners in a declaration to the Governor-General of Vilna, Nazimov, declared that they would be glad to raise the question of the complete abolition of serfdom on condition that for the landowners be preserved the ownership of the soil. Nazimov presented the opinion to the Secret Committee where the discussions were prolonged for three weeks. Alexander lost his patience, and ordered Lanskoï in three days to prepare an answer to the Lithuanian nobles in co-operation with Muraviov, Minister of State Domains, who did not sympathise with the reform but dared not contradict the Tzar. On November 29, 1857, Alexander signed the rescript in the name of Nazimov, which had made a great impression and had played an important rôle in the development of the work. The Government proposed to form provincial committees in the three Lithuanian provinces from delegates of the nobles, one delegate from each district, under the chairmanship of Marshals of the Nobility, for the discussion of methods for the emancipation of the serfs. The Government indicated, however, the fundamental principles on which the reform could be carried out, and those principles did not agree with the views of the Lithuanian nobles.

It was indicated to the nobles that although the land would be considered the property of the landowners, the peasants should be given the right to purchase their allotments during a certain term of time, and should in addition be given sufficient appendaged land by the landowners to secure their subsistence and the payment of their taxes, for which they would have to pay in *barshchina* or *obrok*, in definite amounts. During the transitory stage the landowners were to preserve the right of estate-policing. The peasants were to be divided into village- or *volost*-communities. The provincial committees were to take care of the regular payment of taxes to the Government.

CHAPTER XXI

IN the preceding chapter I expounded the basic principles on which the reform was proposed to be carried out. Not only the principles themselves, which at any rate rejected a landless liberation of the peasants, but also in particular the fact that the Rescript was sent out a few days after its sanctioning to all Governors and Marshals of Nobility, with the request that the nobles of other provinces express their views in regard to an analogous solution of the peasant-question, had a great significance for the further course of the reform. Later the Government decided to publish the Rescript for general information, in spite of the opposition of the members of the Secret Committee, especially of its chairman, Prince Orlov, who were against the sending of it even to the Governors.

The publication of the Rescript was a very important event; the Government could not turn back the course even had it wanted to, without running the risk of arousing great disturbances. On the other hand, since the peasants had become informed about the Government's proposal to the nobles, it was only a question of time before all provinces would participate in the work, for the landowners understood the necessity of hastening the presentation of their addresses concerning the desirability of establishing provincial committees, lest the delay provoke disturbances among the peasants.

Some delay in the presentation of those addresses was caused by the almost general dissatisfaction of the landowners with the principles proposed by the Government. In this case appeared first of all the economical difference between various

provinces, of which the Government had been aware (Levshin, to wit), but had not appreciated sufficiently. Lanskoï received reports from local representatives of the administration concerning the reception of the Rescript by the nobles, and it appeared that it had aroused general criticism. All admitted the timeliness and inevitableness of the reform, but in not a single province did the nobles completely agree with the Government's programme. In the black-soil provinces the landowners derived their wealth exclusively from agriculture; the land was divided in two almost equal parts, one allotted to the peasants, and one cultivated by the landowner with the aid of the serfs' *barshchina*. In most of those provinces there existed no side earnings of a non-agricultural nature. In the most densely populated provinces, as in Tula, Kursk, Riazan, there was a surplus of hands, as we have seen, and in many places unpopulated lands were sold at higher prices than peopled estates, which showed what a burden the bondmen presented in comparison with the value of the soil. It is natural therefore that in such regions the landowners considered the liberation of the peasants with land very disadvantageous, and they preferred to free the peasants without compensation provided the masters retained the most valuable asset of the estates — the land.

In the Northern, not black-soil provinces, on the contrary, the conditions were quite different. There the landowners seldom lived on their estates, and the peasants themselves cultivated the soil very little, but paid their masters *obrok* from their various earnings — in commerce and industry. We see also at present that of the one million inhabitants of Petrograd in 1897 one hundred thousand were ascribed to the province of Yaroslavl, about the same number to Tver, and so forth, which shows how the population of those provinces are occupied with various city-industries, commercial and artisan. Even during the bondage-state numerous peasants were developing profitable occupations in Petrograd and Moscow; many kept

inns and post-stations at high-ways and river-harbours, which was very profitable in the absence of railroads. For the land-owners of those provinces it appeared desirable to liberate the peasants with considerable land-allotments, but on condition that the redemption sum should cover the loss of the masters' income from the high *obroks*.

In view of this difference in the conditions of the various provinces there appeared two distinct theories among the gentry of that time; the most conscious and progressive elements in the Northern provinces desired a quick and complete liquidation of serfdom, but on the basis of high compensation for their estimated losses; the most conscious and progressive elements in the black-soil provinces, on the other hand, were willing to admit even a gratuitous liberation of the peasants, but on condition that they retained ownership of the land. The point of view of the first appeared very dangerous even in the eyes of such friends of the reform as Lanskoy and Levshin, since, in their opinion, it was apt to shake the financial position of the country.

At the time the advanced *intelligentzia* regarded the publication of the Rescript very enthusiastically. The permission of the Government to discuss the matter in the press brought forth congratulatory articles addressed to Alexander by all the progressive organs, even by the representative of the subsequent radical movement, the *Contemporary*, and by the free London publication of Herzen, the *Bell*. Chernyshevsky lauded the Tzar above Peter the Great, while Herzen dedicated to him an article with the epigraph: "Thou hast conquered, O Galilean!" The representatives of the universities, of literature, and of the highest *intelligentzia* of both Capitals gave a public banquet in Moscow, an unusual event in those days; sympathetic speeches were delivered concerning Alexander, and a warm ovation took place in front of his portrait. That loyal

banquet naturally displeased the Governor-General of Moscow, Zakrevsky, and other proserfdom fanatics, but they were not in position to turn the course of the great movement once it was started.

But in spite of public sympathy the programme of the rescript of November 20 caused a delay in the formation of provincial committees. The Government hastened to open a provincial committee in Petrograd, under the pretext that the nobles there had long ago brought up the question of reorganising the condition of the peasants. Indeed, they had raised that question under Nicolas, and later at the accession of Alexander; with no intention, however, of abolishing serfdom, but with a desire to reorganise it on feudal-empyfeutic principles (i.e., the peasants should be ascribed to the landowners' estates with the right of perpetual-hereditary use of allotted lands); but the rescript of December 5, 1857, in the name of the Governor-General of Petrograd, Ignatiev, arranged the opening of a provincial committee on the same basis as those of the Lithuanian provinces.

The first gentry to present an address concerning the opening of a committee, was that of Nizhni-Novgorod; its governor, A. N. Muraviov, the founder of the Union of Salvation in 1817, succeeded in inspiring the nobles of Nizhni-Novgorod — with which patriotic traditions have been connected since the Troubled Time and the days of Kozma Minin-Sukhoruky¹ — to be the first to join the emancipatory steps of the Government. During the assembly of the nobles Muraviov collected a sufficient number of signatures, and sent a deputation to Petrograd; but his opponents aroused an agitation, and soon

¹ During the Interregnum, or Troubled Time, early in the seventeenth century, a patriotic butcher, Kozma Minin, induced his fellow-citizens at Nizhni-Novgorod to contribute men and money for the organisation of a national militia to repulse the Poles who had invaded Russia and were besieging Moscow. Alexander I also referred to Minin in his appeal to the people in 1812 — TR.

after the departure of the first deputation they sent to Petrograd a contra-deputation. The Government forged the iron while it was hot, and on December 24, 1857, before the arrival of the second deputation a rescript was issued in the name of Muraviov in answer to the address of the nobles. In Moscow the delay was due to the fact that the province of Moscow was one of the industrial, not black-soil provinces; only after a remark from above that the Government was expecting prompt action on the part of the First Capital did the Moscow nobles present an address about the opening of a committee. It pointed out the desirability of changes in the programme of activity in accordance with special local needs. The Government, however, insisted on its programme, and the committee was opened on the general basis. After this other provinces began to join, so that by the end of 1858 committees on the peasant-question were opened in all provinces.

The nobles of each district elected two members to the provincial committee, and for the defence of the interests of the peasants the Government appointed to every committee two members from among the local landowners, known to be in sympathy with the abolition of serfdom. In the majority of the committees there was marked from the very beginning an attempt to introduce some changes into the programme prescribed by the rescripts. The committee of the province of Tver expressed its opposition to the Government's programme more sharply than any other committee; its chairman was the Marshal of the Tver Nobility, A. M. Unkovsky, a man of the younger generation, who combined emancipatory ideas with the care for the interests of the local nobles. He considered himself obliged to guard the interests of the nobles whom he represented, so that they should not find themselves in worse condition than nobles of other provinces at the moment of the liberation of the peasants. At the same time he desired that

the period of the reorganisation of the whole Russian life should not come to an end with the completion of the peasant-reform.

In a memorandum presented to the Minister of Interior even before the opening of the committee, he argued from the point of view of the progressive landowners of the industrial provinces that the palliatives offered in the rescripts, particularly the method of the gradual extinction of serfdom and the transitory Obligatory stage, did not solve the question at all; that the peasants would not be satisfied with a half-freedom and the landowners would be ruined, and that, finally, no regular collection of taxes could take place when the peasants were without property and the landowners had no right to manage their property. As the only true way to liberate the peasants "not in words, but in deed, not gradually, but at once, simultaneously and universally, without infringing any one's interests, without arousing dissatisfaction on any side, and without risking the future of Russia"—Unkovsky considered the *redemption* of the bondage-right, i.e., of the person of the peasant with a full land allotment. He demanded that this operation be performed with the aid of the Government, that the landowners receive *at once* the *entire* redemption-sum, at least in the form of obligations bringing a certain income and realisable on the money-market. He also insisted that the price of the land only should be paid by the peasants, and in installments, whereas that part of the compensation which should correspond with the loss of the right to exploit the working power of the peasants should be paid by the State, with the co-operation of all classes, for the bondage-right had been so instituted and it should be so abolished—in the name of national needs and considerations. Unkovsky succeeded in imbuing the landowners of Tver and of other provinces with his views, and when the work of the Tver committee began,

his plan was accepted by a majority of votes, in contradiction to the literal sense of the rescripts and of the appended instructions of the Minister.

In the meantime the Government, which at first had intended to allow the provincial committees complete freedom in the internal organisation of their work within the frame of the rescripts, had become alarmed by the information about the dissensions and contradictions in the various interpretations of the meaning of the rescripts, and it decided to give the provincial committees a definite programme of action and a fixed form for their projects. This mission fell into the hands of a cunning man, a landowner in the fertile and densely populated province of Poltava, M. P. Posen, who in the guise of a Liberal enjoyed at that time the full confidence of Rostovtzev. Posen's programme was to place definitely the dots on the i's and to govern the work of the provincial committees by a uniform set of rules. With the interests of the landowners of the fertile black-soil provinces in view, Posen suggested the idea that the plan should provide for a *transitory Obligatory period* during which the peasants should use their allotments, but after that period (twelve years. Tr.) the allotments would *return to the landowners in absolute property*, and the peasants would receive personal freedom, *without land*.

Posen's programme met with the strenuous opposition of the nonblack-soil regions. The Tver committee sent a deputation under the leadership of Unkovsky to Lanskoï and Rostovtzev with a decisive declaration that if the Government expected the nobility of Tver to co-operate in the liquidation of the bondage-right it must provide for the granting of land to the peasants, entire annihilation of all bondage-relations, and compensation to the landowners for their losses. Should this not be allowed, the committee would resign, and the Government might entrust the work of its officials who "would write down whatever they would be told to." This determined declaration of the

Tver committee took place in October, 1858, when both Lanskoy and Rostovtzev had been already considerably shaken in their views on the necessity of a transitory Obligatory period and on the impossibility of redemption.

We should mention here that the approval of the redemption idea was shared not only by some other committees of the non black-soil provinces, but by a considerable part of the progressive press. As soon as permission was granted to discuss the peasant-question, the *Contemporary* published an article by Chernyshevsky, the second part of which included Kavelin's project *in extenso*, and which on the whole advocated the view of the Tver committee. The *Russian Messenger* of Katkov declared redemption to be the only correct solution of the question, since it was impossible to free the peasants without land and equally impossible to liberate them with land except by means of redemption, for the peasants were not in position to pay for the land at once, and the landowners would not be willing to sell on the basis of delayed installments. The same stand was taken by Herzen's *Bell* in which his closest friend, Ogarev, published long articles on the peasant-question.

In the summer of 1858 Rostovtzev, during his vacation abroad, carefully studied various projects for the emancipation of the peasants, among them some projects worked out by foreign bankers (Frenkel and Homberg). He gradually came to the conviction that the "transitory Obligatory period" would not prevent disturbances and misunderstandings, but would make them inevitable, for the peasants having become personally free and yet obliged to pay *barshchina* and *obrok* to the landowners would not easily submit to their demands and not appreciate the legitimacy of the measure. For this reason he worked out with the aid of the Imperial Secretary, Bludov, a plan for the introduction of extreme police-measures for that transitory period, in the form of specially authorised District-Chiefs and temporary Governor-Generals. But this

plan met with the strong opposition of the Ministry of Interior and of many private persons, who argued that such an order would be not a "transitory Obligatory," but a "state of siege," and life in the provinces would become unbearable. Rostovtzev understood the justness of those arguments and withdrew his plan despite the energetic support it had received from Alexander II who was much annoyed by sharp criticism of it in a memorandum presented to him by Lanskoï on behalf of the Ministry of Interior (the memorandum was drawn by the Governor of Kaluga, Artzimovich, although it had been ascribed for a long time to Miliutin).

The more deeply Rostovtzev went into the matter during his vacation abroad the more clearly he saw the difficulties of the original plan of the Government. He expressed his ideas in personal letters to the Tzar from Wildbad and Dresden. In his fourth (last) letter he pointed out that the shorter the transitory Obligatory period was made the better it would be for the peace of the country, and that in order to preserve authority and calm in the provinces, the power should be concentrated in the peasant-*mir* (village commune with mutual guarantee and responsibility. Tr.) and its representatives, leaving the landowner to deal not with individual peasants, but with the *mir*. At the same time Rostovtzev had already adopted the idea of redemption as a general financial measure; but he would not agree to force the measure on both parties, for he considered that the policy of redemption by aid of the Government should be voluntary and by means of mutual agreements.

At the same time the possibility and feasibility of redemption had been heartily endorsed in the ministry of Interior by N. A. Miliutin and Y. A. Soloviov, who exercised a direct influence on the course of the reform through the *Zemsky* (land-) Department formed in the Ministry of Interior on March 4, 1858, under the chairmanship of Deputy-Minister

Levshin. The activity of Levshin had come to an end with the publication of the Rescript; he did not sympathise with the rapid and energetic measures in the matter of the reform, and he considered the publication and dissemination of the rescripts a dangerous *salto mortale* for the State. Feveish activity began in the *Zemsky* Department and Levshin yielded his place to the younger and more capable workers—Soloviov and Miliutin; the latter soon supplanting him as Deputy-Minister.

Soloviov was an excellent worker in the preparation and elaboration of the materials necessary for the reform. The post of Miliutin was still more responsible and important. Rostovtzev later said that Miliutin was the nymph Egeria of the Editing Commissions. He performed the same rôle in the Ministry of Interior. He entered that Ministry in 1835 as an inexperienced youth of seventeen, immediately after his graduation from the Noble Pension at the Moscow University. Perhaps he was noticed more than the ordinary petty clerks owing to the fact that he was a nephew of the Minister of State Domains, Count Kiselev, but it is beyond doubt that his advancement was due mainly to his remarkable gifts which had been manifested from the first years of his service. Under Count Perovsky he occupied the position of director of the Economy Department, and in spite of his age (he was only thirty then) he was a distinguished figure in the Ministry. During the Forties he undertook an investigation of the economic conditions of the Russian cities; he attracted to this work such men as Yuriy Samarin and Ivan Aksakov, and in 1846 he carried through the reform of the public management of the city of Petrograd, approximately on the same principles on which the subsequent city-reform of 1870 was based.

During the years 1856–57 Miliutin, with the co-operation of his old friend, Samarin, and his new friend, Kavelin, thoroughly prepared himself for participation in the peasant-reform. In 1857 he was able to advocate his views in his conversations

with Levshin, and at the same time he inspired Grand Duchess Yelena and Grand Duke Constantine with the idea that a basic and radical reform, in the form of an emancipation of the peasants with sufficient land-allotments, was necessary. He pointed out the way to make use of the nobles' initiative, but at the same time not to allow the nobles too great a share in the work, lest the aroused interests and appetites of the nobles paralyse the beneficial significance of the measure for the masses. His activity was soon noticed by the court-reactionaries, who hastened to compromise him in the eyes of the Tzar, accusing him of radical political views, and even of revolutionary aspirations. Their attack succeeded, and Miliutin would have been dismissed in 1857, but for the energetic intercession of Lanskoï, Prince Gorchakov (Foreign Minister), and Grand Duchess Yelena. In spite of all the intrigues of his enemies, Miliutin was appointed early in 1859 to the post of Deputy-Minister, in place of Levshin, and although he bore the title of "temporary functionary," he retained the post till the issue of the statutes of February 19, 1861.

Miliutin shared the views of Samarin on the peasant-reform. Both admitted their preference for a radical solution of the question by means of compulsory redemption under the condition of granting the peasants those allotments which they had been using under the bondage-system; but they were aware of the difficulties and dangers connected with such a solution, for the State Treasury which had been drained by the war and was in the weak and incapable hands of such ministers as Brock and (later) Kniazhevich. Miliutin and Samarin considered as the most important part of the reform the liberation of the peasants with a sufficient land allotment, and they regarded with mistrust the majority of the provincial committees. Yet in the demands of the majority of the Tver committee Miliutin could not help seeing a desire to find a conscientious and radical solution of the question, with the

preservation of the advantages and interests not only of the landowners, but also of the peasants.

Eventually Lanskoj and Rostovtzev found it necessary to allow the Tver committee to carry through their plan to its end, and they were permitted to work out a special redemption-project for an immediate and simultaneous liberation of the peasants with land, as against the projects based on Posen's programme, which considered the plan of a transitory Obligatory period. Soon a similar permission was granted to the Kaluga committee, and to fifteen other committees which had not finished their works by that time.

At the same time Rostovtzev, by the order of the Tzar, brought for discussion before the Main Committee extracts from his letters to Alexander written from abroad. The discussion caused very important changes and additions to the original programme of the Government. These influenced the whole further course of the reform, especially the works of the Editing Commissions, the institution established in March, 1859, in aid of the Main Committee for the examination of the projects of the provincial committees and for the working out of general statutes for the State and local units. The chairman, or according to the Imperial decree—the "chief," of the Editing Commissions was Rostovtzev. The Commissions were composed of representatives of various departments connected with the peasant-affairs and with the codificatory works, and also of "expert-members"—landowners who had attracted attention by their projects and work in the provincial committees. The suggestion for "expert-members" was offered by Miliutin to Alexander and to Rostovtzev, and was approved by both. In spite of Miliutin's apprehensions, good relations were at once established between Rostovtzev and him, and Rostovtzev showed his complete confidence in Miliutin, by asking his assistance in selecting members for the Editing Commissions. Miliutin made use of the invitation,

and introduced some members who had been most active in the realisation of the reform. Among them were Y. F. Samarin, Prince V. A. Cherkassky, V. V. Tarnovsky, G. P. Galagan, not to mention Y. A. Soloviov, who was appointed by the Ministry of Interior, upon the advice of Miliutin.

With these friends of the reform, however, there came to the Commissions members with whom Miliutin's circle had to carry on a stubborn and bitter fight. They were: the Marshals of Nobility of Petrograd — Count P. P. Shuvalov, and of Oriol — V. V. Apraksin, Adjutant-General Prince Paskevich, the Poltava landowner, Posen, the editor of the *Journal of Landowners*, A. D. Zheltukhin, and a representative of the Ministry of State Domains, Bulygin, who obdurately advocated the views of his principal, M. N. Muraviov. Originally there were formed two Editing Commissions: one for the working out of a general project, and one for that of local projects; but Rostovtzev merged them into one, and then subdivided it into departments — administrative, juridical, and economical, to which was added later a financial department for the compensation question. These departments served as sub-commissions which worked out reports for the general meeting of the Commissions. Over the two most important sub-commissions — the economical and financial — Miliutin presided. But his activities were not limited by this. Not in vain did Rostovtzev name him the Egeria of the Editing Commissions. He actually was the central person of the whole work, the manager of the internal policy of the Commissions, and the leader of its progressive members in the fight with the hostile forces who acted within and without the Commissions. He succeeded at the very beginning in bringing together a united group of convinced, talented, and industrious advocates of the reform, in the persons of Samarin, Cherkassky, and Soloviov, who were joined in most cases by Tarnovsky, Galagan, Peter Semionov, and others. This group had gained the

complete confidence of Rostovtzev. Miliutin eliminated the bad influence of Posen upon Rostovtzev, by revealing Posen's masqued intentions and forcing him to admit at the sessions of the Editing Commissions that he was in favour of a landless emancipation of the peasants.

From the very first the Commissions had to combat the advocates of the feudal aspirations of the Petrograd nobility. Count Shuvalov and Prince Paskevich, who based their arguments on the literal meaning of the Rescripts, and insisted on the perpetual conservation of the property right to all lands for the landowners, rejected all forms of redemption except individual voluntary agreements, and particularly insisted on the conservation by the landowners of the *votchina* (hereditary estate)-power and *votchina*-jurisdiction on their lands as an inviolable seigniorial right. The fight began at the first sessions of the Editing Commissions in connection with those changes in the Government's programme which had been accepted upon the discussion of Rostovtzev's views expressed in his letters from abroad to Alexander. The new Governmental programme presented to the Commissions at the very opening of their sessions was later formulated by N. P. Semionov (in his "History of the Liberation of the Peasants during the Reign of Alexander II") as follows:

1. To free the peasants *with land*.
2. The final outcome of the liberation to be the *redemption* by the peasants of their allotments in property.
3. The Government to *facilitate the process of redemption* through mediation, credit, guarantee, and financial operations.
4. To avoid if possible a transitory Obligatory period, and if inevitable, to *make the period short*.
5. *Barshchina* must be *abolished* within three years by legislation, by transferring the peasants to an *obrok* basis, except in cases where the peasants did not desire such a change.
6. The peasants to be *given autonomy* in their village-life.

This programme was received sympathetically by the members of the Editing Commissions, and was made the basis of their work.

But having accepted that programme, the Commissions had to take up a position contrary to the majority of the projects of the provincial committees, which had been worked out on the basis of the rescripts and of Posen's programme. The Editing Commissions decided not to take into account the opinions of the nobles expressed in the projects of the committees, but to use them only as material for their own judgments. Three thousand copies of the Commissions' reports were printed and widely distributed throughout the country, by the order of Rostovtzev. In the summer of 1858 the Tzar made a tour through various provinces, spoke to marshals of the nobility and to members of the committees, expressed his gratitude for their initiative, and promised to invite delegates from every committee to participate in the final discussion of the reform in Petrograd. The nobles understood that they would be admitted to the *Main Committee* for participation in the final decision of the question. Miliutin appeared determinedly opposed to such an interpretation of the Tzar's promise, and persuaded Rostovtzev and Lanskoy that the admission of the nobles to the Main Committee even with only an advisory voice would overturn the whole work and distort the result of the reform. It was finally decided to allow the delegates of the provincial committees to criticise the projects of the Editing Commission at its sessions, but not to vote on the questions.

The work of the Commissions was divided by Rostovtzev's plan into several periods. During the first period the projects of the first twenty-one provinces which had finished their work earlier than the rest were examined, and delegates from those provinces were invited to join in the discussions. After the criticism and revision of these projects, delegates of other provinces were called out, and after further criticism and

discussion, the final projects were worked out. The arrival of the first group of delegates was awaited with some uneasiness by the members of the Editing Commissions, as their opponents considered the appearance of the delegates the most opportune moment for a general battle which might distort the course of the work.

The main objections of the nobles were directed, first, against the rejection of all those provincial projects which recommended the return of the land to the landowners after the termination of the transitory Obligatory period of eight to twelve years; next they objected to the lowering of the estimation of the value of the estates, and finally to the elimination in one form or another of the *votchina*-right of the landowners to be the "chiefs" of the village-communities, proposed by the programme of Posen.

Miliutin decided to counteract the attack of the hostile elements by proving the selfish and greedy motives of the majority of the provincial committees, and to accomplish this he wrote out a memorandum (presented to the Tzar through Lansky) in which he tersely criticised the activity of the provincial committees of the first summons, and expressed the opinion of the Ministry of Interior that the delegates should not be allowed to present any general decisions, but should only be invited to present their opinions on the work of the Editing Commissions at its special sessions. The Tzar approved of this view, and corresponding instructions were given to the delegates. The latter naturally grew indignant; at first they intended to present an address to the Tzar, protesting against the actions of the hateful bureaucracy, but when the address was not accepted, they petitioned Rostovtzev to allow them to assemble and work out general decisions for presentation to the "supreme Government." They were allowed to have private gatherings, without the right to make decisions, and they were promised in the name of the Tzar that their

considerations would reach him through the Main Committee. The delegates proceeded then with their comments on the work of the Commissions, and filled two thick volumes with sharp and merciless criticism.

We should note that the majority of the delegates of the first summons were liberally inclined, and with the exception of a few persons were not proserfdom. Most of them belonged to the committees of the non black-soil or semi-black-soil provinces, and definitely stood not only for the liberation of the peasants, but for land allotment. Yet all of them opposed the granting of land to the peasants in perpetual possession under once for all fixed obligations. They feared, not without reason, that the performance of *barshchina* after the abolition of the landowners' authority would actually be impossible, while they considered unjust, in view of the constant rise in land values, the fixation of *obroks* with no right for raising them. The majority demanded obligatory simultaneous redemption with the aid of a special credit operation. Very few preferred the system of perpetual possession with the right of periodical revision of the *obroks*, and only a few persons favoured the retention of all the land by the landowners after the expiration of the temporary Obligatory period.

With absolute unanimity the delegates attacked the project of the administrative organisation of the peasants; they did not directly defend the *votchina*-power of the landowners, but sharply criticised the intention of the Commissions to subordinate the proposed organs of peasant-autonomy to the local district-police, whereby the very principle of autonomy was annulled. In this part of their objections the delegates stood on liberal and even democratic principles, and their arguments made a strong impression on many members of the Commissions and on all progressives in the country. The delegate from Tver, Unkovsky, formulated these ideas best of all and went further in his criticism, attacking the whole existing

system of local district administration, against which he proposed his own project endorsed by the Tver committee. Unkovsky demanded a fundamental reorganisation of the local administration on the principles of decentralisation and autonomy, of which the smallest unit was to be an all-class *volost*.

The delegates came to the conclusion, however, that their comments could hardly be considered by the Tzar, if only because of their voluminosity. For this reason they decided before their departure to try once more to address the Tzar with a petition to admit them to the Main Committee at the time of the final discussion of the reform. But the idea of a general address was not realised, and the delegates broke into groups. Eighteen of them presented a very moderately composed address in which they petitioned that their comments be admitted before the Main Committee. The delegate from Simbirsk, Shidlovsky, presented a separate address with vague demands in an oligarchic spirit. Finally five delegates headed by Unkovsky appeared with a criticism of the bureaucratic régime, a demand for an obligatory redemption, and a general statement on the necessity of a reorganisation of the juridical and administrative order of the State. Simultaneously with those addresses a memorandum was presented to the Tzar by a Petrograd landowner, M. A. Bezobrazov, an aristocrat (a nephew of Prince Orlov) and Court Chamberlain, who was not a member of the delegation. In his memorandum he savagely criticised the actions of the Ministry of Interior and of the Editing Commissions, and demanded that the bureaucracy be "bridled," and elective representatives of the nobles summoned, in whom only, in his opinion, the supreme authority should seek support.

Alexander's ire, provoked by the sharp expressions of that memorandum, was reflected in his attitude towards the addresses of the delegates, although these were drawn in a loyal and correct tone. The delegates who had signed the addresses

were reprimanded by their respective Governors,² and their comments in most cases passed unnoticed. In the end this incident, which served as a beginning for the development of an oppositional movement among the nobles and a certain part of society, proved beneficial to the Editing Commissions and to the outcome of their work, because it strengthened Alexander's sympathy with them and their activities.

After the departure of the delegates of the first summons, the second period of the work of the Editing Commissions began. They revised their projects so as to include some of the suggestions of the first delegates and some of the projects that had arrived from other provinces, although they did not find it necessary to make any essential changes in their original plans. But before the work came to an end, an event took place which seemed to threaten the reform with disaster.

On February 6, 1860, Rostovtzev died after a three months' illness caused by overwork and nervous strain. Count Panin, the Minister of Justice, was appointed to the post of chairman of the Editing Commissions. He was a rabid routinist-bureaucrat and thorough conservative, and an outspoken opponent of the programme of action of the Editing Commissions. This appointment aroused general astonishment and indignation. Herzen used a black border in printing in the *Bell* the news of Panin's appointment, and declared despondently that the tone of the reign had changed. He invited the members of the Commissions to resign, if there was a drop of citizen-blood in them.³ Miliutin shared the same view, and only the

² On February 20, 1860, Unkovsky was banished to the province of Viatka, for a sharp protest against the restriction of free discussion, decreed by the Minister of Interior.—Tr.

³ A contemporary describes in the appearance of Panin at the sessions of the Editing Commissions. In came "an enormous awkward being, with arms as long as those of an orang-outang. This being fiercely and seriously glared at every one over his spectacles, and listened to the names of those whom he met, as they were read out to him by Bulgakov. Some of the representatives were honoured by his shaking

persistent persuasions of Grand Duchess Yelena prevented him from carrying out his intention of resigning. Alexander II explained his motive in reply to the amazed question of his aunt Yelena: "You do not know Panin; his only conviction is the exact fulfilment of my orders." Alexander forbade Panin to make any changes in the policy of the work established by Rostovtzev. Yet his appointment revived the hopes of the serf-holders and of the enemies of the Editing Commissions. The delegates of the second summons, who belonged mostly to the committees of the black-soil and the Western provinces and who advocated a landless liberation of the peasants, arrived at Petrograd with the intention of throwing over the projects of the Commissions with the aid of Panin. They were disappointed: Panin endeavoured formally to keep his promise to the Tzar, and did not assist the delegates. The delegates criticised the projects of the Editing Commissions, especially the ideas of allotting land to the peasants and of the formation of peasant-communities and *volosts* independent of the land-owners; they did not scruple about arguments, and went to any length to discredit the work of the Commissions from the conservative point of view, ascribing the projects republican, socialistic, and communistic principles. Thus the criticism of those delegates differed in principle from that of the delegates of the first summons. The Editing Commissions had no difficulty in disproving those exaggerated accusations. But after the

hands with them, but the majority had to be satisfied with a slight and even slighting nod "

James Mavor, in quoting the above statement in his *An Economic History of Russia*, adds that Panin was proprietor of 21,000 serfs, his income was 136,000 rubles, his interests were bound up with the maintenance of peasant-bondage, his political views were those of a conservative of conservatives.

At the first rumour of Panin's appointment, Herzen wrote in his *Bell*: "What? Panin, Victor Panin! That lanky madman who has destroyed the last vestige of justice in Russia by his formalism! Ha! Ha! Ha! This is a mystification."—TR.

departure of the delegates, when the third, codificatory, period had begun for the Commissions, the group of members led by Miliutin had to live through a hard time.

Count Panin carefully but persistently endeavoured to promulgate in the Commissions some of his views which seriously threatened to cripple the work. Other members of the Commissions, who secretly sympathised with the aspirations of the delegates of the second summons, renewed the struggle with the group of Miliutin, Cherkassky, Samarin, and Soloviov. The conflict assumed a quite bitter character; at one session Panin stated that Miliutin expressed mistrust in his, Panin's, words, and with another member, Bulygin, Miliutin came on the verge of fighting a duel. Panin's main purpose consisted in striking out the expression "perpetual" in the clause granting allotments to the peasants; he pretended to oppose that expression from the juridical point of view, but he evidently intended to create a basis for the realisation of the desires of those provincial committees which had tried to prove, with the aid of Posen, that by the sense of the Rescripts the allotments were to belong to the peasants for the temporary Obligatory period only. Panin failed in his attempt, in spite of all his endeavours, which went so far as falsifying the journals of the sessions, as Miliutin proved. Owing to the steadfast defence of that point by Miliutin and his friends, all that Panin could attain was the substitution of the word "permanent" for the word "perpetual," its equivalent in fact.

Although Panin's opposition was thus frustrated, Miliutin and his friends had to yield several more or less substantial points during the third period (and partly during the second) of the work of the Commissions. Those compromises consisted in some diminution of allotments in certain districts; in some raise of the *obrok* norm in the black-soil provinces, where it had been originally proposed to be one ruble lower than in the non black-soil provinces, and finally in the permission of an

obrok-revision after twenty years, i.e., of the transvaluation of the obligations in accordance with the changed prices on grain in those estates where the fields were given to the peasants in perpetuity. Yielding to that last change, on which the Tzar himself had insisted, Miliutin hoped that no Minister of Interior would ever undertake the readjustment of the *obroks* in the non-redeemed estates. Indeed, no revision of the *obroks* took place in 1881, but instead obligatory redemption was introduced in all those estates where there still remained temporary Obligatory peasants.

On October 10, 1860, the Editing Commissions were closed after having worked without rest for about twenty months, and having prepared projects of sixteen various acts with explanatory memoranda, indices, etc. The printed reports of the departments, the journals of the sessions of the Commissions, the summaries of the projects of the provincial committees, and other works of the Editing Commissions filled eighteen enormous volumes, besides six volumes of statistical information about all estates having more than one hundred serfs, and three big volumes of comments by the delegates of the provincial committees, also published by the Commissions.

CHAPTER XXII

FROM the day of the closing of the Editing Commissions in October of 1860, the work began in the Main Committee. It lasted two months; irreconcilable contradictions among the members appeared which placed Grand Duke Constantine, who had been appointed chairman of the Committee in place of Prince Orlov, in a very difficult position. No majority could be formed on certain questions; there were only ten members, and they broke into three or four groups, and not one of them had an absolute majority.

The main question concerned the methods and norms of the land-allotments for the peasants. At the discussion of this question an obstinate group was formed under the leadership of M. N. Muraviov, Minister of State Domains, who was joined in all questions by the Chief of Gendarmes, Prince V. A. Dolgorukov, and in most cases by Minister of Finance, A. M. Kniazhevich, and for some time also by the Court Minister, Count V. F. Adlerberg, who later, however, withdrew from the coalition. This group had endeavoured to establish the norms of the allotments and their valuation as recommended by the provincial committees, but seeing the impossibility of carrying out that point of view they attempted to have those questions transferred to the decisions of local authorities, permitting the Main Committee to define only the general principles of the reform. The project presented by them was prepared by the new star of the aristocratic party, the hope of the serfholders and feudalists — P. A. Valuiev, who had not long before exchanged his post of Governor for a position in the Ministry of

State Domains, and who was appointed Minister of Interior after the publication of the Act of February 19.

But that group was not able to get a majority in the Main Committee; on the side of the projects accepted by the Editing Commissions were four votes, but they had no absolute majority either, as Prince Gagarin who desired a landless liberation of the peasants, and Count Panin who opposed many of the Commissions' decisions, stuck stubbornly to their opinions. After many efforts on the part of Grand Duke Constantine to win over Panin, the latter joined the majority (five against four), having succeeded in decreasing the norms of the allotments in numerous districts from one-quarter to one-half of a *desiatin*. Thus the work of the Main Committee came to an end after two months, and the decisions of the Editing Commissions suffered no fundamental changes.

The Tzar was present at the last session of the Main Committee, and by invitation, all members of the Council of Ministers. The Tzar thanked the Editing Commissions for their good work, and declared that in transferring the matter to the State Council he would not tolerate any procrastination in the final discussions, and then and there he appointed February 15 as the last day for the examination of the question, so that the abolition of bondage might be enacted before the beginning of field-works. "This," said Alexander, "I desire, I demand, I command!"

The members of the State Council were given ten days for getting acquainted with the question, and on January 28, 1861, Alexander II opened the sessions with a long and vigorous speech in which he reviewed the whole course of the peasant-question during the preceding reigns and in his own time, and repeating his demand for a rapid examination of the question in the State Council, he said: "Different views on the work presented before you may exist. I shall willingly listen to all opinions, but I have the right to demand one thing: that put-

ting aside your personal interests, you act not as landowners, but as State dignitaries endowed with my confidence." At that he reiterated his desire to have the matter accomplished by the middle of February.

Indeed, the members of the State Council had finished the examination of the whole matter by February 17. The Tzar gave his resolution on each question, joining the opinion of the majority at one time, and that of the minority, at another. Not seldom he agreed with the opinion of eight against thirty-five, in order to sustain the decision of the Editing Commissions (which he succeeded on all points).

The project passed the State Council with only one new amendment, made by Prince Gagarin, who having been defeated in all his attempts to carry through a landless liberation, proposed that in cases of mutual agreement the landowner might give the peasants one-fourth of the allotment determined by the law, gratuitously, whereupon all their obligations to one another would be cancelled. The State Council unanimously approved of the amendment, and it was confirmed by the Tzar. Thus originated the so-called "quartered," or in the expression of the people, "beggarly," "charity" allotments. The peasants were frequently tempted with the possibility of receiving a gratuitous allotment, no matter how small it might be; this caused a spread of land-dearth among the peasants, particularly in the Steppe-provinces, where there was so much land in 1861 that the peasants were not very eager to assert their proprietorship of it.

On February 19 the Tzar signed the Act and the solemn manifesto which was written by the Metropolitan of Moscow, Filaret. At first the writing of the manifesto was entrusted to Y. Samarin, but his project was found unsuitable, and it was turned over as material to Filaret, who performed the work reluctantly, in view of his opposition to the way in which the reform was carried out.

Let us analyse the Act of the 19th of February. The new legislation concerning the peasants was very cumbersome — there were seventeen acts and special rules. First came the “*General* act concerning the peasants freed from bondage”; besides general introductory articles the act defined the legal position of the liberated peasants and their administrative organisation which was to be alike everywhere. Of a similarly general character was the act concerning *redemption*, i.e., the methods and conditions under which the allotments were to be redeemed. The act about *house-serfs* also had a general significance. They were to be freed completely and gratuitously two years after the publication of the Act, without getting anything from their masters. Equally general was the nature of the act concerning *local institutions for peasant-affairs*, by the aid of which the new legislation was to be put into practice, namely: Peace-Mediators and their District-Conferences, and Provincial Boards for Peasant Affairs. In regard to the economic side of the question several *local* acts were issued regulating the different conditions. One act was issued for the peasants of Great Russia, White Russia, and New Russia, where the communal — *obshchina* — system was in existence; a special Little Russian act was issued for the peasants of the provinces Poltava, Chernigov, and part of Kharkov; a local act was also issued for the Southwestern provinces, and a local act for the Lithuanian provinces of Vilna, Kovno, Grodno, and Minsk; in each case the acts were to fit the peculiar local agricultural conditions that had taken form in the historical process.

Special acts were issued also for 1) small serf-owners who were permitted to sell their estates to the Government, in case the conditions of the emancipation were disadvantageous for them; for 2) peasants performing obligatory work in land-owners’ factories; 3) peasants in mountain and salt-works; 4) peasants in the Region of the Don Army; 5) peasants and house-serfs in the province of Stavropol (the only Cau-

casian province subjected to peasant-reform at that time); 6) peasants in the Bessarabian Region where personal bondage had been abolished even before its annexation to Russia; finally a special act was issued for 7) Western Siberia; in Eastern Siberia there had been no bondage-right. Considering that the number of articles in every act exceeded one hundred, we may get an idea of the gigantic legislative and codificatory work performed by the Editing Commissions.

The chief significance of the Great Reform has been its *legal* aspect; in this respect the fall of bondage has been the most important event in all the modern history of Russia. Contemporaries and especially participators of the reform were fond of saying that by the Act of February 19 the people were for the first time brought on the historical arena in Russia. At any rate we may say that the whole status of the people has fundamentally changed with the introduction of the reform. Whatever the material consequences of the reform have been, one cannot deny the enormous importance of the fact that men were no longer permitted to sell other men or to transfer them from field work to house service, i.e., to a state of domestic slavery. The peasants got rid of the unlimited interference in their life, which the landowners had exercised even to the extent of arranging marriages among them.

From the generally human point of view the legal significance of the reform has been colossal, but we must observe here that the abolition of serfdom, having freed the peasants from personal and legal subjection to the landowners, has not equalised the peasants with the landowners in their civil rights: the reform has transferred them from the class of bonded peasants *not into the class of fully able citizens, but into the class of the so-called tributary orders*. This vestige of the general binding of all orders, on which the Muscovite state had been based, has continued to exist. The legal position of the tributary orders consisted in their being taxed by the

Government per capita, not according to their income; the tax had to be paid by the group as a whole, by *mutual guarantee*, which bound every one to the group in which he was registered, by the aid of a special *passport system*. Every tributary order was responsible for all its members, and for this reason the Government was obliged to allow such groups a certain authority over its members, the right to keep them forcibly within the group. As long as the "mutual guarantee" system and the per capita tax existed there could not be any full rights of separate classes in Russia, or actual equality of all citizens before the law; those under the burden of the tributary system had no freedom of movement or of profession, for in order to be transferred from one group into another one had to obtain a verdict of dismissal. One limitation logically resulted another, and the traces of that bondage are still noticeable in Russia.

Another article in the General Act stated that during the first nine years after the publication of the Act the temporary Obligatory peasants could not refuse their allotment and had to perform obligations for it; their personal freedom was thus definitely limited. One should have in mind that the men who worked out the peasant-reform of 1861 did not profess the liberal views of the men of the end of the eighteenth or of the beginning of the nineteenth century, whose starting point were the rights of human personality, the ideology of the Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen. The members of the Editing Commissions desired primarily the security of the welfare of the people and of the State. They undoubtedly were well disposed towards the peasants and sincerely wished to improve their life in a fundamental way, but since they acted for *welfare*, and not for *personal freedom* in the proper sense of the word, it is natural that at times questions of welfare prevailed against questions of personal liberation. As a result of that attitude came the beneficial part of the reform — the

liberation of the peasants with land, but the same circumstance conditioned the element of guardianship which was considered necessary to introduce for the time of the organisation of the freed peasants.

The reasonable apprehension that the emancipated peasants might again fall under the power and even bondage of the landowners, resulted in the *administrative organisation* established for the peasants. The peasantry was organised in autonomous social units, of which the smallest was a village community. Economically the communities had considerable independence; in "communal" villages the taxation was determined by the peasants according to the size of individual allotments, which in their turn were determined by the general assembly of the village community. That general assembly could tax the members with dues for various spiritual, mental, or moral needs, and for social exigencies.

Originally it was intended that while the village-communities should have complete management of the economic part, the *volost* was to be another unit of the local administration, not connected hierarchically with the economic unit; but in the end the *volost* was placed above the village community in many administrative matters. The elected village functionaries, the Elders, had to submit in police questions to the *volost*-chiefs and the *volost*-boards, and together they were subordinate to various police and administration authorities of the district, whose orders they had to fulfil without dispute, under the fear of disciplinary penalties which could be inflicted by the Peace Mediator at his own initiative or upon complaints of various officials. In the end the persons elected by the village-autonomy became virtually petty agents of the district-police; although chosen by the village communities and *volosts* they were responsible not to their electors, but to the "authorities." This circumstance undermined the principle of self-government at its root.

We have seen that those defects in the administration were decisively attacked by the delegates of the first summons. The Editing Commissions, fearing the ferule of the landowners over the peasants, objected to having the *volost* represented by all classes and remaining independent from the district administration; but they fell into another extreme, and subjected the village communities to bureaucratic arbitrariness.

In the *economic* respect the Editing Commissions considerably deviated from the recommendations of the provincial committees, particularly in regard to the norms of the allotments, the norms of the peasants' obligations for those allotments, and the question of redemption and compensation. According to the Act, the peasants were to *retain approximately those allotments which they had been using in their bondage-state*. But the Commissions regarded the fact that in some places the landowners gave their peasants larger allotments than were needed (because in the industrial, non black-soil provinces land was of small value); while in other regions the landowners gave their peasants such small allotments that the peasants could neither subsist on them nor be able to eke out the assessed *obrok*. In view of this the Editing Commissions worked out special norms for the regulation of existing conditions. In every region there was to be a *maximal norm*; if peasants on a certain estate were in possession of more land than was limited by that norm, the landowner had the right to let them use the whole land for additional obligations or he could demand the cutting off of the surplus. On the other hand *minimal norms* in the measure of one-third of the maximal norms were established. Where the peasants' allotments were below that minimum, the landowner was obliged to add land for the completion of the norm.

In respect to the maximal norms, the size of which naturally determined the minimal norms, Russia was divided into three regions: the non black-soil, the black-soil, and the steppes. In

the non black-soil region there were seven possible grades of norms, from three and a quarter to eight desiatins, so that there could be maximal allotments of three and a quarter, three and a half, four, five, six, seven, and eight desiatins. In the black-soil region were five grades: three, three and a quarter, three and a half, four, and four and a half desiatins; in the region of the steppes were four grades: six and a half, eight and a half, ten and a half, and twelve desiatins. In establishing these norms the Editing Commissions increased about twice the norms recommended by the provincial committees. In the course of the Commissions' work they had to take into account the considerations and protests of the delegates, and decrease many norms by one-quarter, one-half, and even by whole desiatins. Later the bargaining affair between Grand Duke Constantine and Panin further reduced the size of the norms. But after all the insufficiency of the peasants' allotment was due not so much to the diminution of the original norms recommended by the Editing Commissions, as to the fact that *in the best cases the peasants received those allotments that had been in their possession during the bondage state, and those allotments required only half of their labour, and could not therefore yield enough for their subsistence and for the fulfilment of the obligations.*

In respect to the *obligations* of the peasants, the Editing Commissions subdivided Russia into four regions: non black-soil, industrial (i.e., of the *obrok*-system); non black-soil (of the *barshchina*-system); black-soil (all of *barshchina*); and the steppe region. The maximal, or full, *obrok*, which corresponded to the maximum norm of the allotment, was in the non black-soil industrial region nine rubles per soul, and ten rubles in the more advantageous places, as those in the vicinity of the Capitals or in the province of Yaroslavl. In the other regions the norm was originally estimated to be eight rubles all over, but in view of the protests of the delegates and of some

of the members of the Commissions, the *obrok* in the black-soil region had to be raised to nine rubles.

The "full" *obrok* could be levied only on maximum allotments in a given region; smaller allotments were assessed with lower *obroks*, but the diminution of the *obroks* was not made proportional to the diminution of the size of the allotment. A special *gradational system* was accepted for the estimation of additional desiatins, so that if a peasant had seven desiatins in a region of an eight desiatin-norm, his nine rubles *obrok* was diminished not by one-eighth, but only by fifty-six and two-thirds copecks. In regions where under the bondage-system the peasants had allotments below one-third of the maximal norm, additional allotments required *obroks* almost twice above the norm. For this reason the peasants preferred in such cases "beggarly" gratuitous allotments to additional land, where for one-third allotment they had to pay two-thirds *obrok*. There were many disturbances in places where landowners refused to yield to the peasants' demand for gratuitous "quarterly" allotments.

From the aforesaid we can see what were the allotments received by the peasants after the liquidation of the bondage, and what were their obligations. Their allotments were equal approximately to one-half of the amount of their earning capacity, for in the best cases they received only that land which they possessed under bondage and which required only three days' work in a week, the rest of the time being given to *barshchina*. In order to utilise their labour power, the peasants had either to rent the other half of the land from the landowner, or to hire themselves to the landowner, or to look for some side work which would enable them to pay the taxes and the *obroks* and to buy such necessities as their own property could not supply them with. With the growing density of the population the dearth of land was felt more and more, rent rose higher and higher, and the peasant grew poorer and poorer;

for this reason *in the most fertile part of Russia the misery of the peasants is at the present time the greatest*. The peasants of the black-soil regions, particularly rich in soil, as in the provinces of Tula or Tambov, live in worse poverty than the peasants of the provinces of Tver or Yaroslavl, where the land yields little, but where they earn from industrial occupations.

By the Act of February 19 the peasants received the land in "perpetual," or as Panin insisted — in "permanent" utilisation. By *voluntary agreements* with the landowners they could eventually redeem their obligations, and receive the land in personal possession. Not the land but the obligations were redeemed. *Compulsory redemption* was rejected both by Alexander and Rostovtzev who consented only to redemption by mutual agreement. Yet, as one could have foreseen, the majority of the landowners *had* to seek redemption. In the non black-soil provinces they wished it themselves; in the black-soil provinces, especially in the *barshchina*-estates, the position of the landowners grew unbearable, for with the abolition of their authority over the peasants the latter performed their *barshchina* very inadequately and evasively, so that those estates deteriorated considerably. The landowners in the black-soil regions began to hope for redemption as the only way to settle with their bondmen. On the whole the redeeming operation was realised more rapidly than one could have expected, and it was delayed only in cases where the peasants were unwilling to meet the offers of the landowners.

Such was the economic side of the reform of February 19 for the peasants and for the landowners. For the gentry proper the results of the liquidation of bondage were not alike in all regions. In the black-soil provinces, after the hard *barshchina*-period, the landowners retained most of their land, were able to get cheap labour in view of the dense population and the absence of non-agricultural occupations. Besides, they received a compensation which they could employ either for

the improvement of their estates or for the extinction of their debts. If they were not inclined to manage their estates, they could profitably rent their land, since the rentals were very high on account of the insufficient allotments of the peasants.

But in the non black-soil industrial region the landowners, having received their compensation, severed in most cases all connections with their former possessions; only a few remained on their estates, and endeavoured to continue agricultural pursuits. It was difficult to obtain labour hands from a population that catered to industrial occupations, and the majority of the landowners sold out their estates, and employed their capital for industrial purposes, if they did not waste it otherwise. Thus with the abolition of serfdom industry received new capital.

In conclusion let us say that the chief significance of the abolition of bondage has lain not only in the enormous economic consequences which it bore for the peasantry, gentry, and industry of the country, but still more in the fundamental change wrought by it in the legal conditions of the Empire. Only after the abolition of serfdom did all those great reforms that were promulgated during the Sixties become possible. Only then could the road for the judiciary reform be cleared. During the bondage-system the whole administrative structure was based on class-principles, with the prevalence of the gentry; the landowner was the caretaker of everything on his estate, and the Central authority had confidence in the management of the "gratuitous chiefs-of-police" (Nicolas's expressed idea of the rôle of the nobles. Tr.) Now had the bureaucratic method been feasible, everything should have been rebuilt from top to bottom; but the bureaucracy did not possess sufficient power for such a grandiose transformation. Hence the abolition of serfdom resulted in the introduction of local self-government, in one way or another. Moreover, the Government seemed to prefer a self-government with no class limita-

tion to that of the aristocratic gentry whose oligarchic pretensions at that moment were more disquieting than democratic principles.

Such were the results for the country of the fall of bondage.

CHAPTER XXIII

IN the preceding chapters I have expounded more or less fully the entire course of the peasant-reform, and in the last chapter I analysed the Act of February 19. Now I shall endeavour to illustrate the influence of those labours on the development of public thought in various circles, to trace the differentiation of political views and tendencies that had taken place in this connection in the press, and to clarify in passing the influence of the press on the course of the peasant-reform and the attitude of the Government towards the press. Finally I intend to sketch the programme for the reorganisation of various sides of the State life, that had been definitely formulated among governmental circles, and also those social demands which were expressed in 1861 or about 1861 in the progressive press and in declarations of various social institutions.

We have observed that the position of the press in 1855 was very difficult in respect to censorship-conditions. As a matter of fact, all social and political questions were nearly unmentionable for the press; at the same time one should note that after the oppression which the Russian public had experienced during the long reign of Nicolas, particularly during his last seven years, the public's activity and thought were so stultified that it was hardly ready for active participation in the great work that stood before the country.

In spite of the unanimous consciousness of the need for fundamental reforms, the public indicated very timidly and vaguely the ways for the realisation of those reforms. The public was as devoid of a definite plan for practical reorganisations, as was the Government at the beginning of the reforms. We

have seen that the public regarded the new Tzar very optimistically, and that optimism almost bordered on apathy; everything was expected from the higher spheres. This condition was strengthened by the difficult position of the press in regard to censorship, the absolute impossibility of expressing with some freedom views and opinions on social and political questions, even for those few persons who had such. Even in those memoranda which had circulated widely and had been presented to the Government, and which were not restricted by censorship, the demands were expressed very moderately, as we may see from their formulation in Chernyshevsky's programme of 1856, which has already been mentioned.

The position of Herzen was quite exceptional not only in view of his freedom from the censor's oppression, but because by preparation and equipment he knew contemporary Russia exceptionally well, so that in some matters he appeared almost as a prophet. Thus as early as 1853, before the beginning of the crisis of Nicolas' system, which had opened the eyes even of ordinary persons, Herzen predicted that the fall of bondage was "necessary, inevitable, unavoidable," and that it would occur in the nearest future. Even then Herzen declared his radical programme for the solution of the peasant-question, and demanded not only the liberation of the peasants, but their liberation with all the land which under the bondage-régime they had been using. Upon the accession of Alexander II, Herzen decided to found an organ for the expression of immediate problems of Russian national and social life. In 1855 he began to publish his pamphlets *Polar Star*, and upon the establishment of the Unofficial Committee on peasant affairs, Herzen undertook the publication of a bi-weekly, soon transformed into a weekly paper—the *Bell*. The *Bell* acquired a great importance; Katkov told Herzen during his visit to London that the *Bell* lay on Rostovtzev's desk as a source of information on the peasant-question. It revealed

with an unaccustomed straightforwardness all the sores of Russian national and social life, pilloried abuses and unsavoury actions of individual officials mercilessly, and appeared as a constant menace to the higher functionaries, and as an institution which pushed on the Government and the public, without letting them stop. Herzen was often reproached — especially by Chicherin, in an article published in the *Bell* — for his nervousness, passionateness, for the unevenness of his judgments, for his frequent leaps from praising the Government to sharply condemning its activity. Herzen replied that his platform was immutable, that he always stood on the side of the one who liberated, and as *long* as he liberated. To a great extent the leaps in the *Bell's* attitude towards the Government were due to the vacillating policy of the latter which in all questions — except that of peasant-reform — as in the question of the press or the universities, hesitated and now moved ahead, now retreated. At any rate, until 1858 Herzen's *Bell* was the only organ where the opinions of the Russian progressives could be freely expressed, and in this respect he performed a great service by his stimulating influence on the Government, and by his activity for the formation of a public opinion in the country.

As to the periodicals published in Russia, their tendencies and programmes began to differentiate from the year 1858, when the press was permitted to discuss the peasant-question, and when the provincial committees were opened; these, although closed for the public, did not keep their activity in secret, and gave food for discussion in the provinces and in the Capitals.

The *Contemporary*, directed by Chernyshevsky and Dobroliubov, was the first to move sharply to the left. The *Contemporary* was published, as in the time of Nicolas, by Panaiev and Niekrasov, but they were not the influential leaders of the organ. After the death, in 1848, of its leading contributor,

Bielinsky, in the period of suffocating reaction all the best literary forces of that time, the so-called writers of the Forties, who professed the views of Bielinsky in his last years, were united in the magazine. But the writers who expressed the aspirations of the best part of Russian society in the Forties were liberals, not radicals. Alongside with them, however, began to appear in the pages of the *Contemporary* representatives of the young generation, at first in the person of Chernyshevsky, who being older than Dobroliubov, Pisarev, and the other Men of the Sixties, had begun his career in the Fifties; then in the person of young Dobroliubov who began to write in 1857 at the age of twenty, and manifested at once unusual gifts and an extraordinary independence of views. In 1858 Chernyshevsky took over the department of economics and peasant-problems, and gave Dobroliubov the position of literary critic, which in the "thick" magazines of that time had a great importance, as it included all publicistic discussions and much wider tasks than the title implied. The manager of the critical department occupied a rôle similar to that of the leader in a chorus, or that of the first violin in an orchestra, and such was the rôle of young Dobroliubov who did not long remain under the instructorship of Chernyshevsky, but soon became his equal colleague and friend. By his views he was an heir not only to Bielinsky and to the radical critics of the Forties, but he proceeded further, and appeared as the first herald of populist (*narodnichestvo*) principles and ideals in Russian critique.

The young leaders of the *Contemporary* soon collided with the representatives of the older generation on the magazine: Turgeniev, Grigorovich, Goncharov, and other novelists of the Forties, who were joined by the recently discovered Tolstoy.

Dobroliubov soon began to feel dissatisfied with the development and tendency of Russian Progress, and with ardent passion he expressed his impatience and discontent. He

considered that timid and moderate Progress as treading on one and the same place; he spoke with contempt of the evasive and vague revealments of Russian sores and abuses in the press. Both he and Chernyshevsky were bitterly disappointed in the nobles whose class egoism was manifested in the activities of the provincial committees; Chernyshevsky, who in February, 1858, praised Alexander, and in April wrote complimentary notes about the liberal landowners, changed his tone by the end of the year. About that time a pause came in the press-discussion of the peasant-question. When in April, 1858, Chernyshevsky published in the *Contemporary* a continuation of his article "On New Conditions of Village Life," and quoted at length Kavelin's project which in 1856 circulated freely and was known to the Government, that article appeared very dangerous in the eyes of the Government by its advocating the transfer of the land to the peasants through redemption. The Main Committee considered it an impertinence, and by its request a circular was issued forbidding the discussion in the press of the questions of redemption and *votchina*-authority. The circular and the persecution of Kavelin made a depressing impression on the *Contemporary* and on the other representatives of the progressive press. Katkov (then a liberal) demonstratively discontinued the department on peasant-questions in his *Russian Messenger*; the publishers of *Village Well-Being*, a magazine started by the Slavophiles mainly with Koshelev's money, were about to close it forever. This did not last long, however. We know that the Government's views changed in regard to the redemption question; in the fall of 1858 it permitted again a more or less free discussion of the peasant-problem. Then (at the end of 1858 and particularly early in 1859) Chernyshevsky began to write extremely virulent articles against the selfishness of the landowners, their greedy aspirations and extraordinary appetites, which he had been shown by the works of the provincial committees. He recom-

mended such radical ways for the solution of the problem that they appeared absolutely unacceptable to the Government and as spelling utter ruin for the landowners.

At the same time Dobroliubov reached the apogee in his attacks on the weakness and vagueness of the liberalism of the nobles, and on the cowardice and mildness of Russian progressives. Such were his articles on Shchedrin's *Provincial Sketches*, and on Goncharov's *Oblomov*. When Herzen read his famous "What is Oblomovism?" he thought the *Contemporary* had gone too far, and that it required restraint. During 1859-1860 articles appeared in the *Bell* that warned the *Contemporary*, and defended the liberalism of the nobles from the attacks of Chernyshevsky and Dobroliubov. Thus the *Contemporary* occupied in 1858-1859 a position more radical than that of Herzen's paper.

The main representative of the liberal, or rather the liberal-democratic current was Katkov's *Russian Messenger* which sided with the views of Unkovsky and the Tver liberals. Katkov was at that time perhaps the most consistent and firm upholder of liberalism, and an opponent of any governmental ferule. To a certain degree the same tendency was pursued by Kraievsky's *Annals of the Fatherland*, but the editor, Dudyshkin, was a weak publicist, and had no influence. Druzhinin's "thick" monthly, *Library for Reading*, intended to become an organ of English constitutional Toryism, so to speak, i.e., it hoped to create an enlightened conservative party which would endeavour to promulgate certain liberal reforms and then instead of constantly moving forward, reduce its tasks to the conservation of the positions won. That magazine lacked talents, and was unable to play the rôle it had intended to.

The Slavophile views were expressed in a periodical *Russian Discourse* which appeared irregularly. In 1857 the Slavophiles issued a newspaper *Rumour*, but the censorship conditions

were then very hard, and the paper was discontinued by the end of the year. Ivan Aksakov, who was forbidden in 1852 to be editor or even to publish his writings, received a permission in 1859 for a newspaper, *Sails*, but his tone was so sharp that publication was stopped on the second number.

In general the Slavophiles occupied a quite peculiar position. On one hand, they appeared as conservatives *par excellence*, and even as reactionaries; in some respects they wished to turn Russia back to pre-Petrine times. In their eyes Peter's reforms which had drafted Western civilisation upon Russian life were a distortion of Russia's natural peculiarities, and they demanded a return to ancient times. The Slavophiles idealised the old ages, when the Government did not interfere with social, communal, or private life, and advocated Orthodoxy and Autocracy as necessary foundations of Russian life. They understood under Orthodoxy a church free from external influence and service to the state, and absolutely rejected the official Orthodoxy of the present. In regard to Autocracy they stood on the platform expressed by Constantine Aksakov in his letter to Alexander II: *The power of authority belongs to the Tzar, but the power of opinion — to the people*. In this respect their views were quite radical; for instance, they demanded not an alleviation of the position of the press, but complete freedom of speech, and in religious questions they demanded unlimited freedom of conscience and creed. They did not admit in private or communal life any regulation or interference on the part of the state. They expressed their ideas sharply and radically, and for this reason were unable to promulgate them through the press. Their only successful attempt was the magazine *Village Well-Being*, published for one year at the *Library for Reading*, with the co-operation of Koshelev, Samarin, and Cherkassky. It printed articles exclusively on peasant-problems, mostly written by progressive members of the provincial committees. Chernyshevsky and Dobroliubov ad-

mitted that outside of the *Contemporary* the *Village Well-Being* was the only honest publication, although they often opposed its views. In Moscow another magazine appeared devoted exclusively to the peasant-question, the *Landowners' Journal*, edited by Zheltukhin; most of its articles were written by representatives of black-soil provinces, and therefore advocated landless liberation of the peasants. Professor Vernadsky's magazine, *Economical Indicator*, stood in principle for the interests of big landownership, and advocated pure Manchesterism. It was an academic publication, and the public knew about it only from Chernyshevsky's sharp attacks upon its articles.

During that period, between 1859 and 1861, when the process of the differentiation in the tendencies of the press took place, the freedom of the press grew in spite of the unrelenting censorship; newspapers and magazines became bolder and widened the sphere of their interests, so that by 1861 the press actually discussed all social and political questions of the day. We must say that the very contingent of the questions had expanded considerably. During the first five years of Alexander's reign the public consciousness made big strides, and had gained initiative and definiteness of purpose. In connection with the peasant reform there emerged concomitant questions concerning local self-government, judicial reorganisation and jury-trials, publicity and freedom of speech, and numerous other questions regarding culture, education, and the satisfaction of the economic and industrial needs of the rejuvenated country. Those questions were formulated in projects of provincial committees, in speeches and addresses of delegates to the provincial assemblies in 1860, and were echoed in the press.

In *Voices from Russia* Herzen published parallel with the *Bell* memoranda and projects which could not be published in Russia; there we may see the growth and development of

the plans for reorganisation. In the end of 1860 appeared the ninth and last number of *Voices from Russia*, in which alongside with the "Political Will" written by Rostovtzev before his death for Alexander, was published an unsigned memorandum about the desirable course of the peasant-reform. The publishers of the *Bell* asserted that had the Editing Commissions followed the direction of the author of that memorandum, Russia would have had a true, not pseudo-liberation of the peasants. The *Bell's* admonition came too late, for the Commissions had been already closed. The *Bell* expressed, however, its general satisfaction with the activity of the Commissions, and even said a good word about the deceased Rostovtzev whom it had pursued for years.

The memorandum, which for some considerations I am inclined to ascribe to N. A. Serno-Solovievich, had at the end a programme which formulated the views of the most progressive groups of that time.

"In conclusion," wrote the author, "let us indicate the main demands of public opinion, demands not only perfectly legal, but very moderate, for they are practised in all somewhat enlightened states:

1. The liberation of the peasants with land.
2. Equality of all before the courts and the law.
3. Complete separation of the judiciary power from the administrative; jury-courts.
4. Reorganisation of the police.
5. Responsibility of all administrative organs, beginning with the ministers.
6. Right of verification of the collection and expenditure of taxes.
7. Right of control over the issue of new laws.
8. Freedom of conscience and creed.
9. Freedom of the press.
10. The abolition of the Contract-Monopoly, and the re-

vision of the laws oppressing commerce, industry, and national labour.

11. Abolition of civil ranks.

12. Full amnesty for all sufferers for political convictions.

"The last eleven points are a natural consequence of the first — the abolition of serfdom. In foreign words, it is a constitution; in Russian — it means a regulated order."

As a matter of fact, there was no constitution in the programme; neither a representative government, nor legal guarantees are mentioned there, but it offers a broad liberal, and in some features, radical reorganisation of the state. From that plan we can see how far public opinion outgrew the programmes of the Government.

Such were the *desiderata* of the progressive groups at the moment of the fall of bondage. The fact that those demands had outgrown the offers of the Government brought about new relations between the public and the Government of Alexander II, relations quite different from those that existed at his accession. Now there was no longer the older perfect and unanimous confidence in the Government; on the contrary, the governmental activity aroused scepticism and mistrust, in spite of its progressive tendencies and desire to place the public initiative before that of the Government. At the moment of the emancipation of the peasants, the *entente cordiale* which had existed between the public and the Government at the beginning of the reform, vanished entirely. The declaration of freedom in March, 1861, dissatisfied not only the radical circles of society, but first of all — the peasants.

CHAPTER XXIV

WHILE the reform was in preparation the peasants had patiently awaited for four years the decision of their fate. Many times during that period when the enemies of the reform tried to frighten Alexander with probable peasant disturbances, the Tzar did not believe them, pointing out their general calmness. Until the moment of the publication of the Act there reigned an unusual calm among the peasants. But as soon as the Act was solemnly declared from church pulpits, and copies of it were given out to every landowner and every village community, there began that fermentation among the peasants which the enemies of the reform had long before predicted.

In the majority of the districts no measures were taken for the proper explanation of the Act to the peasants. Only in a very few places which had enlightened governors, such as Artzimovich of Kaluga, care was taken to help the peasants orient themselves in the sense of the Act. But even in such places the publication of the Manifesto aroused misunderstandings on the part of the landowners and the peasants. The peasants had patiently waited four years expecting that in the end they would receive "full freedom," which meant in their eyes the immediate fall of the landowners' power, and the granting to the peasants without any compensation not only of the lands which they had been using under the bondage-order, but also of the land of the landowners to whom the Tzar would pay "salary" for it. When the Act of February 19 was issued, and the peasants saw that for an indefinite time the

obligations were retained — *barshchina* or *obrok* —, that in some cases their land might be diminished, that they had to be bound to their masters until the redemption was accomplished, that redemption could be realised only upon mutual agreement by both sides,— the peasants came to the conclusion that it was not at all the freedom which they had been expecting; they decided that the Tzar could not have given them such a freedom, that the landowners had concealed the “real freedom” and published a “forged freedom.” On this basis a number of disturbances and riots arose. Foreseeing the possibility of such events, the Government had commissioned to all provinces prominent generals who were given the power of governor-generals for extraordinary cases; at the slightest sign of disturbances these special authorities had the right to employ all means for the suppression of the unrest, including the right to command military forces, and charge at the people. Thus it came to pass that when the peasants, considering the declared freedom as “forged,” and at times trying to read into the Act of February 19 what they had been hoping for, refused to perform *barshchina* and pay *obrok* and other obligations to the landowners, the Generals displayed their power in one way or another. Where the Generals happened to be better disposed or more reasonable, or where the peasants were more peacefully inclined, peace was restored by mere persuasion. But in a number of places bloodshed took place. In the village of Bezdna, province of Penza, the peasants, led by a fanatical defender of the people’s rights, their fellow-villager, Anton Petrov, were greatly disturbed; in the end General Apraksin ordered the troops to fire at them, which resulted, according to the greatly underrated official figures, in fifty-five dead and seventy wounded. The students of the Kazan university, under the leadership of the young Professor Shchapov, had a requiem served for the dead of Bezdna. Alexander personally dictated a resolution by which the monks who had

officialated at that mass were to be exiled to Solovki, and Shchapov was to be brought to Petrograd. It was the first instance of the manifestation of dissatisfaction on the part of the democratic layers of the people, and of corresponding repressions on the part of the Government.

At that time a significant change had taken place in the upper spheres, in the very department which was to carry through the reform. As a concession to the landowners who were grieved by the peasant reform, Minister of Interior Lanskoj and his closest assistant, Miliutin, were dismissed from their posts, although in a gracious manner: Lanskoj was granted the title of Count, and Miliutin was promoted to the rank of Senator, with the right to go abroad. Valuiev, who had been known as an opponent to the reform and to the character of the work of the Editing Commissions, was appointed Minister. During the discussion of the question in the Main Committee he assisted the enemies of the project of the Editing Commissions, Minister of State Domains Muraviov, and Chief of Gendarmes Dolgorukov, for whom he worked out a special memorandum.

Now Valuiev declared that he considered his task "the strict and exact realisation of the acts of February 19, but in a conciliatory way." As a matter of fact he soon revealed his purpose of working into the hands of the landowners, not scrupling even about twisting and misinterpreting the law. The carrying through of the reform was placed in the hands of Peace Mediators, their District Conferences, and Provincial Peasant Boards. Before his dismissal Lanskoj had sent out an important circular to the Governors, instructing them about the selection of adequate persons as Peace Mediators. He pointed out that since the Governors were to appoint the Mediators from among nobles recommended by the nobles themselves, they should be very cautious in the selection, admitting to that post only persons known for their sense of justice and

friendliness towards the peasants, and who would be apt to enjoy the confidence of the peasants. Indeed, the best inclined Governors, whose numbers were considerably increased during Lanskoj's administration, had made a successful selection of Peace Mediators. In general one must say that the Peace Mediators of the first summons had left an excellent memory as just and devoted workers. In view of their quite independent position — they could be dismissed only after a trial by the order of the Senate which confirmed their appointments — they were not subordinate to the provincial or central authorities, and were in a position to follow the law and decide cases according to their conscience. In many places they came into collision with the interests of big and influential landowners; the latter complained to Valuiev who came out in their defence, but he suffered a decisive fiasco, owing to the energetic resistance of the Peace Mediators to the attempted pressure on the part of the Government. Irritated by his failure, Valuiev launched a special campaign against the Mediators, attempting to force their subordination through the Provincial Boards. Failing in bringing them under his influence or discharging them, he tried to decrease their number through the Provincial Boards, under the pretext of economy, naturally leaving out of the staff the most stubborn of them. But the Peace Mediators were willing to sacrifice their material interests, and they declared that if it was a question of economy they were ready to receive a half or a third of their salary, provided their number remained intact, as otherwise they would not be able to accomplish the work within the appointed two years. Thus Valuiev failed even in his last stratagem. It was much easier for him to press upon the Governors, for they depended upon him to a great extent, and as a matter of fact those Governors who had honestly followed the Act of February 19 were either dismissed or "promoted" against their will to the Senate. After all, however, the Act of February

19 was carried out in most cases in its correct way, thanks to the firmness of the Peace Mediators.

Yet in spite of this the changes in the spheres, which appeared to all as a sign of concessions to the reactionaries, the substitution of Lanskoï by Valuiev, Valuiev's policy, and also the bloody events and the suppression of the disturbances in the spring of 1861—all these contributed to the general indignation of the *intelligentzia*, reflected partly in the tendencies of the press.

About that time the most radical organs were joined by another magazine, the *Russian Word*, founded in 1859 by Count Kushelev. During its first two years it had no significance, but from 1861 Pisarev, the twenty-year-old publicist who appeared in the literary arena with as much brilliance and force as Dobroliubov, set its tone. Dobroliubov died in November, 1861, at the age of twenty-five, having inscribed his name indelibly in the history of Russian literature. While the *Contemporary* was a political and social organ *par excellence*, and represented in those questions the most radical groups of the public, the *Russian Word* was the organ of the Nihilists, using that term in the sense introduced about that time by Turgeniev (in his novel, "Fathers and Children").

One of that generation, still living with us, Prince P. A. Kropotkin, characterises that movement as "the struggle for individuality"; the foremost purpose was the liberation of the individual from the aged conventions and prejudices, from the chains of family, society, and religion. Pisarev considered the spread of natural science and the dissemination of the conclusions of science one of the main means leading to that aim, supposing not without reason that it would be the best weapon in the struggle with the prejudices and superstitions that had entangled the old order of Russian life. He attacked all authorities mercilessly, and for this reason, although he paid little attention to political questions, considering that the liberation

of personality should in itself be a panacea against all evils in life, his destructive tendencies and passionate struggle with all sorts of authorities appeared more dangerous in the eyes of the Government than the socialistic tendencies of the *Contemporary*. The propaganda of the *Contemporary* and of the *Russian Word* began to arouse the apprehensions not only of the Government, but also of the moderate progressives among the social workers of that time.

As to the nobles, they were divided as before into two wings. One represented the oligarchic-pro-serfdom group, who now, after the abolition of serfdom, were mainly occupied with the question of the compensation which the gentry desired to receive from the Government in order to maintain its prevalence in the country. The representatives of that current saw such a compensation in the expansion of the political rights of the nobles only, without a corresponding expansion of the rights of other classes, for which reason we may call that current oligarchical. The other wing of the oppositional gentry represented a liberal-democratic current, largely based on the ideology of the progressive nobles who had manifested their ideas in the declarations of the Tver provincial committee, during the assemblies of the nobles in 1859, and through their delegates in the Editing Commissions. Their ideas were at that time popular largely among wide strata of the nobles-landowners in the industrial non black-soil provinces. Later N. K. Mikhailovsky gave them the characteristic name of "repentant nobles."

The oligarchic current found considerable support in the Ministry of Interior, whose head, Valuiev, was ready to extend some compensation to the nobles. Acting in this direction, he tried on one hand to change the projected *zemstvo*-self-government to accord with more aristocratic principles, and on the other hand he declared himself in 1863 in favour of granting the nobles some participation in the Government, if not of

a legislative, at least of a consultative character. During the Polish uprising Valuiev presented a report to the Tzar, in which he asserted that in view of the loyal and patriotic sentiments of the Russian nobility, they should be given an advantage over the Polish nobility who were soliciting the restoration of the Constitution of 1815.

The views of the liberal-democratic group soon found a brilliant expression in the famous Tver incident which took place early in 1862.

The oppositional current of the liberal-democratic character was manifested in 1861, as it had been since the very beginning of the peasant-reform, most acutely in the province of Tver where the most conscious representatives of that movement were found. After the emancipation of the peasants the Russian nobles prepared to demand the organisation of land-credit for the nobles. The nobility of Tver considered that question inflated, properly speaking, conditioned by the fact that the peasant-reform had not been solved by paying the landowners at once the compensation sum which would be sufficient for the hiring of labour and for reasonable improvements. But if meliorative credit was to be considered necessary, it was necessary not only for the nobles, but for all agriculturists, of all classes, including the peasants. The Tver nobles regarded the discussion of that question possible only in conjunction with the other needs of the moment, which originated in the questions aroused, but not solved, by the peasant-reform. The Tver assembly found the following reforms necessary for the establishment of a regulated and well organised private credit: 1) The reorganisation of the financial system of the State in the sense that it should depend upon the people, not upon lawless wilfulness; 2) the establishment of independent and public courts; 3) the introduction of full publicity in all branches of the administration, without which there could be no confidence in the Government, and consequently in the firmness of the existing order

of the State; 4) the abolition of antagonism among classes. Upon the realisation of these reforms, the question of credit, in the opinion of the Tver nobles, would be solved by itself, without the interference of the State and without the aid of the State treasury. The resolution of the Tver nobility further declared: "The nobles, being profoundly convinced of the necessity of doing away with inter-class antagonism, and desiring to dismiss every possibility of being reproached for forming an obstacle to the common good, declare before all Russia that they abdicate from all their class-privileges . . . and do not consider an infringement of their rights the obligatory allotment of the peasants with land in property, with the compensation of the landowners by the aid of the State."

The concluding point of that resolution was of particular significance, for it corresponded perfectly with the ideas of the most radical groups of the *intelligentsia*, as expressed by Chernyshevsky in his "Letters with no address," written by him a few weeks after the Tver assembly, but published only in 1874 in the periodical *Forward* issued abroad by Lavrov.

"The realisation of these reforms," declared the resolution of the Tver nobility, "*is impossible by means of governmental measures, as our social life has been managed until now. Even supposing the full readiness of the Government for promulgating the reforms, the nobles are deeply convinced that the Government is not in a position to accomplish them. The free institutions towards which these reforms lead must emanate from the people, otherwise they will be only a dead letter, and will place the public in a still more tense position.* For this reason the nobles *are not appealing to the Government with a request for carrying out these reforms, but, considering its incompetency in this matter, they are merely indicating the road which it should enter for the salvation of itself and of the public. This road is an assembly of men elected by the whole nation, without difference of class.*"

On such a radical platform the nobility now stood! In accordance with those resolutions an address was dictated to Alexander. It reiterated the need for an obligatory redemption, and in regard to the question of the class privileges, the nobles wrote: "By virtue of class privileges the nobles have been exempt until now from the fulfilment of the most important social duties. Sire, we consider it a deadly sin to live and make use of the benefits of the social order at the expense of other classes. The order of things is unjust, under which the poor man pays a ruble, while the rich man does not pay a copeck. This could have been tolerated only under the bondage-system, but now it puts us in the position of parasites, utterly useless to our country. We do not wish to enjoy any longer such a disgraceful privilege, and we do not accept the responsibility for its further existence. We most loyally beg your Imperial Majesty to allow us to take over part of the State taxes and obligations according to our status.

"Besides property privileges we enjoy the exclusive right of supplying men for the administration of the people; at present we consider the exclusiveness of this right lawless, and we beg that it be extended to all classes."

Indicating further the lack of mutual understanding between the Government and the public, the representatives of the latter thus concluded their requests:

"The general disorder serves as the best proof that the reforms demanded by the most urgent needs can not be realised in a bureaucratic way. *Even we do not pretend to speak for the whole nation, in spite of the fact that we stand nearer to it*, and we firmly believe that good intentions are in themselves insufficient not only for the satisfaction, but even for the indication of the national needs; we are convinced that all reforms remain unsuccessful because they are being undertaken without the opinion and the knowledge of the people.

"The summons of men elected by all Russia is the only

means for a satisfactory solution of the problems aroused, but not solved, by the Act of February 19."

Compare these resolutions and their tone with the declaration of Unkovsky, or with the resolutions of the same Tver nobility in 1859, and you will see how far during a year and a half that nobility had shifted to the left, and how much more aggressive its democratic tone had become. They emphasised that the question did not so much concern the promulgation of liberal reforms and the improvement of the existing order of things, as the way in which those reforms should be carried out, and to how great an extent the representatives — not of society, but of the people proper, would participate in carrying them out.

When the resolutions and the address were made public, Valuiev, who had constantly upheld the privileges and rights of the nobles, dared not even raise the question of the legality of such resolutions. Formally the nobles were entitled to the right of expressing their opinions about their needs, and although the declaration concerned the fundamental reorganisation of the order of the state, still it could be construed as emanating from the discussion of the position and needs of the nobility. But Valuiev found a way for punishing, if not the Tver nobles as a whole, at least those of their representatives of the most progressive elements, who had been elected Peace Mediators by the nobles and confirmed by the Senate. Those Peace Mediators were the initiators of the whole affair, and after the transmission of the address to the Tzar they came together at the regular Provincial Assembly of Peace Mediators, and declared that since the nobles had formulated their views, the assembled Mediators would in their further activity be guided not by the orders of the Government, but by the views of the public. In this case one could certainly find infringement of the order and of the service-duty. Valuiev utilised that circumstance, had the thirteen Peace Mediators

who signed the declaration arrested, brought to Petrograd, and imprisoned in the fortress of SS. Peter and Paul. After a confinement of five months they were tried by the Senate and sentenced to two years' imprisonment with the deprivation of certain rights and privileges. The Governor-General of Petrograd, Prince Suvorov, interceded, however, before the Tzar, and the accused were set free; they were deprived of certain service-rights, but these were restored to all who later petitioned for them.

The Tver movement was echoed in other places. In general the idea of the need of constitutional guarantees and a representative order spread widely among the nobility and the *intelligentzia*. Herzen supported that idea in his *Bell* in special articles, and through the project of a general address proposed by Ogarev. One must say that Ogarev's address was considerably less democratic in its demands than that of the Tver nobility, due to the fact that Ogarev had intended to unite for signing the address different layers of the nobility, even the section which was more oligarchically than democratically inclined. Turgenev, a close friend of the publishers of the *Bell*, disapproved of Ogarev's project, indicating that the *Bell* was wrong in attacking the Act of February 19, since the peasantry had accepted the Act as a symbol of their freedom and would consider its opponents their enemies. He objected both to the contents of the address and to the timeliness of the moment for its presentation. He recommended the working out of an adequate address for the moment when the statutes concerning the *zemstvo*-self-government would be published; by that time it appeared certain that Valuiiev would in a great measure distort the projects of the Editing Commissions regarding local self-government.

Other persons of the liberal-democratic camp regarded the address with similar hostility. Kavelin, for instance, pointed out that the country had not as yet prepared the necessary ele-

ments for the realisation of a constitutional order, that the constitution would exist only on paper, or would become aristocratic, the more so since the matter was considered from the point of view of recompensing the landowners for their losses on account of the peasant-reform. Kavelin, as many others among the *intelligentsia* and among governmental circles, looked upon the *zemstvo* as a school for the preparation and training of political workers; he considered well organised local self-government as the only way out for the moment.

Samarin occupied a nearly similar position. He protested in a letter to Ivan Aksakov, the publisher of the newspaper *Day*, against the movement of writing constitutional addresses. Aksakov did not publish that letter for fear that Samarin would make many unnecessary enemies among the public; besides, Aksakov predicted that the addresses would have no success. It is curious that Samarin did not come out from the customary Slavophile opposition to any constitution, but, like Kavelin, claimed that *at that moment* the people were not ripe for a constitution, that "we cannot yet have a popular constitution, while a non-popular constitution, i.e., a rule of the minority acting without authority in the name of the majority, is a lie and a fraud." He argued that under such a constitution centralisation would develop, and Petrograd would stifle Russia. In his opinion Russia needed at that moment various liberatory reforms, the liberation of the public from the despotism of the administration, an independent judiciary, absolute religious toleration, freedom of the press, the reorganisation of the taxes in a direction favourable for the people, the development of education, the limiting of the unproductive expenditures of the Treasury and the Court—all these measures Samarin considered realisable under an autocratic régime.

We have seen what the tendencies of the peasants, of the nobility, and of the *intelligentsia* were in 1861. I wish to touch now upon the characterisation of the commercial-indus-

trial *milieu*. The merchants and manufacturers of that period presented that "dark kingdom" which Ostrovsky depicted so strongly in his comedies (Dobroliubov wrote in this connection his famous critical article, "Dark Tzardom"). But even in that *milieu* there appeared many flashes of progressive ideas, and aspirations to get out of the darkness.

Even during the Crimean Campaign an extraordinary enlivenment took place in the commercial-industrial circles. The war contracts, the new issues of assignments which artificially inspired business-transactions, the liberal perspectives of the new reign — all these combined to account for the appearance of numerous undertakings, trade-companies, stock companies, etc. The Government, in contrast to the oppressions of the preceding reign, regarded them liberally, from the *laissez-faire* point of view. The spread of the movement was caused by the issue of large quantities of money by the Treasury, as I have mentioned; besides, by some strange financial combination, the Government decided at that moment to decrease the interest paid on deposits in governmental credit-institutions; naturally the deposits were withdrawn, and their owners tried to boom new undertakings in order to invest their capital. Still greater enlivenment was expected from the building of new railroads and from the completion of those already begun.

Commercial and industrial activities had developed suddenly with extraordinary force, out of proportion to the needs and actual possibilities of the moment; the flourishing of commerce and industry in a country which was utterly drained by the war, and had been economically bleeding, was abnormal and could not endure long: indeed, after about three years after the war a number of failures took place. Many undertakings which had attracted savings of long years began to collapse, because their conception had not been in accord with the actual needs of the country. Failures were enhanced by the universal industrial crisis of 1857-1858, brought about by changes in the

means of production. Although the building of railroads began at that time, the Government gave the work over to foreign capitalists, so that Russian capitalists were forced to invest their capital in more or less ephemeral undertakings.

Naturally the very fact of transferring such colossal undertakings as the building of railroads into the hands of foreigners aroused dissatisfaction and opposition among industrial circles, and their aggravation grew under the influence of the crisis and the fall of the course of the paper-money. Hence we may understand the alliance that was manifested in the years of the crises between the oppositional merchants and the radical *intelligentzia*, and the sympathy which the commercial-industrial circles began for the first time to show for various organs of the progressive press.

The majority of the conscious representatives of the commercial-industrial circles sincerely welcomed the peasant-reform both because they had always been antagonistic towards the nobles, and also because capitalistic undertakings could not exist without a sufficient amount of free labour, and the abolition of serfdom undoubtedly promised a considerable amount of such labour in the near future.

The abolition of bondage, combined with the building of new roads of communication, created an advantageous conjuncture for Russian capitalism. Hence the conscious elements among the industrialists were progressively inclined and sympathised with the early liberal measures of the Government; but they soon grew disappointed in the activity of the Government, which in many cases was directed against their interests. From the end of the Fifties individual representatives of the commercial-industrial class began to appear, who astonished their contemporaries with their unexpected independence and enterprise not only in commercial but also in social affairs. For instance, Kokorev, a famous contractor who had manifested great enterprise and thoughtfulness in the peasant-

question, actively interfered with the redemption-question, and was the first to point out those means which could be undertaken to aid the Government, in case it should decide to choose the road of obligatory redemption. Kokorev was closely connected with all the progressive and liberal representatives of the public and the press, and enjoyed a great prestige in the Moscow liberal circles. Katkov and Pogodin, and even Herzen in his *Bell*, praised him greatly. During the time of the first censorship-repressions in 1858, when the press was forbidden to discuss redemption and other problems, and the liberal Moscow censor, N. F. Kruze, was discharged the Moscow authors collected about fifty thousand rubles, not without the aid of Kokorev, for Kruze. The progressive merchants even in the provinces willingly contributed money for educational purposes, as for woman-gymnasias, and in other ways manifested their sympathy with enlightenment and progress.

CHAPTER XXV

THE Government watched with great alarm the development of the general opposition and radicalism; it was particularly worried by the revolutionary proclamations which appeared in 1861, some of which were printed abroad, and some, in Russia. The revolutionary spirit in those proclamations grew very rapidly; the first widely distributed sheet, the *Great Russian*, in whose composition Chernyshevsky, Serno-Solovievich, and other persons of the *Contemporary* circle took part, still stood on a liberal-democratic platform, and its contents were not as sharp as the resolution of the Tver nobility. But as early as the fall of 1861 there appeared a proclamation, "To the Young Generation," ascribed to the poet M. L. Mikhailov, which alongside with extremely naïve demands, such as the complete abolition of any police, secret as well as open, definitely threatened the Dynasty, declaring that if the Dynasty would not carry through the reforms that were needed, the question of its deposition would arise; it further asserted that Russia was in need not of a monarch, but of an elected, salaried Elder, who would serve the people—thus manifesting a republican spirit, although the establishment of a republic was not put forth as a practical task of the near future.

In 1862 appeared a proclamation, "Young Russia," which appealed directly for a bloody revolution, social as well as political, and which was written in an unusually ferocious, Marat-like tone. It divided all Russia into two parts: the party of the people, and the party of the Emperor, and as all those who did not sympathise with the revolution were considered as belonging to the party of the Emperor, they were

to be slaughtered and exterminated everywhere; the axe and fire were advocated with enthusiasm. The author of that proclamation was a young student, Zaichnevsky, who was soon caught distributing the "Golden Charter" in the state of his father (a general), and was exiled to Siberia. The proclamation produced a grave impression, although the matter was not so serious, coming as it did from two young men behind whom there was no party. The Government also attributed to it an exaggerated importance, the more so since at that time numerous conflagrations occurred in Petrograd, which threw the population into a panic. It undoubtedly was the work of incendiaries who announced their purpose in advance, and devastated whole quarters. Some ascribed the conflagrations to students, some to Poles, but it is curious that not one of the incendiaries was caught. That it was the work of young revolutionists, is hard to believe; that Polish emissaries did the work appeared more probable subsequently, when in 1863 the cynic proclamation of General Mieroslavsky was discovered which recommended similar extreme measures for the increase of disturbances in Russia, since general unrest was considered an important prop for the success of the Polish insurrection. But no definite facts have ever been discovered for the confirmation of such propositions. Prince Kropotkin suggested in his memoirs that the conflagrations in many places (the city of Simbirsk and other Volga towns were burned) were the work of the reactionary party, as provocative acts. If his suggestion is correct, one must admit that the work was cleverly carried through, as the guilt for the conflagrations was in the end laid at the doors of Russian or Polish revolutionists, and this circumstance produced a natural rift in the progressive ranks. It doubtless served as the first cause for the turning away of a considerable part of Russian society from progressive aspirations, owing to the terrorising influence of such revolutionary actions.

The Government in its turn reacted upon those occurrences very severely. In the first place it began to arrest all who distributed the proclamations, and soon caught their alleged authors. M. L. Mikhailov, the author of "To the Young Generation," was arrested. The Government began to persecute those who had any relations with Herzen abroad, although before it had regarded visits to Herzen quite liberally (among those visitors had been persons of high standing in the Court circles). In 1861-1862 many such persons were arrested; among them were representatives of the progressive press: Chernyshevsky, Serno-Solovievich, and soon after, Pisarev (for writing a ferocious article for an underground publication). The Senate, before which they appeared for trial, sentenced them severely, often disregarding the law, and being guided exclusively by inner conviction. Chernyshevsky was sentenced to fourteen years of hard labour for the alleged authorship of a proclamation, "To the Landowners' Peasants"; the accusation was based on the testimony of a spy, and partly on the basis of a comparison between the handwriting of a certain note with Chernyshevsky's other manuscripts, although he argued that at least one-half of the letters of that note did not correspond with his characters. Serno-Solovievich was also sentenced to hard labour, and Pisarev was sentenced to two and a half years' imprisonment in the fortress; as a matter of fact he spent there four and a half years, for his preliminary imprisonment was not counted as a part of his penalty.

Not satisfied with these arrests, processes, and banishments, the Government pounced upon those organs in which the revolutionary tendencies had been expressed, or whose personnel had been compromised. The *Contemporary* and the *Russian Word* were discontinued for eight months. At the same time Aksakov's *Day* was discontinued, naturally only for its sharp tone, because Aksakov took no part in the revolutionary movement, and was hostile towards the revolutionary, and par-

ticularly the Nihilist, tendencies. After four months the *Day* was restored under the responsible editorship of Samarin, and then from the New Year Ivan Aksakov was again permitted to edit it, without any changes in the personnel or in the tendency of the paper. But the discontinuation of the *Contemporary* and the *Russian Word*, and the elimination of their leaders, had decisively influenced their further fate.

The main consequence of those events was the split in the ranks of progressive society. The public mood was characteristically expressed during the Petrograd conflagrations in the words of a liberal to Turgenev: "Look what your Nihilists are doing: they are setting Petrograd on fire." The view that the "Nihilists" had become a menace and a danger not only to the Government, but to the very public, was shared by many. A sharp argument arose between the liberal *Russian Messenger* and the radical *Contemporary* and the Nihilistic *Russian Word*. When Katkov (the editor of the *Russian Messenger*) was criticised by Herzen for a virulent article, "To which Party Do We Belong?" in which he derided all existing parties, the *Russian Messenger* opened a ruthless campaign against the *Bell* and Herzen, ignoring his services in the matter of the peasant-reform. The quarrel between them grew particularly bitter in 1861, when Herzen, partly under the influence of Ogarev and later of Bakunin, who fled from Siberia and came to London, began to support the leaders of the Polish movement. He carried on definite negotiations with the Poles, and agreed under certain conditions to support their struggle against the Russian Government; in the eyes of Katkov and his readers this appeared as national treason, the more so since in the ardour of his campaign against the governmental repressions in Poland, Herzen published articles encouraging Russian officers and soldiers to desert their army and fight against the Government for the Polish cause.

All these manifestations of unrest made a very strong im-

pression abroad, especially among circles connected with Russian finances through holding Russian securities. The foreign rumours about the approaching revolution in Russia, which threatened the position of her finances abroad, alarmed the Government; in a circular to all Russian ambassadors Prince Gorchakov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, interpreted the internal events in a way intended to calm the foreign bourses. In his customary picturesque manner Gorchakov wrote: "The expanse of the sea, as Racine says, cannot be calm. Such is the condition here. But the equilibrium is getting restored. When the billows rise, as they now have all over, it would be naïve to assert that the sea will immediately calm down. The main task is to put up dams where danger threatens the public peace and the interests and existence of the State. Toward this are directed our cares, *without deviating from the way which our august Tzar has chosen from the very day of his accession. Our motto is — neither weakness, nor reaction.* Russia begins to understand this motto. It requires time to have it acclimatised also in Europe, but I hope that the most prejudiced minds will be convinced of what is evident."

The Note was intended to quiet European circles interested in Russian financial conjunctures, by persuading them that in the first place there was no revolution as yet, and secondly that no reaction would follow, but reforms would be carried through for the peaceful continuation of Russia's social and economic life.

In the meantime the Polish movement developed *crescendo*, and in 1863 an armed uprising broke out in Warsaw.

The policy of Marquis Velepolsky had been carried on in Poland. He was a very distinguished statesman, but did not, however, win the sympathy of the dominating Polish parties. He tried to realise the policy recommended in 1858 by another Polish statesman, State-Secretary Enoch, who, inspired perhaps by Velepolsky, asserted that if Russia desired the

pacification of Poland she should seek support in the middle class which was economically connected with Russian interests. For the satisfaction of the political demands of that group of the Polish population, Velepolsky proposed a series of more or less liberal reforms inclined mainly towards the restoration of national independence within the limits of the Kingdom, and of such institutions as were composed of local men; as a result of the re-establishment of Polish loyalty to the Tzar it was proposed to reintroduce the Constitution of 1815.

The Russian Government approved of that policy, but it did not satisfy either of the two predominating active revolutionary parties. One of them, the White, composed of the nobility, aspired further politically than Velepolsky (for the restoration of the Poland of 1772), while in the social respect it did not sympathise with the bourgeois-democratic reforms proposed by the latter. The other party, the Red, using demagogic means, demanded more radical reforms than those recommended by Velepolsky, and also required the restoration of the territory of 1772.

Velepolsky, in the capacity of Polish Minister of the Interior, had a number of collisions with the Russian vice-rois who were changed four times during two years (1861-1862). Finally Grand Duke Constantine was appointed to the post (at his own request), and he promoted Velepolsky to the position of Chief of the Civil Administration, which was equivalent to the post of a prime-minister. But by that time Velepolsky, on account of the struggle he had to carry on with both the aristocratic and the democratic parties, was greatly discredited in the eyes of the population.

In his struggle with his internal enemies Velepolsky closed up the "Agricultural Society" which was the centre of the active organisations of the nobles, and, on the other hand, desiring to moderate or somehow avert revolutionary actions on the part of the revolutionary Democrats, he declared a recruitment in

the cities only, hoping in this way to eliminate all the young men of the lower urban classes, who formed the chief support of disturbances and of revolutionary street-riots in the cities. But his attempt to carry out that measure in Warsaw served as a signal for an open revolt.

The first act of the revolt was the annihilation of the sleeping unarmed Russian soldiers in the barracks. That circumstance aroused many in Russia against the Poles, including Aksakov, and particularly Katkov, who up to that time advocated the satisfaction of Velepolsky's demands — the granting of some independence to Poland within the limits of the "Congress-suvka," i.e., the present ten Polish provinces (before 1915. Tr.) Aksakov had considered it desirable for the sake of her dignity for Russia to withdraw her troops from Poland and allow the Poles to take care of themselves. But after the treacherous slaughter of the Russian soldiers many Russian organs published indignant articles against Poland.

The irritation against Poland became still greater when the European Powers attempted to interfere in the matter, and even threatened armed intervention. The "skirmisher" in that case appeared to be, as before the Crimean Campaign, Napoleon III, who maintained active connections with the Polish emigrants. The threats of foreign intervention aroused an unexpected outburst of patriotism in Russia. A mass of patriotic addresses was sent by nobles, merchants, peasant- and town-societies, and even by Schismatics. The address of the last-named was composed by Katkov; it was he who inserted the famous phrase: "In the novelties of thy reign our antiquity is felt. . . ."

Those addresses greatly encouraged the Government and having produced a certain impression abroad helped it to repulse with dignity the attack of the foreign diplomatists. But at the same time the patriotic movement, merged with the anti-Nihilistic current and with the opposition to the revolu-

tionary manifestations that took place in Petrograd in 1862, not only deepened the schism in the ranks of the *intelligentsia*, but produced a considerable shifting of all social elements to the right, so that the radicals remained isolated and weakened. Katkov, who had gone far to the right from the position he occupied in 1861, was triumphant and the hero of the day.

The prestige of Alexander's government was restored, and it was no longer afraid of the liberal and radical opposition which had completely lost its influence. The change in the public mood was expressed among other ways in the fall of the *Bell's* circulation: from two and a half to three thousand it fell to five hundred, and although it existed for five years, its circulation never rose above that number. Its existence became hardly noticeable.

In view of the conditions that had solidified during 1862-1863, a supposition might have risen that the triumphant reaction would discontinue the realisation of the proposed reforms. This did not take place, however. *The Government remained as before directly interested in the promulgation of the reforms.* Without some of them it could not technically administer the country, while others were necessary for the support and development of the cultural and economical life of Russia. In this respect the lesson taught by the Crimean Campaign still preserved its significance. Besides, the Government had to fulfil the programme announced by Gorchakov to the financial circles of Western Europe. The Government was to show its loyalty to the slogan: "Neither weakness nor reaction," and indeed, it undertook to continue the reforms even before the suppression of the Polish uprising. But now the democratic basis which appeared to unite in 1861 the Tver nobility and the *Contemporary* and Aksakov's *Day* was to a great extent eliminated from those reforms which were worked out in a purely bureaucratic way: in the depths of governmental chanceries, of special committees and commissions. True, the

projects were given wide publicity and were discussed by competent persons and in the press, but not in the mood in which the peasant-reform was carried out.

Of the subsequent reforms the first was the financial, which resembled Speransky's Plan of 1809. During the years 1862-1866 V. A. Tatarinov, one of Alexander's most honest and able assistants, after a careful study abroad of various financial systems, had undertaken important measures for the regulation of the financial administration. His measures were first of all directed towards the eradication of the abuses which flourished in all departments in regard to the squandering of sums without any adequate accounting. Tatarinov had centralised the state economy in the hands of the Ministry of Finances which was to be responsible before the State Comptroller for all income and expenditures, and was to prepare a yearly budget-scheme for the approval of the State Council; up to 1862 the budget had not had any publicity. At the same time the so-called "single cash" system was established, by which all individual treasuries at various departments were abolished, and every copeck of income or expenditure had to pass through the Ministry of Finance, which also directed the assignments for single departments in accordance with the state budget. Tatarinov was placed at the head of the State Control, and that department was reorganised so that it might control the carrying out of the budget and also the fiscal accounts at the Capital and in the provinces. Local Controlling Chambers were formed, independent of the administration — of the governors and of the chiefs of separate departments.

Alongside with these reforms for the improvement of the financial apparatus another important measure was undertaken — the establishment of the State Bank; on one hand it supplanted the old credit-institutions which proved quite clumsy for the developing economic life, and on the other hand it was to encourage and finance commercial-industrial undertakings.

Finally, in 1863, the wine-contracts were abolished. The beverage income had constituted the lion share of the budget; the Government had been wavering between two systems for exploiting it, the direct fiscal monopoly of the manufacture and sale of the beverages, or the system of contracts. The abuses of the first system forced Kankrin to prefer the system of contracts which had been abolished by Guriev. But the system of contracts demoralised the officials just as much, as the contractors bribed the whole local administration, so that it was a generally known fact that every local official received two salaries — one from the Government, and another, larger than the first, from the contractors. The Government tolerated that system, being aware of the insufficient salary it paid its functionaries. In 1863 the sale of wine was permitted to all; every vessel of wine or vodka was taxed with a special excise, and every wine-house with a special license-tax. The taxes were collected by local excise institutions, whose personnel was well remunerated and consisted of educated persons.

Parallel with these financial reforms some improvements were made in the personnel of the financial administration. In place of incapable ministers, like Brock and Kniazhevich, the young and capable M. K. Reitern, whose appointment aroused great hopes among society, now stood at the head of the Ministry. Those hopes were ultimately disappointed, but he did introduce some improvement in the management of the finances. The honest, gifted, and energetic administrator, K. K. Grote, was at the head of the new Excise Department.

Next to financial reform came that of the universities, in 1863. During the first years of the new reign the oppressions introduced in the reign of Nicolas were removed, and although the old statute of 1835 remained intact, the students enjoyed actual freedom and independence; the old Curators were supplanted with humanistic and enlightened persons who permitted them to have their organisations and meetings, and publish

their own periodicals free from censorship. Private persons, unclassified students, and even women, were admitted into the universities. The awakened society, not too rich in intellectual forces, placed great hopes in the university youth, and the position of the students was quite honourable. They were flattered by such an attitude, and became imbued with social aspirations; they took active part in establishing Sunday Schools, popular libraries, and similar educational institutions.

In 1860, Pisarev, a new prophet of the young generation, appeared. He demanded that youth be allowed to speak in public, to write and publish their thoughts, in order "to shake up with their original scepticism those stale objects, that dilapidated junk" called "general authorities." "This is the final word of our young camp," wrote Pisarev,— "what can be broken, we should break: whatever will stand the blow—is of use; whatever will be smashed to pieces—is rubbish; at any rate, smash right and left; no harm may come out of this."

The spirit of criticism, self-will, and youthful pugnaciousness toward the professors was not slow in appearing. It became customary in the classes to applaud, to whistle, to hiss. Various demands were presented to the professors. In 1861 one of the first revolutionary proclamations, the one composed by Mikhailov, was directly addressed "To the Young Generation." In Kazan, as I have mentioned, after the Bezdna catastrophe the students led by the young Professor Shchapov had a demonstrative mass served for the souls of the peasants killed by the soldiers. At the convocation of the Petrograd university, February 8, 1861, the students created a scandal when the address announced by Kostomarov about the recently deceased Constantine Aksakov was forbidden by the Minister.¹

¹ To this day Russian revolutionary students are fond of a song which has a refrain about the *nagaika*, i.e., the Cossack-whip:

"Ah, little nagaika, little nagaika, my little nagaika—
Thou danced on our backs on February the Eighth."—TR.

In a word, the university showed, as a correct barometer, to use Pirogov's expression, the stormy tendencies that had accumulated by that time among society.

The Government, alarmed, attempted to check this movement by strict measures. The weak, human Minister Kovalevsky was dismissed, and his place was taken by an extreme obscurantist, Admiral Putiatin, recommended by Count Stroganov, the same Stroganov who was Curator in Moscow during the Forties, and who now stood at the head of the reactionary government circle. Under the chairmanship of Stroganov special temporary rules were worked out for the universities and were sanctioned by the Tzar on May 31, 1861. These rules forbade all embryos of corporative life among the students, even the uniform dress;² they forbade the issue of poverty-certificates, the exemption of poor students from tuition fees and any gathering without the permission of the authorities. Curator Delianov, who was then a liberal and had attempted with the aid of Kavelin and other popular professors to work out in co-operation with student-delegates reasonable and feasible regulations, was discharged immediately after Kovalevsky, to be supplanted by General Philipson, formerly Attaman (chieftain) of the Cossack troops. In the fall, when the new rules were to be put into practice, grandiose student-riots took place, which resulted in mass-expulsions from the University, in a procession of the students through the city towards the home of Curator Philipson, in a collision with the troops near the University buildings, and in the imprisonment of three hundred students in the fortress. Simultaneously the Moscow students rioted and marched on the streets. But there the police instigated the common people against them, by spreading a rumour that the nobles made

² During the last two reigns, however, the wearing of a uniform has been made obligatory for students, under the threat of penalty for being discovered in civilian garb. The motive for this policy has been the Government's desire to facilitate for its agents the task of recognising "suspicious" elements on the street and in public places.—TR.

disturbances because they desired the re-establishment of serfdom. The students were cruelly beaten up, many were arrested, and later expelled from the University. Alexander II was at that time in Crimea with the Empress, who was ill. He was greatly alarmed by these occurrences, hastened back to Petrograd, and expressed his dissatisfaction both with the actions of Count Putiatin and with those of the Petrograd Governor-General Ignatiev. The former gave way to A. V. Golovnin, who was recommended by Grand Duke Constantine, and proved to be one of the most enlightened and well-intentioned Ministers of Education in Russia; Ignatiev was supplanted by the human and good-hearted Prince A. A. Suvorov, who treated the youth very sympathetically. Golovnin at once began to work out a new statute. Professor Kavelin, dismissed with four other professors a short time before for having protested against the measures of Putiatin, was now commissioned to go abroad for the study of university conditions in various countries. Prominent scholars, professors, and administrators took part in the preparation of the new statute.

The project worked out in the Ministry was printed and sent out to various competent persons in Russia and abroad. The press took active part in the discussion of the question. The opinion of Stroganov about the transformation of the universities into exclusive aristocratic institutions was rejected by all. The general views were divided between two systems. One was represented by the historian Kostomarov and by Baron Korf, and it advocated the view that universities were to give the students only knowledge, while education proper should be implanted at home and in the lower schools. The other system was represented by the friends and disciples of the late Granovsky — Chicherin, Kavelin, Katkov, and other liberal professors, who insisted that the universities should have a general educational mission for the young generation. Kavelin brought from abroad the unanimous opinion of foreign au-

thorities in favour of a corporative constitution for the universities. The project was presented to the State Council, after a preliminary discussion by a special commission under the chairmanship of Count Stroganov. The progressive principles were considerably modified and curtailed in that commission, and in such a form it passed the State Council and was sanctioned by Alexander II on June 18, 1863.

The new statute restored the university-autonomy within the limits of the statute of 1804, although it preserved some paragraphs of the statute of 1835, which concentrated a considerable discretionary power in the hands of the Curator. The Statute greatly limited the entrance of outsiders. The corporation of professors received autonomy in the form of a self-governing council of the faculties, but the students were allowed no legal opportunity for the organisation of their own social and academic life. Yet as long as Golovnin remained at the head of the Ministry, his liberal policy contributed to the establishment of some order and peace in the universities.

The secondary schools were also reformed at that time. The gymnasia were divided into classic and "real"; in the first Greek was added to the instruction of Latin, and the preparation was intended mainly for the universities; the "real"-gymnasia were to prepare their students chiefly for higher technical schools. The Statute was sanctioned November 19, 1864, but its realisation was hampered by lack of funds and of Greek instructors.

Here we should say a few words about the secondary schools for women. Before the accession of Alexander no open schools for women had existed; they were taught either at home or in some closed Institutes which were organised according to an antiquated system dating back to the days of Catherine. When, on the basis of the emancipation-movement, the struggle for individualism began, the woman-question became one of the most burning problems. In the press, at provincial assem-

blies, in university circles—everywhere was discussed the necessity of emancipating woman from her dependent and secluded position. In 1859 schools began to open for women in cities where the inhabitants were able to collect from voluntary contributions a more or less sufficient sum. Those woman-gymnasias, at first of four grades, and later of six, were placed under the patronage of the Empress Maria Alexandrovna, and their management was conducted not by the Ministry of Education, but by the Department of the Institutions of Empress Maria (formed by Nicolas I after the death of his mother, Maria Feodorovna, the widow of Paul I). The chief administrator of the woman-gymnasia was the enlightened and distinguished pedagogue, N. A. Vyshnegradsky. The programme of those schools was slightly shorter than that of the "real"-schools.

With the emancipation of the peasants arose the urgent need for the organisation of primary education which up to that time had existed only in a few estates of rich and philanthropically inclined landowners, and partly among the State-peasants. In some places church-parish schools appeared to exist, but in the prevailing majority of cases they existed only on paper. The question about popular schools had been discussed very actively among the *intelligentzia* from the end of the Fifties. With the aid of Professor Pavlov numerous Sunday Schools supported by students, progressive army-officers, women of wealthy families, and so forth, were established in Kiev in 1859 and then in many other cities. During the years of stormy opposition, 1861–1862, in several places the Sunday Schools became the arena for largely naïve political propaganda, which resulted in the Government's decree in 1862, closing all Sunday Schools until the issue of special rules concerning them.

At the same time the idea persistently circulated among society about founding special societies for the spread of learning among the people. One of the projects belonged to I. S.

Turgeniev. Special Committees of Learning were established at the Free Economic Society in Petrograd and at the Agricultural Society in Moscow; those committees were of great use in the work of popular education both through collecting money for schools and through publishing and distributing popular books.

With the appointment of Golovnin as Minister of Education his Ministry began to work on a statute for primary education. Two projects were presented before the State Council, one of which proposed the management of the primary schools by the Ministry of Education, and the other recommended the organisation of local committees in the provinces and districts for the maintenance of those schools. The Chief of the Second Department of H. M.'s Chancery, Baron Korf, suggested to the State Council that it hand over the management of the projected schools to the proposed *zemstvo*-institutions. The State Council decided to organise special councils in the provinces and districts, into which representatives of the *zemstvo* were to be invited. The Statute was sanctioned June 14, 1864.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE abolition of serfdom, as I have already mentioned, caused many changes in the existing system of local administration which had been closely connected with the bondage-right. The landowner had been the sole and unlimited representative of the administrative power on his estate, and most of the police and judiciary positions in the district and provincial administration had been filled by nobles. Such a system could be tolerated only under bondage conditions, but when the Crimean Campaign had revealed the sores in the old order of things, the Government saw the necessity of reorganisation to improve the national and social life of the country through the participation of all capable and living forces of society. Such were the principles expressed by Miliutin, chairman of the commission for the reform of the local administration, in a memorandum presented to and approved by the Tzar at the very beginning of the reforms. Miliutin's plan was: *To give local self-government more confidence, more independence, and more unity.* Declarations of some of the provincial committees, particularly of the non black-soil industrial provinces, followed, emphasising and developing the suggestions of the delegates of the first summons which had indicated the necessity of establishing self-government on an all-class basis, in accordance with the new civil order of the country now liberated from bondage. On those foundations Miliutin's commission prepared the first sketch of the *zemstvo*-institutions.

The same commission was to work out a general police-reform and the organisation of new Peace-institutions for carry-

ing out the peasant-reform. Its work was far from completed, when Lanskoï and Miliutin were dismissed, and the new Minister, Valuiev, assumed the chairmanship of that commission. We know that Valuiev was opposed to the principle of class-equality, and strove to support and strengthen the prestige and power of the nobility, which had been shaken by the abolition of serfdom. Yet he dared not set aside the principle of class-equality altogether, but he tried to give the nobles prevalence in the *zemstvo*-institutions, by lowering the census for nobles in comparison with that of landowners of other classes, and by increasing the number of delegates from private estates over the number of delegates from peasant-communities. But his amendments were rejected by the State Council, owing to their criticism by Baron Korf who pointed out that they would arouse dissatisfaction and irritation among the public. Although the representation of the population was finally based on a curial system, still it was more just and democratic than the one suggested by Valuiev. Valuiev had intended to give electoral rights to nobles who possessed land equal in size to fifty maximum-peasant-allotments of a given region, while the census for landowners of other classes was to be equal to one hundred such allotments. The State Council instituted a uniform census for all categories—the equivalent of one hundred allotments.

The electors of the *zemstvo*-delegates were divided into three curiæ: 1) the curia of private landowners, 2) the curia of village-communities, and 3) the curia of townspeople whose participation in the elections required the possession of real estate in the town of a certain value (three thousand and six thousand rubles), or membership in a merchant-guild, or the possession of commercial-industrial establishments with a turnover of not less than six thousand rubles yearly. For the number of delegates to be sent by each curia to the district-*zemstvo*-assembly Valuiev had intended to institute a preference in

favour of the private landowners, proposing that while the village-communities should elect one delegate from every four thousand allotments, the private landowners should be entitled to one delegate from a tract of land equivalent to only two thousand allotments. The State Council equalised all *curiæ* to a requirement of three thousand allotments for the election of one delegate, and of an equivalent amount of property for townspeople. It was further decided that the total number of delegates elected by one *curia* could not exceed the total number of delegates elected by the other two *curiæ* combined.

The structure of the *zemstvo*-institutions was proposed in the following way. The *zemstvo* organs of the province as well as of the district were divided into those of arrangement and of execution. The first were instituted as *zemstvo* assemblies of delegates elected by the *curiæ*; the number of the delegates to the district-assembly varied according to the size of the district, from fourteen to over a hundred; the provincial assemblies were composed of provincial delegates elected by the district assemblies. The presidents of the district-assemblies were marshals of district nobility, and presidents of the provincial assemblies — provincial marshals of nobility. The district assemblies were to manage economic affairs of the district, the provincial — the economic matters that concerned the whole province. The district-assemblies were made completely independent of the provincial. The assemblies of both categories were to convene once every year for the determination of a general plan of management, for the confirmation of the budget with the right to tax real estate and the commercial-industrial establishments within their region, and finally for the election of executive organs which managed the entire business, and for the examination and approval of the yearly accounts presented by those executive organs, called *Zemstvo*-Boards, provincial and district, each composed of a chairman and several members. The delegates were to be elected for three years, and the

Boards had to be elected for the same term by the assemblies.

As to the competency of the *zemstvo*-institutions, Miliutin, not wishing to expand the circle of affairs under their jurisdiction too much, insisted that in their sphere only they enjoyed full independence from the local administration-authorities, and were subject only to the Senate, while the Governors simply had the right of supervising the legality of their transactions. At first it was proposed to hand over to the *zemstvo* all those matters that had been managed before the Emancipation by the local administration, of which the most important were: the construction and maintenance of roads of communication, matters of public welfare, i.e., hospitals and asylums, and alimentary affairs. Upon the suggestion of Baron Korf, the power of the *zemstvo* was expanded to include caring for the spread of local education, for the construction of churches and of prisons, for the development and organisation of medical and veterinary aid in the districts and provinces, and in general for the benefits and needs of the local population, of the village-interests, commerce and industry.

Such were the general features of the structure and powers of the all-class local self-government organs created by the act of January 1, 1864.

They were introduced at first only in thirty-three provinces, and even there gradually, beginning in the year 1865. By the first of January, 1866, they were introduced in nineteen provinces, by January 1, 1867 — in nine more provinces, totaling twenty-eight; during 1867, in two more, and after January 1, 1868, in four more; the Bessarabia Region was included in the *zemstvo*-provinces.

The public and the press placed great hopes in the *zemstvo*-self-government and many exaggerated its significance, although the Act in itself aroused much criticism. Most pessimistic was the opinion of I. Aksakov who refused to see in it any self-government, but considered it as one of the forms of calling

elected *zemstvo*-men to the service of the State. He greeted only the principle of class-equality put through in the *zemstvo*-act. The most optimistic view was expressed by K. D. Kavelin in a series of articles which appeared in Korsh's *St.-Petersburg News*. He saw in the *zemstvo*-institutions a necessary and excellent school for the preparation of men of all classes for participation in state-affairs under the future representative order; he ardently appealed to all progressive and enlightened persons to take part in the new institutions.

However, the *zemstvo*-institutions had to begin their activity under very unfavourable circumstances, for in 1866 reaction was triumphant throughout Russia. They were regarded with hostility by all governmental organs—local and central, and were soon limited in their right of taxing commercial and industrial establishments; then the publicity and accessibility of *zemstvo*-assemblies was restricted, and the freedom of their discussions limited, in view of which many precious and worthy *zemstvo*-workers soon lost interest in the work, and withdrew from the personnel of the *zemstvo*-boards and assemblies.

Chronologically, the next capital reform of the Sixties was brought about in the judiciary, through the issue of new statutes on November 20, 1864. To grasp the enormous importance of that reform, one must remember what the old courts and court-proceedings had been in the pre-reform days. "Black in the courts with black injustice," thus on the eve of the Crimean Campaign the poet-patriot of the Slavophil camp—A. S. Khomiakov, characterised Russia. "The old court!" I. S. Aksakov who had served personally on many pre-reform judiciary institutions, wrote in the Eighties—"at the very memory of it my hair stand up on end, a frost rasps my skin! . . ."¹

From the time of Catherine the judiciary remained un-

¹ From his editorial in the news-paper *Russ*, February 15, 1884.

changed, although the need for its fundamental reorganisation had been admitted by Alexander I and by Nicolas I, and during those two reigns a number of memoranda, and projects were prepared on the question by such men as Speransky, Nicolas Turgeniev, Dashkov, Bludov, and others. They were unable to shake the firmly established "justice," as long as the bondage system existed, and the nobles prevailed in all grades of state-service and in all state-institutions, central and local. Even under Alexander II the measures undertaken for the improvement of the judiciary at the beginning of his reign enjoyed no success until after the fall of bondage. The judiciary reform progressed in a rapid tempo only after 1861, when it was decided to have no historical connection with the previous structure, but to begin anew, on the basis of new principles founded on juridical science and on the experience of civilised countries. The chief vices of the old order were the class-differentiation of the cases, the multitude of court-instances, the complete dependence of the court on the administration, the archaic inquisitorial process in criminal cases, the secrecy of the proceedings, the declaration of the verdict without arguments of the parties or attorneys, the ignorance of the judges and their meagre remuneration which was the cause of flagrant bribery and abuses, and — in a word — the domination of force over justice and truth. In truth it was an "abomination of desolation in the holy place" (Aksakov).

After the abolition of serfdom and the appointment of Zamiatnin instead of Count Panin to the post of Minister of Justice, the work of the fundamental reform was entrusted to a special committee of enlightened and brilliant jurists. An extremely perseverant and devoted person, State-Secretary of the State Council, S. I. Zarudny, was the life of the work. The main principles were worked out and confirmed by the Tzar in 1862, and a hurried preparation of judiciary statutes on the basis of juridical science was begun. Into the founda-

tion of the new structure were laid the principles of non-class composition of the courts, equality of all citizens before the law, absolute independence of the court from the administration, for which purpose judges were appointed for life, received large salaries, and were chosen from among enlightened and juridically-educated persons.

Trials were to be open and public, with the active participation of both sides; accusations were to be formulated and supported by the procurator, while the interests of the defendant were to be upheld by a sworn attorney. The number of instances was considerably shortened: two for civil cases, and one for common criminal cases. A jury court was established, the jurymen to be chosen in turn from a list of full right citizens who had reached a certain age. The jury system was copied from the English courts. Only in case the jury court acted against the established forms or order of proceedings, or if the law was incorrectly applied by the judge, could the parties appeal to the Senate which, if it found the complaint just, might order a new trial of the case by the same or another court, but at any rate by a new jury. Unfortunately from the very beginning cases of state-treason, of certain official misdemeanours, and also press-cases were eliminated from the competency of the juries, and the general and political importance of the latter was thus diminished.

The independence of the judges was somewhat curbed by the fact that although they could not be removed from office by the authorities, there still remained the system of rewards and presentation of ranks and orders, so that the administration (the minister of justice) had some power over the more pliable judges. Later, during the period of reaction, the Government tried to shake the principle of the permanence of office of judges, and to increase the number of cases eliminated from the jurisdiction of juries (from 1866 on).

Alongside with this general judiciary reform which aspired

indeed for a "fast, just, and merciful" court (the words of Alexander II), there were introduced justices of peace for petty cases, elected by the *zemstvos* and by municipal *dumas*.

One may say without hesitation that in spite of the restriction of some of the principles originally instituted, the judicial reform was the most radical and in principle the most consistent of all the great reforms of the Sixties.²

Unfortunately the new courts as well as the *zemstvo*-institutions began to operate in 1866 at the beginning of a period of prolonged reaction, which mutilated and distorted the judicial statutes of Alexander II, through the so-called "novelles," i.e., partial modifications and amendments which were subsequently enacted as permanent laws.

The last of the great reforms of the Sixties was the new legislation about the press, issued in 1865 in the form of "Temporary Rules." Nowhere during the first ten years of Alexander's reign did the Government and the Tzar show so much vacillation as in the question of censorship regulation and the position of the press. In any case, the liberation of the press from censorship appeared to the Government as the most dangerous of the reforms which it considered necessary

² Maxime Kovalevsky (recently deceased), the greatest authority on Russian institutions, illuminates the impotence of the Russian juries in his article on the "Reforms of Alexander II"

"Not every person is allowed to become a member of the jury; to enjoy this privilege a man must be a land-proprietor possessing not less than one hundred desiatins, or real property valued at five thousand rubles. . . . No wonder that our jurymen show, as has been said, a great severity in judging all offences against property. The requirements of the law have been even increased during the reign of Alexander III, and the growing class of proletarians has been in this way more and more deprived of any participation in the performance of this civil duty. At the same time the Government has kept in its own hands the power of eliminating from the lists any class of people it considers untrustworthy. . . ." M. Kovalevsky, *Russian Political Institutions*.—TR.

to introduce. As early as 1855 Valuiev, later one of the most persistent and cunning oppressors of the press, asserted in his famous memorandum, "A Russian's Meditation," that before all other reforms it was necessary to grant some freedom to the press. Indeed, at the very beginning of the reign the Buturlin-Committee was abolished, and Baron Modest Korf, one of its leaders and initiators, became one of the most consistent liberals in the governmental circles. New magazines were permitted to appear with widened programmes and with the right to discuss political and social questions. Upon the rescript of November 20, 1857, the press was permitted to discuss the peasant-question and the abolition of bondage. Soon, as we remember, there came a pause, a change in the Government's mood, but it passed in a few months. In 1859 Alexander II said to the censor, Academic Nikitenko, that he was opposed to oppression of the press, but that he could not allow any "evil tendencies. . . ."

Actually the freedom of the press grew and developed until the year of 1861, when it manifested in its radical organs an outspoken revolutionary tendency. The progress made in the development of the public thought in six years—from 1855 to 1861—was unbelievable. At that time the stupid obscurantist Putiatin was supplanted by the liberal Golovnin, who began to work on a new censorship-statute, and at the same time tried to influence diplomatically the editors of the magazines. But in the governmental spheres a reaction had already begun, and Minister Valuiev obstructed Golovnin on every step, and complained of his levity toward the press. The matter of repressions and punitive measures against the press was transferred to Valuiev, while Golovnin continued to manage the general censorship and to work on the reform in the commission of Prince D. A. Obolensky. Then came the conflagrations of 1862, and new rules concerning "warnings" and "discontinuations" of periodicals were issued for the restrain-

ing of the press. Those rules were at once applied to the radical Petrograd magazines and to the non-radical, but too sharp, *Day of Aksakov*. Upon the request of Golovnin the whole censorship question was transferred to the Ministry of Interior, where a new commission for its solution was formed under the chairmanship of the same Obolensky. That commission regarded the issue of a new censorship statute untimely and dangerous; instead it introduced in 1865 as an experiment "temporary rules," which continued to exist without considerable changes for forty years.

According to those rules preliminary censorship was abolished for books of a certain volume (not less than ten sheets for original, and not less than twenty for translated books); for periodicals the question of exemption from preliminary censorship was left to the discretion of the Minister of Interior, and for the first time it was decided to introduce that freedom only in Petrograd and Moscow. The permit for publication of new periodicals was also left to the discretion of the Minister of Interior; among the punitive measures those introduced by the temporary rules of 1862 were retained.

Such was the extremely moderate freedom granted to the press by the reform of 1865. Of all the reforms of the Sixties this was undoubtedly the most parsimonious and cautious. Yet on September 1, 1865, the progressive papers, appearing for the first time without preliminary censorship, expressed their joy in eloquent, grateful articles. Soon, however, they were bitterly disappointed.

The low spirits, the prostration and the even reactionary mood, into which certain circles of society had fallen after the revolutionary outbreaks of 1862 and after the Polish revolt, had gradually passed away under the influence of the renewed progressive activity of the Government. In circles of the nobility constitutional aspirations again appeared, though in a more reserved tone, and far less democratic than the Tver

declarations of 1862. The assembly of nobles at Moscow in the year 1865, mostly aristocratically-oligarchically inclined, accepted an address to the Tzar, edited by Katkov. In that address they begged the Tzar "to crown the edifice of his reforms" with the summons of representatives of the Russian land, by which they understood mainly the representatives of the nobles. Alexander II regarded that address unfavourably, and in a rescript to Valuiiev he indicated that the right of initiative in State reorganisations belonged to the Tzar alone, and that such addresses on the part of the nobles might only hinder him in carrying out the reforms he had decided on.

The radical part of the public was at that time, as we have seen, completely deranged; yet partly under the influence of the practical ideals pointed out in Chernyshevsky's novel, "*What is to be done?*" various circles and associations began to arise among the young generation which purported to fulfil the ideals preached in that novel. One enterprising Moscow circle, led by Ishutin, was preparing for a broad and definite propaganda of communistic ideas, but before it had time to start its activity, one of its members, a cousin of Ishutin, Karakozov, an unbalanced and probably abnormal fellow, decided against the persuasions of his comrades to assassinate Alexander II. Karakozov came to Petrograd, and fired a pistol at the Tzar, when the latter was entering his carriage after a stroll with his daughter in the Summer Garden. The bullet missed its mark, because a commoner, Komissarov, who happened to stand near by, pushed Karakozov's hand.³ That event made an indelible impression on Alexander and on the public, and the reactionaries and enemies of the democratic reforms made skilful use of that impression. The period of reforms came to an end before some of them had been carried out; the municipal reform was accomplished in 1870, and that

³ Komissarov was promoted to the rank of nobleman by the Tzar.
— Tr.

of universal military service, in 1874. A stubborn and lasting reaction began in April, 1866, and lasted with a few short pauses till 1905. The reforms which had been accomplished suffered mutilation during that reaction; not only radicals, but even the liberally inclined social groups underwent various persecutions and restrictions. This circumstance did not, however, destroy either the great historical significance of the promulgated reforms, or the preparation and internal development of that socio-political process which forms the contents of Russian history in the nineteenth century, and has not as yet been completed. The importance of the great reorganisations of the period of reforms is such that the dividing line they have placed between the pre-reform and post-reform Russia is impassable and inerascable; no reaction in the Government's and social circles could have returned Russia to her pre-reform position. The reaction which started in 1866 brought much evil to the country: it disturbed the peaceful course of the development of society and of the people; by driving all opposition into the "underground" it provoked an underground revolutionary movement which acquired a more and more irreconcilable and terroristic character; but the reaction was powerless to restore the old régime, for that régime was irrevocably destroyed with the abolition of serfdom and with the development of democratic ideas among the public. The reaction could cripple and distort the new order, but it could not bring back the old.

The democratic principles of the new all-class order have found a favourable soil in the Russian people. In a short time they became so deeply rooted that they proved strong enough to stand a half century-long attack at the hands of the reaction which came immediately after their declaration. The country would perish, and the great State become disrupted because of internal dissensions and a lasting, decomposing struggle, rather than give up those principles; during fifty years, whenever the

reaction weakened through internal or external causes, the inner course of the socio-political process manifested its rights at once and developed with a multiplied force along the road indicated during the period of the great reforms of the Sixties.

PART THREE

CHAPTER XXVII

THE attentate of Karakozov, on April 4, 1866, produced a shocking impression upon Alexander and upon the public. They refused to believe that the attempt was planned and carried out by an individual, and they ascribed it to the work of some powerful and fiendish organisation, of some unknown secret society. General M. N. Muraviov, famous for the cruelty and ruthlessness with which he had suppressed the recent Lithuanian uprising,¹ was appointed head of the committee for the investigation of the affair; but in spite of his vigorous efforts to reveal the alleged conspiracy, and in spite of his unscrupulous actions and orders which terrorised the peaceful citizens, especially college-students and authors, no conspiracy against the life of the Tzar was discovered. The insignificant circle of Ishutin at Moscow had nothing to do with regicide ideas; as a matter of fact the members of that circle tried to dissuade Karakozov from his intention, and considered him mad and abnormal. But the Government made use of the existence of that circle, and of the fact that Karakozov had belonged to it, to throw a shadow of suspicion upon the tendencies of the young generation, upon the state of affairs in the universities, and upon the direction of the Ministry of Education which was then managed by the enlightened and liberal A. V. Golovnin. The court circles did not miss the opportunity to utilise the impressions of those events upon Alexander, and they directed their reactionary blows first of all at the Ministry of Education, even before Muraviov's investigation had come to an end.

¹ In the revolutionary parlance he has been known as the "Hangman."—Tr.

Karakozov's attentate took place on April 4, and on April 5, during the session of the Committee of Ministers, the Super-Procurator of the Holy Synod, Count D. A. Tolstoy, attacked as not sufficiently Russificatory the policy of Golovnin in the Northwest; this partial criticism soon became a general attack, and Golovnin, convinced that he had lost the Tzar's confidence, was forced to resign and leave his place to Count Tolstoy.

Tolstoy had by that time a thoroughly established reputation. In 1859 he made known his pro-serfdom ideas in a sharp criticism of the works of the Editing Commissions; Alexander said of that criticism, that its author either did not understand anything about the peasant-question, or was a person of evil intentions. This did not prevent Tolstoy from becoming Super-Procurator of the Synod in 1864, and Minister of Education in 1866, with definite reactionary plans.

If Muraviov did not succeed in discovering a conspiracy against the life of the Tzar, he and his friends from among the court-reactionaries succeeded in connecting the unrest and fermentation in the minds of the young generation with the policy of the Ministry of Education and with the tendencies of the radical press. The *Contemporary* and the *Russian Word* were closed forever; the attitude of the Government towards the young generation was characteristically expressed in the Imperial rescript on the name of Prince P. P. Gagarin, President of the Committee of Ministers, dated May 13, 1866. "Providence has willed," the rescript read, "to reveal before the eyes of Russia what consequences we may expect from aspirations and ideas which arrogantly encroach upon everything sacred, upon religious beliefs, foundations of family life, property right, obedience to the law, and upon respect for the established authorities. My attention is now turned to the education of the youth. I have given instructions to the end that the education be directed in the spirit of religious truths,

of respect to right of property, and of keeping the fundamental principles of public order, and that in all schools there should be forbidden the open or secret teaching of those destructive conceptions which are hostile to all conditions of moral and material well-being of the people." The rescript invited the parents to co-operate with the Government in its activity; it further indicated the necessity for guarding the existing order of things from all sorts of destructive attempts emanating from certain pernicious organs of the press, and from private persons (some of whom occupied State positions, the rescript declared). "It is necessary," the paper concluded, "to put a stop to the repeated attempts for arousing hostility among various classes, particularly against the nobility and the landowners, in general, in whom the enemies of public order naturally see their direct opponents."

The reaction that began in 1866 affected not only the Ministry of Education; after the resignation of Golovnin other resignations followed. Prince V. A. Dolgorukov, Chief of the Gendarmes, resigned, among others. He could not be suspected of liberalism, but after the event of April 4, he admitted that he was too old for his position. He was supplanted by a young court-general, Count P. A. Shuvalov, who soon became the soul of the reaction in governmental spheres; he was joined in the Committee of Ministers by Valuiev and by Minister of State Domains, General Zelenoy. They formed a very influential triumvirate. Prince A. A. Suvorov, the human and tactful governor-general of Petrograd, was also dismissed and succeeded by General Trepov who was appointed Supreme Chief of Police in the Capital; he had already manifested his abilities as Supreme Chief of Police in the Kingdom of Poland.

Shuvalov, Valuiev, and Zelenoy presented a project to the Tzar about the strengthening of gubernatorial powers; although that project contradicted to the recently promulgated liberal reforms, and in spite of the opposition of Minister of Justice

Zamiatnin and Minister of Finance Reiter, Alexander admitted the necessity of the measure, owing to the fact that Shuvalov constantly disturbed him with reports about the unrest in the provinces. Although it required legislative sanction, the measure was passed in an administrative order, in the form of an act of the Committee of Ministers, confirmed by the Tzar. Persons of judiciary ranks, whose independence had not long before been established by the new statutes, were ordered in a special circular to present themselves before the governor of their province whenever he demanded this, and to regard the governor as the representative of the monarchical authority. Thenceforth not one official could occupy his position without the consent of the governor; to this rule were subject the Controlling Chambers which had just opened, and even the *zemstvo*-institutions, although the latter were recognised by the law as non-governmental, but "public" institutions. Such were the first symptoms of the reaction in 1866.

Here we should note that the event of April 4, 1866, and the white terror perpetrated by M. N. Muraviov, which followed it, had a tremendous influence not only on governmental circles, but also upon the public. Some journalists, like Katkov, who now passed definitely to the side of the reaction, furiously attacked the Nihilists and the seditious Poles. For these Katkov found even Muraviov's measures not sufficiently severe. Others, like Niekrasov, were so frightened that they were ready to make the most undignified compromises with Muraviov. This, however, did not save Niekrasov's magazine from being discontinued. Still others, like Dostoievsky, were not only sincerely terrified by the event, but held society responsible for it. On the whole an extreme mental confusion reigned, which naturally was utilised by the Government. Under such unfavourable circumstances the new courts and the *zemstvo*-institutions had to begin their activity.

Yet, we have already observed, in spite of the new

tendency of the Government the reaction was not in a position to set Russia back to her pre-reform position. The reforms accomplished could be distorted, but not recalled. Moreover, during this reactionary period the Government was forced to proceed with carrying out the reforms in various departments of national life and administration which had been planned in the preceding years. It had to complete the arrangement of the peasant-affairs by expanding the Act of February 19 upon the State (formerly Fiscal) peasants, to introduce the principles of self-government in municipalities, and finally to accomplish the great reform in the matter of military service, and a series of reforms within the army. Alongside with these it had to pursue a progressive financial and economical policy in order to help the development of the country, although such a policy hardly harmonised with the new reactionary course in the affairs of internal administration and education.

For these reasons Alexander II was obliged to retain such advocates of progress as Dmitri Miliutin in the Ministry of War, as Grand Duke Constantine at the head of the Navy and of the State Council, as Tatarinov at the post of State Comptroller, and as Reiter in the position of Minister of Finance, while he saw Tolstoy succeed Golovnin, and the formation within the Committee of Ministers of the reactionary triumvirate of Shuvalov, Valuiev, and Zelenoy. In a word, life in Russia did not stop or regress during that heavy period of governmental and to some extent public reaction, but it continued, as we shall see, to develop and progress, although under the yoke of repressions and reaction that development had frequently assumed morbid and mutilated forms. The foes of progress could do nothing more, in the face of the uncontrollable process of the internal growth and development of the national organism, than put sticks into the wheels and hinder the process as much as they could.

In 1866 the peasant-reform was completed by spreading the

fundamental principles of the Act of February 19 to the numerous categories of the State peasants. Still earlier—in 1863—the reform was applied to the *Udielny* peasants. The name *udielny* (appanage) was used in the Act of the Imperial Family, issued under Paul in 1797, for the peasants who were ascribed to estates of members of the Imperial family. By the time of the peasant-reform there were about eight hundred and fifty thousand *Udielny* peasants of the male sex. Upon Alexander's request the Ministry of the Court issued in 1858 a special ukase, equalising the *Udielny* peasants in their personal rights and administrative management with the State peasants; this measure at once abolished personal bondage in the Imperial estates. As to the land-allotments of those peasants, a special commission in the Ministry of the Court discussed their conditions for two years after the emancipation act of 1861, and as a result the position of the *Udielny* peasants was made considerably better than that of the landowners' peasants. In the pre-reform period the *Udielny* peasants possessed larger "basic" portions than other categories, and besides they made use of various additional portions out of the "reserved" lands of the Imperial estates. The application of the Act of February 19 to those peasants would have put them in a much worse condition than before. Count Adlerberg, Minister of the Court, disagreed with the Main Committee, which suggested that the *Udielny* peasants relinquish their additional, reserved portions, in view of the fact that their "basic" allotments were quite satisfactory in comparison with the allotments of the landowners' peasants; he worked out a project which was approved by the Tzar and enacted as a law on June 26, 1863, by which the peasants reserved all their former allotments, while those whose allotments were below the maximum portions of the landowners' peasants, received additional land. Thus the maximal norms of the allotments of the landowners' peasants were taken as minimal norms for those

of the *Udielny* peasants. At the same time the obligations remained unaltered (they were comparatively light. Tr.), and the *obrok*-payments at once began to be counted as redemption-payments, to be completed in forty-nine years; the peasants were directly acknowledged as proprietors of their allotments.

As to the numerous categories of the State peasants, it was decided to apply the Act of February 19 to them also. Before the formation of the Ministry of State Domains under Count Kiselev, during the reign of Nicolas I, the possession of the State lands had no order or regulation. In some places Fiscal peasants were in possession of enormous tracts of land, which they were actually unable to cultivate; while in other places they owned not more than half a desiatin per soul, and were obliged to rent land from neighbouring landowners or even peasants. During the Forties Kiselev founded Cadastral commissions which were to equalise the allotments of the Fiscal peasants throughout the empire, and in cases where it was impossible to allot the peasants sufficient land, they were to be transplanted to other free State lands, and pay *obrok*. Another task of the commissions was to work out a just system of *obroks*, in accordance with the agricultural and industrial conditions of different allotments. After almost twenty years of work, those commissions succeeded in establishing more regulated conditions for the Fiscal peasants in the provinces of European Russia; in provinces where land was scarce the minimum of the peasants' allotments was eight desiatins per soul — a quite satisfactory amount in comparison with the allotments of the landowners' peasants, while in provinces where land was abundant the peasants received as much as fifteen desiatins per soul. Thus even under Kiselev (1837-1856) the State peasants were considerably provided with land. As to taxes, the Cadastral commissions estimated them not according to the size of the allotment, but according to the income of the peasants, since in many provinces the peasants were occupied

with industry more than with agriculture. In the end the *obroks* of the State peasants were considerably smaller than those of the landowners' peasants.

When the general peasant-reform began, Kiselev had already left his post, and was succeeded at first by Sheremetiev, then (from 1857) by M. N. Muraviov, the most vicious and clever serfholder among Alexander's ministers. Fearing that the prosperity of the State peasants would bring about the enactment of better laws for the landowners' peasants, Muraviov decided to make the condition of the State peasants worse. With this aim he undertook in 1859 a revaluation of the *obrok*-assessments; he claimed that the State land allotted to the peasants belonged to the State, not to the peasants, and their *obroks* were not taxes, but rental fees. The new *obroks* were increased on the whole fifty per cent., in some places, eighty per cent. When the ukase of March 5, 1861, was issued, ordering the introduction of the emancipatory reform in the State domains, Muraviov prepared a project which was very unfavourable for the State peasants. Fortunately, however, some defenders of their rights were found among the members of the Main Committee and the question fell into the hands of N. A. Miliutin, who succeeded in frustrating Muraviov's attempts, and in making the State peasants hereditary owners of those allotments which were given to them by the Cadastral commissions. We have seen that those allotments were larger than even those of the *Udielny* peasants, let alone those of the landowners'. As to the obligations, in spite of their considerable increase owing to the efforts of Muraviov in 1859, they were still smaller than the *obroks* instituted for the landowners' peasants.

In the legal and administrative respects the *Udielny* and State peasants—the latter by the ukase of January 18, 1866—were to enjoy the general system instituted for the landowners' peasants. This equalised the entire Russian peasantry legally and administratively. Yet the final settlement of the

State peasants was delayed a few more years after 1866, owing to the fact that the Cadastral commissions had not completed all their work by that time, and in single provinces special enactments had to be carried through between 1867 and 1872. Thus the land question of the landowners' and of the *Udielny* peasants was settled much earlier than that of the State peasants, and the allotments of the latter were not at once considered their property; they had to redeem them later at considerably raised norms.

We get the following picture of Russian landownership in the Seventies of the nineteenth century from the official data of the Central Statistic Committee, issued in 1878 for forty-nine provinces of European Russia, not including Finland, Poland, and the Caucasus. The entire land in those forty-nine provinces was estimated as three hundred and ninety-one million desiatins, in round figures; this included one hundred and fifty million desiatins of fiscal lands, i.e., lands not allotted to the peasants, but at that moment the property of the State,—which formed thirty-eight and a half per cent. of the entire territory. Lands of the Imperial family, after the allotment of the *Udielny* peasants, occupied seven and four-tenths million desiatins, or two and two-tenths per cent. of the whole territory; in private property of landowners of all classes were ninety-three million desiatins, i.e., twenty-three and seventy-eight hundredths per cent.; of the latter the land belonging to nobles proper toward the end of the Seventies amounted to only seventy-three million desiatins, while lands owned by non-nobles, by commoners, among whom were also rich peasants who bought property outside of their communities, amounted to twenty-million desiatins. The amount of lands owned by churches, cities, monasteries, and other institutions reached eight and a half million desiatins. Finally the total amount of the peasant-allotments was one hundred and thirty million desiatins, i.e., thirty-three and four-tenths per cent. of the territory of

the forty-nine provinces — considerably more than the amount of land in private ownership.

Professor L. V. Khodsky published a book in the Eighties, devoted to the study of the position of the peasants after the Reform and of the material well-being of separate peasant-classes. Before this, in 1876, Professor Yanson undertook the same task, and endeavoured to estimate the allotments and obligations of the peasants on the basis of quite unsatisfactory figures. Later we shall have to deal with his calculations and conclusions, but at present, for the general picture of land-ownership in Russia, I shall quote Professor Khodsky's figures, because they are based on the data of the Central Statistic Committee, published in 1878. Khodsky had figured out that out of ten million six hundred and seventy thousand State and *Udielny* male peasants, five million four hundred thousand, or fifty per cent., were given generous allotments; three million eight hundred thousand, or thirty-five per cent., were given sufficient allotments, and one million four hundred and fifty-five thousand, or thirteen and seven-tenths per cent., were given insufficient allotments. Professor Khodsky employed the terms "generous," "sufficient," and "insufficient," conditionally. He indicated that the maximal allotment of the landowners' peasants was equal to one-half of the amount of land the peasant was capable of cultivating, considering that he did not receive that portion for which he had to work three days *barshchina* in the pre-reform days. In regard to the State peasants, Khodsky figured on the basis of the reports of the Cadastral commissions, and in view of the absence of *barshchina* among them, that the average allotment of the State peasants was sufficient for a tolerable existence, and absorbed the whole working capacity of the individual; hence he regarded the allotments that were above that average norm as *generous*. Out of these considerations Khodsky concluded that fifty per cent. of the State and *Udielny* peasants were allotted *generously*, and thirty-

five per cent.—*sufficiently*. By *sufficiently* Khodsky understood, not quite consistently, the allotments that were to be classed between the maximal norm of landowners' allotments and the average norm of the State allotments. This second class appeared far from uniform, because the peasants whose allotment approached the maximal norm of the landowners' allotment received, as we have seen, only one-half of what they were capable of cultivating, while those whose possessions were near the average norm of the allotments of the State peasants, received indeed a more or less sufficient portion. For this reason Khodsky considered in the province of Samara, for instance, those who received more than ten desiatins as generously endowed, while in the category of the sufficiently endowed he included those who received from three to ten desiatins—a quite variegated category. Finally, Khodsky found that the allotments below that norm were absolutely *insufficient*, and in this category he figured thirteen per cent. from among the State and *Udielny* peasants.

As to the landowners' peasants, whose number was approximately equal to the total number of the State and *Udielny* peasants (there were about ten million State, and about eight hundred and fifty thousand *Udielny* peasants—altogether about ten million six hundred thousand souls, while the number of landowners' peasants was also about ten million six hundred thousand),—Khodsky found among them only thirteen per cent. *generously* allotted, i.e., whose portions were above the average norm of the State peasants. Then four million six hundred thousand and twenty-five, or forty-three and a half per cent., were allotted *sufficiently*, and finally forty-two per cent.—four million four hundred and sixty thousand—received absolutely *insufficient* allotments. If we put all the categories of the peasants together, we find that of the total of twenty-one million two hundred and seventy-eight thousand male souls there were six million nine hundred thousand *gen-*

erously allotted, mainly from among the State and *Udielny* peasants; they formed thirty-two per cent., i.e., *less than one-third* of the total mass. Eight million four hundred and thirty thousand, or about forty per cent., were *sufficiently* allotted with those limitations of that term which I have observed. Finally five million nine hundred thousand, or about twenty-eight per cent., i.e., *more than one-fourth*, were allotted *insufficiently*.

On the whole this treatment of the peasants was quite liberal, if we compare the general dimensions of peasant ownership with those of private landownership of that day, and do not take into account the enormous tracts of fiscal landownership which consisted in the main of remote and unarable land, of which only four million desiatins were utilised as *obrok*-paying assets, while the remaining one hundred and forty-six million desiatins were situated chiefly in the northern provinces, and consisted of forests, water, and marshes, which greatly increased the total amount of fiscal landownership, but, in view of their climatic and soil-conditions, did not form a part of the utilisable land-fund.

This is, in general features, the picture of the peasants' landownership, as it appeared soon after the realisation of the Reform. In another chapter we shall analyse the changes and defects that had eventually been revealed in that system.

CHAPTER XXVIII

WE shall now examine the immediate economic and social results of the peasant-reform, which have directed the general current of Russian life until recent times.

Historians who have studied this question—like Professor Miliukov in his book, “Studies in the History of Russian Culture,” and those who have quite recently investigated the data connected with this question—like M. Oganovsky in his work, “Studies in the History of Agrarian Relations in Russia,” published in 1911,—agree that the first immediate, and at the same time the most conspicuous, consequence of the peasant-reform was the extraordinary rise of the growth of the population. P. N. Miliukov arrives at this conclusion after an examination of past centuries; he justly indicates that the growth of the population had been checked for a long time, and that at the beginning of the eighteenth century, in the period of Peter’s stormy activity, his wars and expensive reforms and constructions, the population of Russia, especially of her central regions, had absolutely decreased. We may fairly presume the same to have been true during the Troubled Time, at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century. Miliukov supposes therefore that beginning perhaps with the sixteenth century down to the second quarter of the eighteenth century, there had been no increase in the population, since the entire surplus was swallowed up by the enormous sacrifices which the people had to make for the creation of the Russian state and for territorial aggrandisement. Miliukov gives the following figures for the central provinces, i.e., for the Petrine province of Moscow which embraced the future provinces of Kaluga, Tula, part of Riazan, part of Nizhni-

Novgorod, Kostroma, Vladimir, and part of Tver: In 1678 there were thirty-nine persons per square verst, in 1724 — somewhat less than twenty-nine persons, and only in 1858, on the eve of the peasant-reform, did the density of the population again reach that of the middle of the seventeenth century, i.e., thirty-nine and four-tenths per verst. At first glance there appears indeed an enormous leap in the growth of the population during the last forty years of the nineteenth century. In the Petrine province of Kiev Miliukov estimated in 1678 eleven and four-tenths per square verst, in 1724 — eleven and two-tenths, while in 1858 the density of population there reached forty persons per square verst, and in 1897 — fifty-seven,— a growth not only in the post-reform time, but even before the Reform. P. N. Miliukov brings analogous figures for other parts of European Russia, which seem to prove that although the growth of the Russian population has progressed quite rapidly since Peter, its most rapid progress was manifested after the Reform. Most of the later investigators are inclined to share this view, among them the above mentioned Oganovsky who cites Miliukov's figures and diagrams in support of his opinion of the great significance of the increased growth of the population after the Reform.¹

If we should take into account, however, the data of all the census that took place in Russia during the nineteenth century, we shall see that the growth of the population changed somewhat differently from the way Mr. Oganovsky suggests. Thus, if we trace the numbers from the fifth "revision" (census), at the very end of the eighteenth century, to the cen-

¹ It seems that the first investigator of the peasantry to have categorically claimed the "extraordinary" growth of the population after 1861, was P. P. Semionov, in his introduction to the Census materials issued in 1882. To a considerable extent his conclusion was shared by P. B. Struve, in his famous early work, *Critical Notes on the Question of Russia's Economic Development*, Petrograd, 1894. In his later work, *The Bondage Economy*, published in 1913, Struve rejected his former point of view.

sus of 1897, i.e., for one hundred years, we shall find that at the beginning of that period the population of Russia was about thirty-six million of both sexes, including (approximately) the population of the conquered provinces, or twenty-nine million without the latter. The next, sixth, "revision" took place before the war, in 1811, and showed that the population had increased in fourteen years from thirty-six to forty-one million. By the seventh "revision," taken immediately after the war of 1812, the *general* population of the Russian Empire had increased to nearly forty-five million, but one must observe that this number included the population of the annexed territories — the Kingdom of Poland (about three million), the Grand Duchy of Finland (over one million), the region of Bessarabia (about three hundred thousand), and the dominion of the Caucasus where it was impossible at that time to get any figures as to the number of the people. Excluding these territories, we see by the calculation of Academic Herman² that without Poland, Finland, and Bessarabia, but including the Caucasian portion and Siberia, Russia had in 1811 a male population of eighteen million eight hundred thousand in round figures, which within four years diminished by nearly a million. Considering that the annual increase of the population in the preceding years exceeded one per cent., the increase during the four years should have been approximately eight hundred thousand, whereas there was a loss of nearly one million, i.e., in general the human loss caused by the Napoleonic wars was over one and a half million male persons. After the wars the population began to grow again, in spite of the existence of bondage; as in the case of other countries, slavery did not lead to the diminution of the population. Indeed, during the Thirties and the Forties the numbers increased greatly, and by the ninth

² In accepting the data of Herman, I have corrected the important errors included in his table published in *Mémoires de l'Académie des Sciences de St. Petersbourg*, 1820, page 456.

"revision" we see that in 1851 there were sixty-eight million as against forty-five million in 1815, i.e., in thirty-six years the population increased more than one time and a half, in spite of the fact that there were no territorial acquisitions during that time, and that those years included the cholera epidemic of 1848, when owing to the ignorance of means for combating the disease about one million people perished; besides, there were a number of famines on account of failure of crops (1820-1821, 1833, 1839-1840, 1843-1846, 1848). In the short period of seven years, from the ninth "revision" to the tenth, in 1858, the population again increased considerably, reaching seventy-four million, in spite of years of misery, including the Crimean Campaign which cost at least half a million lives.

Thus we see that under bondage the *general* population grew quite noticeably. True, the number of bonded peasants not only did not increase, but diminished between the eighth and ninth, and ninth and tenth "revisions," but this shows merely that even during the bondage system there was a considerable number of peasants who had changed their status—through liberation of single villages (the number of which was quite considerable after 1804), through redemption of persons or families, through the purchase of estates from landowners by the State, under Kiselev (about fifty-four thousand souls), through flights and forced exiles to Siberia. But the most considerable loss of bondmen was due to the recruitments which took place every other year, and at times every year, requiring from five to ten men out of every thousand. Between the eighth and tenth "revisions" the recruitments diminished the number of bondmen by not less than one and a half million.³

³ From 1834 the recruitments took place each year alternately in one-half of the empire, taking five to ten men from every thousand. During the war of 1853-1856 seventy men were recruited from every thousand, which depleted the ten million bondmen by not less than seven hundred thousand. One should also bear in mind that the re-

Thus we may come to a well founded conclusion that the number of the bonded peasantry diminished not because of the decrease of the *natural* growth of the population, but merely because a considerable part of the bondmen were then assigned to different classes of the people.

I am bringing out these facts in order to limit the optimistic conclusions which are apt to spring from the superficial comparison of the numbers of the peasants before and after the emancipation. If we take the whole first half of the nineteenth century, it will indeed appear that the growth of the population during that period was smaller than during the second half of the century—on account of the Napoleonic wars and epidemics; but after the Napoleonic wars, in spite of two cholera epidemics and numerous crop failures, the relative growth of the population was almost as large as after the Emancipation. In my opinion the increase of the population in the years following the Napoleonic wars was one of the main causes which, alongside with a number of other economical conditions that undermined the system of bondage-land-ownership, prepared the fall of bondage.

A priori considerations lead the investigators of the post-reform to another idea—that after such an event as the emancipation of the peasants from bondage there must have taken place in a large degree the *distribution* of the population among less populated fertile provinces, on the one hand, and its movement into cities—on the other. The latter especially, since with the abolition of serfdom it appeared possible to bring about those conditions which create in all countries a normal development of capitalism (the increase of the labour supply on the market, and the transition of natural wealth into money-wealth on a large scale). Some historians have followed these

cruits were men between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five, i.e., the most fecund producers of children, which fact decreased the number of births in the years following recruitments.

a priori considerations, and accordingly interpret the figures given by the statistic data. But if we should follow the statistic material furnished by the "revisions" and censuses, and by the data collected at various times by the Central Statistic Committee, we shall see that in this case also the *a priori* considerations are not justifiable.

A detailed study of the growth of population in single provinces will show us that in the regions where the peasants immigrated before and after the Reform, i. e., in the provinces where the population had particularly increased during the nineteenth century, a considerable part of that increase, and in some provinces the main part, took place in the pre-reform time. A comparison between the growth of the population from 1797 to 1897 in the southeastern and southern provinces with its growth in the central, particularly in the non black-soil provinces, will show a colossal difference. Whereas in the province of Yaroslavl the increase for the whole century was seventeen per cent., in those of Vladimir and Kaluga, thirty per cent., in those of Kostroma, Tver, Smolensk, Pskov, and even the *black-soil* Tver, fifty to sixty per cent.,—in the province of Astrakhan the increase was one thousand and seven hundred and fifty per cent., in that of Ufa—one thousand two hundred per cent., in that of Samara and in the Region of the Don Army—one thousand per cent., in that of Kherson—one thousand per cent., in Bessarabia—eight or nine hundred per cent., in that of Tavrida (Crimea)—four hundred per cent., in that of Yekaterinoslav—three hundred and fifty per cent., and so forth. These figures indicate a considerable outflux of the population from the centre to the peripheries. Among the central and northern non black-soil provinces only those of Moscow and Petrograd show during that time an increase of one hundred and fifty per cent. for that of Moscow, and five hundred per cent. for the province of Petrograd, an increase explained wholly by the growth of the urban popu-

lation in the capitals. From the table and cartograms at the end of this chapter you can observe that the process of the migration from the centre to the peripheries had taken place in a considerable measure, and in some cases largely, in the pre-reform period.

Approximately the same may be said concerning the growth of the urban population in Russia. P. N. Miliukov, in his work on the history of Russia culture, gives very interesting figures about the growth of the urban population for the last two and a half centuries. In the middle of the seventeenth century, in 1630, the urban population numbered two hundred and ninety-two thousand, or two and four-tenths per cent. of the entire population. About one hundred years later their number increased only to three hundred and twenty-eight thousand, or two and a half per cent. of the total population; we must remember that this was in the time of Peter, when the numbers of the people diminished greatly. By the fourth "revision," made in 1782, we had already eight hundred and two thousand urbanites, or three and one-tenth per cent. of the total population. The fifth "revision," in 1796, the starting point for the study of the population movement in the nineteenth century, shows one million three hundred and one thousand — four and one-tenth per cent. of the total population. For the sixth "revision" Miliukov gives the figures of one million six hundred thousand, or four and four-tenths per cent.; for the "revision" — three million and twenty-five thousand, or five and eight-tenths per cent.; for the ninth "revision," in 1851, three million four hundred and eighty-two thousand — five per cent.;⁴ for 1858 — six million, or nine and two-tenths per cent. of the total. Then Miliukov takes at once the census of 1897, and shows the number of the urban population as sixteen million two hundred and eighty-nine thousand, almost thirteen per cent. of the entire population.

⁴ Miliukov gives the wrong percentage — seven and eight-tenths.

The general conclusion that one may draw from these figures is that the urban population increased after the Reform not only absolutely but even relatively, although Miliukov himself finds the present proportion of the urban to the general population very unfavourable, in comparison with other countries of a higher culture. As a matter of fact, the figures used by Miliukov require considerable corrections. Those he employs for the pre-reform time (except the figures for 1858, evidently) denote the numbers of the so-called *city classes*, the merchants and commoners (*mieshchanie*) combined, whereas the census of 1897 gives the number of all the *city inhabitants*, not only of the merchants and commoners. From the data of the Economy Department we can see that in 1847 the entire urban population of Russia equalled four million seven hundred thousand persons, of whom there were two million three hundred thousand commoners, or fifty per cent., about four and a half per cent. were merchants, about five and a half per cent. nobles and other privileged persons, about one-half per cent. — clergy. All these categories formed sixty-one and a half per cent. of the total number of city inhabitants, while the remaining thirty-eight and a half per cent. were marked in the category of “others.” Professor Ditiatin, who has made a special study of the history of Russian cities in the nineteenth century, explained that the “others” denoted “factory workers, labourers, drivers, and other categories of workingmen almost all whom belonged by their origin and ascription to the *peasant-class*.”

Indeed, we witness a similar phenomenon at present: in Moscow and Petrograd an enormous portion of the population is ascribed to the peasants in spite of the fact that for years and decades they have lived in the cities, engaged in commerce or industry. By the end of the Forties nine per cent. of the Petrograd population were commoners, and five per cent.—merchants, while the remaining eighty-six per cent. belonged to non-urban classes.

Hence it is evident that the city-classes and the city-inhabitants are not synonymous; the figures given by Miliukov for the city-classes of the pre-reform days can not be compared with the figures of the city-population as a whole, given by the census of 1897, which included nobles and peasants and persons of various ranks who lived at that time in the cities.

If we should take for a basis of the city contingent of the population the data of the Economy Department, taken in the forties, quoted and illuminated by Professor Ditiatin, we shall have to multiply the figures⁵ quoted by Miliukov for the pre-reform time at least one time and a half, if not more, and then the picture will be quite different. It will appear that the growth of the city population proceeded consistently, gradually, very slowly, and has increased little after the Reform. One must note, however, that in regard to the population of the capitals and of some big industrial centres, it grew considerably more rapidly after the Reform than before it.

Thus you can see that the *a priori* considerations about the effect of the peasant-reform on the growth of the population, on its distribution through the empire, on the growth of the cities and, in general, on the preparation of the capitalistic order, are not quite correct, and should be regarded with great caution. Upon a close study of the figures and relations, we see that the transformation of the economic status after the Reform has been accomplished more slowly and gradually than one might have expected.

The reasons for this fact are quite simple. During the first years after the Reform Russia was in a very depressed economic state. On one side the peasants found themselves burdened with almost intolerable payments; on the other side, the land-owners were unable to cope successfully with the new condi-

⁵ I do not know where Miliukov has taken his figures for the population in 1858, but they evidently express the entire city population, not only the city-classes.

tions produced by the revolution. The landowners lacked the resources required for the new form of agricultural management which demanded not only hired labour, but also a complete new inventory—implements and cattle, for under the bondage system the peasants had cultivated with their own implements and cattle the land of their masters. Not having their own inventory, the landowners of the black-soil provinces were not infrequently forced to rent the larger part of their estates to the emancipated peasants.

In the non black-soil, industrial provinces, the conditions of the landowners were in this respect still worse. With a few exceptions they were unable to meet the new conditions, and their estates were either ruined or sold out; since the peasants did not have the money for the purchase of the much needed land, the estates were sold to merchants or to single rich peasants who treated it like birds of prey, cut out forests and even gardens, and then themselves sold the ravaged estates to peasants.

Such was the situation in the field of agriculture. Curiously enough, in the years immediately following the Reform, we find no improvement in the industrial field either. We know that the merchants and factory owners had expected that the emancipation of the peasants would increase the supply of labour, from among the freed peasants, especially since their allotments were not sufficient. But such was not the case in the first years after the Reform. A great number of factories, especially iron-foundries and cloth-factories, were still Possessional, i.e., they depended on bonded labour. As soon as their working men were liberated, they began to abandon the factories in crowds, in their desire to get away from the hateful places of their long suffering and slavery. For this reason many factories were forced either to close up or to lessen their production in the first years after the Reform.

Tugan-Baranovsky, in his book, *Russian Factories*, sets forth curious figures about the Kuvshinsky works, for instance.


In 1857 that foundry produced four hundred and seventy-nine thousand puds of cast-iron, in 1862 — three hundred and thirteen thousand puds, and even in 1868, seven years after the Reform, it produced only three hundred and fifty-three thousand puds. Such was the general situation in the Urals. All the Ural foundries gave in 1860 fourteen million five hundred thousand puds, in 1861 — only fourteen million two hundred thousand puds, in 1862 — ten million four hundred thousand, in 1863 somewhat more — eleven million four hundred thousand, in 1867 — twelve million four hundred thousand puds, and only about 1870 did the total reach the first norm, and soon thereafter began to exceed it. In the seventies the iron-production was considerably larger than in the pre-reform days; it took the iron manufacturers ten years to orient themselves in the new circumstances. The cloth-factories also required five to six years before they could adapt themselves to the new conditions.

It is curious to observe that a similar situation existed for the cotton-mills, although they had instituted hired labour long before the Reform, and had therefore expected an improvement in the labour conditions. It happened that England was going through a severe commercial-industrial crisis at that time, which raised the prices of cotton-yarn (a considerable part of the Russian cotton-mills still depended on English yarn). For this reason their conditions had also somewhat deteriorated in the first years after the Reform.

These circumstances which resulted from or coincided with the peasant-reforms, affected the state of internal commerce in Russia. A clear illustration is furnished by the figures of the turnover of the Nizhni-Novgorod fair. Fairs had a greater significance at that time than now when they are giving way before the modern methods of wholesale trade. In 1860 the turnover of the Nizhni-Novgorod fair was one hundred and five million rubles, in 1861 — ninety-eight million rubles, in

1862—one hundred and three million rubles, and only in 1864 did it exceed the turnover of 1860, reaching one hundred and eleven million rubles, after which it continued to increase.

Such were the post-reform economic conditions in Russia. The state of industry was far from flourishing, and the way was still far to a developed capitalistic order.



DISTRIBUTION OF LAND-OWNERSHIP BY CATEGORIES
IN 49 PROVINCES IN THE YEAR 1878.

DENSITY OF THE POPULATION IN VARIOUS PROVINCES

Provinces in order of density of population in 1797	Per sq mile by revision of 1797 (both sexes)	Place of province in order of density	Per sq mile by revision of 1863 (both sexes)	Place of province in order of density	Per sq mile by census of 1897 (both sexes)	Place of province in order of density	Percentage increase of density for 100 yrs.	Notes
Tula	1600	1	2048	3	2378	5	ab 50%	{ Owing to Mos-
Moscow	1586	2	2672	1	4064	1	150	{ cow.
Kursk	1400	3	2166	2	2776	3	100	
Kaluga	1340	4	1647	8	1760	14	130	
Yaroslavl	1234	5	1430	13	1486	19	17	
Razan	1176	6	1859	4	2220	7	100	
Orel	1170	7	1775	5	2314	6	100	
Vladimir	1062	8	1356	14	1604	17	30	
Penza	1003	9	1674	7	2040	11	100	
Simbirsk	952	10	1306	16	1654	15	72	
Kharkov	932	11	1760	6	2786	2	200	
Smolensk	928	12	1110	18	1440	20	ab. 60	{ Partly owing to
Nizhni-Novgorod	916	13	1340	15	1618	16	75	{ Kharkov.
Tambov	860	14	1644	9	2170	8	150	
Voronezh	840	15	1580	11	2085	10	150	
Pskey	762	16	858	21	1316	21	100	
Kazan	752	17	1431	12	1826	18	150	
Kostroma	624	18	709	25	884	28	50	
Tver	582	19	856	22	946	28	60	
Saratov	504	20	1132	17	1566	18	200	
Petrograd	480	21	1610	10	2668	4	500	{ Owing to Petro-
Yekaterinoslav	396	22	1013	20	1820	13	350	{ grad
Viatka	356	23	806	29	1097	23	200	
Novgorod	283	24	450	38	592	29	118	
Kherson	272	25	450	19	2156	9	700	{ Partly owing to
Tavris (Cimea)	238	26	538	27	1772	22	400	{ Odessa.
Berni	189	27	308	39	476	30	200	
Orenburg	82	28	309	31	360	31	340	
Samarra	82	29	522	26	933	26	1000	
Ufa	82	30	580	24	1090	24	1200	
Don Region	82	31	326	30	892	27	ab. 1000	
Volgda	81	32	129	32	177	33	118	
Olonezh	72	33	165	34	127	34	70	
Asrakian	14	34	130	33	256	32	1750	
Arkhangelsk	13	35	19	35	23	35	75	

CHAPTER XXIX

COMBINED with the depressed economic state of the country was a similar state of the national finances. After the Crimean Campaign, during the whole reform-period, and in the post-reform years, the Government was in very difficult circumstances. One of the main causes was the fall of the course of the paper-ruble. After the money-reform of 1843 and until the Crimean Campaign the position of the Russian finances was quite satisfactory. Owing to Kankrin's reform the amount of credit-money in circulation was very moderate: in 1854 three hundred eleven million rubles, and their course stood at par in view of the presence of a metallic fund of one hundred and twenty-three million rubles, which allowed a free exchange of the paper money. The war required new issues of paper-money, the amount of which reached in 1858 the sum of seven hundred and eighty million rubles, while the metal-reserve had fallen to one hundred and nineteen million rubles, i. e., below the one-sixth norm which Kankrin considered necessary for the uninterrupted maintenance of free exchange; hence the Government was forced to refuse redemption. Naturally the course of such unredeemable money fell continually during the years immediately following the Crimean Campaign.

At the same time the Government was eager to see the development of private credit and of private capitalistic undertakings; with this view it lowered the interest paid for deposits in fiscal credit-institutions — to direct the deposits to private enterprises. The deposits began to flow out rapidly,

descending in ten years to two hundred million from over one billion rubles. In the pre-reform time the Government made free use of that fund, and borrowed from it for its needs, so that in the end the debt of the Government to the saving institutions exceeded five hundred million rubles. When the deposits began to be withdrawn more rapidly than it had been expected, the Government was forced to contract new loans on heavy conditions, and yet it did not cover the entire debt; it still owed the credit-institutions one hundred and sixty million rubles.

The course of the paper-money fell not only because of the superabundant issue of such money and the diminution of the metal-fund, but also because of Russia's extremely unfavourable balance of trade at that time, in view of her insignificant export and large import soon after the war. This unfavourable trade balance was enhanced by the fact that after the abolition of the rule forbidding Russians to go abroad, which was introduced in the reign of Nicolas, the number of Russian travellers abroad became very large, and they withdrew enormous quantities of money from their country.

The situation resembled that after the Treaty of Tilsit and during the Continental System, early in the nineteenth century. Under such difficult conditions the Tzar appointed in 1862 the comparatively young M. K. Reiter as Minister of Finance, after two absolutely incapable ministers — Brock and Kniazhevich. Reiter's ability had been demonstrated through his activity in the financial sub-commission of the Editing Commission, which worked out the plan of the redemption-operation.

Reiter's immediate task consisted in raising the course of the paper-ruble, while his remote ideal was the transition to a permanent metal standard. However we may regard such a plan of political economy, which is reduced to one exclusive problem, we must say that at his very start Reiter committed

a big blunder. In order to raise the course of the paper-money he attempted to make it redeemable by contracting a loan of fifteen million pounds sterling, i.e., about one hundred and fifty million rubles, which at once increased the metal-fund, and allowed the Government to announce that it was ready to redeem the credit-money. But at this Reiter made a naive mistake: he declared that until a certain date the paper-ruble would be exchanged at a certain rate, after a certain time — at a higher rate, then at a still higher, and so forth — calculating that the course of the ruble would constantly rise owing to the redemption. He did not take into account the numerous speculators who hastened to buy out the credit-bills while the rate of exchange was low, to present them for redemption when the rate was promised to be the highest. This mad speculation absolutely paralysed the possible success of the measure; to this was added the Polish revolt, and the expected intervention of foreign powers, the fear of which forced the Government to spend a part of the reserve fund for military preparations. Soon Reiter was not in position to continue the redemption-operation, and the course of the paper-ruble fell lower than before. Although the number of credit-bills in circulation had decreased from seven hundred and eighty million to seven hundred million rubles, the metal-fund had also shrunk from one hundred and nineteen million to fifty-five million rubles, which formed only about one-twelfth of the total amount of credit-money, and was thus less than one-half of the moderate fund considered by Kankrin as indispensable.

Reiter's first big error was masqued, however, by the Polish revolt and by the military preparations which absorbed large sums of money; his reputation did not suffer, and he remained at his post sixteen years. His next activity was directed to the raising of the country's productive powers, after he saw his "heroic" measures for the raise of the paper-course fail. He

understood that in order to increase the export of the Russian chief commodity — grain, it was necessary to build railroads; toward this he directed all his efforts. Owing to the fact that he enjoyed the confidence of Alexander II, Reiter was the actual manager in this matter, in spite of his frequent conflicts with the Minister of Communications.

The history of railroad building presents one of the most cardinal parts of the history of the development of capitalism in Russia, and its study is of great importance for the clear understanding of the course of the transformation of Russian social life after the abolition of serfdom. We have seen the difficult conditions of the embryonic capitalism immediately after the Emancipation; and we all know that the development of a net of railroads is the most powerful nerve in the evolution of capitalism in every country.

The first Russian railroad was the Tzarskoselsky (from Petrograd to Tzarskoie-Selo. Tr.), twenty-five versts long, built in 1837 by private means without any subsidies or guarantees on the part of the Government; the railroad was to remain the property of its builders for an indefinite time. The construction lasted two years, and cost comparatively little — forty-two thousand rubles per verst, including all the necessary buildings. The exploitation of that railroad convinced the Government of the practicability of railroads in Russia, and it undertook the construction of the Petrograd-Moscow line, subsequently called, the Nicolaievsky. At the head of the fiscal undertaking stood Minister of Communications Kleinmichel, one of Arakcheiev's generals; although it is generally testified that personally he was honest, the construction of the railroad was connected with flagrant abuses. True, it was firmly built, especially the depots, bridges, etc., but it cost one hundred and sixty-five thousand rubles per verst, as against forty-two thousand rubles of the Tzarskoselsky railroad. The construction of the Nicolaievsky railroad lasted nine years; the bonded peas-

ants were driven in hordes to the works, and the workers perished in large numbers.

These were the only railroads built during the reign of Nicolas. True, in 1851, the Government decided to construct the Warshavsky (Petrograd-Warsaw) Railroad, again by fiscal means, in spite of the lesson it had learned, but until 1853 only a small portion was constructed, at the expense of eighteen million rubles, and the breaking out of the war caused the work to cease for lack of funds. After the Crimean Campaign the Government of Alexander II, which had just experienced the horrors of want of roads, when the ammunition had to be transported to Sevastopol on horses, and the troops had to march there on foot, determined to consider as one of its first tasks the construction of roads. But in view of the bitter lesson taught by the fiscal management of the building of the Nicolaievsky railroad, and in accordance with the principles of its new economic policy, the Government decided to hand the matter over to private companies, limiting its own rôle to general initiative and to encouragement of private enterprisers. Added to these considerations was the plan for attracting capital and metal-money into Russia, for which reason foreigners were allowed to head the undertaking. Although among the founders was one Russian banker, Stiglitz, most of them were foreigners; even the office of the Company was not in Petrograd, but in Paris. A joint-stock company was formed, under the title, Main Company of Russian Railroads; it issued stock, with the Government's guarantee for five per cent. income on that capital, besides other privileges, as, for instance, that the company should retain ownership of the roads for ninety-nine years. Yet the founders of the company did not furnish any cash capital, but only underwrote it; special "obligations" had to be issued for the construction of the roads. Owing to the fact that the founders had squandered a considerable part of the stock-capital, the building of the roads proceeded with great

difficulties and at high cost — about one hundred thousand rubles per verst.

The Main Company was to complete, first of all, the Warshavsky line, then to construct the line Dunaburg-Riga, next the Moscow-Nizhni-Novgorod line, and finally, the Moscow-Sevastopol line. It had been planned in that way to connect the fertile Volga provinces, part of New Russia, and the central black-soil provinces, with a Baltic port through Moscow, while Moscow would in her turn be joined with the Black Sea (Sevastopol). But the Main Company completed only the Warshavsky road and the line to Nizhni-Novgorod, while the Dunaburg-Riga was not finished by the stipulated time, and the Moscow-Sevastopol railroad was not even begun. Only part of the capital was subscribed abroad, but the larger portion of the stock and obligations the company sold and realised in Russia, so that in the end the hopes of the Government for the influx of foreign capital were not fulfilled; the reverse came to pass, and the whole enterprise, conducted as it was rapaciously in means and methods, proved unfortunate in all respects.

In view of this failure, particularly after it appeared that owing to the high cost of the construction the profitableness of the railroads was doubtful, the more so since the movement of freight on the Warshavsky road was not large, the dividend expectations of the stockholders were not realised, and the Government had to pay out considerable sums on the basis of its guarantee. Not only was the Russian public disappointed in the results of the undertaking, but the Government itself felt almost despondent, and in 1861 it cancelled its first agreement with the Main Company, insisted upon the transfer of the main office from Paris to Petrograd, and that the management should include four members appointed by it; the company was released from its obligation to construct the remaining two railroads.

In spite of this failure, Reiter and the new Minister of Communications, Melnikov, decided to continue the work; in Reiter's opinion the construction of railroads was unconditionally necessary for his basic task — the development of the country's productive powers, in general, and the raise of the course of the Russian money, in particular, by way of increasing the grain-export. Melnikov prepared a quite purposeful plan for the further development of the railroad net; to construct the Moscow-Sevastopol line, the lines Odessa-Kiev and Kiev-Moscow, to complete the Dunaburg-Riga road, to continue it through Riga-Libava (Libau), and to connect that road with Oriol, i.e., with a central point for export commodities, particularly agriculture products; Oriol was to be joined with Tambov and Saratov. On the other hand a line was to be built from Kiev, or from some point on the Odessa-Kiev line, towards the Austrian border, for strategic reasons, and a line from Yekaterinoslav to the Grushevsky coal-mines in the Don Region, in order to provide the new roads with mineral fuel, in case the forests along their course would not furnish them with sufficient fuel.

The plan was apparently well made, but it was very difficult to begin its realisation. Reiter still preferred private capital for the undertaking; he expected an influx of Russian and foreign capital; besides he pointed out that since a considerable part of the construction would have to be done by the aid of loans, it was important that those loans be a private matter, although with the Government's guarantee, lest the contracting of new loans should harm the national credit. On the other hand, Melnikov considered that since private construction had been compromised, the work should be done by fiscal means; he recommended the establishment of a strict supervision, to eliminate thievery. Melnikov's view was defeated, and a hunt for private concessionaires began. It appeared that the heads and members of the Main Company, who had filled their

pockets with Russian money, had spread rumours abroad about the extreme difficulty of constructing railroads in Russia, asserting in addition that the whole enterprise was unprofitable. For this reason no capital could be attracted on the Continent. The Government tried to find willing capitalists in England, and offered them extraordinary privileges, such as ninety-nine years of proprietorship, a guarantee of five per cent. profit for the entire capital, gratis sites for depots at Sevastopol, Moscow, and other places, and even its readiness to establish porto-franco at Sevastopol, i.e., the Government was willing to promulgate measures which would have undermined its own financial policy.

Fortunately the English proved too slow, and let pass the final date announced by the Government; owing to that delay only the concession did not take place. Then Melnikov suggested that temporarily at least the construction of some of the projected roads be commenced by fiscal means. The Kiev-Balta railroad was built in this way, and it appeared that thanks to Melnikov's personal honesty and strict watchfulness, the cost was only a little over fifty thousand rubles per verst.

An important rôle in the history of Russian railroads was played by the concession given to a Russian contractor, Derviz. In 1866 he undertook to build the Riazan-Kozlov line which connected through Riazan, Moscow, and through the latter — Petrograd, with the most fertile region; the enterprise proved very profitable, and yielded eight per cent. dividend the first year. It completely changed the state of the Riazan-Moscow line which began to pay twelve per cent. dividend. These circumstances, discovered after 1866, aroused the appetites of Russian capitalists, and improved the chances of Russian railroads abroad. Many high personages, or persons with high connections, began to seek concessions; even many *zemstvos*.

Reitern's propositions were examined by a special committee under the chairmanship of a member of the State Council,

Chevkin, and with the participation of N. A. Miliutin; the committee decided that the further construction of railroads was a most vital question for Russia. Miliutin argued that in the next ten years (1865-1875) at least five thousand versts of railroads should be built. Although Miliutin's calculation was considered optimistic in 1865, it was greatly exceeded, because owing to the concession-fever which began after the success of the Riazan-Kozlov line, between 1865 and 1875 were built not five thousand, but twelve thousand more versts, so that by 1875 Russia was in possession of a net of seventeen thousand versts, which connected the most productive regions with ports and with the coal region of the Don, and allowed a wide export of internal products abroad.

Thus we may say that the plans of railroad construction were finally well realised; but as to the question of its cost for the Treasury and the country, and as to whether the work was done at all conscientiously, we must say that not only was the cost of the construction excessively large, and enormous capital fell into the pockets of the "*gründers*," but there were numerous other unpardonable abuses, with which many high personages were connected.¹

Particularly strange appeared the episode of selling the Nicolaievsky railroad to the Main Company. Reiter decided to form a special railroad-fund for the encouragement of private capitalists; the Nicolaievsky line was not very profitable (owing to its high cost), he proposed to sell it, as well as other unprofitable State property, and to use the money for the railroad-fund. We can understand these considerations, but the subsequent course of the affair is beyond comprehension. A solid company of Moscow capitalists, headed by Koshelev, offered to buy the line on very advantageous conditions, but it was sold to the Main Company, which had begun its career with

¹ Kornilov generally uses the term "high personages" for members of the Imperial family.—Tr.

fraud, compelled the Government to pay out an enormous sum as "guarantee," managed its affairs badly, and still owed a large debt to the Government. Some explain that outside of ordinary graft in the matter, the sale of the road to the Main Company was motivated by the desire of the Government to give it a chance for settling with its creditors, primarily with the Treasury. A quite extraordinary consideration!

Thus was accomplished the construction of the railroads which have been a powerful factor in the development of Russian capitalism.

Outside of this activity Reiterm worked hard for the creation and popularisation of private credit. In the pre-reform time, and shortly after the reform, until the opening of the Imperial Bank in 1860, Russia had no organised private credit. Reiterm was not satisfied with the exclusive activity of the Imperial Bank, and decided to encourage the establishment of private banks. The question was vividly discussed in the press and in financial circles. With the aid of the Ministry of Finance a number of societies were formed from among private capitalists for various forms of private credit. Reiterm was also interested in the question of general agrarian credit, but in this respect he acted timidly, fearing that in view of the instability of prices on land there might be great abuses.

His immediate task in the field of national finances, in the narrow sense of the word, was his struggle with deficits in the State-budget. The budget had grown less considerably than one might have expected by the perspectives pictured during the reform-period. At the beginning of Reiterm's administration it amounted to three hundred and fifty million rubles, and by the end of his service, in 1878, i.e., after fifteen years, it increased only to six hundred million rubles (in paper-money). We should add that in spite of such a moderate growth of the budget, in spite of the constant economising in the expenditures of various departments, even in the reorganisation of the army,

which was found indispensable after the Crimean Campaign, every budget brought a deficit, and Reiterm was continually fighting with individual ministers for the diminution of expenditures.

Only about the years 1873-1874 did he succeed in reducing the deficit to zero, and in 1875 in having the income exceed the expense. He then began to save up for a reserve fund which he considered necessary for a transition to a metal-currency. Just when his last dream seemed realisable to him, it vanished—at the outbreak of the war in 1877.

The same considerations which forced the Government to support capitalism, to prepare and encourage its development, compelled it to carry through several other important reforms during that reactionary period.

It is instructive to note in this respect that Reiterm, a person who did not share the liberal aspirations of his progressive contemporaries, was forced, however, in 1866 to enter into a stubborn battle with his most reactionary colleagues in the Committee of Ministers, and first of all with the Chief of Gendarmes, Count Shuvalov, in which battle he almost lost his post. In one of his posthumous notes, issued by his heirs in 1910 as supplements to Kulomzin's biography of him, we read: "In 1866, after the attentate of Karakozov, the appointment of Shuvalov, the resignation of Golovnin,—a regular baiting began against me from different sides, instigated by Shuvalov. He was joined by Valuiev, and together they opened a pseudo-liberal campaign, i.e., they tried to produce an impression of liberalism on the public, at the same time adhering relentlessly to absolutism. The enclosed memorandum had put an end to their attacks against me. . . ."

We can hardly agree with calling the policy of Shuvalov-Valuiev "pseudo-liberalism"—as a matter of fact it was undoubtedly a reactionary policy which at times used very thin liberal phrases as a subterfuge, but this is immaterial; what

interests us is the memorandum presented by Reiter to the Tzar on September 16, 1866, about which the author says that it had put an end to the attacks against him — so convincing did its contents prove for Alexander II. That memorandum is therefore of considerable significance for the characterisation of the Government's mood at that moment, and for the understanding of the circumstance that in spite of the reigning reaction certain reorganisations were carried through which had not been accomplished during the reform-period. In that memorandum Reiter wrote:

"Your Imperial Majesty has obliged me to report to you about the present financial difficulties, and about the measures which should be undertaken for the improvement of the financial and economic conditions of the country.

"The financial and economic state of a country is complex; its roots abide not only in fiscal measures and in purely economic conditions, but in phenomena of general national development. If, on one side, it is doubtless that lack of frugality, a bad administration, and ill-considered and oppressive fiscal measures are bound to derange the finances, and then the economic state of a country,—it is, on the other side, also true that during certain epochs of national development financial difficulties appear as an inevitable result of circumstances, as a symptom of the process that is going on within the social organism."

Reiter further analysed the situation in which Russia found itself at the beginning of Alexander II's reign — which is again quite characteristic for a memorandum written at that time by a *minister of finance*.

"Russia came out from the Crimean Campaign tired of the gigantic struggle, with drained finances and exhausted money-funds, crippled by an issue of four hundred million credit-bills. The moral authority of the Government was shaken; the war revealed numerous defects of our administration, both military

and civil; it shook the dominating position which Russia had occupied in Europe since the Vienna Congress; as a consequence of this came the fall of our authority abroad, and mistrust for the power and ability of the Government — within the Empire.

“Even if the Government,” he further wrote, “had wished after the Crimean Campaign to return to the traditions of the last forty years, i.e., to a relentless opposition to all modern aspirations, it would have met insurmountable obstacles, if not in an open, at least in a passive resistance which might in time have shaken even the loyalty of the people — the broad basis of the monarchical principle in Russia. For the happiness of Russia your Imperial Majesty has chosen a different road. History of all nations proves that revolutions may be forestalled only by timely reforms which give the people in a peaceful way that which they seek in revolutions, i.e., the elimination of the outgrown forms and of the inrooted abuses. The reforms which will immortalise the reign of your Imperial Majesty did not touch only the surface of the social order, as most reforms undertaken voluntarily by governments do. Courageously and consistently you approached the root of the evil, and laid a correct foundation for the structure of civil order. Millions of our people have been called to civilism, without being divorced from the soil; the system of administrative graft which had been officially tolerated and even encouraged has fallen with the contracts (i.e., of the beverage), and now there is a possibility for an honest administration; the great principle of the separation of the judiciary from the administration has been strictly carried through in the reorganised courts — without it the sense of justice cannot develop among the citizens. Finally, in the field of local *zemstvo* affairs the principle of self-government has been laid.

“These and many other reforms have already deeply changed Russia, and I venture to say, for the best, but they have not

had time to become ripe, and have aroused in certain minds extreme and deplorable tendencies." "In a word, the reforms are so broad, they have so thoroughly affected the depth of our state-structure and social life, that much time, much labour, many sacrifices will be required before Russia will emerge from her transitional state, and will be firmly established on new, rational foundations. Only then will the economic development find a stable basis, confidence and credit will be restored, and there will be found a solid ground for finances, which does not exist at present. . . ."

Such were the frank declarations of the Minister of Finance who had directly connected the reforms which were accomplished, and those that were to be promulgated in the future, with the financial well-being of the State. Naturally those were the most substantial arguments in favour of reforms, that could at that moment produce an impression on Alexander.

At the very end of his lengthy memorandum, after the exposition of his financial principles and plans, Reitern wrote:

"With such a course of action one may hope that in a few years the economic forces of Russia will grow stronger; the reforms which form the glory of your Majesty's reign will not have to be stopped in their development on account of want of means, but on the contrary they will yield abundant fruit, and Russia will finally emerge from the transitional and restless period which naturally and inevitably follows revolutions in the civil and economic order, stronger and richer than ever."

This memorandum, in spite of the reactionary mood of Alexander, supported by Shuvalov and other retrogrades, was accepted by him graciously, and had not only put an end to attacks against Reitern, as the latter believed, but it enabled him to develop the financial policy which was quite progressive for that moment, and did not at all harmonise with the general reaction of the Government.

Out of similar considerations other reforms were carried

out: municipal, which were connected in the beginning with certain reforms projected by the Ministry of Interior back in the Forties, and then a whole series of important reorganisations in the sphere of the military department, the urgent necessity of which was demonstrated by the unfortunate Crimean Campaign, but the realisation of which was delayed mainly because of the poor state of Russian finances at that time.

CHAPTER XXX

SO far I have not spoken about the municipal reforms and the development of the cities, in general, because there has been little to say on the subject. The status of the cities remained almost without change throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, indeed, till the end of the Sixties, so that municipal self-government instituted by Catherine had not only not developed, but had come to a standstill and was decaying. To give a clear picture of the cities and the city-life in Russia during the earlier part of the nineteenth century, I shall quote some statistics gathered from official sources in an article by Professor Ditiatin, one of the best scholars in the field of the pre- and post-reform municipal life. Those statistics were taken three times during the nineteenth century—in 1825, in 1852, and in 1867, and on each occasion they showed the same picture of a stagnant, motionless city-life.

We see by the tables of 1825 that out of forty-two provincial capitals—including such cities as Odessa, administratively equivalent to provincial capitals—only in two, Odessa and Vilno (both hardly Russian cities), did stone-buildings prevail over wooden houses; in Odessa, by the way, stone was cheaper than wood. In Petrograd there were twice as many and in Moscow two and a half times as many wood as stone-buildings. In other provincial capitals the proportion was still worse: one out of five, in one place, one out of seven, in two cities, one out of eight, in three, one out of ten, in two, and finally, in Samara, there was one stone-building for every seven hundred and eighty-four wooden ones.

The same picture was presented by the figures of 1852 and

of 1867. Such, in spite of the quite broad self-government that was granted to them by Catherine in 1785, were the poverty and backwardness of the cities. By that charter the population of the cities was divided into six classes; all of them were admitted to the election of a general *duma*, the delegates of which elected from among themselves an executive of six members. Paul I abolished that Statute before it had time to become fairly rooted; beside his tendency to undo all that his mother had undertaken, he pointed out that the city-charter, taking up the liberties and rights of the citizens, contradicted the autocratic order which he intended to guard so jealously. Alexander I restored the charter, but it continued to exist merely on paper. From the investigations of the Ministry of Interior we see that not only in small towns, but even in large provincial cities, even in the Capitals, municipal institutions were a myth. We find, for instance, that such an institution as the Assembly of Delegates, which was to keep the registration books of the voting citizens, did not exist even in Petrograd and Moscow, so that the elections of the general *dumas* and of the city-mayors were evidently performed by casual persons whose voting rights nobody examined. Never more than one-tenth, and more often only a twentieth of the voters made use of their privilege. The percentage of the voters differed according to classes; Professor Ditiatin shows that only one-half to one-tenth per cent. of the commoners entitled to vote took part in the elections of the city-mayor of Moscow in the Forties. Moreover, the revision of the Ministry of Interior during the Forties proved that the general *dumas* seldom existed in reality; such was the case in Moscow early in the nineteenth century.

It thus appears that the city-inhabitants had failed to make use of the privileges granted them by the law. The revision discovered that instead of the legal institutions there existed in the towns various forms of peculiar chanceries, completely sub-

jected to the local police, which did not tax the population, but begged the well-to-do to give contributions for the miserable maintenance of the town-administration. Thus did reality differ from the lofty phrases of Catherine's legislation.

I see one explanation of the fact in the general relationship between the authorities and the subjects; the omnipotent guardianship manifested on the part of the representatives of the authority, i.e., the police, deprived all reasoning persons from the desire to take part in pseudo-self-government. A greater importance had the circumstance that according to Catherine's legislation the self-government was given no power for levying taxes; it was to seek means for the required expenditures, i.e., it was allowed to collect contributions for paving the streets or putting up lanterns. Naturally no sensible citizen had any taste for such self-government.

When some symptoms of economic development in Russia appeared in the Forties the Government became somewhat alarmed at the deplorable state of the cities. The Minister of Interior, L. A. Perovsky, a quite enlightened man, instructed the young and gifted N. A. Miliutin, who then occupied the post of Chief of the Economy Department, to investigate the matter. In co-operation with such intelligent men as Yuriy Samarin, Ivan Aksakov, and others, Miliutin made a thorough study of the conditions and needs of Russian cities, and presented the material to the Minister of Interior for the preparation of a new statute for municipal government. Owing to Miliutin's energy a new statute was worked out for Petrograd, which was sanctioned by Nicolas, in spite of the fact that the Forties were the years of cruel reaction; evidently the Government had no apprehensions of unrest on the part of the hapless, harmless city *duma*.

By that statute the general municipal *duma* which had not existed in reality was restored. Miliutin, well intentioned, but inexperienced, ascribed the backwardness of municipal

affairs to lack of culture among those strata of the population, which were expected to take care of them; therefore he decided to instill into municipal self-government the most cultured and enlightened forces of the country — the nobles. The *duma* was to be elected by six orders, of which the first was the order of hereditary nobles who had some connection with the city; next followed personal nobles and officials, merchants, commoners, and the order of *tzekh*-artisans who belonged to the class of commoners; every order could elect from one hundred to one hundred and fifty representatives, so that the dimensions of the *duma* were quite majestic — over five hundred members. It is astonishing that Nicolas I acquiesced in the establishment of such a representative body. The *duma* was to elect a special, executive *duma* for the actual management of all affairs. Properly speaking, the new statute differed little from that of Catherine; it was rather a well-intentioned attempt to re-establish or to call to life that which had been instituted by law. The attempt did not succeed; the nobles who lived in Petrograd showed no interest in the municipal affairs, and besides, since the *duma* had no right to levy taxes it was utterly impotent. Yet with the appearance of progressive tendencies among society the Government became uneasy about even this form of self-government. At the end of the Fifties the Governor-General of Petrograd, Ignatiev, expressed alarm at the dimensions of the *duma* as instituted by Miliutin in 1846. The Government was afraid of the repetition of the Western European events of 1848 when in almost all big centres the social movement emerged from the city-halls. The similarity was of course only external, yet it alarmed the Government to such an extent that the municipal statute was revised by the State Council, the number of the *duma*-members was reduced to two hundred fifty, and the very elections of the delegates were made not direct, but through special assemblies of electors, called by class-curiæ.

Such was the situation when other Russian cities, moved by the general liberal spirit and manifestation of initiative after the Crimean Campaign, began to petition in the end of the Fifties and early in the Sixties for the expansion to them of the Petrograd municipal statute. In 1863 the Government introduced that system in Moscow and Odessa; at the same time, trying to meet the general desire, the Tzar ordered on July 20, 1862, the working out of a new municipal statute for the Empire.

Valuiev, who was then Minister of Interior, sent out a circular to the governors, in which he requested them to form special commissions from among the representatives of the public for the discussion and clarification of the question. Five hundred and nine local commissions were formed; all of them presented their considerations and desires which were not based on any experience, but were imbued with liberal aspirations, and justly connected the poor state of the cities with the existing order of things; yet they did not go beyond generalities, and did not even express a definite demand that first of all municipal self-government should have the right of self-taxation, without which nothing could be done.

On the basis of the presentations of the commissions the Ministry of Interior worked out in 1864 a general project which, with the conclusions of Baron Korf, the Chief of the Codificatory Department, was presented to the State Council on March 31, 1866. But a few days later Karakozov's attente took place, which resulted in general confusion and reaction. The project remained motionless for two years, and finally was returned to Timashov, the new Minister of Interior, more reactionary than Valuiev. In 1869 Timashov presented it to the State Council, without substantial changes. The State Council sent it back to the Ministry of Interior, demanding that representatives of the city-communities take part in the discussion of the project. Six provincial mayors and two

from the Capitals were invited into a special commission for such discussion. The commission proved very conservative and opposed to the principle of all-class-representation in city government; fearing that the democratic elements would numerically prevail against the more well-to-do classes, the commission introduced the so-called *Prussian Class-System*, according to which the tax-payers were divided into three separate curiæ. The first curia consisted of the highest tax-payers, who subscribed one-third of all taxes; their number was of course very small. Those who paid the second third of the taxes, formed the second curia, and finally all the small tax-payers who filled the last third, formed the third curia. Each curia had an equal number of delegates, so that one-third of the city-*duma* represented a few wealthy people, one-third represented the middle class, and only one-third — the multitude of small tax-payers.

On June 18, 1870, the statute became a law. Its main defects were its distortion of the all-class-principle, and the insufficient amount of independence it afforded the municipal self-government. True, the city-*dumas* were made independent of the local administration, and were made subject directly to the Senate, while the governors were instructed only to watch the legality of the enactments of the *dumas*. But actual independence is connected with the power of taxation, and in this respect the rights of the *dumas* were very limited. They were permitted to tax only certain incomes, and to a limited amount, so that they received very meagre means for their expenditures; but at the same time they were charged with the fulfilment of many obligations which were by their nature fiscal rather than local, as, for instance, the up-keep of the police,¹ or the partial up-keep of the civil administration of the city. As a result, the funds of the municipal self-government did not suffice for the satisfaction of such cultural needs as popular education and

¹ All Russian police are in *national* service.—Tr.

medical care. The limitations and restrictions promulgated in the municipal statute were more considerable than those introduced into the *zemstvo*-statute by the law of November 21, 1866. We shall see later how the municipal self-government has developed in actual life.

Let us turn now to the important reforms in the Ministry of War, which I have mentioned. The question of the reorganisation of the army, and the radical reformation of all the defensive means of the country loomed up gravely after the Crimean Campaign which had proved the general backwardness of Russia in comparison with civilised countries, and the inadequate conditions of her defence, in spite of her numerical strength. But such reforms as the equipment of the army with modern ammunition, or the laying out of good roads, required immense sums of money and in view of the poor financial conditions after the war, these reforms, obvious as their need appeared, had to be postponed. The first two years after the war were occupied by the release of a considerable part of the army which amounted in 1856 to two million two hundred thousand; it was reduced to one and a half million. It was intended to reduce the army further, but the international complications of 1859, and later the Polish insurrection of 1862-1863, which threatened the intervention of foreign Powers, forced the Government to carry through an additional mobilisation, and to keep five military corps on the western frontier.

Another circumstance which blocked the work of reorganisation was the presence at the head of the Ministry of an ordinary Nicolaievan general, Sukhozanet, a firm man, but one utterly unfit for any reformatory activity. Not until 1861 was he supplanted by D. A. Miliutin, brother of N. A. Miliutin, in whom Alexander had finally found the right person to carry through the reform. D. A. Miliutin had been a professor in the Academy of the General Staff, and later Chief

of the Staff of the Caucasian army, and thus, in addition to distinguished personal gifts, he combined a theoretic with a practical preparation.

Miliutin began by mitigating the service for the soldiers. Up to that time the term of service was twenty-five years of what was generally considered equivalent to hard labour. Even the bonded peasants looked upon military service as the severest and most degrading punishment; the soldiers naturally felt quite humble, and considered themselves no better than criminals, a circumstance that had considerable bearing upon the spirit of the army. Miliutin reduced the term to sixteen years; abolished corporal punishment which had been widely practised before; he further endeavoured to change the attitude of the officers toward their subordinates — in general he tried to elevate the soldier to the dignified position of the defender of his country. He reorganised the management of the Ministry of War along more reasonable and economical lines; he proposed the abolition of separate army-staffs in time of peace and of such big units as corps, so that the largest military unit became a division (four regiments). The minister of war was given greater authority, but on the other hand the military administration was somewhat decentralised, being divided into Military Districts, the commanders of which appeared to be quite independent authorities in time of peace, combining the authority of corps-commanders with that of military governor-generals in relation to the army. The next important reform was the reorganisation of the military judiciary along more humane principles, the same as were laid as the foundation of the judiciary reforms of 1864; owing to the fact that Miliutin stood at the head of the work, and to the absolute confidence Alexander had had in him, the reform of the military judiciary was spared the mutilations which the civil judiciary suffered during the years of reaction. Alongside with this one should consider the reform of the military schools which were re-

organised from exclusive caste-institutions into military gymnasia, with a higher educational programme. Higher Junker-schools were assigned for special military training and for the preparation of military specialists; among these were the Pavlovsky, Alexandrovsky, Constantinovsky, and Nicolaievsky Schools. This reform contributed greatly to the higher educational level of the military contingent, and to the mitigation of martial customs, in general.

But the chief military reform carried out by Miliutin was the radical change in the very system of the military obligation, the complete abolition of the recruitments which lay heavily on the people, and the introduction of a most democratising principle into Russian life. Throughout Europe the introduction of universal military service was taking place at that time; that system was important not only by virtue of the conditions of equality which it established in accordance with the new order of society instituted everywhere during the nineteenth century, but it appeared considerably more adequate also in the technical, military, and economic respects.

The military reorganisation which was carried through in Prussia after the Treaty of Tilsit by the talented General Scharnhorst served as the prototype of that system. In view of Napoleon's prohibition of maintaining more than forty thousand men in actual service, Scharnhorst hit upon the clever idea of subjecting the whole nation to a military training, by making the service-term very short, and registering every soldier upon the completion of his actual service into the reserve. Thus in case of war the forty thousand men could be rapidly multiplied many times, through mobilising the reserves. On this idea was based the acceptance of universal military service by most of the European Powers during the first half of the nineteenth century. But while the mobilisation of the reserves was quite feasible for Prussia, in view of her small size, good roads of communication, and the comparatively high culture of

the population,—it was almost impossible in the Russia of the first half of the nineteenth century. For this reason Alexander I was forced to turn to the unfortunate idea of Military Colonies; for the same reason Russia kept under Nicolas I, as at present, an army of one million, although the population was three times smaller than now.

With the development of railroad-building in the Seventies there arose a possibility for the reorganisation of the army along general European lines. Miliutin presented his plan for the reform to Alexander; it was approved, passed by the State Council, and became a law on January 1, 1874.

By the new statute recruitments were abolished, and universal service equal for all classes took their place. While before men had been recruited from the age of twenty to thirty-four and were often fathers of families, the new law called only for men of the age of twenty for a term of six years, after which time they were registered as reserves for nine years, and remained assigned to the militia till the age of forty. All classes enjoyed equal privileges. Miliutin granted exemption of the first degree to only sons of parents, or only grandsons of grand-parents, or only brothers-supporters of orphan-minors. The exemption of the second degree was granted to those who had brothers younger than eighteen. Exemption of the third degree was granted to those who followed immediately brothers in active service, even if there were other brothers-supporters in the family.

The non-exempted, if found healthy and capable of service, were assigned as recruits, in the order of lot-numbers they drew, until they filled the amount required every year from a given district. If the number of the non-exempt was not sufficient for the completion of the required contingent, those of the third-degree and, next, of the second-degree-exemption were called upon, again in the order of the lots drawn. But the

men of the first degree exemption could be called to service only by a special Imperial summons.

Privileges were granted to persons of education. University men had to serve half a year, instead of six years; those who had a secondary education had to serve two years; graduates of Municipal or District schools, or of four-grade-gymnasias — three years. Finally, those who had a primary education served four years. Men of a university or secondary education were permitted, besides, to enter the army as volunteers, in which case the term of their service was further reduced to one half.

Such were the fundamental features of Miliutin's reform which has proved to be one of the most important factors in the democratisation of Russian society; at the same time it was one of the most humane reforms of the reign of Alexander II, having actually abolished military bondage.

In 1875 Miliutin introduced new rules for the training of soldiers, which concerned not only military subjects, but began with general reading. In regard to literacy, the contingent of the army had improved by virtue of the fact that it was composed of men of higher classes after the promulgation of the new statute; until the reform of 1874 the number of literate in the army amounted to thirteen per cent., while in 1874 the percentage rose at once to twenty. Owing to the rules of 1875, almost every recruit went back home able to read and write, so that in Miliutin's hands the army had become a considerable surrogate of schools, the number of which was quite insufficient in Russia.

Curiously enough, during the discussion of that reform in the State Council, the educational privileges and other liberal articles of the reform were opposed by those ministers who should have upheld them. Minister of Education, Count Tolstoy, denied the desirability of granting special privileges for men of a university education, and Count Pahlen, Minister

of Justice, opposed the subjection of cases about evading military service to juries; Miliutin, a military general and Minister of War, had to defend the liberal principles from the attack of those who might have been expected to take a different stand. Enjoying the full confidence of Alexander, Miliutin was in a position not only to have his reform passed through the State Council, but, unlike the other reform-ministers of Alexander II, to *see it carried out into life*, since he was not dismissed like Lanskoï or his brother, Nicolas, but remained minister of war to the very end of Alexander's reign.

CHAPTER XXXI

OF a totally different character was the activity of the Minister of Education, Count D. A. Tolstoy, outspokenly reactionary and directed plausibly against Nihilism, but in fact against any liberal and democratic ideas. His policy was in complete accord with the reactionary mood of the Government, which took form after Karakozov's attempt on the Tzar.

In general we may say that Count Tolstoy and Miliutin were two persons who brilliantly characterised the two contradictory sides, the two irreconcilable, almost mutually exclusive, tendencies of the reign of Alexander II. It may appear astonishing that for fifteen years after 1866 those two great political actors remained among the co-workers of Alexander II, and that both had evidently enjoyed his full confidence. We may explain it by the fact that in Alexander himself there was going on a constant conflict between two opposed principles. On one side he was fully aware of the necessity for promulgating progressive reforms which would radically alter the former order, but on the other side he was under constant repression and fear of the growing revolutionary movement which he considered it necessary to combat rigorously. We have seen that after the reactionary tendencies of the Government had become quite definite, still the peculiar conditions of the new life, the technical and economic needs of the State, powerfully demanded the continuation of the reforms, and such reforms as the municipal and the military were carried out after 1866.

Count Tolstoy consistently and incessantly represented those reactionary tendencies and demands, under the onslaught of

which Alexander found himself after 1866. As a matter of fact, Tolstoy was not an enemy of education; he was neither like the mystic clericalist Golitzin of the time of Alexander I, nor like the savage obscurantist Shirinsky-Shikhmatov at the end of the reign of Nicolas I. In his personal tastes and fondness of Classicism Tolstoy resembled externally rather Count Uvarov, to whom Russia owes a considerable advance in education in spite of his boast that he would hold back her general development for fifty years. But undoubtedly Tolstoy was less clever and educated than Uvarov, and at the same time more consistent and perseverant in the promulgation of his ideas, for Uvarov was, properly speaking, first of all a man of compromise, and ever calculating about his career. Yet, unlike Uvarov, Tolstoy has left behind him the reputation of having been unreservedly a foe and extinguisher of enlightenment.

As I said, Tolstoy was not an enemy of education proper, but he was a constant, consequential, and vicious enemy of the people, and as minister he obstinately and persistently trampled the most sacred rights and interests of the *people* for the sake of the interests and prerogatives of that ruling *class*, to which he belonged. For this reason he appeared to be one of the most ardent advocates of that political and social order with which those prerogatives were connected. Of all the ministers of Alexander none equalled Tolstoy in his persevering and uncompromising upholding of the reactionary principles. We have seen that Reiter wrote that Shuvalov and Valuiev carried on a pseudo-liberal policy, while actually it was reactionary. Nobody could have said this about Tolstoy; he was an open and outspoken reactionary, and of all the ministers of Alexander II he was the only one who *openly declared himself opposed to the reforms of the Sixties*. He never compromised with his views like Valuiev who appeared liberal during the period of liberalism and reactionary during the period of reaction. Tolstoy was a convinced reactionary; he

sharply criticised the peasant-reform in a memorandum which aroused the indignation of Alexander, and was appointed Minister of Education as an acknowledged reactionary, at the time when the Tzar considered such a reactionary necessary for that post.

In his activity Tolstoy found support in the theoretic principles with which he was furnished by the prominent publicists of the time — M. N. Katkov and P. M. Leontiev, the editors and publishers of the *Russian Messenger* and the *Moscow News*. Katkov, as we know, had then become a most rabid opponent of the Nihilistic tendencies which developed at the end of the Sixties; on the other hand, being opposed to the separatistic tendencies which began to manifest themselves in some of Russia's borderlands, particularly in the Western provinces, he grew more and more reactionary after the Polish insurrection, and especially after the attentate of Karakozov. During the epoch of reforms he was known as a liberal of the English calibre; he still preserved a portion of his Anglomania, but it turned conservative and even reactionary. Tolstoy shared Katkov's Anglomania, and intended to transplant the English system of education, which appealed to him on account of its aristocratic character. But while the English aristocratic system was in full accord with the established political order (where the aristocracy was a constitutional factor, although a conservative one) and has guarded the acquired rights and liberties of the people from the absolutism of the kings, the aristocracy which Katkov and Tolstoy aspired to implant in Russia was to suppress the interests of the people under the wing of the autocracy. This difference between English and Russian aristocracy was well observed and indicated by Prince A. I. Vassilchikov in a memorandum published in 1875 in Berlin, called a *Letter to the Minister of Education, Count Tolstoy, from Prince A. Vassilchikov*. On the whole, we must say that although Tolstoy's system undoubtedly had

certain aristocratic tendencies, in the most unattractive sense of that word, yet his main and most essential idea consisted in the struggle with Nihilism which had rapidly developed in Russian society, and to which was ascribed an important revolutionising influence. It was from that point of view that Katkov also criticised the former system of popular education.

By Nihilism was then understood the spread of the materialistic point of view, which in its turn was connected with the popularisation of the latest conclusions of natural science among broad circles of the *intelligentsia* and the college youth, owing to the efforts of Pisarev and other publicists of the *Russian Word*, the chief organ of the Nihilists. Tolstoy and Katkov held accountable for the spread of such a *Weltanschauung* among students the system of education which allowed hours to the study of natural science, of history, of rhetoric, and similar subjects which train the pupils in "senseless high-browiness," in "water-grinding," in acquiring "premature, hasty conclusions"; in short they opposed such studies as helped to develop independent thinking, demanding instead a system which would train the young minds exclusively in the acquisition of exact information, and prevent them from excessive reasoning which led to Nihilistic ideas and materialistic teachings. They considered ancient languages, and next — mathematics, as the most important studies in secondary schools. Such were the basic principles of Russian Classicism, theoretically elaborated by Katkov, and put into practice by Tolstoy.

From the very first Tolstoy favoured that system, but he found its realisation quite difficult; financial conditions did not permit any considerable expenditures, there was a dearth in instructors of Latin, and particularly of Greek, and besides he was aware of the opposition his plan was bound to meet not only on the part of the public, but even among the upper [✓]bureaucratic circles, even among the members of the State Council, where the discharged reform-ministers succeeded in

creating a liberal atmosphere and sympathy with the ideas of the former progressive Minister of Education, Golovnin.

Tolstoy had to move his plan slowly. At first he sent out a circular to all District Curators, asking them to point out the defects of the existing system of education. Next he founded a new high institution, the Philological Institute, which was to prepare instructors of ancient languages; later he reorganised along these lines the Lyceum founded by Bezborodko in Niezhin. At the same time he engaged in active negotiations with foreign institutions, especially Austrian, where there were many Slav philologists who might easily learn Russian and become instructors of ancient languages in Russian gymnasia. A considerable number of such instructors soon flowed in from Galicia and Bohemia.

In 1871, i.e., five years after his appointment, Tolstoy decided to bring his plan to the front. He presented a carefully worked out memorandum to the Tzar, recommending classic education as a means for combating Nihilistic tendencies among the youth, the evil influence of which Alexander had pointed out in his rescript to Prince Gagarin, in 1866. Alexander regarded the general tendencies of Tolstoy's report favourably, but since he himself had no classic education, he ordered a commission of experts to discuss the matter. Among the members of the special commission were Valuiev, Troinitzky, Tolstoy, some specialists from his ministry, and Count S. G. Stroganov. Tolstoy found it necessary to prepare himself for the occasion, and he took lessons in Greek from a director of a gymnasium.

The commission rapidly worked out a detailed plan for the new statute, and presented it to a special committee of the State Council, among whom were all ministers who had charge of some schools, the former Ministers of Education — Kovalevsky and Golovnin, former Minister of Justice, Count Panin,— D. A. Miliutin,— fifteen members altogether. Of them nine

members sided with Tolstoy, while six vigorously opposed his plan; those who pleaded most energetically against it were D. A. Miliutin, then Admiral Count Lietke, the former tutor of Grand Duke Constantine, former Minister Golovnin, Academic J. K. Grot, and to the general surprise — Count V. N. Panin. Miliutin and Golovnin pointed out that the classic system was considered dead even in England and Prussia, which countries Tolstoy used as models for his plan, and that *real*-schools were being opened there on equal rights with classic gymnasia, so that the parents might be free to choose. Miliutin also denied the connection between a *real* system of education and Materialism and Nihilism; he indicated that all the actors of the French revolution, the Materialists at the end of the eighteenth century, were brought up on Classicism. Tolstoy won in the special committee.

But at the general session of the State Council, where the discussion was customarily purely formal, as the members accepted the project prepared by some special department or committee, something unusual occurred on this occasion. Moved by one of the strongest human feelings — parental love, to use the expression of Prince Vassilchikov, the State Council rejected Tolstoy's project by twenty-nine votes against nineteen. But Alexander joined the minority, and on May 15, 1871, Tolstoy's project became law.

In the new Classic gymnasia forty-nine hours a week were assigned for the study of Latin, and thirty-six hours for Greek. The students were to gain a thorough knowledge of the grammatical and syntactical peculiarities of the ancient languages, and to be capable of rapidly translating under dictation difficult passages from Russian into Latin or Greek. Then the amount of mathematics taught was considerably enlarged, while the hours of the instruction in Russian language and rhetoric were greatly decreased; the instruction in Church-Slavic was introduced at the expense of Russian. Natural science was elim-

inated, the hours for history, geography, and modern languages were contracted, and the study of modern languages was declared of secondary importance.

At the same time the whole educational system in the gymnasias was changed. The pupils were to be trained in such a way that they should appear ultra-disciplined and absolutely obedient; espionage was encouraged under the form of "special confidence" and "frankness" on the part of the pupils towards their instructors. The Pedagogic Councils lost all authority, and the entire power was concentrated in the hands of the directors; the latter, as well as the inspectors, were appointed largely (70-80 per cent.) from among instructors of ancient languages.

Alongside with this the *real*-gymnasias were abolished; in their place were founded *real*-schools, with a six years' course (the gymnasias had an eight years' course), intended to give the students a special, technical or industrial, education, which in the opinion of Katkov and Tolstoy would satisfy the educational needs of the higher industrial classes. Subjects of general education and development were eliminated from the *real*-schools as well as from the classical gymnasias. In place of ancient languages the *real*-schools required an enormous amount of drawing—forty hours a week. A considerable amount of mathematics was required, and a very moderate dose of natural science which, according to instructions, was to be taught not scientifically, but "technologically," whatever this term might have meant. Thus the main object of the schools was frankly considered not the elevation of the level of knowledge and enlightenment, but the substitution for matters of general education of subjects designed to discipline the mind.

At the time of the discussion of the project it was vigorously attacked by the progressive press, such as *European Messenger*, *Petrograd News*, *Voice* (the radical organs, *Contemporary*, and the *Russian Word*, had already been discontinued). But

when it was presented to the State Council, Tolstoy obtained an Imperial order prohibiting the discussion of the plan by the press.

Tolstoy had intended to reorganise in a corresponding spirit the higher educational institutions, but in spite of his repeated efforts in that direction, he never succeeded in radically changing the university statute of 1863. He was forced to be satisfied with issuing additional rules periodically, with the aim of further restricting the liberties of the students and of the professors. During his administration numerous disturbances occurred among the students, particularly grave in the years 1869, 1874, and 1878. Tolstoy made use of those disturbances for preparing the reform of the universities, and worked in that direction upon the mood of Alexander. But in spite of the co-operation of Katkov he failed to accomplish his aim. The elements of the new statute he prepared were ultimately put into practice by his successor, Delianov, in 1884, at a more opportune conjuncture.

Tolstoy's interference with the gymnasias for women, which belonged to a different department (the Institutions of Empress Marie), was of such a nature, especially in regard to the limitation of the instruction of natural science, that the distinguished pedagogue, Vishnegradsky, who was at the head of those schools, was forced to resign. Tolstoy was opposed to higher education for women. Before 1863 women had forced themselves into the universities as "free-hearers," or unclassified students; but the commission which discussed the statute of 1863 rejected the clause about admitting women into universities. Then a group of progressive women, under the leadership of Mesdames Trubnikov, Stasov, and Philosophov, began a series of intercessions for the organisation of higher education for women. Tolstoy finally had to yield, and permit public lectures for both sexes, to be read by university professors; one weighty reason for his consent was the fact that

Russian women, deprived of higher education at home, filled the universities of Switzerland, where they easily fell under the influence of socialistic and anarchistic propaganda, to the mortification of the Government. Thus the Alarchinsky Courses were opened, the majority of whose students consisted of women. Similar courses, especially for women, were opened in 1870 in Moscow, under the name of Lubiansky; they acquired the character of a school of natural sciences, *par excellence*; one year later they were joined by a historico-philological department. As to Petrograd, it was only in 1878 that Professor Bestuzhev-Riumin succeeded in opening private courses for women, with a physico-mathematical and a historico-philological department. A special society was organised for the finding of means for the support of those courses, and owing to the energy of that society and of the persons who stood at the head of that institution, those courses have developed into Higher Courses for Women, which are still in existence.

Tolstoy refused to allow women to study medicine, but D. A. Miliutin, as Minister of War, opened in 1872 medical courses for women at the Nicolaievsky Hospital. In 1881, Minister of War Vannovsky found the existence of the courses at a military hospital out of place, and they were closed. Only in 1897 were they reopened in the form of the now existing Medical Institute for Women.

Such was the fate of the secondary and higher schools under Count Tolstoy. We should note that Miliutin's military gymnasia were at that time the only schools of a general educational character.

Tolstoy's attitude was as negative towards primary as towards secondary and higher education. By the statute of Golovnin, of 1864, the Ministry of Education left the founding of primary schools to the initiative of private persons, societies, cities, *zemstvos*, and other institutions. The Ministry obliged itself only to supervise the order of instruction in

those schools; it was to spend for the support of primary schools, one hundred thousand rubles the first year, two hundred thousand the second year, and three hundred thousand rubles during the third year. Actually only the first assignation took place, in 1864; in the following years money for schools was expended only for the western borderland, with the view of fighting Polonism. The one hundred thousand rubles assigned for the Russian provinces were to be distributed among the thirty-four School Councils which existed in the *zemstvo*-provinces, so that it would make three thousand rubles for each province. But even that meagre sum was given a different direction by Minister Tolstoy who either used it for organising some Ministerial Schools, or for the foundation of Teachers' Institutes, or of Seminaries for teachers of primary schools.

The *zemstvos* have played the main rôle in opening primary schools, although by the statute of 1864 they were not obliged to engage in that activity, except for the clause added through the initiative of the *zemstvos* of Petrograd and Nizhni-Novgorod, and owing to the support of M. A. Korf. According to this the *zemstvos* were allowed to care for the finding of means for the spread of primary education in *zemstvo*-provinces and districts. From the very start the *zemstvos* interpreted that clause broadly, and considered it one of their chief obligations to care for the dissemination of popular education in Russia. In view of the meagre means in their possession, they were at the beginning rather unsuccessful in their attempts to encourage the opening of schools by village-communities.

According to the statute of 1864 there were Provincial and District School Councils. The Provincial Councils were poorly constructed. Golovnin had to combat the aspirations of the Ecclesiastical Department for the management of popular education; he was forced to compromise and to decree that the Provincial Council was to be presided over by a bishop, and its membership to consist of the governor, two representatives

of the Ministry of Education, and two members of the *zemstvo*. Since the bishop and the governor were absorbed in their own affairs, the Provincial Councils were clumsy, dead institutions. The District Councils consisted of one representative of the Ministry of Education (usually the principal of the local District-school), one representative of the Ministry of Interior (who was preferably to be elected from among the local gentry), and two members from the *zemstvo*. They were permitted to elect their own president, and he was generally one of the *zemstvo*-members. The District Councils were inclined to work hand in hand with the *zemstvo*, and this greatly strengthened the position of the latter in its educational policy.

When Tolstoy was appointed Minister of Education in 1866, he sharply criticised the existing state of affairs, and immediately prepared a project for the installation in every province of a special ministerial inspector who would guard the school-business from falling into "ill-intentioned" hands. In 1869 the inspectors were installed, and one year later Tolstoy had the audacity to claim in his report to the Tzar that the activity of the School Councils and of the *zemstvo* was "good for nothing," and that only the inspectors were performing their duties properly. Even a superficial glance at the situation was sufficient to prove that one inspector for a whole province was actually unable to get acquainted with the state of affairs, and was in fact impotent in regard to the supervision of the schools.

Striving to take the management of primary education out of the hands of the School Councils, Tolstoy obtained in 1871 a new Imperial decree, instructing the inspectors to interfere with the appointment of teachers by the Councils. This was in violation of the statute of 1864, which placed the *zemstvo*-institutions outside of the jurisdiction of the administration; complaints against the Provincial Councils could be brought

only before the Senate. The conflict between the *zemstvo* and the Ministry of Education was sharp and relentless. Tolstoy saw the necessity of changing the statute, in order that he might usurp the management of the primary schools. In 1873 he presented a plan for a new statute, by which directors of People's Schools were to be appointed at the head of the Provincial Councils, and at the head of the District Councils — inspectors of those Schools, which posts (of directors and inspectors) were to be established in every province and district. The reformed Councils were to be subordinate to District Curators.

Although this reform was approved by the Emperor, it was strongly opposed by the State Council. Tolstoy unexpectedly came into collision with a strong wing of the nobility who were indignant at his attempts to place popular education in the hands of the bureaucracy. That sentiment found access to Alexander, and on December 25, 1873, Tolstoy received an Imperial rescript, in which his attention was called to the fact that the supervision of the schools was to be intrusted in the provinces to the first order — the nobility. Accordingly Tolstoy had to alter his plan, and place at the head of the Provincial Council the provincial Marshal of Nobility, and at the head of the District Council — the District Marshal of Nobility. In many places the Marshals were on the side of the *zemstvo*, it should be noted. The number of inspectors was increased to two for every province, instead of one; Tolstoy could not install more inspectors on account of financial difficulties.

The conflict between the Ministry of Education and the *zemstvo* was continued in the Eighties, under Minister Delianov. During Tolstoy's administration the struggle assumed bitter forms. The representatives of the *zemstvo* had to defend the popular schools from the bureaucratic encroachments of the inspectors who tried to restrict and curtail the education of the

peasants' children. After the issue of the law concerning universal military service, the *zemstvo*-members of the School Council had to perform the function of examiners for those who sought the educational privilege of the fourth degree, i. e., of primary education. This rôle enabled the *zemstvo*-members to manifest more vigorously their opposition to the policy of the Ministry of Education.

The friction between the *zemstvo* and the agents of the Ministry of Education finally grew so keen that in certain provinces, where the representatives of the Ministry were particularly aggressive in their endeavour to limit the participation of the *zemstvo*-members in the school management, the *zemstvo* refused to vote money for the schools. In 1879 the Tver *zemstvo* resolved to discontinue all money appropriations for popular education. It is not known what the end would have been had not the epoch of the "heart dictatorship" come, and had not Loris-Meliov obtained the dismissal of Count Tolstoy in 1880. Only then were the *zemstvos* enabled to breathe more freely, under the more liberal ministers, A. A. Saburov and Baron Nicolayi (both of them did not keep their positions for a long time: Saburov from the end of 1880 till the spring of 1881, and Baron Nicolayi from May, 1881, to May, 1882).

CHAPTER XXXII

WE shall now examine the sphere of activity of the *zemstvo*-institutions and their means and powers. The organs of the *zemstvo*-self-government were instituted for the management of local affairs, in districts and provinces, and for the satisfaction of local needs by the aid of the means that were given them and of the certain administrative authority which was granted them by the law. The entire field of their activity was indicated in the second article of the statute of 1864. It comprised first of all various so called *zemstvo*-obligations: to maintain in good order the roads, to lay out new roads when necessary, to manage the so-called *zemsky*-post, i.e., the post-horses and stations for internal communication in the districts, to take charge of the alimentation of the people, of "public welfare," in the broad sense of the word, including care of cripples, poor, and of corresponding philanthropic institutions; it also included care for the development of local commerce, industry, and particularly agriculture, and for the insurance of property; also care for public health, i.e., local medical-sanitary activity, for popular education in the provinces and districts, for the erection of churches, and for the up-keep of penitentiaries.

Most of these tasks were performed even in the pre-reform time by various bureaucratic or class-institutions which used for the purpose certain *zemsky* taxes and also "natural obligations" borne by the people by the order of provincial and district authorities. The law of 1851 divided the *zemsky* obligations and taxes into *State* and *provincial*; the income from those taxes amounted to four million four hundred and fifty

thousand rubles in 1814, and fifty years later — to twenty-three million nine hundred thousand rubles; of the latter sum nineteen million were classified as State-taxes, and only four million eight hundred thousand — as provincial. At the institution of the *zemstvos* the entire *zemsky* State taxes, which formed, as we have seen, three-fourths of the pre-reform revenue, were retained for the central organs of the Government. The *zemstvos* were permitted to obtain means through self-taxation, i.e., by levying provincial and district taxes on real-estate and commercial-industrial institutions. They also received about nine million rubles which had been collected for the maintenance of various philanthropic institutions; in the thirty-three provinces, where *zemstvos* had been instituted at that time, there were in all seven hundred and eighty-five such asylums, for which the population paid yearly a little over four hundred thousand rubles, an average of twelve to thirteen thousand rubles per province. The *zemstvos* received also nine million rubles which had accumulated as alimentary capital.

The pre-reform revenues proved insufficient for the needs of the *zemstvos*. In 1865, when nineteen *zemstvos* were installed in provinces, their budget reached five million six hundred thousand rubles; in 1867, when there were twenty-eight *zemstvo*-provinces, the budget rose to ten million three hundred and nine thousand, in 1868 to fourteen million and a half, in 1871 to twenty-one and a half million, in 1876 to thirty and a half million, and towards the eighties, in spite of the drainage of the Russo-Turkish war, the *zemstvo*-budget reached thirty-six million rubles. Thus in 1880, sixteen years after the publication of the *zemstvo*-statute, the *zemsky*-taxes increased more than sixteen times over those of the pre-reform period; yet compared with the growing needs of the people, the collected revenue was far from sufficient.

From the very beginning the *zemstvos* encountered very unfavourable conditions; besides the reaction in governmental

circles, which impeded their activities, they were greatly embarrassed by the general economic and financial conditions. The situation of both the landowners and the emancipated peasants immediately after the Reform was such that it was practically impossible to assess land. Prince A. I. Vassilchikov wrote at that time:

“The Russian land is poor, for it, the land — literally the soil, is paying above its capacity, above its productivity . . . because for centuries agriculture has been burdened more than any other branch of national labour with high taxes . . . because the land squeezes out of the poorest tax-payers most of the taxes for the satisfaction of those State needs which least concern the poor tax-payers. . . .”

Unable to tax the over-burdened land any more, the *zemstvos* tried to meet their requirements by assessing heavily industry and commerce. But Minister of Finance Reiter saw in this policy a danger to his plans of protecting big industry, and owing to his initiative a new law was issued on November 21, 1868, making it possible for the *zemstvo* to assess only the immovable property of factories and foundries, and commercial patents and license — not more than ten to twenty-five per cent. of their fiscal assessments. This at once put the *zemstvos* in a difficult financial position, and caused the first friction between them and the Government, which has continued to grow keen, assuming at times such extreme forms as the temporary closing of the *zemstvo* institutions (in the province of Petrograd).

The enormous needs of popular education, of public health, etc., required immense sums of money, and the *zemstvos* had to solve the grave problem of how to obtain the necessary sums without taxing the population beyond endurance. Prince Vassilchikov furnished curious figures about the *zemskey* taxes before the Reform; of the total sum of thirty-five million five hundred and ninety-eight thousand rubles, thirty-five million

were collected from one hundred and nine million desiatins of peasants' land, five hundred thousand rubles from seventy million desiatins of landowners' land, and thirty-six thousand rubles from one hundred and thirteen million desiatins of fiscal land. Thus fiscal land paid *zemsky* taxes one thousand times less, and the landowners' land seventy times less per desiatin than the peasants' land. The *zemstvos* had to regulate the payment of the taxes, and we see from the budget of 1868 what a radical change they wrought in that field: Of the nine million seven hundred thousand rubles of land-assessments, four million eight hundred thousand rubles were levied on landowners', and Imperial lands—seventy-five million desiatins altogether, while an almost equal sum was collected from the seventy million desiatins of peasants' land.

Another difficulty of the *zemstvos* consisted, and still consists, in the regulation according to which they must first of all cover the so-called *obligatory* expenses—pre-reform items; these do not include such needs as public health, education, agricultural or industrial improvements. From the budget of 1868 we see that eighty-two and eight-tenths per cent. were spent on the *obligatory* items plus maintenance of *zemstvo*-boards; only eight per cent. could be spent on public health, and five per cent. for popular education.

We must note that on the whole the early *zemstvo*-workers manifested high idealism and disinterestedness; they stood above class-interests, and honestly strove for the betterment of the peasants' conditions in every respect. If the results of their ardent work were not brilliant, we should not overlook the most obvious causes: lack of funds, and the opposition of the Government.

After Karakozov's attempt on the Tzar's life, the relation between the Government and the *zemstvo* grew rapidly worse. A series of new rules was issued in quick succession, limiting the rights and publicity of the *zemstvo*-institutions, and subor-

dinating them to the local administration, to wit the governors. The growing restrictions, and the systematic ignoring of *zemstvo*-pleas and declarations by the Ministry of Interior, affected the attractiveness of the *zemstvo*-activity, and drove away many disappointed devoted workers. In their place came new types of members who demonstrated not only narrow class-interests, but often base selfish aspirations. During the railroad-delirium, the *Gründer*-spirit found expression even among *zemstvo*-institutions, and the altruistic service of the early workers gave place to seeking for a portion of the "public pie." During the dark period not many idealists were capable of retaining their fighting posts in an atmosphere of depression; only exceptional personalities could continue the hard struggle against the reaction, and devote themselves to modest, but productive culture work against heavy odds. Under such circumstances progressive tendencies could be preserved, naturally, only in a few provincial and district *zemstvos*.

CHAPTER XXXIII

LET us cast a glance at the new courts, and at the press freed from preliminary censorship at the end of the sixties and during the first half of the seventies.

Properly speaking, the new judiciary statutes were enacted as early as November 20, 1864. But the question of their installation was subjected to a lengthy discussion, at first by the Committee of Ministers, then by a special committee, and lastly by the State Council, after which a decree was issued concerning the introduction of the statutes into practice. The Government's hesitation was due to two serious reasons: lack of funds (nine million rubles were assigned for the reform), and lack of adequately prepared men for the occupation of the new judicial posts which were to be held for life. Fortunately the Government rejected the proposed compromise—to withdraw the life-tenure principle, which measure, instituted at the very introduction of the new statutes, would have dealt them a death-blow. As to the financial difficulties, two suggestions were made; Prince Gagarin, President of the Committee of Ministers, proposed introducing the new courts simultaneously throughout the Empire, but in view of lack of means, limiting their personnel. This would have taxed the energy of the new institutions, and would have affected the speed of the court decisions; yet it had been solemnly promised that the new courts would be "speedy, just, and merciful." The other plan was offered by Minister of Justice Zamiatnin, and called for the installation of the new courts for the time being in only two districts, that of Petrograd and that of Moscow. The Tzar ordered a special commission to examine both

opinions; the majority accepted Zamiatnin's plan, against a minority of the most ardent friends of the reform, who, headed by Senator Zarudny, insisted that it would be better to postpone the installation of the new courts altogether, if it was impossible to carry out the reform simultaneously throughout the Empire. We may rejoice now that the opinion of the minority did not triumph, for who knows what would have become of the new statutes during the reactionary period, had they not been promulgated in 1866?

The State Council approved the opinion of the majority, and decreed that the new institutions be opened on April 17, 1866, in both Capital districts. Karakozov's attempt on the Tzar on April the 4th, encouraged the reactionaries to suggest the postponement of the opening of the new courts, but Alexander remained firm in his decision. The courts were opened on the date set.

In spite of all apprehensions the personnel of the new courts was extraordinarily successful. Minister Zamiatnin had spent much of his time in seeking out distinguished and honest workers among the old courts, and he filled the four hundred new positions in the districts, which ranked from coroners to senators of the cassational departments, with brilliant men. From the very start the trials in the new courts, in spite of the novelty of the proceedings, passed smoothly and successfully. The public interest might be compared perhaps only with the interest shown in the sessions of the first State *Duma*; the gallery was always filled with eager crowds who could not control their enthusiasm, and cheered in spite of the admonitions of the presiding judge.

The press also warmly greeted the new courts. Here is what Katkov wrote at that time:

"With this reform an entirely new principle is entering into our life, which will place a conspicuous border-line between the past and the future, and which will be reflected in

everything. . . . Its influence will not be limited to the judiciary institutions proper, but like a keen element it will invade everything, and will lend to all a new significance, a new power. Justice, performed publicly and with the participation of jurymen, will become a living social force. An independent court, not subject to administrative control, will elevate and ennoble the social milieu, for through it the character of independence will be imparted to all manifestations of public life. . . ."

In 1867, after the courts had demonstrated their adequacy, Katkov wrote:

"In truth, one can hardly believe that such an important matter, so dissimilar to our former order, has been so firmly and successfully implanted from the basic idea to the minutest details in a short time. *History will not forget a single one of the names of those connected with this great work of the civic rejuvenation of Russia.*"

Now we can hardly believe that those words belonged to Katkov, who eventually became one of the most vicious enemies of the new courts, and accused them of taking part in the general sedition. But then it was the "honey-moon" of the reform, to use the expression of J. V. Hessen; as a member of the new courts, the now famous A. F. Koni, expressed himself then, all the workers put into their activity their *first love*. The idyl of the honey-moon could not last very long, considering the reactionary conditions.

First of all the keen dissatisfaction of the Government, especially of Valuiev, was aroused by the verdicts of the courts concerning cases of violating censorship regulations. Such cases began to appear in 1866. The first, in which A. S. Suvorin, then a liberal, was tried for his book, "All Sorts," passed comparatively safely for the new courts: the author was sentenced to a light penalty, and the book was withdrawn from circulation. But in the very next case, against Pypin, editor of the *Contemporary*, and Y. G. Zhukovsky, author of the article "The

Cause of the New Generation," the Crown court (not a jury) found no guilt, and acquitted them. Valuiev was utterly enraged, declared the verdict impossible, and requested the dismissal of Motovilov, the president of the court, in defiance of the principle of life-tenure. Alexander remained, however, within the limits of the law, perhaps because the verdict was decided while Motovilov was on a furlough. The case ended with the procurator appealing to the higher cassation, and the Judicial Chamber sentencing Pypin and Zhukovsky to one week's arrest; as to the magazine itself, the *Contemporary* had been in the meantime stopped forever by an Imperial decree.

Another celebrated case was that of Protopopov, a petty clerk who was accused of having insulted one of his superiors, a vice-director of the department. To Valuiev's horror, the jury found Protopopov irresponsible, on the basis of a diagnosis by experts, and acquitted him as having acted in a moment of mental derangement. The reactionary press, especially the *Tiding*, began to attack the revolutionism of the courts.

Early in 1867, when the Petrograd *zemstvo* held public discussions concerning the new law which limited the power of taxation by the *zemstvo*, one of its members, M. N. Liuboshchinsky, Senator of the Cassational department of the Senate, delivered an indignant address; upon Valuiev's report, Alexander in a moment of rage decided to discharge the Senator. But Minister Zamiatnin tried to convince him that such a step would be a direct infringement of the law, and to his great displeasure Alexander, perhaps for the first time in his life, came to see that even his power might have some limit. The Senator retained his post, but Minister Zamiatnin and his Deputy, Stoianovsky, were dismissed as suddenly as had been Lanskoï and Miliutin in 1861, upon the publication of the peasant-reform. In the selection of a successor the Tzar followed the suggestion of Chief of Gendarmes Count Shuvalov, who recommended a person who was foreign to justice and

had had his experience in a different sphere,—Count K. I. Pahlen, at that time Governor of Pskov, and before vice-director of the Police Department; so utterly unprepared was he in the work of his new department, that the management of the Ministry of Justice had to be temporarily intrusted to Prince Urusov, Chief of His Majesty's Second Chancery, while Pahlen underwent preparatory instruction. Soon, however, Pahlen came out with self-confident criticism of the statutes, the guardianship of which he had just assumed.

Even before he entered upon his duties Pahlen held a consultation with the Moscow members of the procurature, trying to find support among them for the reactionary measures he was about to introduce. By way of experiment he expressed his opinion concerning the dangerousness of granting life-tenure to young men appointed as coroners, since there remained no way for correcting errors in such appointments. Pahlen found no sympathy among the members of the Moscow procuracy, who testified unanimously to the excellent personnel of the coroners. Yet he insisted on his notion, and as it was still considered premature to abolish one of the cardinal principles of the new statutes—that of life-tenure, the Minister used a roundabout way, and received the Imperial permission to appoint not coroners, but officials to “act in their place”; the latter, of course, might be discharged. This roundabout way has become firmly established in the Ministry of Justice; to this day there are persons who have been “acting” coroners for twenty years and more.

By the Statutes the Procurator is the representative of the Government's authority, and is directly subordinate to the Minister of Justice (who has the title of Procurator-General); he does not enjoy the life-tenure privilege. But as the procurators were also general guards of the law and defenders of the citizens from illegal encroachments of the administration, it is evident that for the worthy fulfilment of their func-

tion they had to be conscious of their independence from local administration; this consciousness could be the easier cultivated since the young procurators were to be selected from the minor judiciary personnel, the coroners, who had the life-tenure privilege. Hence one may understand how the actual deprivation of coroners of that prerogative might affect the personnel of the procurators. Bear in mind that the judiciary statutes were a sort of Habeas corpus act for Russia; for the first time they asserted that no one could be punished without due court-proceedings. Yet at the same time it was stated that the administrative authorities were to take legal measures for prevention of crimes. When the Statutes were discussed by the commission, Unkovsky, the former Marshal of the Tver Nobility, published an article in which he pointed out the danger of administrative measures for prevention of crime, since officials were not responsible for their actions; he insisted that in order to maintain the significance of the civil guaranties it was necessary to establish responsibility of officials for their actions against private persons. His idea was not accepted.

For this reason the guarding of private rights was left to the procurators; one can readily see the importance of the selection of their personnel, and of the establishment among them of a tradition of independence from the administration. But Pahlen throughout his administration endeavoured to bring up the procurators in the bureaucratic spirit, and to make them follow hints from higher up. They were instructed not to counteract the local administration, but on the contrary, to work in accord with the governors. This naturally was reflected in the local application of the Statutes. As the activity of the new courts grew there appeared considerable punitive activity on the part of administrative authorities and institutions, particularly severe and frequent in regard to the peasants; these were classed as "measures for prevention of crime." It was up to the procurators to struggle against such abuses of

the police and administration. During Pahlen's administration the personnel of the procurators, and consequently the judiciary personnel as a whole, fell very low, since the further career of the procurators consisted in being promoted to the Judicial Chamber and the Senate.

During the same time a long series of so-called *novelles* was issued — additions and modifications of the laws, which actually distorted their principles. As early as 1866, after the process of Pypin and Zhukovsky, Valuiev insisted upon the exemption of press-cases from District-Courts, and their direct trial by Judicial Chambers. In 1871, when the first symptoms of the spread of the underground revolutionary movement had become manifest, after the Nechaiev-process, Pahlen and Shuvalov carried through a radical reformation of the order and proceedings of cases concerning State crimes; namely, all such cases were to be investigated in their first stage not by coroners, but by officers of the gendarmerie with the participation of procurators. The investigations were to be submitted through the procurator of the Judicial Chamber and the minister of justice to the Tzar who might direct the case in one of these three ways: either order regular court-proceedings (such a direction had almost never occurred, except in cases when the inevitability of a severe verdict appeared certain), or the Tzar might order to drop the case, or the third, most frequent, way — that of solving the case administratively, i.e., by exile into more or less remote provinces. That administrative method was motivated by a most hypocritical consideration — the desire to mitigate the punishment for young political criminals; the hypocrisy of that motive was soon shown when the administration demanded not the mitigation, but the hardening of punishments for belonging to revolutionary societies, which demand was satisfied by a special law issued in 1874.

The very order of the proceedings in political cases had been changed time and again. At first they were subject to Judicial

Chambers, then to special sessions of the Senate, and by the *novelle* of 1878, they were again entrusted to Judicial Chambers, owing to the fact that by that time the Government had prepared an obedient contingent of judges among the members of the Judicial Chambers. In the same year those cases were transferred to Military Courts, under the provision that they should apply Article 279 of the Military Code, which gave a death sentence for nearly all cases; by a special circular, in 1887, the military courts were directly forbidden to employ measures of punishment other than death, and if they found special reasons for the mitigation of the verdict they were to petition about the commutation of the sentence at its confirmation.

The fact that the Government decided to make use of the military courts at quite a late date, in spite of the growing reaction and revolutionary movement, was due to the reorganisation of those courts by Miliutin; as long as he remained at the head of the Ministry of War, the Government feared the courts of his department more than the civil courts manipulated by Pahlen.

Among other reactionary changes in judiciary circles was the limitation of the rights of attorneys in matters of internal organisation; by the law of 1874 their order was declared subject to District Courts and Judicial Chambers. Finally, clouds began to gather over the most important side of the new institutions—the juries. The Ministry of Justice had collected material alleged to prove the immense number of acquittal-verdicts declared by juries in cases of doubtless guilt. A persistent campaign was launched not only to exempt a series of cases from the jurisdiction of juries—this had been already done to a considerable measure before—but to abolish jury-courts altogether. Count Pahlen's opposition to the juries was moderated, however, after he had read the memorandum written on that question in 1878 by A. F. Koni, who had been presid-

ing judge of the Petrograd District Court for many years, had gathered large material of statistic data and personal observations, and convincingly proved the wrongness of the prevailing opinion concerning the jury courts. The campaign against the juries was postponed till the Eighties.

Turning now to the position of the press, we observe that all the publications which appeared on September 1-st, 1865, abounded in praise for the Government's measure which had abolished preliminary censorship, although they were aware of the difficulties which the new statute promised for them. Ivan Aksakov wrote in his *Day*:

"At last to-day's issue appears without preliminary censorship. To-day, starting to write an editorial, we know that we shall read it in print just as we wrote it down; to-day we are not obliged to comply with the taste, valour, and *Weltanschauung* of the 'gentlemen having command of the barriers and turnpikes.' . . . To-day the nightmare, in the form of the censor, will not disturb our work, will not oppress our spirit, stifle our mind, and hold back our pen, and we are granted an unprecedented, an unheard of right: *not to lie, not to quibble*, to speak not in a falsetto, but in our own, natural voice."

The joy was of short duration. The press soon came to see that the power of the administration was not curbed by the new law. By the "temporary rules" of 1865 a monthly magazine appearing without "preliminary censorship" still had to be presented two days before its publication to the censor who might delay its release or cut out certain articles or pages. The provincial magazines and newspapers remained for a long time under censorship, except the Kiev paper, the *Kievite*. Soon the Government had press-cases exempted from regular court-proceedings, and made broad use of the administrative penalties permitted by the Statute. In the first place there were the "warnings"; after 1865, a newspaper or magazine having received two warnings and deserving a third one, was to be

stopped for a period of from two to eight months; the counting of the warnings did not begin every year, but might hang, like the sword of Damocles, for years over a publication. The censor had another means for affecting the material conditions of the press: he could forbid the printing of private advertisements, besides imposing heavy money-penalties.

When in 1868 Valuiev was displaced by Timashov, the position of the press became still more difficult during the ten years of the latter's administration. A number of *novelles* were issued regarding the press rules. On June 14, 1868, a rule was illegally carried — through the Committee of Ministers instead of the State Council — by which a publication could be forbidden, on account of pernicious tendencies, to sell its issues to non-subscribers. In 1871 magazines were ordered to be presented to the censor not two, but four days ahead of publication; also books that were published without preliminary censorship were to be presented to the censor one week before their publication. In 1873 the minister of interior was given the right to forbid the discussion of certain internal or foreign questions in the press; it was then that the reform of the secondary schools, which had been the burning problem of the day, was not allowed to be touched in print. A publication which disobeyed that rule could be stopped without warning for a period not over three months. For forty years those "temporary rules" raged over the Russian press, swollen by additional restrictions issued by Timashov, and later (in the Eighties) by Tolstoy.

A few words about the conditions and the tendencies of the press during that time. The Slavophiles, in spite of their loyal convictions, in spite of their profession of the three basic principles of the Russian order — Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality — still suffered restrictions in the spread of their ideas and opinions. Yuriy Samarin was forced to publish Khomiakov's writings abroad, in 1867, and there he began to

publish his *Russia's Borderlands*. Upon the appearance of the first issue of that publication, Samarin received an Imperial reprimand. The fate of Ivan Aksakov was no better. After many adventures he brought his paper, the *Day*, to a natural death, in 1866; when he attempted in 1867 to publish a new magazine, *Moscow*, a shower of various and frequent penalties fell upon him. During one year the magazine was stopped three times, after a series of warnings, and finally upon the presentation of Timashov, the Committee of Ministers resolved to stop its publication forever. True, the Senate permitted Aksakov to contest the ministerial decision, and he even won the case before the Senate, but since the senatorial decision was not unanimous, the case was transferred into the State Council, where it was finally resolved to discontinue the *Moscow*. Without awaiting the outcome of his contest, Aksakov began to publish a daily, the *Muscovite*, but it met with such a number of penalties that he had to stop it by the end of the year. Thus from 1868 the Slavophiles actually had no organ of their own. True, in 1872 Koshelev founded the magazine *Discourse*, but its pages were open to writers of different tendencies; after the confiscation and burning of two issues of that magazine, it also was discontinued at the end of the first year. Strakhov's *Dawn* was also partly inclined toward Slavophilism. It was published from 1870 to 1871, and actually expressed the views of the "Men of the Soil."¹

As to the radical press, we have seen that in 1866 the *Contemporary* and the *Russian Word* were stopped forever by an Imperial order, and for a year and a half nobody dared renew their traditions. Only by the end of 1867 Blagosvietlov attempted to continue the work of the *Russian Word*, and founded a magazine *Action*, in which Pisarev, Shelgunov, Zaitzev, and other contributors to the *Russian Word*, took part.

¹ Dostoevsky was one of the "Men of the Soil"; their ideas may be defined as reactionary *Narodnichestvo*.—TR.

Pisarev, however, soon had a disagreement with Blagosvietlov, was drowned, in 1868, and with him disappeared the chief force of the movement; Zaitzev soon emigrated abroad. Shelgunov, who was far from being an adequate exponent of the Nihilistic views, remained the only representative of Pisarev's ideas.

The traditions of the *Contemporary* were restored in 1868 in the *Annals of the Fatherland*, which Niekrasov rented from Kraievsky, and edited together with Yeliseiev and Saltykov. Of the former members of the *Contemporary*, Pypin, Zhukovsky, and Antonovich did not join the new publication. The new *Annals of the Fatherland* began to demonstrate populistic (*Narodnichestvo*) views, which became so one-sided during the Seventies that the magazine rejected all political ideals for the near future, and labelled the Constitutional idea "a fad of the nobility" (for which it did not pay to break lances), asserting that the only question of the moment was the improvement of the conditions of the masses. In 1866 a weekly, the *Week*, appeared under the editorship of Dr. Conradi and his gifted wife; although officially the publication had no party allegiance, it undoubtedly promulgated ideas of *Narodnichestvo*, and one of its main contributors was P. L. Lavrov, the founder of that doctrine, about whom we shall speak again.

Katkov's *Russian Messenger*, and *Moscow News*, the daily which he edited together with Leontiev, inclined more and more to the right. Katkov mercilessly attacked the Nihilists, Separatists, and all non-Russians, especially the Poles. But he was still somewhat liberal in respect to judicial independence and to local self-government, and even in his chauvinistic and Russificatory ideas he was still not the typical rabid reactionary of the Eighties. The newspaper *Tiding*, organ of the selfdom-advocates and of the oligarchic-constitutional nobles, had to discontinue publication in 1869 for lack of subscribers and in view of governmental persecutions. A few years later Prince

Meshchersky, editor of the *Citizen*, resolved to revive the views of the *Tiding*, and to this day ² he appears as the representative of the aristocratic aspirants, and as a relentless enemy of the democratic order which came as a result of the reforms of the Sixties.

Of the daily papers the *Moscow News*, as long as it did not become completely reactionary, was the most influential and widely read during the Sixties and Seventies. But its prestige began to be rivalled by that of the Petrograd liberal paper, *Voice*, especially after its powerful articles against Tolstoy. The influence of the *Voice* became still greater when in 1871 the historian Bilbasov became its editor; its liberal tendencies were tinted occasionally with Slavophile hues, as in the articles of A. D. Gradovsky and of Prince A. I. Vassilchikov.

Until the middle of the Seventies the *Petrograd News*, published by the Academy of Science, but rented and edited by V. F. Korsh, occupied an important place. Owing to its attacks against Tolstoy the paper suffered persecution, and in 1875 the Academy of Science was requested to withdraw it from Korsh, and lend it to more yielding hands. The forces which had been grouped around Korsh were distributed between two publications, the *Bourse Gazette* of Poletika, which existed till the end of the Seventies, and the *New Time* (*Novoie Vremia*), founded in 1876 by Suvorin, then an extreme liberal. Suvorin did not preserve his liberalism, however, and soon began to turn to the right and to vacillate.³ In the latter half of the Seventies the *Russian News* (*Russkiya Viedomosti*) began to gain influence as an organ of the moderately liberal democrats; it has been inspired by young professor-economists, headed by A. I. Chuprov and A. S. Posnikov.

² Meshchersky died in 1914.—Tr.

³ To this day the *Novoie Vremia* is the weathercock of the official policies. It still preserves the epithet given it by the satirist Saltykov-Shchedrin—"the 'What is your request?' paper."—Tr.

The public was in a quite depressed mood after 1866. Only once, in 1870, did symptoms of life appear among society,—in connection with the announcement of important military and *zemstvo*-reforms, and with the victory of Russian diplomacy in abrogating the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Paris, in 1856, upon Russian navigation in the Black Sea. The general mood was well illustrated in the address to the Tzar presented by the duma of Moscow; it was edited by the Slavophiles, greeted the Government's return to reformatory activity, and expressed hope for further liberal steps in respect to freedom of press, of conscience, and of the Church. After the assurances of loyal rejoicing on the occasion of the diplomatic victory, the address went on:

"Whatever trials may threaten us now, they will—we are certain—not find Russia unprepared, but will find her closely concentrated around Your throne.

"With greater faith than in the past does Russia now look at her future, aware of a constant spiritual revival. Every one of Your great reforms which have been accomplished, or are being accomplished, or are eagerly awaited, has served as a source of new power for the country as well as for Your Majesty. No one is so entitled to the gratitude of the people, as You, Sire, and to none has the nation shown such gratitude. . . . From you alone the nation expects the fulfilment of your beneficent promises, and first of all—*freedom of opinion and the printed word*, without which the national spirit withers, and there is no room for sincerity and truth in the relations to the Government; *freedom of the Church*, without which the preached sermon is impotent; finally, *freedom of religious conscience*—the most precious treasure for man's soul.

"Sire! Internal and foreign affairs are mutually connected. The pledge of our success in the foreign region lies in the power of national self-consciousness and self-respect. . . . Confidence on the part of the Tzar in his people, reasonable

self-restrain in freedom and honesty in loyalty on the part of the people, a mutual, unseverable bond between the Tzar and the people based on the accord of aspirations and beliefs — herein is our power, our historical mission. Yes, Sire, we shall conclude with the words of our ancestors in their reply to your first crowned forebear, in 1642: “*Your will* we are ready to serve with our wealth and with our blood, but *our thought* is what it is.”

The address was edited by Ivan Aksakov, Prince Cherkassky, and Yuriy Samarin. But the Slavophiles were once more convinced that the Government desired not honest loyalty, but slavish obedience. The Minister of Interior found that the address abounded in such impossible expressions that it could not be presented to the Tzar. . . .

After this the last signs of social life were extinguished, and the public, tired by its struggle and disappointed in its attempts, began to stagnate in a prostration which lasted till the second half of the Seventies.

CHAPTER XXXIV

IN one of the previous chapters I outlined the external process of the distribution of landownership, as it took form after the expansion of the peasant-reform in 1866 upon the State-peasants. Now I intend to examine the contents of the internal process, the outcome of which depended upon many material and non-material factors.

By the Act of February 19, the redemption of peasant-allotments was based, under normal conditions, upon mutual agreement between the landowners and the peasants. The landowners were allowed to demand redemption against even the desire of the peasants, but in such cases they received not full compensations, but only eighty or seventy-five per cent. of the full amount. Moreover, by the Act of February 19, only *obrok*-estates might be redeemed, while *barshchina*-estates had first to pass to the *obrok* system, after which the landowners might demand redemption which was estimated by the capitalisation of the *obrok*.

We have already observed that on the *barshchina*-estates the productivity of the peasants after the Reform had considerably fallen, since the emancipated peasants had become aware of the fact that the landowners no longer exercised their former authority; in many places the peasants refused to be transferred from *barshchina* to *obrok*. In 1862 a number of declarations by the gentry concerning the necessity of introducing obligatory redemption appeared. Outside of the sharp declarations of the Tver nobility, which had a political character, there had been petitions of a purely business character, as for instance, the petition of the nobles of the province of Kazan, where the

majority of the peasants were on *barshchina*, and where the landowners felt helpless and were being rapidly convinced of the necessity of bringing their peasants to redemption.

In 1863 the Government issued an additional law by which *barshchina*-estates might be directly redeemed upon the request of the landowners who were to receive from the Redeeming Institution only eighty and seventy-five per cent. of the compensation sum. In the meantime peasants of many places, particularly in the southeastern and in the southern New Russia provinces, actually fled from redemption, in spite of the fact that they did not have to make any additional payments and that their debt by the compensation arrangement equalled only three-fourths or four-fifths of the capitalised *obrok*. The peasants refused redemption in view of the absence of side earnings in those regions.

Then the Government was forced to make use of the additional clause introduced by Prince Gagarin, concerning the so-called "quarterly" or "beggarly" allotments. Wherever the peasants were unwilling or unable to pay for the land they were allowed to demand free "quarterly" allotments. The entire southeast of Russia and part of the eastern provinces, as Ufa, the southern part of Perm, part of Voronezh, all of Tambov, Samara, and part of Saratov, appeared to be the region of the greatest expansion of those "beggarly" allotments.

In view of the fact that during the first years after the Reform most of the redemption cases were accomplished upon the demand of the landowners (more than sixty-five per cent.), and since because of this the latter received incomplete compensation, they in their turn made broad use of their right to "cut off" the allotments of the peasants within the limits of the established maximal norm. Those "cut-offs" had in many places a great importance in that they not only diminished the property of the peasants in size but in that they greatly dete-

riorated it qualitatively, and often placed the peasants in complete economic dependence upon the landowner because the latter intentionally cut off such necessary parts of the land as the meadow or the pasture land. In non-black-soil provinces where the land requires manuring the peasants could not exist without raising cattle, and they could not keep cattle without having the meadows and pastures, so that they were compelled to rent those "cut-offs" at such prices as the landowners were pleased to name.

These conditions affected the general state of agriculture very unfavourably in the first years after the Reform. On one side the peasants owing to the "cut-offs" fell in many places into complete economic bondage to the landowners. On the other side the landowners also depended to a great extent upon the peasants, being forced to conduct their estates by free hired labour; although owing to the greater freedom of movement after the Reform outside labourers appeared, still the landowners preferred to deal with their former serfs. In the non-black-soil provinces industry was well developed, and the landowners had great difficulty in finding labourers for their estates. They were forced to sell out their property.

A different economic conjuncture was in the black-soil provinces. There the peasants received very small allotments and at the same time in most of those places they could find no side-earnings. They were forced either to hire themselves as labourers to the landowners or to rent land from the latter.

We should note that at that moment the black-soil provinces were splendidly situated in respect to raising grain. Since the end of the Forties after the abolition of the Corn laws in England and under the influence of the growing concentration of the population of Western Europe in cities, the demand for Russian grain increased, and agriculture had come to be very profitable; after the Reform to this was added the building of

railroads which was so planned as to facilitate the export of grain from the most fertile provinces to sea-ports.¹

Under this influence the cultivation of the soil in the fertile provinces grew very rapidly after the Reform. During the Sixties the area of cultivated land in European Russia equalled eighty-eight million eight hundred thousand desiatins; twenty years later one hundred and six million eight hundred thousand desiatins were under cultivation, and in 1887 one hundred seventeen million desiatins. We must not forget that in the non-black soil provinces the landowners abandoned their estates, so that the amount of land under cultivation did not increase throughout the Empire. In the black-soil provinces the cultivated area increased unequally; in the central black soil provinces it increased only by five per cent.; in the middle Volga provinces during the twenty years following the Reform the area increased by thirty-five per cent.; in the Little Russian provinces — by thirteen per cent., while in New Russia it increased by ninety-eight per cent., and in the Southern Trans-Volga region by three hundred and sixty-five per cent.

These figures do not show an increase in the landowners' estates at all. In spite of the increase of prices on grain, which rose during those twenty years by fifty to eighty per cent.; in spite of the fact that the landowners had received an enormous capital in the form of compensation sums, and that during the Eighties a number of Agrarian banks were opened — the landowners did not invest those funds in agricultural improvements, but spent them in various ways, and preferred to rent their

¹ The export of grain from Russia which was very unsteady in the first half of the nineteenth century, but had not reached even thirty million puds before 1845, rose to fifty-one million puds between 1846-1850; in the next five years, 1850-1885, it fell to forty-five million, on account of the war; between 1856-1860 it rose to sixty-nine million, between 1861-1865, to seventy-six million, between 1876-1880, to two hundred and fifty-seven million puds per year, and so forth.

land to the peasants, making use of the growth of rental prices. So that on the whole landowners' estates decreased.

This is explained by the fact that at the moment of the liberation of the serfs the landowners did not have their own inventory, and that their estates were deep in debt. Of the five hundred and eighty-eight million rubles which the landowners were to receive as compensation during the first ten years after the Reform about two hundred and sixty-two million rubles was retained for the extinction of their debts to the Treasury, and the remaining three hundred and twenty-six million rubles were paid in bonds, the course of which was quite low, so that the actual sum equalled only two hundred and thirty million rubles. The indebtedness of the landowners' estates continued to grow; by the end of the Sixties the new debt was equal to two hundred and thirty million rubles, by the beginning of the Eighties it reached four hundred million rubles and by the end of the Eighties it exceeded six hundred million rubles. A general view of the first twenty years after the Reform will show the following process:

In the North landowners' estates deteriorated; they were either sold or transformed into industrial units. In the Southern provinces landowners retained their possessions, but they rented a considerable part of their land to peasants. During the Eighties in European Russia, excepting Poland, Finland, and the Caucasus, there were sixty-eight million desiatins under cultivation, of which forty-seven million and three hundred thousand desiatins belonged to peasant-allotments, about twelve million desiatins were rented by the peasants from the landowners, and only eight million seven hundred thousand desiatins belonged to private landowners. Thus we see that eighty-seven per cent. belonged to the peasants, and only twelve and eight-tenths to private landowners.

In respect to the black-soil provinces we must come to the conclusion that although the landowners retained the land they

did not improve or expand the cultivation of their estates, and in the meantime their indebtedness continued to grow, so that during the Nineties a wholesale liquidation of landowners' estates took place with the aid of Peasant and Gentry banks.

The statistic data about the sale of landowners' estates show that the average sale of their land between 1859-1875 equalled five hundred seventeen thousand desiatins yearly; between 1875-1879 seven hundred and forty-one thousand desiatins yearly; at the beginning of the Nineties—seven hundred and eighty-five thousand desiatins yearly. The yearly average of the sales has continued to grow, and reached one million desiatins by the beginning of the twentieth century, while in 1906 (when special conditions existed) seven and one-half million desiatins of landowners' property was offered for sale.

The distribution of the land by classes during that time had changed in the following way; in 1877 the nobles possessed 77.8 per cent. of the entire area of private landownership, the merchants—12.2 per cent, commoners—two per cent., peasants—seven per cent, and all "other" private owners—one per cent. In 1887, ten years later, we get the following figures: nobles 68 per cent., merchants—13 per cent., commoners—2.9 per cent., peasants—12 per cent., and "others"—2.3 per cent.

While the merchants have been buying the land from the nobles not for agricultural, but for industrial or speculative purposes, the peasants bought land mainly for direct cultivation. Most of their purchases during that period were accomplished not by communities or societies, as it was in the next period, but by individuals. During the Sixties the peasant purchases equalled ninety-one thousand desiatins annually, during the Seventies—two hundred and three thousand desiatins, during the Eighties—four hundred and thirty-eight thousand desiatins. In many cases peasant-buyers were land speculators like the merchants.

It thus appears that the peasants triumphed all along the line; their possessions expanded, they bought land, increased the size of rented land. We must not forget, however, that they aspired for an increase of property because, owing to the limited allotments which were given them by the Act of February 19, they had no other way out. The dearth of land in the black-soil region was felt by the peasants particularly during the first years after the Reform. While the prices of grain doubled, the rental prices increased by three hundred and even by four hundred per cent., which was due not only to the rise of grain prices on the international market, but also to the extension of railroads to such places as Kozlov, Morshansk, Saratov, Penza, Kursk, Oriol, Kharkov, New Russia, and so forth. The sale of grain became very lively near the new railroad centres, and the peasants were tempted to produce more of it. But in view of the enormous rental prices most of the peasants were in the long run ruined, and furthermore, the excessive cultivation of the soil caused the exhaustion of the black soil.

The economic conditions of the peasants on their own allotments were no better, because they were greatly burdened with all sorts of payments. In 1872 Minister of State Domains Valuiev, collected interesting material about their condition in various parts of Russia. Putting aside the official conclusions we may derive valuable information from the work of such independent investigators as Professor Yanson, or as Prince Vassilchikov. From such data we learn that the sum of all direct taxes and payments which lay on the rural population in 1872 was two hundred and eight million rubles, of which only thirteen million rubles fell upon private landowners; the rest, about two hundred million rubles, fell upon peasants' land. Among those taxes were the State *zemsky* tax, local *zemsky* taxes, redemption payments, and in some places — *obrok* payments. In all, the peasants paid ninety-five million rubles of land assessments.

Then followed the per capita tax of forty-two million rubles, which was paid exclusively by peasants — altogether ninety million rubles of various non-land payments. These did not include the natural obligations which were performed only by peasants, and which we may roughly estimate as equivalent to several tens of millions rubles. Thus, not counting the natural obligations, the ninety and one-half million peasants paid about two hundred million rubles of taxes, i.e., an average family paid thirty rubles. Such payments were doubtless unbearable for the ordinary peasant.

We should add that these taxes were unequally distributed among the peasants themselves. The landowners' peasants had to pay fifty-four million rubles for their allotments of thirty-three and one-half million desiatins, while the State-peasants had to pay only thirty-seven million rubles for their seventy-five million desiatins. The general picture of the heavy and unproportional taxation to which the peasantry was subjected appeared early after the Reform. As early as 1867 there was a grave failure of crops in the province of Smolensk, which was followed by a famine; Valuiev, then Minister of the Interior, at first denied the existence of the famine and asserted that there were sufficient alimentary reserves for the satisfaction of the peasants' needs, but investigators who were appointed discovered that the reserves were not sufficient, and that the peasants not only had to eat various substitutes for bread, like bark, lime, etc., but that they actually died from starvation. The Government became alarmed and appointed a special commission under the chairmanship of the Heir (the future Emperor Alexander III) for the relief of the starving peasants.

Three years later another failure of crops occurred; it affected mainly the southeastern provinces which had been considered the granary of all Russia and even of Europe; in the province of Samara it lasted three years and resulted in a famine of enormous dimensions. It became clear to the Gov-

ernment that it was necessary to lighten the burden of the over-taxed peasants on one side, and on the other to bring an end to their landlessness in the black-soil provinces. Yet the Government continued to act very slowly, and allowed the conditions of the peasants to grow worse. During the Seventies some local administrators attempted to explain away the misery of the peasants by their own bad morals. For instance, Klimov, the Governor of Samara, expressed it as his opinion before the Committee of Ministers in 1873 that the peasants spent all their income on drink and hence starved when the crops failed. The State Comptroller, A. A. Abaza, pointed out that Klimov's information about his own province was incorrect; Abaza indicated that the province of Samara paid more than three per cent. of the general sum of taxes collected in Russia, while its excise payments equalled only one and one-half per cent. of the total excise revenue, thus definitely proving to the Governor of Samara that his province was one of the most sober in Russia. The exhaustion of the black-soil belt of Russia in the Nineties was certain beyond a doubt. During the famine years of 1892-1893 I had to gather statistic data about starving peasants, and I personally saw a large number of impoverished villages in the central black-soil provinces; for instance in the province of Tula seventy-five per cent. of the peasants' houses had their stoves built without chimneys, for the sake of economy in fuel which consisted of wood or straw; the ceilings in those houses were absolutely black with soot, and in damp weather they dripped black mud. A large number of houses in such villages were uncovered; only the rafters remained on the roof, since the straw was removed and given to the cattle. According to the data I collected it appeared that by the beginning of the Nineties in some villages about fifty per cent. of the peasants had no horses, while of the remaining fifty per cent. about forty-five per cent. owned

one horse, and only five to six per cent. possessed two or more horses.

If the Government was slow in undertaking serious measures for the improvement of the unbearable position of the peasants, the public saw even during the Seventies that the status of the peasantry was doomed to slide downward. Among the writers who made use of the statistic data gathered by the Government commissions were two distinguished investigators whom I have already mentioned — Y. E. Yanson and Prince A. I. Vassilchikov. Professor Yanson had definitely expressed the conclusions which he drew from his investigations in his book, *A Statistic Investigation of the Peasant-Allotments and Assessments*. He set forth the economic insecurity of the peasant, his poor nourishment, bad physical and moral conditions of living, large number of sickness and high death rate; he named as the causes of such conditions poor soil, insufficient allotments, and finally the heaviness of taxation. He recommended the lowering of land taxes, the transplanting of peasants into unoccupied provinces, the facilitation of land acquisition by the migrating peasants, and finally the revision of the system of taxation. Most of his recommendations were put into practice early in the Eighties.

Prince A. I. Vassilchikov differed from Yanson in that he considered the main cause of the miserable conditions of the peasants not the insufficiency of their allotments, but the terrible taxation system which paralysed the beneficial results of the reform of February 19. Quoting the epigraph of Taine, in his characterisation of the position of the peasants in France before the Revolution of 1789 — *quand l'homme est miserable, il s'aigrit; mais quand il est à la fois propriétaire et miserable, il s'aigrit encore d'avantage* — Prince Vassilchikov found the condition of the French peasants of that time quite analogous to the position of his contemporary Russian peasants, and he

warned the Government that the tax system was bound to bring the small landowners to desperation and to such outbursts of popular indignation as were manifested during the French Revolution.

The opinions of Prince Vassilchikov and Professor Yanson were in a large measure shared by most of the writers of that time; this attitude was expressed back at the end of the Fifties and early in the Sixties by Chernyshevsky, and later by Serno-Solovievich and others. During the Sixties a quite definite and persistent opinion about the defects of the economic order that was established by the peasant Reform was formed among the progressive Russian *intelligentsia*; the spread of that opinion gave rise to the movement of *Narodnichestvo* in literature and in life.

CHAPTER XXXV

THE pessimistic conclusions of Yanson and Vassilchikov did not surprise the representatives of the *intelligentsia* who were familiar with the critical views of Herzen, Chernyshevsky, Dobroliubov, and other publicists of the *Contemporary* or the *Bell*. Radical public opinion regarded the Governmental activity with mistrust and suspicion. From the very beginning of the Sixties the formation began of the so-called *Narodnichestvo*¹-school in Russian literature. Already in 1860-1861 the first productions appeared of such writers as Nicholas Uspensky, Naumov, Levitov, Rieshetnikov, and a number of others who brilliantly described the difficult position in which the people found themselves at the moment of emerging from the bondage system. The above-mentioned writers could do it the easier since by their origin they were close to the people; they were the commoner-writers who were then entering Russian literature which until that time had been created chiefly by nobles. In an article "Is It Not the Beginning of a Change?" dedicated to Nicholas Uspensky, Chernyshevsky indicated that phenomenon.

Those *Narodniki*-writers had tasted in their personal life of the misery which oppressed the people. In their description of the real state of the masses they worked largely upon the public conscience, upon the conscience of the most susceptible minds, particularly of the young generation. There loomed up the question of the duty of the *intelligentsia* before the people, for it

¹ *Narod* — means: people. The derivatives are numerous. *Narodnichestvo* — the doctrine of going "to the people." *Narodnichesky* — the adjective. *Narodnik* — an adherent of the doctrine.—Tr.

appeared clear to those idealists that every intellectual body is enabled to enjoy the benefits of culture only at the expense of the people; this brought about the problem of paying back to the people the debt which lay upon the shoulders of the *intelligentsia*. Such was the sentiment not only of the commoners who came from the ranks of the people, but of numerous representatives of the nobility — those whom a few years later N. K. Mikhailovsky named "Repentant Nobles."

When in 1861 student disturbances took place in connection with some questions regarding the liberation of the peasants, when Putiatin and Ignatiev exaggerated the event and tactlessly ravaged the University of Petrograd, and hundreds of young men were expelled and thrown into fortresses and barracks, Herzen wrote in his *Bell*, addressing those expelled students:

"Where shall you go, youths, from whom knowledge has been shut off? Shall I tell you, Where? Give ear, for even darkness does not prevent you from listening,—from all corners of our enormous land, from the Don and the Ural, from the Volga and the Dnieper, a moan is growing, a grumbling is rising,—this is the first roar of the sea-billow, which begins to rage, pregnant with storm, after a long and tiresome calm. *V narod!* To the people!—that is your place, O exiles of knowledge. Prove to those Bistroms² that out of you will emerge not clerks, but soldiers, not mercenaries, but soldiers of the Russian people!"

That slogan: *V narod!* To the people!, which was used by Herzen on a particular occasion, was caught up by the *narodnichestvo*-literature, and was powerfully reflected in the minds of the young.

² Bistrom was the General who commanded the soldiers during the quelling of the student disturbances in 1861; he told his soldiers that the disturbers were "clerks" dissatisfied with the liberation of the peasants.

True, in the following years, under the influence of the collapse of the progressive *intelligentzia*, which took place in 1862 after the Petrograd conflagrations, under the influence of the Polish insurrection which aroused reactionary mood, but mostly under the influence of that current which under the leadership of Pisarev received the name of Nihilism, and put forth more selfish questions — of the struggle for individuality (i.e., for the liberation of one's intellectual personality from all religious, social and other chains and prejudices) under the influence of those circumstances the Russian *intelligentzia* had somewhat deviated from the *Narodnichestvo* aspirations and from the tendencies which began to develop in literature after the peasant Reform.

But during the second half of the Sixties the *Narodnichestvo* movement again came to the front, enhanced by the new rules issued by Minister Tolstoy in 1867, which severely restricted University life; the young generation felt oppressed, insulted, and removed from the honourable place to which it was elevated by Dobroliubov, Pisarev, and other literary leaders of the radicals. In place of problems of internal struggle for individuality and for the liberation of one's personality there inevitably rose before them the question of the necessity of acquiring first of all more tolerable external conditions. That thought necessarily pointed towards social problems.

At the same time we have seen that in 1868, in connection with the famine in the province of Smolensk, the question about the misery of the peasants rose before the public for the first time. The young generation were deeply affected by the pictures of the sufferings of the people, and a strong fermentation was going on among the University students during 1868–1869. Grave disturbances took place, in which the students protested against the Government, and in the result masses of them were excluded from the University and from the Medical Academy, and were transported to their homes. The surging

young mass was thus scattered throughout Russia, where it came in contact with society, and at once began to propagate the very ideas which they had been punished for holding. The year 1869 and those immediately following saw the beginnings of new, revolutionary and radical-*Narodnichesky* currents among Russian youth.

As if to meet the new currents an article written by P. L. Lavrov in the magazine *Week* appeared, which was a successful formulation of the tasks which were placed before society by the new circumstances. Lavrov, who was quite moderate during the Sixties and had been opposed by the radical organs, especially by Pisarev, had moved considerably to the left. In spite of his maturity—he was then a retired Colonel of forty—Lavrov was inclined to evolution, and constantly moved forward, trying to preserve his bond with the younger generation and with their problems. In 1868 in his articles written from exile under the transparent pseudonym of Mirtov,³ he formulated those general problems which in his opinion were then before the Russian *intelligentsia*. He wrote:

“The development of the individual physically, mentally and morally, the embodiment of truth and justice in social forms, this short formula embraces everything that may be considered Progress.”

On the basis of that formula Mirtov wrote a series of articles under the title of “Historical Letters,” in which he indicated the conditions for the achievement of the purpose. He put forth the obligations of every “critically thinking individual,” whose rôle he saw in paying the price of Progress.

“A civilised minority,” he wrote, “who do not strive to be civilising in the broadest sense of the word, bear responsibility for all the sufferings of their contemporaries, which they could have removed, had they not limited their rôle to that of

³ *Lavr* — means: laurel. *Mirt* — myrtle.

representing and conserving civilisation, but had taken upon themselves also the rôle of moving it ahead."

"The embodiment of truth and justice in social forms," as the aim of human activity, and the obligation of striving for the achievement of that aim, gave the young generation a basis for its conduct which it needed gravely at that moment, and which Pisarev could not furnish.

Later the sociological teachings of Mikhailovsky gave a brighter and stronger expression to the task outlined by Lavrov, but the latter was undoubtedly the first Russian thinker to place that task before the public. So much did his formula suit the moment that even Shelgunov, the leader of the *Action* and promulgator of Pisarev's ideas, greeted the appearance of Lavrov's articles in book form, and although he disagreed with some of the latter's views, he warmly recommended the book to the public as "an extraordinary phenomenon in Russian literature."

The formula of Lavrov was so broad that it was taken up by representatives of various platforms. Since "the embodiment of truth and justice in social forms" might be achieved in various ways, the formula was accepted by revolutionaries as well as by peacefully inclined *Narodniki* who limited their activity to cultural development of the country, particularly of the village.

A formula, politically more definite, although in substance analogous to that of Lavrov, was announced abroad at that time by the most distinguished representative of the Russian emigration, M. A. Bakunin. In 1868 a Russian magazine was founded in Geneva, the *Cause of the People*, under the editorship of N. I. Zhukovsky; in the first issue Bakunin placed before the progressive Russian youth a number of tasks required, in his opinion, by the moment. The first point of his programme completely corresponded with the formula of Lavrov, with the only difference that Bakunin was more definite.

First of all was placed the task of liberating one's personality from any bonds, but it was definitely indicated that only the individual who had thrown off all religious beliefs and had become atheistic, might be considered free, so that Atheism was put forth as the cornerstone of personal evolution. The second point of the programme called for the "embodiment of truth and justice in social forms," but it pointed out definitely that by truth and justice was meant a certain social order in which was to be attained not only the social and economic liberation of the people through the abolition of all *hereditary* property, transferring the land to agricultural communes, and the factories, capital and means of production — to labour-associations, granting equal rights to women, abolishing marriage and family, and submitting all children to a public education: all these Bakunin considered realisable only in case the work began from the complete annihilation of the State. Anarchism was the typical feature of Bakunin's programme. According to him, as long as mankind will live and develop under forms of state, economic and social freedom will be impossible, for whatever the form of government — whether a constitutional monarchy or a democratic republic — any state organism is based on compulsion and hence inevitably leads to inequality and domination of one social group or class over others.

The sharp and irreconcilable formulation of the question by Bakunin appealed to the aroused youth more than the vague and abstract formula of Lavrov. During the winter of 1868–1869 Bakunin's programme was the subject of lively discussion among students. The question rose whether it was worth while to study. According to Bakunin all study, all knowledge, were at that time waste of the people's sources; the transfer of knowledge and culture to the people was impossible as long as the people were not free, in Bakunin's sense of the word; hence until that moment it was not worth while to study. Bakunin recommended leaving the universities, going

to the people, and raising them — not in the sense of imparting knowledge and ideas to them, but in the direct sense of rebelling against the existing order of things, since until that order were overthrown and annihilated no proper social development was possible.

Soon a new herald of revolutionary ideas appeared among the young generation, who went further than Bakunin. It was the twenty-three-year-old Niechaiev, a teacher in a primary school, and an unclassified student at the University. He had a magnetic influence not only upon the young people, but upon all who came in contact with him. Among his followers was the forty-year-old writer, Pryzhov, who admitted that he had never met such a winning personality. Niechaiev soon fled abroad, and there he produced such an impression on Bakunin that the latter was ready to submit to him, and even tried to win Herzen to his side, but the latter brusquely turned away. Bakunin succeeded, however, in converting Ogarev and for a time, Herzen's children, whom he persuaded after the death of their father (January, 1870) to hand over to Niechaiev the public money which had been in their trust.

Upon the young generation Niechaiev had a hypnotising effect. In his extreme ambition he intended personally to manage the whole movement; he did not scruple about spreading mystifying rumours and using dishonest means for the achievement of his purpose. Bakunin finally became utterly disappointed in him. Niechaiev put into the foundation of his political system the principle of extreme jesuitism. In his opinion a revolutionist was justified in ignoring all moral principles, in deceiving, killing, and robbing; for the sake of holding the organisation in a firm grip, Niechaiev allowed himself to compromise his coworkers, to steal their letters or documents, and to terrorise them in other ways.

This harmonised with the structure of his organisation which was borrowed from Babeuf and his followers. It consisted

of a hierarchy of "fives"; each group of five knew only one superior from the next "five," and at the very top was the mysterious "committee," which was itself a myth, since Niechaiev was the actual head of all the "fives." In one of the Moscow "fives" which consisted of Uspensky, Pryzhov, Nicolaiev, Kuznietzov, and Ivanov, Niechaiev observed that Ivanov began to regard him critically. He ordered the other members of the "five" to kill Ivanov, as a spy, calculating that the crime, once committed, would throw those who had taken part in it into slavish subjection to him. He succeeded in his plan; the student Ivanov was murdered. But the affair was disclosed, and served as the basis for the Process of the Niechaievians, in which eighty-seven persons were tried, thirty-three sentenced to various penalties, while many of the acquitted were later exiled in the administrative order.

When Bakunin gained a clear view of the personality of Niechaiev and his system, he did his best to disavow any connection with him and to denounce him publicly. But the evil had been done: Niechaiev's organisation, "The Tribunal of the People," had produced a deep impression upon the contemporary public, and that episode had greatly harmed the reputation and development of the revolutionary movement. In 1872, one year after the trial of the Niechaievians, Dostoevsky, himself a former revolutionist, wrote a novel "Demons" ("The Possessed"), with the Niechaiev affair as its basis. But Dostoevsky generalised that monstrous phenomenon, and applied it to the whole movement, which naturally aroused great indignation in radical circles; it was adequately expressed in an article of a young writer in the *Annals of the Fatherland*, N. K. Mikhailovsky, who, without attempting to defend Niechaiev and his system, protested at the same time against Dostoevsky's general slander of the revolutionary movement.

About the same time, in the early Seventies, the circle of the

Chaikovtzy, who were grouped around a young university graduate, N. V. Chaikovsky, a new movement, in contrast to that of Niechaiev, arose among the young generation. In his *Memoirs of a Revolutionist* Prince Kropotkin describes the origin of that circle and of similar circles.

"In all cities, in all the ends of Petrograd, appeared circles of 'self-development.' There the works of philosophers, economists, and of the young school of Russian historians were carefully studied. The reading was accompanied with endless discussions. The aim of all those readings and discussions was to solve the great problem which stood before the young men and women: *In what way could they be most useful for the people?* Gradually they came to the conclusion that there existed only one way: *One must go to the people and live their lives.* Young men began to depart for villages as physicians, assistant-surgeons (*feldshers*), school-teachers, *volost*-clerks. In order to be still closer to the people, many became hard day-labourers, blacksmiths, woodchoppers. Girls began to undergo examinations as school-teachers, midwives, nurses, and flocked by the hundreds to villages where they devoted themselves unreservedly to the service of the poorest part of the population. None of them had as yet any thought of revolution, of any revolutionary reorganisation of society after some definite plan. They merely wanted to teach the people how to read and write, to enlighten them, to help them in some way to get out of darkness and misery, and at the same time to learn from the people themselves, *their* ideal of a better social life."

These memoirs were written several decades after that epoch, and many of them have become, so to speak, chronologically merged; there might have been perhaps some chronological aberration. We may therefore take Kropotkin with some reservations. We may point out that many members of the circles were revolutionists from the very beginning; an-

other prominent *Chaikovetz*, L. E. Shishko, tells us in his memoirs that when still a junker he professed revolutionary ideas. Many others entered the circles with definite revolutionary ideas. But at any rate even the political processes at the end of the Seventies assure us that numerous *Narodniki* who "went to the people" in the middle of the Seventies were imbued with most peaceful intentions. Here is the testimony of S. I. Bardin, a woman defendant in the Process of Fifty, tried in 1876:

"I belong, gentlemen, to the category of those who are known among the young people as peaceful propagandists. Their task is to instil into the consciousness of the people ideals of a most perfect and most just social order, or to clarify for them ideals which are unconsciously inrooted in them; to point out to them the defects of the present order, in order that the errors might be avoided in the future; but when that future will come, we do not state, and we cannot state, since its ultimate realisation does not depend upon us. I think that it is quite a distance from such propaganda to instigation for riots. . . . We are accused of being political revolutionists; but if we aspired for a political *coup d'état* we should have acted differently; we should not have gone to the people whom it is necessary to prepare and develop, but we should have sought to bring together the dissatisfied elements among the educated classes. . . . But the truth of the matter is that we have in no way aspired for a *coup d'état*. . . ."

It is certain that in the early Seventies the aims of the *Chaikovtzy* were not revolutionary, but peaceful, cultural. In their desire to come in contact with the people they put on peasant garments, tried to appear "common," and at the same time endeavoured to disseminate among the masses and the *intelligentzia* general knowledge and their own social views. Among them were men of various political views, and many who were not at all interested in political questions. Among

the books which they spread were: Marx' "Capital," the first volume of which had been translated into Russian (1872), articles by Chernyshevsky, Dobroliubov, Mirtov's "Historical Letters," Flerovsky's "The Position of the Labouring Class," and his "ABC of Social Sciences." The Censorship Committee forbade those books, and even burned some of them. Then the *Chaikovtzy* were forced to deviate from the legal path of action, and they began to print in an underground way small, thin brochures. For this purpose they established a printing place, with the aid of Ippolit Myshkin, a governmental stenographer in Moscow.

The propagation of Socialistic, or to be exact, Anarchistic ideas among Petrograd workingmen occupied a considerable place in the early activity of the *Chaikovtzy*. Foremost in this respect was Prince P. A. Kropotkin, a former Imperial Page, a well educated military officer who served not in the Guard, but in Siberia, whither he was attracted by his desire to investigate that little known region. In 1871 he lived abroad, and frequented German workingmen-circles. It was the moment of the split in the International, owing to the difference of opinion between Marx and Bakunin. The two men were mutually exclusive both in questions of programme and of tactics. While Marx aspired for the establishment in the remote future of an ideal social order through socialising the means of production and the realisation of Socialism by the aid of a *state*, and placed before the proletariat a definite task of capturing the authority of the State, and even, if necessary, instituting a dictatorship — Bakunin first of all denied the State, and considered that every person or group of persons who wished to improve the condition of the masses economically and socially, would have to fight the State as their main enemy. The conflict between the two leaders ended in the expulsion of Bakunin from the International, but his cause was upheld by many sections, especially in Latin countries, and the Inter-

national perished in the internecine strife. Kropotkin, who happened to find himself in the thick of those dissensions, decisively took the side of Bakunin; he also thought that the liberation of the working masses was possible only upon the abolition of the State and the establishment in its stead of federative unions, starting with the smallest socialistic or communistic units.

Then Kropotkin joined the circle of the *Chaikovtzy*, and began to propagate these ideas actively in this and also in other circles of revolutionary youth, which began to form at that time. Those students who had been expelled from higher institutions, especially in 1869, prepared revolutionary cadres in the provinces among senior gymnasia students, among their younger brothers and sisters, seminarists, etc.; so that parallel with the circle of the *Chaikovtzy* there appeared a number of other, revolutionary, organisations. The revolutionary mood affected even men of mature age. Thus Kovalik, President of the Conference of Peace Mediators in Mglinsk, gave up his position, and devoted all his time to the organisation of revolutionary circles; in a short time he went through several provinces, and established more than ten revolutionary organisations. He soon made close connections with another known organiser, a Penza landowner, Voinaralsky, who contributed all his fortune — about forty thousand rubles, to the cause, and actively organised circles. I have already mentioned Ippolit Myshkin, who made use of his position as governmental stenographer for maintaining an illegal printing machine at his Moscow home for the publications of the *Chaikovtzy*.

At the same time considerable revolutionary cadres were being prepared abroad. Part of the expelled students went there. Especially large was the number of girl students who went abroad, on account of the difficulties of procuring higher education at home; from the early Seventies Zurich swarmed with Russian girls, and even married women — often fictitiously

married. Girls frequently at that time contracted fictitious marriages with persons whom they might never meet again, in order to free themselves from parental guardianship. In the Zurich "Colony" there were some wealthy members; the Colony purchased a home for eighty thousand francs, where they had meals and daily lectures, addresses, readings, and so forth. Lavrov was a permanent lecturer at the Colony, and became the editor of the revolutionary publication, *Forward*.

He had by that time accepted in a certain sense Bakunin's programme, except that he considered the federative-anarchic order an ideal of the remote future and hence recommended a long road of propaganda and peaceful preparation of the masses for the future uprising and revolution. Bakunin, as an ardent, irreconcilable revolutionary Anarchist, naturally rejected Lavrov's way, and advocated immediate action, organisation of revolts, considering even a small revolt as the best propaganda. He proclaimed therefore *propagande par le fait*, and his numerous followers were called Bakunists-parlefactists.

The intensive activity of the Lavrists and of the Bakunists alarmed the Russian Government. It demanded that by January 1, 1874, the students come back to Russia, threatening those who might come after that date with many difficulties; on the other hand it indicated its intention of organising higher education for women. Indeed, we may believe that owing to the threatening dimensions of the Zurich Colony the Government did not oppose the opening of courses for women at Petrograd and Moscow. The students resolved to take the Government's notice as a signal for going "to the people"; they went back, but not with the intention of studying; they marched "to the people."

Together with the revolutionary cadres that had been formed at home, the *Narodniki* from abroad were scattered among the people. Most of them decided to act peacefully, in the beginning at least, and to limit their activity to propaganda of so-

cial ideas. They acted very clumsily, having had no experience or preparation, taking no precautions against the police, and failing to conceal their identity under the transparent peasant-guise. Two or three months after the beginning of that movement, the Government started an investigation of the propagandists; Count Pahlen prepared an extensive memorandum concerning the matter. In the month of May many of the young idealists were imprisoned. Some of them were soon released, but many were kept two and three and four years; those arrests gave the basis for the big Process of 193, which took place in 1877.

From the memorandum of Count Pahlen we may judge approximately the dimensions of the movement: during two or three months seven hundred and seventy persons were arrested in thirty-seven provinces—six hundred and twelve men and one hundred and fifty-eight women. Two hundred and fifteen persons were imprisoned, and the rest were set free. Many propagandists were not caught, and one must assume higher figures than the official ones for those who went “to the people.” Among those apprehended were Kovalik, Voynarsky, a number of girls from noble families, like Sofia Perovsky, V. N. Batiushkov, N. A. Armfeld, Sofia Leshern von Herzfeld; there were daughters of merchants, like the three sisters Kornilov, and persons of all ranks and classes, from Prince Kropotkin to common workingmen.

Pahlen stated with horror that society not only did not resist the movement, but even assisted it financially and otherwise. He could not understand that the public did not sympathise with the Government’s reactionary policy, and therefore welcomed any expression of opposition.

For the *Narodniki* the movement “to the people” proved a failure; not only because they were soon arrested, but because they did not come into contact with the people. The peasants shunned them, and in some places betrayed them to

the police. The *Narodniki* who were not imprisoned began to think of a firmer organisation. Two attempts were made in 1876 to organise the revolutionary forces. In Moscow a group of peaceful *Narodniki*-propagandists was formed, who figured in the Process of Fifty, in 1877. Among them were L. N. Figner, V. I. Alexandrov-Nathanson, Dzhabarti, and several workingmen, one of whom, Peter Alexeiev, delivered at the trial an ardent speech which made a profound impression. Of a greater importance was the attempt to bring together the Petrograd revolutionary *Narodniki* in the society which subsequently became known under its historical name "Land and Freedom" (*Zemlia y Volia*). At the head of that society were Mark Nathanson, his wife Olga, Alexander Mikhailov, and the remnant of the *Chaikovtzy* and those *Narodniki* who had not yet been arrested.

The basic principle of the programme of "Land and Freedom" was the assumption that only an *economic revolution from the bottom* might bring about a final and complete change from the existing order to a juster social organisation *harmonising with the ideals of the people*. Therefore they based their operations on the people proper, and divided their activity into the following branches: (1) *organising activity* — the creation of a fighting squad among the people, which would concentrate all the material and spiritual forces of the revolution, and could start a general uprising at the right moment. But since even Bakunin acknowledged before his death (1876) that it was necessary to engage in preparatory work, the party proposed (2) *agitational activity* — *passive* (sending petitions, strikes, refusal to pay taxes, etc.), and *active* (riots and uprisings), which was employed only in one place with the aid of forged manifestoes — in Chigirin (the case of Stefanovich and Deich); (3) *establishment of regular connections with the existing organisations among the people* (Schismatists and Sectants); (4) *propagation of revolutionary Narodnichestvo*

among society, young people, and city workingmen. According to Aptekman, these four points exhausted the tactics-programme of "Land and Freedom."

Alongside with this programme a definite constitution was worked out, by which the original Petrograd group was to be the nucleus of the organisation, and the members of which could recommend outside elements. From the nucleus the "administration" of the society was formed; it had a "heavily chancery"—for the fabrication of false passports; there were separate groups for propaganda among students and workingmen, and a special, *disorganising*, group for the application of armed force against the Government and traitors. Finally for direct propaganda and organisation of the people there existed the most important and numerous group of the "rustics" (*derevenshchiki*). The "disorganising" group gradually increased, by force of circumstances, and formed a basis for the terroristic party, "Will of the People," about which we shall have to speak later.

The first manifestation of the "Land and Freedom" society was expressed in a demonstration in front of the Kazan Cathedral in Petrograd, on December 6, 1876, in which thousands of workingmen were to take part; the speaker was a young man, G. V. Plekhanov, now leader of the Russian Social-Democrats. Only two or three hundred persons gathered, however, and were easily scattered by janitors and petty merchants, organised for the occasion by the police. Twenty men were arrested, tried a month and a half later, and severely punished; some were sentenced to hard labour for five or ten years, while the minimum penalty was exile.

The most numerous group of that society, the "rustics," made persistent efforts to establish firm connections with the peasants. Taught by the bitter experience of 1874, they were more cautious and tactful, and no longer appeared an easy prey of the police and of the ignorant, treacherous peasants. But in

the end they were forced to the conclusion that the people were hopelessly unprepared for the acceptance of their ideas, and that no success of their work was even thinkable until the people were more developed. They could only, therefore, either abandon all revolutionary plans and turn into peaceful *Kulturträger* for life, or — abandon the village, and begin the work “from the other end.” The difficulties which they had to go through, the rude persecutions on the part of the Government, the growing indignation against the despotism of the administration — were bound to direct the minds of the *Narodniki* toward the second alternative. It appeared necessary to acquire first of all elementary conditions of social life which would allow free intercourse with the people. Circumstances developed in such a way that the number of “rustics” began to decrease, while the “disorganising” group grew and became at the end of the Seventies the famous “Executive Committee,” which originated among Kiev revolutionists, but soon attracted all the active revolutionary forces, and made the terroristic struggle with the Government the main issue, pushing the *Narodnichestvo*-dreams and ideals to the background.

CHAPTER XXXVI

ALONGSIDE with the growth of revolutionary tendencies among the young generation, with the accretion of dissatisfaction on the part of liberal *zemstvo*-circles, elements of discontent and exasperation had accumulated during that post-reform period of Russian history in various parts of the vast Empire, provoked by insulted and persecuted national feelings. Under the influence of the Russificatory policy carried on in the crudest forms in the borderlands there arose and developed morbidly sharpened national interests and feelings.

The Ukrainophile movement appeared in Little Russia, and grew and strengthened, thanks to the persecution of the Little Russian language which had been inaugurated by Nicolas and renewed during the Sixties and Seventies in connection with the chauvinistic tendencies that prevailed in the ruling spheres and among a part of the public and the press after the suppression of the Polish uprising. Katkov turned patriot and chauvinist, and attacked all non-Russian nationalities for the aspirations of cultural self-expression and alleged political separatism. His persecution of the Ukrainophiles caused the Government to appoint a special commission, of Minister of Education Tolstoy, Minister of Interior Timashov, Chief of Gendarmes Potapov, and a renowned Kiev chauvinist, Yusephovich. The commission investigated, among other things, the activity of the South-western branch of the Geographical Society, found its work in the field of Little Russian poetry connected with Ukrainophilism, and had it closed in 1875. At the same time persecutions of the Little Russian language began: all publica-

tions and stage productions in that language were forbidden. Professors Dragomanov (historical philologist) and Zieber (economist) of the University of Kiev were dismissed (after they refused to resign) by the "Third point," which deprived them forever of the right to occupy an official position. The ethnographer Chubinsky was banished from Kiev, while Dragomanov and Zieber preferred to migrate abroad.¹

The Polish question at that time was no less acute. Before the uprising the governmental policy was based at first on the principles suggested by Marquis Velepolsky, and later on the views of N. A. Miliutin and Y. F. Samarin, who distinguished between the question of Russian domination in Poland proper, and that of Russian prevalence in the Northwest and Southwest, where the task was to combat the influence of Polonism upon those Russian or Lithuanian regions. The Kingdom of Poland was to be absolutely free to employ the Polish language and develop its own culture. But that policy changed rapidly after the removal of Miliutin, who was stricken with apoplexy in 1866, and the management of Russian affairs in Poland fell into the hands of Prince V. A. Cherkassky, whose heavy character and brusqueness made the relations with Polish society acute; from that time the Russian policy in the Kingdom of Poland began to be governed by the same principles that had been applied to the Western region.

Compulsory instruction of Russian was demanded at first in secondary, and later also in primary schools; elementary education became very difficult, since the Poles naturally were unwilling to give money for Russian schools and send their children there as long as they were not allowed to be taught in their native tongue. During the Seventies and Eighties (under Curator Apukhtin) the restrictions had reached such an

¹ There exists an opinion that Dragomanov did so upon the advice of Prince Dundukov-Korsakov, Governor-General of Kiev, who was friendly disposed toward him.

extent that even religious instruction was not permitted in Polish, owing to which in the majority of schools such instruction was entirely discontinued during that time. All trade-signs had to be either in Russian or in both languages.

In the Seventies the question concerning the Kholm region, which was solved in recent years by the Third *Duma*, came to the front. A large portion of that population were not Poles, but Ruthenians, i.e., Little Russians, who had formerly belonged to the Orthodox creed; under Polish dominion their faith was modified, in that while they preserved Orthodox traditions they also acknowledged the supremacy of the Pope. During the Seventies the question arose about the reconversion of those *Uniates* to the Orthodox church, as had been done under Nicolas I in the Northwest. But the administration acted in that case rudely, hastily, and violently; a number of atrocities, riots, and repressions took place; hussars and cossacks were sent to aid the "voluntary" conversion to the Orthodox faith, and the reunion of the *Uniates* acquired the character of a real scandal. It is obvious that such a policy could not have aroused any good feelings towards the Government on the part of the oppressed nationalities; it enhanced the general opposition which existed under the influence of economic factors and of the growing reaction.

The general discontent caused by this stubborn reaction and by senseless repressions was complicated during the Seventies by difficulties in foreign affairs. By that time the old Eastern question had ripened.

For twenty years after the Crimean Campaign the Russian military authorities, especially on the frontiers, had been trying to restore the prestige which the Russian army had lost in Crimea, if not in Europe—at least in Asia. Two years after that war Russian territory began to increase steadily all along the Eastern Asiatic frontier. In 1858 Governor-General Muraviov of Eastern Siberia annexed to Russia the entire left bank

of the river Amur, together with the vast region Ussuriysk, to the south of the mouth of Amur down to Vladivostok; the Chinese government had no power to resist, and Muraviov accomplished the great conquest with the aid of a few hundred soldiers. In 1860 the annexation was officially confirmed in Peking.

Simultaneously the conquest of the Caucasus was completed, in the form of the "pacification" of the stubborn mountaineers. The decisive blow was delivered in 1859, by the capture of the village Gunib and the surrender of Shamil, the spiritual head and military leader of the mountain tribes. By 1865 the entire Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia, to the Turco-Persian frontiers, were parts of the Russian Empire.

Alongside with this there went on throughout the Sixties a constant pushing forward of the Russian border into the depth of Central Asia, at the expense of the Khanates. Russia had from old carried on commercial relations with those Khanates, but their subjects, who consisted of wild steppe raiders, had continually harassed the Russian borderland, robbing and carrying away not only cattle, but often men, women, and children, whom they sold into slavery. The numerous attempts of the Government to check the raiders had failed mainly because of the topographic difficulties. Under Peter the Great a military expedition under the command of Prince Cherkassky-Betovich moved far into those lands, but perished after a temporary success. In 1839 during Nicolas' reign Governor-General Perovsky of Orenburg undertook a winter expedition against Khiva; the snow-storms of the winter proved not less disastrous than the heat of the summer in those regions. In 1853 Perovsky succeeded in pushing the Russian military posts to the shores of Syr-Daria, and built there a considerable fort, later named after him.

At the same time the frontiers to the south of Siberia and the Steppe Region continued to be moved southward. In 1854

the border line extended along the river Chu from the city Vierny to Fort Perovsky, enforced by a series of military posts. Wild hordes from Bokhara and Kokand tried to break through that line, and those raids gave the Russian commanders a pretext for pushing the raiders farther inland. In 1864 Colonel Cherniaiev captured Tashkent, in Kokand. The Government approved of his action, annexed the region of Tashkent, and two years later formed there the Turkestan Governor-Generalship. This led to further collisions with Bokhara and Kokand, again without any official order from above. England looked with alarm upon the aggressive movements of the Russians towards South Asia; remembering since the days of Napoleon the fantastic Russian plans of penetrating India through Asiatic mountains and steppes, the British Government asked the Russian Chancellor where his Government intended to stop. Gorchakov replied that the Emperor did not have in mind the aggrandisement of Russian territory, but the strengthening and improvement of the frontier.

In the end a formal war broke out with Bokhara and Kokand, in which both of them were discomfited, and in 1868 the Russians took the city of Samarkand, the burial place of Tamerlan,— a sacred place with which there is connected a belief that whoever possesses it will possess all Central Asia. Governor-General Kaufman of Turkestan impressed the half-savage Eastern tribes with his cruel conduct, and firmly established the Russian prestige. Making use of an uprising in Kokand, he sent an army there under the command of Skobelev, who conquered the Khanate and had it annexed to Russia under the name of Fergan Region. General Kaufman's next step was to undertake a campaign against Khiva, in 1873; the Khan was forced to give up more than half of his possessions, to free all his slaves, and to become a dependent vassal of Russia, as his neighbour, the Emir of Bokhara, had become before.

Thus was the conquest of all Central Asia accomplished, to

the great indignation and natural apprehension of the English who saw that between the Russians and India lay only the lands of the Turcomen and Afghanistan, and that the Russian invasion of India was no longer as fantastic a dream as it had appeared at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

While the British apprehensions were reaching their apogee in regard to the "Russian peril" in Asia, the state of affairs in the Near East had grown very acute. In 1874 the insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina broke out, chiefly because of the unbearable taxation system of the Turkish government. Other nationalities on the Peninsula were restless, and the situation grew alarming. The uprising in Herzegovina made Austria uneasy, as she feared that Bosnia and Herzegovina she coveted would unite with Serbia, and avoid her grip; her Foreign Minister Andrashi urged a collective intervention on the part of the European Powers, and in January, 1876, the Sultan had to yield to the demand of six Powers to conclude an immediate armistice with the insurrectionists, and to undertake a series of radical reforms in the general administration and taxation of the provinces which had revolted. But the Herzegovinians declared that they would not lay down their arms until the European Powers gave them sufficient guarantees that the Sultan would keep his promise. Turkey refused to satisfy the demands of the insurgents; a religious movement against Christians arose among the Mohammedans; the Sultan was accused of submitting too much to foreign influence. He was forced to send hordes of savage Bashi-Bazouks for the suppression of the restless Christians, and those irregulars committed bloody massacres in Bulgaria, in which, according to the investigation of a British diplomat, twelve thousand Bulgars of both sexes were slaughtered. At the same time the French and German consuls in Saloniki were murdered. The indignation against Turkey became general in Europe.

The semi-independent states of Serbia and Montenegro de-

clared war against her, and masses of Russian volunteers filled their armies. Although the commander of the Serbs was General Cherniaiev, the conqueror of Tashkent, they proved poorly prepared and equipped, and the Turks delivered them a number of crushing defeats. Seeing that Serbia was on the verge of the abyss, and that she was threatened by massacres similar to the Bulgarian atrocities, Russia demanded of Turkey the immediate cessation of war activities and the conclusion of an armistice. That demand was supported by other European Powers, although Austria, in her desire to see Serbia decisively beaten by the Turks, hesitated for some time.

In 1876 a memorandum was issued in Berlin, in which the Powers demanded of the Sultan the immediate introduction of the promised reforms in the Christian dependencies of Turkey, the enlargement of the territory of Serbia and Montenegro, and the appointment of Christian governors in Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Herzegovina. England, however, refused to join the other Powers; encouraged by this circumstance, Turkey declined the demands of the Berlin memorandum. When the European Powers sent their fleet for a demonstration at Saloniki, the British fleet was sent plausibly to assist Turkey.

In the meantime by a court revolution Sultan Abdul-Aziz was deposed and strangled; his successor, Murad V, proved half-witted, and was supplanted by Abdul-Hamid, who remained on the throne till the revolution of 1908. A conference was called in London for the peaceful solution of the acute situation; Turkey consented to a six weeks' armistice with Serbia and Montenegro. Confident in the support of England, the Turkish plenipotentiaries at the conference allowed themselves, we may say, to mock at the European Powers: They declared that the Sultan had resolved to grant his people a constitution, hence no changes in the internal or foreign affairs could be made without the consent of their parliament. This reference to a constitution which had not existed

exasperated all the diplomats, even those of England. Russia sent an ultimatum to Turkey threatening war unless the Turkish Government accepted immediately the project prepared by the European Powers. Turkey declined, and in April, 1877, Emperor Alexander declared war.

Alexander II did not take this step with an easy heart; he was well aware of its importance, of the financial difficulties connected with the war; he saw clearly that it might easily become an all-European conflagration, and the still more dangerous possibility of Russia being forced to fight against Austria, England, and Turkey, with the other Powers neutral. The head of the Russian diplomats, Prince Gorchakov, had become somewhat senile by that time—he was about eighty years old—and his policy was extremely wavering. Alexander himself wavered considerably; he was compelled to wage war against his desire, by the bellicose mood in the Court-circles and by the public opinion created by the Slavophiles. The pro-Slav sentiment at home and abroad was so general that the Emperor could not remain behind his people in the eyes of the world, and had to take decisive measures in defence of the Slavs.

In vain Reiterm tried to dissuade Alexander from plunging the country into war. In 1875 he had succeeded in attaining a budget without deficit, and even in saving up a metal reserve of one hundred and sixty million rubles; but even before the war unfavourable circumstances had begun to threaten the course. A considerable failure of crops in 1875 had been complicated by a drought which hampered the navigation in some of the water-ways that were of great importance for the transportation of grain to ports. The seventeen thousand versts of railroads were still not generally profitable, and the Government had to pay guaranteed income. The course of the ruble began to fall under the influence of the unfavourable balance of trade (owing to the decrease in exported grain), of

the forced payments of railroad-guaranties, of the outflow of foreign capital in view of the alarming international affairs, and of a panic on the Moscow bourse, caused by the bankruptcy of a large bank. Reiter's plans began to quaver, and the war threatened them with complete ruin. For a partial mobilisation in 1876, intended as a demonstration against Turkey, the Government had to contract a loan of one hundred million, and Reiter sharply remarked to the Tzar that in case of war Russia might go bankrupt.

When the war broke out, it appeared that beside the fact that it was necessary to issue masses of paper-money, which destroyed all Reiter's efforts to restore the course of the paper-ruble, Russia was unprepared in every other respect. Miliutin's reforms in the army were only two years old, the new order had not as yet been working well, and it took six months to draw even moderate forces towards the Turkish frontier.

Ambassador Ignatiev gave assurances that Turkey was decaying, and that very small forces would be required for its defeat. It was criminal optimism. The Russian army was not only insufficient, but inefficient. The staff was extremely bad. Grand Duke Nicolas, the Tzar's brother, was made commander-in-chief, although he lacked elementary strategic ability; he appointed as Chief of the Staff General Niepokoitichitzky, who was senile and had no plan for the campaign. After their brilliant crossing of the Danube, the Russian armies were scattered; individual commanders accomplished heroic feats, but in view of the lack of concerted action, the army was threatened more than once with disaster. Had Suleiman-Pasha obeyed orders and joined forces with the brave Osman-Pasha, the Turks would have succeeded in cutting off the advance-forces of Gurko's army.

With all the blunders of the Turks and miraculous escapades of isolated Russian troops, the war lasted throughout 1877 and part of 1878. After the capture of Plevna (with the aid of

the Roumanian army, under the command of Prince, later King, Carol) the Russians crossed the Balkans, occupied Adrianople, and appeared before Constantinople in January, 1878. It was then that Alexander received a telegram from Queen Victoria, asking him to stop, and conclude an armistice. Although Alexander had promised England even before the war that he would not occupy Constantinople, Lord Beaconsfield had the parliament vote six million pounds for military expenses; war seemed inevitable. But Turkey was exhausted and forced to ask for peace; in the middle of January, 1878, the Adrianople armistice was signed, and soon after diplomatic negotiations began in San Stefano, where Ignatiev successfully represented Russia. In March the peace was signed, in which all Russian demands were satisfied; Serbia and Montenegro were enlarged, and Bulgaria became a semi-independent principality, with a territory reaching to the Ægean Sea. In Asia Russia was to receive the conquered Kars and Batum, with their environs. Part of Bessarabia which went to Roumania in 1856 was restored to Russia, and Roumania was compensated with Dobrudja.

Lord Beaconsfield immediately protested against any territorial changes being made in Turkey without the participation of the Great Powers who had signed the Treaty of Paris, in 1856. Under the threat of war with England and Austria, Alexander was forced to consent to a congress of European representatives in Berlin, presided over by Bismarck. At that Congress the conditions of the peace were substantially changed: the possessions of Serbia, Montenegro, and especially Bulgaria, were diminished; part of Bulgaria, to the south of the Balkans, was separated as a Turkish province under a Christian governor. Beaconsfield protested also against Russia's territorial acquisitions, but he succeeded only in changing Batum from a military port into an open port for all nations.

The humiliation at Berlin, coupled with the inadequate

management of the campaign, and with the theft and graft which were discovered in the matter of provisioning the army — aroused the indignation and opposition of wide circles in Russia, not only of radical and revolutionary layers, but of the most loyal society, as the Slavophiles. When rumours concerning the concessions wrested from Russia at the Berlin Congress had reached Moscow, Ivan Aksakov delivered a thundering speech at the public session of the "Slav Society," in which he said:

"Shall we admit even a particle of truth in all those letters and telegrams which are circulating every day, every hour in all tongues, to all corners of the world, disgraceful news about our concessions? Not once denied by the Government, this news, spreading among the people, scorches them with shame, stings their conscience, oppresses them with bewilderment."

He went on describing in strong terms the humiliating conduct of the Russian diplomats, the significance of the concessions for the independence of Bulgaria and of other Slav nationalities on the Balkan peninsula, for the political preponderance of treacherous Austria, and for the fall of Russian prestige among the Slav nations. Aksakov repeated several times that he refused to believe that those actions of the diplomats were approved by the "supreme authority," and he finished his remarkable speech with the following words:

"The people are raging, grumbling, indignant, disturbed with the daily news from Berlin, and await, like a blessed tidings, the resolution of the Throne. Russia awaits and hopes. Its hope shall not be belied, for the Tzar's words: 'The sacred cause will be brought to its end,' shall not be broken. Loyal duty commands us all to hope and trust, but loyal duty commands us also not to keep silent in these days of lawlessness and untruth which are building up a wall between the Tzar and the land, between the thought of the Tzar and the thought of the people. Is it indeed possible that in answer

there will sound from above a grave word: '*Hold your peace, O honest lips! Speak but you, O flattery and falsehood!*'"

When Alexander heard about that speech, he was so enraged that in spite of Aksakov's position in society, and his age, he ordered him banished from Moscow.

Still greater was the excitement among the liberal *zemstvo*-men and among the revolutionary circles, especially in the South, where the people were nearer to the war zone, and had been able to see better the abuses and disorders in the commissariat, and where the Ukrainophile movement had been quite widely spread. The conviction of the necessity of a constitutional order in Russia became particularly widespread among Kiev society. That conviction was strengthened by the fact that in Bulgaria, which from an oppressed, wild, and uncivilised country was transformed into an independent Principality, a constitutional order was immediately established; this could not have taken place without the consent of Alexander; hence the hopes of the Russian patriots and liberals were encouraged. From the South the constitutional movement spread throughout Russia.

The revolutionary movement had by that time taken on sharp forms. The non-political aspirations of the *Narodniki* underwent a change under the repressive measures of the Government which prevented them from carrying on their peaceful, cultural work among the people; after the attempt of Viera Zasulich to shoot Chief of Police Trepov for flogging a political prisoner,² the revolutionary movement became a keen political

² The Government was so confident that the process of Zasulich would lower the reputation of the revolutionists in the eyes of the public, that it allowed her to be tried by a jury. To its horror the jury declared Viera Zasulich not guilty, in spite of the fact that she did not deny her actual shooting at Trepov with the intention of killing him. Upon leaving the court, Zasulich was almost arrested by gendarmes who had intended to deal with her "in the administrative order," but the crowd protected her, and soon after she fled abroad. She is still active in the revolutionary propaganda.—TR.

struggle. It had become evident that under the existing political conditions it was impossible to carry on any social propaganda; moreover, the masses were not at all sympathetic with such a propaganda; the *Narodniki* began to seek means for the improvement of political conditions. After an armed uprising in Odessa and the execution of Kovalsky, Stepniak-Kravchinsky murdered Chief of Gendarmes Mezentzev in daylight on the streets of Petrograd, and was not caught.

The Government appealed to the public for co-operation in its struggle against the "sedition." At that time *zemstvo* workers of several southern provinces had united, and held some conferences in Kiev and Kharkov which were attended by liberal elements of the public. They attempted to make a temporary agreement with the revolutionists, and persuade them to discontinue their terroristic activity in order to enable the liberals to try peaceful means of persuasion with the Government. Their attempt failed. Yet the *zemstvo* men decided to call the attention of the Government to the fact that in its struggle with the revolution it had been employing measures which infringed upon the interests and rights of society as a whole, and that as long as the Government ignored the just demands of the public and did not respect the inviolability and elementary rights of peaceful citizens, the representatives of society were unable to give it any assistance. Similar resolutions were planned by many *zemstvo* assemblies, in response to the invitation of the Government for co-operation. At the provincial assembly of the Chernigov *zemstvo*, I. I. Petrunkevich delivered a characteristic speech in which he pointed out all the abuses of the autocracy, the bigoted measures of Tolstoy, the absence of freedom of press and of speech, and ended with the resolution that under such conditions society was unable to come to the assistance of the Government.

The Government hastened to forbid the discussion of such questions at *zemstvo* assemblies, so that only a few of them had

time to publish their declarations. The resolution of the Tver assembly was as follows:

"The Emperor, in his care for the Bulgars, liberated from the Turkish yoke, has found it necessary to grant them true self-government, inviolability of personal rights, independence of the judiciary, and freedom of press. The *zemstvo* of the province of Tver ventures to hope that the Russian people who have borne all the burdens of the war with such readiness, with such unreserved love for their Tzar-Liberator, will be granted the same benefits, which alone will enable them to enter, in the words of the Tzar, on the way of gradual, peaceful, and legitimate development."

The Marshals of Nobility were notified through a circular that they would be held responsible by the Minister, if they let such resolutions pass. Yet the movement in the *zemstvo* circles did not calm down, but continued to grow. In 1879 and 1880 there were many secret *zemstvo* assemblies, the most imposing of which took place in Moscow. The Government began to punish the active members of the movement. Petrunkevich was arrested and banished to the province of Kostroma.³

At the same time, as we have seen, the activity of the revolutionary Socialists grew more extreme and drastic. From 1878 a series of terroristic acts took place, with the view of wresting elemental political freedom from the Government. In 1879 the party "Land and Freedom" had a conference at Voronezh, for the discussion of new ideas and the revision of their programme. A preliminary conference was held at Lipetzk by the extreme wing of the party, the leader of which was a prominent revolutionist from Odessa, Zheliabov; it decided to form

³ I. I. Petrunkevich is at present a prominent leader of the Constitutional Democrats, and an untiring *zemstvo* worker. He was elected to the First *Duma*, and at the first session demanded amnesty for all political prisoners.—TR.

a special "Executive Committee" for terroristic actions against the Government. The majority of the Voronezh conference approved of the Lipetzk resolution; a small group of *Narodniki*, led by Plekhanov, separated from the majority, declaring themselves in favour of the former programme and tactics which placed social propaganda before political struggle. The party of "Land and Freedom" split in two: the larger organisation of the "Will of the People" (*Narodnaia Volia. Narodovol'tz, Narodovoltzy* — members of the party), which concentrated its chief forces on a systematic terroristic struggle with the Government, though retaining some *Narodnichestvo* ideals in their programme; and the smaller and less influential group, the party of the "Black Partition" which continued to advocate the old *Narodnichestvo* views in full. The field of action remained in the hands of the "Will of the People," which during the next two years performed a number of terroristic acts that shook the governmental organisation.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE economic and financial difficulties were very acute after the war; Minister of Finance Reiter, who had been opposed to the war, resigned upon its conclusion, not wishing to cope with the complicated situation. At the same time the gulf between the Government and the people grew deeper and wider, signified by the development of the *zemstvo* oppositional movement, and by the conversion of the revolutionary *Narodniki* to active terroristic activity.

The terroristic attempts of the "Will of the People" were directed chiefly against the life of the Tzar; he was systematically besieged by a small, but energetic group who organised nets of mines, exploded bridges, trains, and buildings, risking their own as well as many other lives. The revolutionists strongly believed that the murder of the Tzar would serve as a signal for a general uprising of the people. The bewildered Government, finding no support in the people whose needs and rights it did not consider, undertook convulsive repressive measures which made the conflict more acute and resolute, and rendered the life of peaceful citizens as unbearable as under the conditions of a siege.

After the attentate of Soloviov in 1879 and a number of other attempts on the life of the Tzar, it appeared clear to all that the Government was unable by repressive measures alone to eradicate the revolution and establish peace in the country. Some of the higher administrators and members of the Court began to look for other means. Governor-General Loris-Melikov of Kharkov, appointed after the attentate of Soloviov, experimented with a new policy in his region; continuing to

suppress the revolutionists, he at the same time endeavoured to win the sympathies and respect of the population by a human and decent management of public affairs. Parallel with this, Count Valuiiev, President of the Committee of Ministers at that time, began to inspire the Emperor with the idea of trying to regain the confidence and co-operation of society, by allowing its representatives to participate in affairs of the State; for this purpose he dug out the project he had prepared back in 1863. Grand Duke Constantine, then President of the State Council, also presented his plan for a representative order, drawn up by his request in 1866 by Prince Urusov.

While those projects had been discussed in court circles, throughout the country administrative despotism reigned arousing general discontent and exasperation. The revolutionists organised a daring explosion in the Winter Palace, on February 4, 1880. The explosion took place just at the moment when the entire Imperial family were to take their seats at the dining table, to entertain the Prince of Bulgaria, Alexander Battenberg. The carefully planned slaughter of the whole family failed only because the train of the Bulgarian Prince was late, and the dinner took place half an hour behind the scheduled time.

This event proved to all, and first of all to Alexander himself, the danger of the situation, in which the revolutionists were better informed and more efficient than the costly, enormous police organisation. New views concerning the internal policy began to dominate among the higher circles. A week before the explosion the Emperor called a conference for the discussion of Valuiiev's plan. The Heir, Tsesarevich Alexander, who took part in the discussions, expressed himself definitely against the constitutional plans suggested by Valuiiev and Grand Duke Constantine, thus demonstrating early the political beliefs which he later professed throughout his reign. At the conference called by the Tzar after the explosion the

Tzesarevich suggested the establishment of a supreme investigating commission, with large authority, similar to the commissions instituted in 1862 after the Petrograd conflagrations, and in 1866 after the attentate of Karakozov. The Tzar at first regarded his son's plan negatively, but at the conference which took place on the next day, with the participation of several governors-general who happened to be in the Capital, Alexander II declared that he intended to make use of the Heir's plan for the formation of a dictatorial institution, under the name of the Supreme Commanding Commission, which should have extraordinary power for the suppression of sedition, and should at the same time seek a way out of the untolerable position of the moment. At the head of the commission Alexander placed Loris-Melikov, the only governor-general who had shown energy not only in suppressing the revolution, but also in winning the sympathy of the population. By a special ukase all administrative authorities, including the ministers, were subjected to the commission under the command of Adjutant-General Loris-Melikov.

To the public at large Loris-Melikov was known as a prominent Caucasian general who won glory in the War of 1877-1878 by the capture of Kars, and later during the spread of the black-plague in the province of Astrakhan, as an energetic administrator. In the South he was known as Governor-General of Kharkov. Immediately upon his appointment, February 14, 1880, Loris-Melikov issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Petrograd, in which he declared that while firmly endeavouring to eradicate the criminals who attempted to shake the existing order, he at the same time desired to reassure the peaceful and well-intentioned elements of the public.

"Upon the support of the public," he wrote, "I look as upon the main power which may assist the Government in the restoration of a normal course of national life, from the disturbances of which the interests of the public suffer mostly."

Most of those who knew Loris-Melikov personally, testify to his straightforwardness, honesty, sincerity, true liberalism, readiness to meet loyal public demands even to the extent of allowing society some participation in the affairs of the State. It is a mistake, however, to consider him a constitutionalist who intended to introduce any Western form of government. He openly opposed the establishment of any representative institution, considering the moment inopportune; he advised that affairs be regulated by a series of administrative and legislative measures, to restore the institutions created by the reforms of the Sixties and destroyed during the reaction, and in that work of improving the conditions caused by the reaction he intended to admit in one form or another the representatives of the people to participate.

The fundamental task of Loris-Melikov was to suppress the revolution. He decided to centralise the repressive authority, and with this view abolished the Third Department of His Majesty's Chancery, instituted with the aid of Benckendorff by Nicolas I, and had all police affairs concentrated in the hands of the Minister of Interior. At the head of the Police Department he placed the former procurator of the Petrograd Judicial Chamber, V. K. Plehve,¹ who was instructed to bring the procurature in close connection with the activity of the police, thus furthering the work of Pahlen — of rendering the procurators dependent upon the administration. The new Dictator, as he was called, expanded his repressive measures upon not only revolutionists, but all persons opposed to the Government. At the very beginning of his "dictatorship of the heart," he exiled N. F. Annensky, the famous writer and statistician, to Siberia. He rejected the petition of the *Borozna zemstvo* to allow Petrunkevich to return to the province of

¹ Minister of Interior during the present reign; perpetrator of the Kishinev massacre of 1903, and of other atrocities; assassinated in 1904.—Tr.

Chernigov; Petrunkevich was permitted, however, to change his abode from the province of Kostroma to that of Smolensk.

At the same time Loris-Melikov consistently carried through his ideas concerning guarding the rights of the *peaceful* citizens. It was his intention to restore in full measure the *zemstvo* and judicial statutes of 1864, and to abolish all restrictions and distortions which had followed them. He then insisted on the dismissal of Minister of Education, Count Tolstoy, and supplanted him with the liberal A. A. Saburov, who endeavoured during the short term of his administration to return to the principles of Golovnin. His next step was to discharge Minister of Finance General Greig, who was both incapable and reactionary; in his place was appointed A. A. Abaza, a friend of N. A. Miliutin and one of the circle of Grand Duchess Yelena Paulovna. Abaza's first measure was to abolish the heavy salt-tax; he undertook a number of measures for the promulgation of liberal financial reforms, which were partly carried out during the following reign.

Loris-Melikov had considerably improved the conditions of the press. A number of new organs began to appear during his dictatorship: The *Country*, edited by L. A. Polonsky, the *Order*, edited by M. M. Stasiulevich, *Russian Thought*, edited by Yuriev, a friend of Koshelev. For the twelfth time Ivan Aksakov was permitted to raise his voice—in the Slavophile publication, *Russ*, which existed for several years. The *zemstvo* workers were finally allowed to have their own organ, established in Moscow by the means of Koshelev, under the title *Zemstvo*; it appeared for two years under the editorship of Scalon, and manifested a very liberal, if not radical, tendency. Allowing the press to discuss political questions and to criticise governmental measures, Loris-Melikov insisted upon one restriction: the press was not permitted to mention or discuss constitutional problems, in order that it might not arouse false hopes. Such restrictions were announced not in the form

of circulars, but were indicated to the editors in personal conversations with the Dictator.

The Supreme Commanding Commission was closed six months after its institution, upon the report of Loris-Melikov who found no further need of extraordinary authority for the struggle with the sedition. He was appointed Minister of Interior, and at that post he continued his activity in the former spirit. Enjoying the full confidence of the Tzar, he at the same time kept up direct connections with progressive and democratic circles of the public, particularly of the *zemstvo*, and eagerly tried to realise many of the desiderata expressed by public men in private memoranda and conversations.

After a study of the peasant-question through various *zemstvo* presentations, he came to the conclusion that fundamental reforms, which would be a direct continuation of the Reform, were required for the satisfaction of the crying needs of the peasants. He considered among other urgent needs the revision of the taxation system, and the reorganisation of the legal and administrative status of the peasants. The latter question Loris-Melikov decided to hand over for a preliminary discussion to the *zemstvos*, and by a circular to the governors, December 22, 1880, he directed them to permit the discussion of the question at provincial and district *zemstvo* assemblies.

This policy of establishing a certain harmony between the Government and the representatives of the people was tremendously successful, and even such radical *zemstvos* as that of Tver regarded Loris-Melikov's activity with full approval. In an address to him, written in 1880, the Tver *zemstvo* said:

"In a short time you have been able to justify the confidence of the Tzar, and many hopes of the public. You have introduced straightforwardness and good-will into the relations of the Government and the people. You have wisely recognised the lawful needs and desires of the public."

In the end the Tver *zemstvo* expressed its belief that "the

deplorable past would not return, and a happy future was opening for our dear country." Since the establishment of the *zemstvos* no other high functionary has been honoured with such a sincere public approval, neither before nor after Loris-Melikov.

On the part of the revolutionists, however, the activity of Loris-Melikov not only did not meet with approval, but aroused irritation and alarm. The revolutionary circles were in a state of temporary disorganisation, owing to the arrest of a prominent member of the "Executive Committee," Goldenberg, the slayer of Governor Prince Kropotkin of Kharkov in 1879; the clever tactics of the gendarmes brought Goldenberg not only to complete repentance, but made him betray the names of most of his comrades. For a time the organisation was forced to discontinue its activity, for fear of falling an easy prey to the well informed police. Loris-Melikov mistakenly interpreted the temporary lull in the terroristic acts as the decision of the "Will of the People" to give up that activity. In their underground publications the revolutionists sharply condemned his policy as that of "the fox's tail"; they logically feared that the "dictatorship of the heart" would isolate them from the fascinated public.

Loris-Melikov understood that in order to maintain the good-will of the public he had to allow some outlet for the desires progressive circles manifested to take part in State affairs. In his report to Alexander II, presented on January 28, 1881, he reiterated his opinion about the untimeliness and impossibility of granting the people constitutional institutions; yet he insisted on the necessity of satisfying the desire of the advanced representatives of the people for State activity. He suggested following the practice of the Editing Commissions in inviting public men to co-operate in working out national reforms; alongside with capable officials he wished to invite *zemstvo* workers, professors, publicists, and other competent

persons. For the first time he proposed appointing two preliminary commissions in Petrograd; an *administrative* one, for the general reorganisation of the administration, and a *financial* commission, for questions of taxation, etc. The plans for those commissions were to be brought before the *General* commission, which was to consist of the members of the preliminary commissions, and also of local experts invited for the purpose, who were to be elected by *zemstvos*, or by municipal self-governments. Finally the plans were to pass from the *General* commission to the State Council, into which were to be invited ten to fifteen elective persons, as representatives of public opinion.

You can readily see that it is erroneous to call Loris-Melikov's plan *constitutional*, as it has been widely known. Yet his moderate plan might have been a step forward in the formation of an understanding and co-operation between the public and the Government; its realisation might have brought about a constitution in a peaceful way, while the present constitution had to be wrested through a revolution, and the people were not organically prepared for it.

On the whole we may say that the policy of Loris-Melikov was not unsuccessful; but the fact that he regarded somewhat optimistically the results of his system in regard to the suppression of the revolutionary organisations, played a tragic rôle. The revolutionists had concentrated all their forces to deliver the Government a telling blow; they disregarded Loris-Melikov as a nonentity, but renewed their attempts to kill Alexander II. Petrograd, one may say, was undermined; in many places, where the passage of the Imperial carriage might be expected, the street or bridge was mined. After numerous attempts the revolutionists resolved that mines did not bring any results, in view of the difficulty of establishing the exact moment of the Emperor's passing by; they decided to make use of hand-bombs. One week before March 1, Zheliabov

"sounded a call," as they expressed it in the parlance of the "Will of the People," i.e., he asked for volunteers to appear on the streets with bombs in their hands. The bombs were prepared by the talented chemist, Kibalchich. In the end of February Zheliabov and Trigoni were arrested; Sophia Perovskiy, who was still unarrested, decided not only not to drop the matter, but to hasten its accomplishment. On March 1, Alexander II, disregarding the warnings of Loris-Melikov, who had succeeded twice in keeping the Tzar from Sunday rides, rode out to inspect the troops, then to the Mikhailovsky Palace (now Museum of Alexander III), the residence of Grand Duchess Yelena, whence he was to return to the Winter Palace. The revolutionists, led by Sophia Perovskiy, manœuvred on the streets, shifting positions, and making sure not to miss their victim. The circumstances of the catastrophe are too well known to be retold here.²

² When the Imperial carriage turned on the Catherine Canal, Sophia Perovskiy waved her handkerchief, as a signal to her comrades who were scattered at various corners of the adjacent streets. One of them, Rysakov, flung a bomb wrapped in cotton at the cortège; the bottom of the carriage was smashed, a number of the escorting Cossacks were wounded and thrown from their saddles, but the Tzar was not injured. The coachman suggested to drive on to the Palace, but Alexander approached the wounded Cossacks and the imprisoned, half dead Rysakov. "Thank God, I am untouched," he said in answer to anxious inquiries of his entourage. "It's too soon to thank God," shouted another terrorist, Grinevitzky, who came close to the Tzar, and threw a bomb at his feet. The explosion was heard throughout the city. A number of persons were wounded, among them Grinevitzky. The Emperor suffered severe wounds; one leg was shattered to the top of the thigh, the other severed to the knee; the abdomen was torn open; the face was terribly disfigured; the right hand was lacerated, pieces of the Tzar's wedding-ring having been driven into his flesh. He could barely whisper to Grand Duke Mikhail: "Quick home, to Palace, there die." At the Palace his legs were amputated; he died about an hour and a half later, without regaining consciousness.

On the 16th of April the death sentence was executed upon the participators of the assassination — A. J. Zheliabov, Sophia Perovskiy, U.

Thus was brought to a sudden end the system of measures planned by Loris-Melikov. Alexander III, as you might have concluded from his stand at the conference before the explosion in the Winter Palace, showed no promise of becoming a liberal monarch.

Kibalchich, T. Mikhailov, and N. Rysakov. Grinevitzky had died of his wounds before the trial, and the execution of Jessie Hanfman was postponed because of her pregnancy.—Tr.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

EMPEROR ALEXANDER III was the second son of Alexander II; his elder brother, Tzesarevich Nicolas, died from tuberculosis in 1865. Until that year Alexander was brought up as an ordinary Grand Duke, whose career was to be mainly military; after the death of his brother care was taken to broaden his education. A number of prominent professors were invited to him, among them the historian S. M. Soloviov, and K. P. Pobiedonostzev, who was destined to play such an important rôle in the future. At that time Pobiedonostzev was not reactionary; on the contrary, he had taken part in the preparation of the judicial reform, and was one of the most brilliant of Russian jurists. Other more or less progressive professors were employed, but the young Tzesarevich did not form any liberal ideas and principles as a result of his education. In his personal and family life he presented an original exception in the Court circles. He early married the bride of his late brother, the Danish Princess Dagmar, and after his marriage led a private life, occupied himself with music and Russian history; it was he who founded the "Imperial Russian Historical Society," of which he was the first president.

Partly because of his mode of life, and still more perhaps because society had little information about him, a legend grew up that Alexander was a liberal. We have seen that he had manifested his conservatism some months before his accession, and promised no sympathy for liberal reforms.

On March 2, 1881, at the reception of the members of the State Council and other high dignitaries, who took the oath,

Alexander III declared that he hoped to follow the policy of his father; this was apparently a promise of a human and liberal reign. Then in a circular note of March 4, sent to Russian representatives abroad, it was announced that the new Emperor, ascending the throne at such a difficult moment, desired to preserve peace with all Powers, and concentrate all his attention on internal affairs. The note too made a favourable impression on the public.

In the meantime a question arose concerning the project of Loris-Melikov, which had been approved by Alexander II on the morning of his assassination; the late Tzar had ordered a conference for March 4 at the Winter Palace, for the discussion of the method of the opening of the projected commissions. Alexander III at first considered that project as a legacy from his father, which would give the finishing touch to his reign. He called a special meeting of the Committee of Ministers, to which was invited Count S. G. Stroganov, leader of the Court conservatives, to decide whether the opening of the commissions should be announced to the public or not. The conference took place on March 8, and two conflicting, mutually excluding tendencies appeared — a progressive, to which belonged Loris-Melikov, Minister of Finance Abaza, Minister of War D. A. Miliutin, and Grand Duke Constantine, head of the Navy Department and President of the State Council, and a reactionary group which was represented first of all by K. P. Pobiedonostzev, not long since a member of Loris-Melikov's Supreme Commanding Commission. In 1880 Pobiedonostzev was appointed, upon the presentation of Loris-Melikov, Super-Procurator of the Holy Synod, in place of Count D. A. Tolstoy; he was tutor to Alexander and his elder brother, and enjoyed the confidence of the Tzar. At the conference he was supported by Count Stroganov who had been invited at his suggestion, and by former Minister of Interior, Makov. An intermediary position was maintained by Grand Dukes Vlad-

imir and Mikhail; of the ministers, Minister of Justice Nabokov was inclined liberally, but supported Loris-Melikov hesitatingly, while Count Valuiev, President of the Committee of Ministers, who had appeared in 1880 with *quasi*-constitutional projects, showed little support of Loris-Melikov's project at the conference, because of his hatred for the former Dictator and for Grand Duke Constantine.

At the conference it appeared that Alexander III sympathised with the reactionaries, and was impatient with the liberal members; he was impressed by the passionate speech of Pobiedonostzev which opened with the phrase: "*Finis Russae*," and predicted disasters and revolutions in case of the acceptance of Loris-Melikov's project. Alexander remarked that Emperor Wilhelm I had definitely advised his late father of the danger of a constitutional régime for Russia, and urged him, in view of the rumours about the Tzar's intention of granting a constitution, to withdraw it, if it was not too late, and if it was — to curtail it as much as possible; Alexander referred also to the Danish ministers who regarded the influence of the constitutional institutions pernicious for Denmark.

No decision was immediately arrived at. Alexander continued to hesitate for some time. He was loath to disobey the last will of his father, the more so since some of the Court liberals informed him of the grave mood of the country, and counselled a liberal course as the only means for restoring calm in the land. On the other hand, Pobiedonostzev tried to persuade the Tzar of the absence of constitutional aspirations among the wide circles of society, and drew to his support Katkov and Ivan Aksakov. Katkov represented at that time the extreme reactionaries, and openly hinted in his *Moscow News* that the revolutionary movement emanated not from the country, but that it "had built a nest on the threshold of the supreme power," referring to Loris-Melikov and other liberals at the court. Aksakov was deeply shocked by the event

of March 1. He came soon after to Petrograd, and delivered a passionate speech at the Slav Society, in which he attacked not only the revolutionists, but all the tendencies of Western liberalism. Pobiedonostzev succeeded in persuading Alexander that Katkov and Aksakov represented the public opinion of the country, and he was secretly commissioned to draw up a manifesto. On April 29, 1881, to the complete surprise of Loris-Melikov and the other ministers the significant manifesto appeared, which was intended to put an end to further vacillations. In one place it read:

"In the midst of our great grief God's voice commands us to stand courageously at the helm of the government, relying upon Divine Providence, *with faith in the power and truth of the Autocracy which, for the benefit of the people, we are called upon to strengthen and guard from any encroachments.*"

Those words were naturally interpreted as a clear indication from above that the principle of autocracy was to be the cornerstone of the governmental policy, and that no constitutional expectations would not be realised. Immediately upon the publication of the manifesto Loris-Melikov, Abaza, and Miliutin resigned. Yet, in spite of the defeat of the progressive elements, the programme of the new reign was still not quite reactionary, as it may be seen from the personnel of ministers selected by the Tzar. As Minister of Interior N. P. Ignatiev, a Slavophile, was appointed. He expected, together with Aksakov, to be able to bring about the summoning of a *Zemsky Sobor* (assembly of men of the land), of a consultative character. N. C. Bunge, a man of conservative views, but a sincere friend of the reforms of the Sixties, a convinced democrat who strove to alleviate the lot of the people, took the place of Abaza as Minister of Finance. In place of Saburov, who had resigned some time before, Alexander appointed Baron Nicolay, who immediately began to carry out Golovnin's policy, and actively opposed Pobiedonostzev.

The manifesto of April 29 promised to strengthen and continue the great reforms of the preceding reign. This motive was emphasised in the circular of the new Minister of Interior, Ignatiev, sent out on the very day of his appointment, May 6, 1881. He indicated that the Government would take measures for the establishment of close relations with the people, and for the participation of local men in the affairs of the State. The circular further stated that the rights of *zemstvos* and the municipal institutions would remain intact, on the basis of the Act of 1864. The peasants were warned against false rumours, and were promised that not only would their rights and liberties be guaranteed, but that measures would be taken for the lightening of their burdens (mainly the taxes), for the satisfaction of their needs (particularly of land), and for the improvement of the rural administration and structure.

Thus we see that the régime was as yet far from reactionary. Ignatiev's circular resembled the programme of Loris-Melikov; one month after its issue Count Ignatiev began to carry out his promise about allowing local men to take part in State affairs. In June, 1881, the first session of "informed men" was summoned by the Government for the discussion of such important questions as the lowering of redemption payments, the regulation of peasant migration, the beverage question — which involved both the problem of combating drunkenness and of regulating the revenue.

At the same time the Government raised the question of redemption; there still remained one-seventh of the estates, or one million four hundred thousand peasants who paid *obroks*, as "temporary-Obligatory." Loris-Melikov had pushed the question ahead, and in January, 1881, the State Council determined to introduce obligatory redemption of the *obroks* in those estates where a voluntary redemption had not been started. At that time reactionary agitation began to appear on the part of the nobles who considered compulsory

redemption an infringement of the sacred rights of property. In the State Council that view was voiced by former Minister of Interior Timashov, and later it was expressed in resolutions of many assemblies of the nobles (of Tambov, Moscow, and others), which impressed Alexander III in spite of the arguments of Ignatiev. The agitation of the nobles brought no fruit, however, and the reform was carried out safely.

Then a series of new enactments began, which were known as the reforms of Bunge, although a considerable part of them had been prepared in the period of the "dictatorship of the heart." The first problem was to ameliorate the conditions of the freed peasants by lowering the redemption payments. The session of the "informed men" who assembled in June of 1881 worked out, together with representatives of the Government, a law by which all allotments received a reduction of one ruble from every payment, and five million rubles, to be distributed by the *zemstvos*, were assigned for lowering the payments in especially burdened provinces; the total sum of reductions amounted to twelve million rubles. It is worth noting that in some provinces, very few indeed, reactionary voices against the lowering of the payments rose from the nobility, although that reform was carried on at the expense of the Treasury.

The next reform promulgated by Bunge was the abolition of the per capita tax. Bunge in his financial policy was a follower of Reiter, and had also striven primarily for the raising of the course of the ruble and for the establishment of a firm balance of the budget. Hence his protectionism, and economy in expenditures. Yet he determined to do away with the detrimental per capita tax, which necessitated "mutual guarantee," and thus limited freedom of movement and of occupations among the peasants. But the abolition of that tax meant a loss of forty million rubles in yearly revenue; Bunge had to fill that gap in some way, for Russian finances were still in a deplorable state since the war with Turkey. Part of the loss

was retrieved through an increase of the liquor tax, which affected mainly the drinking portion of the population, and the rest of it Bunge had to recover by taxing the better situated and less burdened peasants. The land-taxes of the State peasants were raised by forty-five per cent. The abolition of the per capita tax was accomplished in two terms: In 1883 and 1884 it was removed from the most burdened peasants, and in 1886 — from the rest.

Bunge also made a serious attempt to regulate the collection of taxes, which the police had accomplished in the crudest and most cruel ways, compelling the peasants at times to sell their crops in advance in order to pay the taxes. Bunge appointed tax-inspectors who were to collect taxes, and also to gather information concerning the paying capacity of the population, with a view to further regulating the tax-system.

CHAPTER XXXIX

AMONG the measures directed against the dearth of land we should mention three: The establishment of a Peasant-bank, to aid the peasants with credit for buying land; the facilitation of renting fiscal lands; and the regulation of migration. All those tasks had been definitely outlined during the "dictatorship of the heart."

The Government assigned five million rubles a year for the Peasant-bank; in spite of the meagre sum, its activity during the first three years, while Bunge remained Minister and while the first personnel of the bank administration, selected by Bunge, was in power, was regulated by considerations of comparative needs of the peasants to whom loans were made. But later the activity of the bank changed; the Government became alarmed at the number of tax-delinquents, and began to sell with zeal the lands of peasants who were in arrears; as a result the activity of the bank was reduced by the end of the Eighties to insignificant transactions and occasional irrational land-purchases by well-to-do peasants. After ten years of its existence it had assisted the increase of peasant landownership by one and a half per cent, i.e., by scarcely twelve hundredths per cent. annually, whereas the previous assistance of private credit-institutions had increased the peasant landownership by three-tenths per cent. annually.

The growing rent rates had become the burning question in the progressive press, in governmental circles, in the second session of the "informed men." The general desire was for the regulation of the fiscal and private renting prices and conditions of rent. But the State Council had expressed on sev-

eral occasions its fear of arousing false hopes among the peasants by agrarian reforms from above; in this case it allowed the regulation of rents only on fiscal domains, which amounted to several million desiatins. In 1881, when Loris-Melikov was still in power, Ignatiev, then Minister of State Domains, carried through a law, by which fiscal lands were to be rented primarily to peasants of respective districts; this measure at once raised the amount of fiscal land rented to peasants from twenty-three to sixty-six per cent. In 1884 the law of 1881 was somewhat restricted; the term of rent was shortened from twenty-four to twelve years, and land could be freely rented only by peasants who lived within twelve versts of it.

The migration question was an old one. During the serfdom-system peasants were either transported by their masters to new estates, or fled from their owners into free lands, where they settled with the actual, although unofficial, knowledge of the Government. The migration of Fiscal peasants went on more regularly since the days of Kiselev; they were often helped by the Government in various ways. Between 1831 and 1866 the migration of Fiscal peasants averaged nine thousand persons annually, while in certain years the number reached twenty-eight thousand.

By the Act of 1861 peasants were not allowed to leave their allotments during the first nine years without the consent of the landowner. Nevertheless they migrated in enormous masses to less remote parts of Siberia or to the borderlands of European Russia; few made use of the privileges offered in the regions of Amur and Ussuriysk. By the end of the Seventies official estimates of such "wilful" migrators totalled forty thousand per year. Special rules were issued on June 10, 1881, restricting the migration, and requiring the permission of the Ministers of Interior and of State domains in every case. The rules were not put into practice, and the illegal migration continued. The second session of "informed men," called by

Ignatiev in September, 1881, criticised the restrictive rules, and recommended that the Government assist the migrators in every way. Their recommendation was not heeded until July, 1889, when in spite of the reigning reaction under D. A. Tolstoy as Minister of Interior, the State Council passed a law by which migration was facilitated and aided.

Under Bunge protective laws concerning workingmen were issued for the first time. By the law of 1882 the working time of women and children was limited, the conditions of their work were placed under the official supervision of Factory Inspectors. The latter institution was further developed in subsequent laws, issued in 1884, 1885, 1886.

Bunge made the first attempt to shift the burden of taxes upon the shoulders of the wealthy. In 1882 a law was issued about an inheritance-tax, and in 1885 — a tax on bonds was instituted.

Such were the not unimportant, although purely palliative measures of the Government early in the Eighties for the improvement of the economic conditions of the masses.

The question of the reorganisation of the rural administration was handed over to the *zemstvos* for discussion, by the circular of Loris-Melikov of December 22, 1880. The *zemstvos* did not arrive at an unanimous opinion, however, and it was left for the Government to institute in the fall of 1881 a special commission under the chairmanship of State Secretary Kokhanov, Deputy-Minister under Loris-Melikov. Into the commission entered those Senators who had been commissioned by Loris-Melikov to inspect certain provinces and report the results of their revisions, some of those who participated in the original preparation of the reform of local administration, and, as expert-members, various *zemstvo* workers. The commission appointed from its midst a sub-commission, headed by Kokhanov, which was to work out the reform. After two and a half years the sub-commission pre-

sented a plan for important reforms in the entire local administration, on the basis of the principle of *classlessness*. But the completion of the work of Kokhanov's sub-commission (the end of 1884) coincided with the absolute triumph of the reaction in governmental spheres, when Tolstoy had become Minister of Interior. Tolstoy decided to liquidate the work of Kokhanov's commission, and in order to do it in "good form," he invited into the commission such "informed men" as would undoubtedly reject its conclusions; without Kokhanov's knowledge several governors and a number of reactionary nobles were appointed as members, who naturally disagreed with the views of the sub-commission.

The collapse of Ignatiev's régime took place, properly speaking, in May of 1882, one year after his appointment as Minister. His fall was caused by the same Pobiedonostzev who a year before had brought about the fall of Loris-Melikov. Pobiedonostzev made use of Ignatiev's suggestion that a *Zemsky Sobor* be summoned during the coronation in Moscow; that *Sobor* was to consist of nearly three thousand persons, and presented a quaint assembly, similar to neither the legislative nor consultative institutions of any civilised country. The project was prepared by some Moscow Slavophiles, presented to the Tzar, and had gained his approval, when Pobiedonostzev appeared on the stage. He succeeded in persuading Alexander III to discard once and for all the system of concessions to public opinion. Ignatiev was informed that his project could not be accepted, and resigned. His place was taken by the same Count D. A. Tolstoy, who in 1880, at the request of Loris-Melikov and to the joy of all thinking Russia, had been dismissed. Only from that moment did the course which Alexander III followed to the end of his days, begin to appear distinctly.

CHAPTER XL

IN the two preceding chapters I have characterised the first two brief but significant periods of the reign of Alexander III, which had a preludial, transitory, hence hesitating character. With the collapse of Ignatiev's ministry and the appointment of Tolstoy began the reign of reaction, the true epoch of Alexander III. Simultaneously with the dismissal of the Slavophile ministry of Ignatiev were discarded the secret societies which had existed at the Court, the "Holy Squad," and the "Voluntary Guard," in whose midst were discovered constitutional tendencies and circles organised by the young Count Shuvalov, with the aid of Court Minister Count Vorontzov-Dashkov.

After the coronation, safely celebrated in Moscow in May, 1883, the Government, with the aid of the traitor Degaiev, and owing to the internal decay of the revolutionary organisation, succeeded in capturing the remnants of the "Will of the People." Tolstoy was given full authority thereafter. But even Tolstoy had to spend many efforts and considerable time on the final liquidation of the heritage of the "heart dictatorship"; for three more years Bunge remained at his post; the Kokhanov-Commission continued its work for two more years, and its activity had to be annulled by a special effort on the part of the Government, described in the last chapter.

First of all Tolstoy restored the reactionary tendency in his old department — the Ministry of Education, which he had managed for sixteen years under Alexander II; Baron Nicolayi was supplanted in May, 1882, by Delianov, formerly a liberal, but now obsequiously obedient to Pobiedonostzev and Tolstoy.

In 1884 a new University Statute was worked out according to the ideas of Katkov, Leontiev, and Liubimov, concerning which Katkov announced his famous triumphant outcry: "Rise, Gentlemen: the Government is coming, the Government is returning." By the new Statute the University Councils were deprived of all vestiges of autonomy, and the Ministry was enabled to introduce its own programme in the departments of law and philology; it resembled the régime of Shirinsky-Shikhmatov. The students were to be handled with "porcupine gloves," to use a Russian expression; no corporative organisations of students were to be tolerated, and at the first attempt to protest they were to be reduced to soldiers.

The secondary schools were to preserve all the features of Tolstoy's Classical system, and at the same time regain the class-character which they bore during the reign of Nicolas. Delianov sent out a circular in which he urged the elimination of children of lower ranks from secondary schools.

Pobiedonostzev insisted upon handing over primary education into the hands of the Ecclesiastic department; this did not take place because the nobles, although reactionary, were unwilling to relinquish their control of popular education, and because of lack of funds. In an enormous majority of cases the *zemstvos* refused to transfer their schools to the Ecclesiastic department, and the Government could not afford to take them by force and maintain them at its own expenses. But the lowest type of the schools, the so-called Reading and Writing Schools, which were established by the peasants themselves, were given over to the Ecclesiastic department, by the law of June 13, 1884, carried through by Pobiedonostzev with the aid of Delianov.

The reactionary tendencies of the nobles received support and encouragement from Tolstoy, and they were reflected chiefly in the fate of the peasant-question and in the reform of the *zemstvo* administration. Whenever the interests of the

nobles were threatened, the reactionaries began to spread rumours about unrest and sedition among the peasants, in the form of expectation of a "black" partition of the land. Those rumours, undoubtedly inflated, produced a strong impression upon the Tzar, and in his Coronation speech to the *volost*-chiefs he sounded a warning to the peasants—not to listen to "sedition" talk, but to obey "their" Marshals of Nobility.¹

On the occasion of the centenary jubilee of the Nobility Charter, in 1885, a special Bank of the Nobility was opened, with the view of supporting landowners by means of loans. In the manifesto issued in connection with that event a wish was expressed that "*the Russian nobles preserve a dominant place in military leadership, in affairs of local administration and courts, in spreading exemplary rules of faith and loyalty and sound principles of popular education.*"

In their address of thanks the nobles, especially the reactionally circles, such as the nobility of the province of Simbirsk, voiced by Pazukhin, indicated that they put their hopes in the firm hand of the Government, the force of which would allow them to live peacefully in the villages. The Government replied that it would direct its legislation in that spirit. Thus the liberal ideas of Bunge and Ignatiev came to an end. Pazukhin symbolised the new régime; he it was who received the authority to liquidate all the work and the projects of the Kokhanov-Commission. He published an article in 1885, in which he voiced the sentiments of the most reactionary elements of the nobility. He considered the reforms of the Sixties, particularly those of the *zemstvo* and of the courts, the source of all evils in the country, since they destroyed the principle of class-differences.

¹ That speech was reprinted during the present reign, and widely distributed through the Empire, especially in rural public places.—Tr.

"If," he wrote, "in the reforms of the former reign we see a great evil in the destruction of the class-organisation, it is the task of the present reign to restore what has been destroyed."

No wonder that in view of such tendencies among the nobility, rumours began to circulate in the villages of the approaching restoration of the bondage-system.

Count Tolstoy was greatly pleased with the views of Pazukhin; he appointed him Chief of his Chancery, and commissioned him to work out a project of the "restoration." As a result of that work appeared the statute of July 12, 1889, concerning *Zemsky* Chiefs, and the statute of June 12, 1890, concerning *zemstvo* institutions. The principle of both statutes was to create a "firm local authority," concentrated in the hands of the nobles. The *Zemsky* Chiefs, appointed from among the nobles, were to enjoy enormous power over the peasants and their organs of self-government. By the Statute of 1890 the *zemstvo* institutions were completely deprived of that portion of independence from the Government, which was granted to them by the Statute of 1864. Tolstoy reduced the *zemstvo* boards to organs of the Ministry of Interior, subject at every step to the governor; the presidents of the boards were to be appointed by the Government. Pazukhin's ideas concerning the necessity of reviving class-spirit found expression in the revision of the electoral system for the *zemstvos*. The modified rules gave the nobles a complete predominance. The number of peasant-delegates was greatly reduced; the *volosts* could elect only candidates for delegates, and the governor appointed delegates from among them. The *zemstvo*-assemblies were actually, by the Statute of 1890, transformed into assemblies of the nobles. We must say, however, that Tolstoy died before he carried through his entire plan; his successor, I. N. Durnovo, possessed neither Tolstoy's talent,

nor his character and influence, and the State Council passed his original project with certain changes, which retained some semblance of self-government for the *zemstvos*.

During that period the mutilation of the judiciary statutes went on *crescendo*. The jury institution suffered most of all. Besides, by the law of July 12, 1889, one of the fundamental principles of the statutes—that of separation of administrative and judiciary authorities—was destroyed: The *Zemsky* Chiefs were to perform both administrative and judiciary functions; Justices of Peace were discarded.

Naturally the press was further restricted during that time. Tolstoy issued in 1882 "temporary rules," in addition to the rules of 1865 and the "additions" of Timashov. By those rules organs which had been temporarily stopped after three warnings, might reappear only on condition of their being presented to the censor on the eve of publication, not later than at eleven P. M. This caused the discontinuation of liberal dailies which could not of course exist under such conditions. Another rule established a special Areopagus of four Ministers—of Education, Interior, Justice, and the Super-Procuretor of the Synod, who might stop any publication for pernicious tendencies, and even forbid the editor of such a publication to edit at any time in the future. Heavy penalties were showered upon the press, prohibition of private advertisements, of retail sale, etc.

During the last two or three years of Tolstoy's régime the number of those penalties had diminished, and it might appear that the Government had loosened the reins; but as K. K. Arseniev remarks, the diminution of the number of penalties was due to the fact that liberal organs had either disappeared or had been placed in such a position that they could not say anything offensive. Only a very few liberal organs, such as the *European Messenger*, *Russian Thought*, *Russian News*,

lived through the difficult period, with the sword of Damocles constantly hanging over them.

Particularly difficult during that gloomy period was the position of non-Russian nationalities. In spite of the law of May 3, 1883, which promised toleration for Schismatists and Sectants, Pobiedonostzev persecuted the dissenters severely, even furiously. Even such pure, moral sects as Tolstoyans, Dukhobory, Stundists, were persecuted, and at times deprived of their children. In 1894 the Stundists were forbidden to assemble in their houses of prayer.

In harmony with this were the measures against the Uniates in the West and in Poland, and in some cases against Lutherans in the Baltic provinces. Jingo Nationalism had reached its apogee. Jews and Poles were persecuted most of all; Lamaites, Kalmycks, and Buriats also suffered persecution and were not allowed to build temples and perform worship.

Jews in particular suffered from restrictions. By the "temporary rules" of May 3, 1882, they were forbidden to live even within the Pale of Settlement — outside of cities and small-towns (*miestechki*); they were forbidden to buy real estate in villages. In 1887 Rostov-on-the-Don and Taganrog with its district were exempted from the Pale; thus the Pale of Settlement was reduced. In 1891 Jewish artisans who had the right to settle outside the Pale, were driven out from Moscow; about seventeen thousand of them were rudely exiled. In 1887 a percentage for Jewish children entering schools was introduced. In 1889 an end came to granting Jews the rank of Sworn Attorney; they had to remain Assistant-Attorneys to the end of their days.

The Poles were restricted in their rights of occupying governmental positions in Poland and in the Western provinces, but in other parts of the Empire they suffered no special oppressions.

The reactionary spirit was reflected also in the army. The humanistic principles implanted by Miliutin had gradually disappeared. The Government tried to bring up the officers in the spirit of caste distinction. Thus the penalty for duels was reserved only for civilians; military officers were exempt from it. The military schools, reorganised into gymnasia by Miliutin, were once more turned into Cadet Corps, and Minister of War Vannovsky endeavoured to revive the spirit of exclusive institutions of the time of Nicolas I.

CHAPTER XLI

THE only breach in the reactionary wall of Alexander III's government was Bunge's handling of the financial policy. He remained at his post until January 1, 1887, in spite of the intrigues and insinuations that pursued him in the Court circles and in the reactionary press. He resigned, under the pretext of old age, and was supplanted by I. A. Vyshnegradsky, a learned technologist and practical financier, who had had experience as professor in the Technological Institute and in the Mikhailovsky Academy of Artillery, and also as a speculator on the bourse. In his financial-economic policy he did not demonstrate any broad views or foresight; like most of the Russian ministers of finance in the nineteenth century, he considered raising the course of the paper-ruble the paramount aim. The main and immediate task of the Ministry under Vyshnegradsky had become the accumulation of large money reserves in the Treasury, and the broad participation in foreign stock-exchange operations with the aid of those reserves, with the view of effecting a pressure upon the foreign money market, and thus raising the course of the ruble. Alongside with this, the protectionist tariff policy had reached its apogee in 1891.

Big industry had become the pet child of the Ministry of Finance. Upon the complaints of large manufacturers, Bunge's workingmen-laws were revised in favour of the capitalists; the factory-inspectors were restricted in their activity, so that independent and conscientious inspectors soon resigned, and that institution began to deteriorate. The Ministry protected the home industry in every way by a special customs tariff and

by special railroad-rates; artificial favourable conditions were created for manufacturers, at the expense of the interests of other classes of the people, particularly the rural population, who felt the effect of the tariff of 1891 in the rise of prices on such important commodities as iron and agricultural implements.

As I have described in a previous chapter, the peasantry grew impoverished and ruined, and was naturally losing its buying capacity. This affected the internal market, for such commodities as, for instance, cotton fabrics. The manufacturing industry sought compensation in the markets of Central Asia, but those were not sufficient; by the end of the reign of Alexander III a new idea originated — to push the market to the Far East. In this connection appeared the idea of building the Siberian railroad, the question of an outlet to the Pacific Ocean, of the acquisition of an ice-free port in the Far East, and all that policy which brought to the development of the Russian Far East undertakings that culminated in the Russo-Japanese war.

A few words concerning the railroads. By the end of the reign of Alexander II the net of railroads amounted to twenty-two and a half thousand versts, and for the thirteen years of Alexander III's reign it grew to thirty-six thousand six hundred and sixty-two versts. The old policy of *Reitern* was followed in building the roads so that they would aid the hauling of raw materials to ports, in order to increase the exports and thus improve the money course; on the other hand, the Ministry granted special low rates for manufacturers of the industrial Central provinces. For the latter purpose a special department was instituted at the Ministry of Finance — the Tariff Department, at the head of which was placed a young man, S. Y. Witte, destined subsequently to play an important rôle in the history of Russia. Another feature of the new railroad policy, in contrast to that of *Reitern*, was the increase

of fiscal ownership of railroads. During the reign of Alexander III the verstage of fiscal railroads increased by twenty-two thousand versts, while that of private roads diminished by seven thousand six hundred versts, in spite of the building of new private railroads: the Government continually redeemed old roads.

Such were the features of the financial policy which prepared and deepened the acute state of Russian socio-economic conditions at the beginning of the twentieth century. Those conditions developed alongside with the crisis lived through by the people after the famine of 1891-1892, when failure of crops caused misery and starvation in twenty provinces, mostly in the black soil region. That crisis formed, we may say, the finishing touch to the general picture of Russia as seen at the end of the reign of Alexander III, and appeared at the same time as a powerful factor for bringing about the grave changes of the subsequent years.

In his foreign policy Alexander III was undoubtedly original and independent, and bent his own line. In 1882 the senile head of Russian diplomats, the class-mate of Pushkin, Prince Gorchakov, died; his place was taken not by another distinguished statesman, but by a modest official, State-Secretary Giers, who was in fact not so much a minister as a private secretary of Alexander in the sphere of foreign policy.

During the first half of his reign foreign conjunctures did not develop favourably for Russia; she was constantly threatened by war, on the part of Austria or England, and there appeared various international complications, partly in connection with Eastern affairs. The conquest of Central Asia, begun in the Seventies, was continued and completed, to the growing alarm of England.

By the plan of General Skobelev, to a considerable extent realised by himself, the last stronghold of the Turcomen, Geok-Tepe, was to be destroyed, in order to bring the Russian fron-

tier to Afghanistan, and in one point even to the northern border of British India. After energetic efforts and stubborn conflicts, Skobelev finally succeeded in capturing Geok-Tepe, subduing the savage tribes, and approaching Afghanistan and British territory; after some bloody battles with the Afghans, the last point of that portion of Central Asia — Merv — was captured by the Russians. Alexander III was able to furnish adequate answers to the interpellations of the British diplomats, and to avert war with England.

Another danger threatened from Austria; Bismarck did his best to involve Russia in a war with Austria, so that he might have a free hand to deal with France; he also tried to embroil Russia in the Balkans, where Serbia and Roumania ascribed their failures at the Congress of Berlin to Russia, and where Bulgaria was going through internal dissensions. Alexander III, who personally disliked Germans, yet held up the traditional friendship of his dynasty with the Hohenzollern House, and disregarded the machinations of Bismarck. The exasperating affairs in Bulgaria, the Principality which was created by Russia and maintained by her, brought Russia to the verge of intervention and probable war with Austria; but in that case also Alexander III disappointed Bismarck, withdrew his army-officers from Bulgaria, and left the Bulgars to themselves. Alexander III, aware of his isolated position in Europe, asserted that Russia was not in need of any alliances; on one occasion he demonstratively raised a toast to his *only* friend in Europe — the Prince of Montenegro.

In the second half of Alexander's reign a possibility was opened for Russia to establish better international relations. In 1887 Bismarck nearly succeeded in instigating war between Germany and France; a personal letter from the Tzar to Emperor Wilhelm I restrained the latter from declaring such a war. This served as the beginning of the *rapprochement* between Russia and France; in 1889 a union was signed between

them, and made public after the solemn declaration by Wilhelm II of the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy.

The Russo-French alliance served as an important factor in the international policy of the end of the nineteenth century; it certainly brought an end to Bismarck's aspirations to crush France. Alexander III, even during his life-time, was justly called the Tzar-Peacemaker by many historians and publicists.

RUSSIA UNDER NICOLAS II, 1894-1916

BY ALEXANDER S. KAUN

Professor A. Kornilov wrote to me last August:

"I am highly complimented by the fact that you have appreciated my work, and I shall greatly rejoice at its appearance in the English language."

I deem it my duty before the esteemed author and before the public, to state that my supplementary chapters do not pretend to be a direct continuation of Mr. Kornilov's work.

I fully agree with the opinion of Professor James Mavor, expressed in a letter to me:

"Kornilov's book has a certain artistic unity, and it was a very good idea on his part to close his History with 1890. The history of the last twenty-five years cannot be written from the same point of view or with the same perspective as the history of the previous seventy-five years."

Precisely so. The events of the reign of Nicolas II have not yet crystallised into a subject-matter for the impartial historian. I do not pretend to have treated that period *sine ira et studio*.

In the four following chapters the reader will find a subjective interpretation of the most salient events during the present reign, as reflected in the mind of the Russian *intelligentsia*, of which I claim to be a member.

A. S. K.

November, 1916.

I

THE REACTION UNDER NICOLAS II

(1894-1905)

FOR a quarter of a century, from March, 1881, to October, 1905, Russia was ruled by one consistent, relentless, inflexible personality—that of Constantine Pobiedonostzev, tutor in the Imperial family during the reign of Alexander II, intimate counsellor and confessor of Alexander III and Nicolas II, and Super-Procurator of the Holy Synod. If in the Court-circles Pobiedonostzev had been looked upon as the saviour of the Dynasty, he was famous throughout the land as the “evil genius of Russia.” In his hands Uvarov’s trinity-formula—Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality—had developed to its apogee, to the absurd; the Government, the entire State-apparatus, became a yielding instrument for the realisation of the Procurator’s aspirations which, in the main, spelled the strangulation of any initiative and free will on the part of the people and the ruthless persecution of all non-Orthodox creeds and of all nationalities that did not belong to the Great Russian tribe. Such, in a nutshell, was the policy of Alexander III and of Nicolas II, until 1905; but, to repeat, it was the personality of Pobiedonostzev that had stamped all the important acts of the State during that long period. A student of the Russian language will unmistakably recognise the soulless, brutally-unctious style of the Grand Inquisitor in most of the manifestoes, ukases, and rescripts, issued during that time, all of them breathing the same spirit of obscurantism, intolerance, and cruelty, all of them striving to extin-

guish light and mind, to grind to dust the peasant and the workingman, the intellectual and the *zemstvoist*; the Finn, the Jew, the Pole, the Armenian, the Sectarian — *ad majorem autocratiae gloriam*.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the people who had expected a change of policy at the accession of young Nicolas II were utterly disappointed. As a matter of fact those rosy expectations were based rather on self-suggestion than on substantial precedents. As Heir to the throne Nicolas had not demonstrated any independent views or opinions, any brilliance of mind or intensity of purpose; he was brought up as an ordinary Grand Duke, under the guidance of the pedantic General Danilovich, and in the unhealthy atmosphere created by Pobiedonostzev. Yet the people, having chafed for thirteen years under the intolerable régime of Alexander III, *wished* to hope that the young monarch would return to the policy of his grandfather, so tragically interrupted on March 1, 1881.

Among the deputations that came to congratulate the new Tzar were *zemstvo* delegates, of whom many presented frank addresses voicing the sentiments and desires of the country. As usual, the Tver *zemstvo* appeared to be the most radical and outspoken; the author of the address, Rodichev, was not allowed by the Minister of Interior to be present at the Court reception, and was forbidden to live in Petrograd; other persecutions followed the members of the *zemstvos* of Tver and of other provinces which presented similar addresses. How far from revolutionary those petitions were, can be seen from the text of the Tver address:

“Your Majesty:

“In these festal days, which see the beginning of your services in the cause of the welfare of the Russian nation, the *zemstvo* of the province of Tver greets you with feelings of fervent loyalty. . . .

"The Russian nation has listened with gratitude to the solemn expressions uttered by Your Imperial Majesty upon your accession to the throne of all the Russias. We are filled with gratitude for your resolve to devote yourself to the furtherance of the happiness of your people, and we hope for the success of the great task which has been bestowed upon you. We allow ourselves to indulge in the hope that on the height of the Throne the voice of the people and the expression of its desires will be heard and listened to. We are firmly convinced that the welfare of Russia will improve and fortify itself under your rule, and that the law will henceforward be respected and obeyed, not only by the nation alone, but also by the representatives of the authority that rules it; because the law, which in Russia is an expression of the will of the Monarch, should stand above the changing views of the individual instruments of this sublime power.

"We earnestly hope that during your reign the rights of individuals, as well as those of already existing representative bodies, will be protected permanently and energetically.

"We expect, Gracious Sovereign, that these representative bodies will be allowed to voice their opinions in matters in which they are concerned, in order that the expressions of the needs and thoughts, not only of the representatives of the administration, but of the whole Russian nation, may reach the Throne. We expect, Sire, that under your rule Russia will advance on the path of civilisation and progress, as well as on the road of a peaceful development of her resources and needs. We firmly believe that in the close union of all the elements and classes of the Russian people who are in the same measure devoted to the Throne and to their country, the power which Your Majesty wields will find new sources of strength and better chances of success towards the fulfilment of the high aims Your Imperial Majesty has in view."

This loyal advance of the *zemstvo* was roughly rebuked by

the young monarch in a short speech which he delivered at the reception of the deputations. As a political programme of the new reign, that speech was to smash all hopes for progressive changes in the Government, and to hurl the moderate liberals into the ranks of the aggressive opposition. The memorable speech was as follows:

“ I am glad to see here the representatives of all the different classes of the country, assembled to express to me their submissive and loyal feelings. I believe in the sincerity of those feelings which are inherent in every Russian heart. But it has been brought to My knowledge that during the last months there have been heard in some *zemstvos* the voices of those who have indulged in the *senseless dreams with respect to the participation of the zemstvos in the general direction of the internal affairs of the State*. Let it be known by all that I shall devote my whole power to the best service of the people, but that the principle of autocracy will be maintained by me as firmly and unswervingly as by my lamented father.”

This blunt declaration was echoed with general indignation; the country was given notice that the régime of Pobiedonostzev was to continue unaltered and unmitigated. Thenceforward the alignment of the national forces appeared simple and distinct; roughly speaking, it was — the Government *versus* the People, the Bureaucracy against everything free and liberal in the country. The consequences of the new alignment were foreseen by all, except those engaged in sawing the branch on which they were seated. The famous Russian emigrant, Stepniak-Kravchinsky, wrote on that occasion:

“ Looked at politically, the speech of December 20 indicated a turning point in the history of our progressive movement. Hitherto the Government had declared that it was only from the ranks of persons outside the law, revolutionary firebrands, socialists, and other ignoble persons, that demands for reforms in our political system had emanated. Nicolas II was the first

openly to recognise that the country had asked from him through its empowered representatives a constitutional reform, which, however, he refused to grant, and had decided stoutly to resist it as long as he should be able."

The revolutionists, utterly crushed during the reign of Alexander III, now saw an opportunity for the resurrection of the movement through the unification of all oppositional forces. They were frank enough to express their hopes and expectations in a lengthy address to the Tzar, printed abroad, but dated "St. Petersburg, January 19, 1895." It is a remarkable document, one may say — prophetic in many respects. Below are some parts of it, quoted from a recent book written by a Russian courtier under the pseudonym of Count Vassili:¹

"You have spoken, and your words are at present known everywhere in Russia; ay, in the whole of the civilised world. Until now you were unknown, but since yesterday you have become a definite factor in the situation of your country, about whom there is no room left for *senseless dreams*. We do not know whether you understand or realise the position which you have yourself created with your 'firm words' . . .

"First of all, you are badly informed about the tendencies against which you decided to raise your voice in your speech. There has not been heard in one single assembly of any *zemstvo* one single word against that autocracy which is so dear to your heart. . . . The most advanced thinkers among them have only insisted upon — or, rather, humbly begged — that a closer union might be inaugurated between the Monarch and his people; for the permission for the *zemstvos* to have free access to the Throne without any one standing between it and them; for the right of public debate, and for the assurance that the law should always be observed and stand above the caprices of the Administration.

"In one word, the only thing that was in question was the

¹ *Behind the Veil at the Russian Court*, by Count Paul Vassili.

desire to see fall and crumble to the ground that wall of bureaucracy and courtierdom that has always parted the Sovereign from the Russian people.

"This was the desire of the people which you, who have just stepped on the throne, inexperienced and ignorant of the national needs, have seen fit to call 'senseless dreams.'

"It is clear to all intelligent elements of the Russian people, who has advised you to take this imprudent step. You are being deceived; you are being frightened by this very gang of bureaucrats and courtiers to whose actual autocracy not one single Russian man or woman has ever been reconciled. . . .

"Do believe that even for the mildest of men such a declaration, ill-timed as it was, could only produce a crushing feeling of betrayal. That day has done away with that halo with which so many Russians had crowned your young, inexperienced head. You have laid your own head on your popularity, and have destroyed it. . . .

"After your sharp reply to the most humble and lawful demands that have been addressed to you, by what and through what means will Russian society be able to keep in quiet submission to your will those of its members who wish to proceed, further and further, on that road which leads to the amelioration of the nation's fate? . . .

"It (your speech) has strengthened in others the determination to fight to the bitter end against a hateful order of things, and to fight it with all the means they may have at their disposal and in their power. You have been first to begin the struggle, and it will not be long before you find yourself entangled by it."

Thus began the new reign; the despotic régime was not only not mitigated, but on the contrary it grew more intense and ruthless, since Pobiedonostzev had become the omnipotent ruler of Russia. During the former reign the Procurator still had to encounter a sovereign with a character and a will, who had

some scruples and respect for the memory of his father's activity; no such obstacles were in his way now, and he wielded his grip over Russia uncontested and unrivalled.

No changes of import were promulgated during the first period of Nicolas' reign, either in the personnel or in the policy of the Government. The selection of functionaries was practically in the hands of Pobiedonostzev who was quite consistent and consequential in his programme, and favoured persons with political views at least as conservative as those of Count Dmitri Tolstoy, whose unlamented death in 1889 has deprived the bureaucracy of one of its ablest and cleverest upholders. Minister of Interior Durnovo, Minister of Education Delianov, Minister of Finance Vishnegradsky, Minister of Agriculture Krivoshein, adhered strictly to the ferule of the Super-Procurator, and so did their successors; the only changes consisted in the degree to which the reactionary policy was carried out.

The Minister of Interior continued the policy of Dmitri Tolstoy in every respect. The *zemstvo* was further curbed in its field of activity, and became more and more dependent upon the good will of the local administration. Since politics were absolutely forbidden, the *zemstvo* activity was limited to economics. During the famine of 1891 their work proved of unprecedented efficiency, considering Russian conditions. In the field of local activity the *zemstvo* of the province of Moscow led the rest; under the presidency of Dmitri Shipov, and with the co-operation of such spirited men as Muromtzev, Golovnin, Kokoshkin, Chelnokov, it succeeded in introducing radical improvements in the provincial life, such as establishing a school within two miles and a hospital within five miles of every inhabitant, equipping small medical outposts, supplying the peasants with clover for the improvement of the cattle, introducing veterinary doctors and inspectors of imported cattle, compelling factories to live up to sanitary requirements,

and so forth. The example of Moscow was followed by other *zemstvos*, notably by those of Samara, Tver, Tambov, Chernigov, Viatka, and by many city-*dumas*. Needless to say, the Administration did everything possible to hinder the work of these public institutions, thus forcing the peaceful workers to join the opposition. Most of the subsequent leaders of the Constitutional-Democratic party (Cadets) received their political instruction as members of the *zemstvo* or city-*dumas*. From 1894 to 1903 there took place sporadic congresses of *zemstvo*-presidents of a semi-official character, for the discussion of provincial needs. In spite of the guarded policy of the leader, Shipov, political questions were raised and discussed at the congresses, for it was impossible for public workers to overlook such phenomena as inequality of civil rights, gagged press, obstructed popular education, limitations imposed upon the *zemstvo*, irrational financial policy, and similar flagrant evils.

In 1902 Minister of Finance Witte set up a commission for the "investigation of the causes of the exhaustion of the central provinces"; the commission appointed local sub-committees, with the co-operation of the *zemstvos*. Witte's intention was to discredit his rival in the Committee of Ministers, Minister of Interior Plehve; hence his flirtation with the liberal elements. Pobiedonostzev and Plehve were sharply opposed to those committees, and the latter minister sent out circulars forbidding the discussion of many vital questions at their assemblies. The uncomplete results of the sessions showed one hundred and eighteen committees advocating moderation, one hundred and eighty-one standing for enlightened conservatism, and four hundred and eighteen outspokenly oppositional to the régime. Witte failed to achieve his purpose — of compromising Plehve; on the contrary, he lost his position as Minister of Finance, and was appointed President of the Committee of Ministers, an unimportant post at that time. Plehve renewed his persecution of the *zemstvos* with fresh vigour, cancelled elections (he an-

nulled the re-election of Shipov as President of the Moscow *zemstvo*; in his place was elected the considerably more liberal Golovnin), banished radical members, closed up assemblies, and did everything in his power to strangle their activity. His assassination in 1904 cleared the air.

At the end of the Nineties a new movement began among liberal *zemstvoists* and other progressives, for the founding of a Liberal party. The idea was finally realised in the establishment of an organ, *Liberation*, in Stuttgart, under the editorship of Peter Struve, an ex-Marxian. Among the "Liberators" (*Osvobozhdentzy*, from the word *svoboda* — freedom; *osvobozhdenie* — liberation) were such idealists as Princes Peter and Paul Dolgorukov, Prince Shakhovskoy, such prominent *zemstvoists* as Petrunkevich and Rodichev, radical writers, professors, lawyers, as Korolenko, Miliukov, Nabokov, Kokoshkin. The Liberators had local branches throughout Russia, and carried on an energetic propaganda of constitutional ideas. The group of the *Zemstvo* Constitutionalists and the Union of Liberators were formed before the outbreak of the war with Japan, and were destined to play an important part in the events of 1904-1905.

The persecution of non-Orthodox creeds and sects went on *crescendo*. Pure, harmless sects, as those of the *Stundists*, *Molokane*, *Dukhobortzi*, were ruthlessly oppressed, exiled, compelled to serve the army, forbidden to perform their worship. The only voice that dared rise against the bigoted policy of Pobiedonostzev, was that of Lev Tolstoy; on several occasions he made vigorous appeals to the civilised world on behalf of the *Molokane*, *Dukhobortzi*, and other oppressed sects and creeds. It was largely due to his efforts that the *Dukhobortzi* were enabled to migrate in large numbers to Canada where they have been living according to their convictions. In 1897 an ecclesiastical congress was held at Kazan, under the auspices

of the Holy Synod; among its bigoted resolutions, which were approved by Pobiedonostzev, was one petitioning the Government to declare the Tolstoyans, i.e., the followers of Lev Tolstoy, a sect "particularly dangerous for the Church and the State," who should be dealt with as drastically as the most "pernicious" sects. In 1900 the Holy Synod, obedient tool of the Russian Torquemado, anathematised the greatest Russian, the "conscience of Russia,"—Lev Tolstoy; the Orthodox church was forbidden to afford him burial-rites.

The political and educational restrictions upon the Poles, the Little Russians, the Baltic provinces, and other "borderlands," were continued with the former zeal, and adhesion to Uvarov's trinity-formula. The Jews suffered most of all. The "temporary laws" of 1882 have existed to this day, with various modifications and additions, in most cases in the nature of further restriction. The Pale of Settlement continued to be narrowed and curtailed; Jews were not allowed to occupy state or public positions, were greatly restricted in attending schools (five to ten per cent. in secondary schools, and two to five per cent. in higher educational institutions), were forbidden to buy real-estate outside of towns, in a word—"it was as if all the Jews of Russia were to be violently crowded in and piled on top of each other, like grasshoppers in a ditch. Here they were to be miserably crushed together until the fruitless struggle for life should have done its work."² Pobiedonostzev is credited with having predicted as a result of his policy against the Jews that "a third of them would be converted, a third would emigrate, while the rest would die of hunger." In spite of those unbelievable persecutions, or perhaps because of them, the Russian Jews have distinguished themselves in all fields of national life—in commerce, at the bar, in science, in art, in the press and—naturally—in all liberal and revolutionary movements. Plehve was said to have in-

² *Alexander III of Russia*, by Charles Lowe.

tended "to drown the Revolution in Jewish blood"; the massacre in Kishinev, in 1903, was perpetrated with the knowledge of the Minister of Interior (Plehve), as it has been established beyond doubt.

Pobiedonostzev's short-sighted chauvinism, which resulted in the alienation of loyal subjects of the Empire, was demonstrated most palpably in the Government's policy with regard to Finland. Since 1809 the Grand Duchy enjoyed internal autonomy, granted by Alexander I, and solemnly confirmed by all successive Tzars. Nicolas II had sworn allegiance to the Finnish constitution, but instigated by the Super-Procurator of the Holy Synod he broke his oath, and in the year of 1899 the independence of Finland came to an end; the Grand Duchy was to become a Russian province, ruled by the Imperial ministers. The indignation of the little nation was shared by the entire civilised world; the Finns resisted the new order passively, but the senseless oppressions of Plehve as Minister for Finland, and of Governor-General Bobrikov exasperated even that stoical race, and in 1904 Bobrikov was assassinated by Eugene Schaumann. The Government was responsible for the rapid spread of Social Democracy and of revolutionary ideas in the formerly peaceful and loyal Grand Duchy.

In a similar way the Armenians and the Georgians in the Caucasus were driven by the Governmental despotism to revolutionary terrorism. Prince Golitzin, Governor-General of the Caucasus, obtained the consent of Plehve and Pobiedonostzev for the confiscation of the Armenian church-lands and charity-funds which amounted to nearly sixty million dollars. The attempted Russification of the theretofore loyal Armenians resulted in the creation of a new revolutionary contingent, more sanguine and aggressive than the long-suffering native Russians. The pacification of the Caucasus in subsequent years required more efforts on the part of the Government than any other part of the Empire.

The ablest minister during the present reign had been Sergey Witte who succeeded Vishnegradsky in 1894 as Minister of Finance. Like his predecessor, Witte pursued the policy of increasing the reserve-fund of the State through economy and with the aid of heavy taxation. In 1886 the reserve amounted to fifty-six million rubles, in 1893 to two hundred thirty-six million, and in 1901 the gold reserve was six hundred and forty-eight million against a note issue of six hundred and thirty million rubles; at the same time Witte introduced a golden standard (1897). These measures were achieved, naturally, at heavy sacrifices for the people; besides the enormous foreign loans the country was burdened also with a complicated system of indirect taxation.

Witte endeavoured to monopolise the railroads, of which in 1900 the State owned sixty per cent. Yet the Government had to meet growing deficits year after year, partly on account of the construction of purely strategic lines, like the Siberian, or the Eastern Chinese railway. The monopolisation of the sale of liquor was also a measure carried through by Witte; it greatly increased the revenue of the State, but at the expense of the masses: drunkenness spread like a plague through the country, whole villages suffered from the vodka-evil, and the demoralisation of the illiterate, tax-burdened, half-starving peasantry received an encouraging stimulus from the State wine-shop.

Witte continued the protectionist policy of his predecessors, on an enlarged scale. He employed strenuous efforts for fostering capitalism in Russia, and encouraged the development of home industry at the expense of the fundamental national asset—agriculture. The peasants, impoverished by heavy taxes, were unable to pay the enormous import duties on agricultural implements and other necessities. Mr. Pares figured out that "the Russian peasant pays, as compared with the German, two and a half times as much for cotton and sugar, four

and a half times as much for iron, six times as much for coal," and he adds: "The apparent wealth accruing to the State from these various sources (from the spirit-monopoly and the protective tariff A. S. K.) was unscrupulously exaggerated, and systematic efforts were made to produce a deceptive appearance of prosperity."³ Witte himself was forced to acknowledge the growing misery of the country, especially of the Central provinces, where agriculture had greatly declined, and the peasantry were utterly impoverished. We have seen that he established a special commission for the investigation of the causes of the misery; the results were so unpleasant for the bureaucratic régime that Witte lost his post, and Plehve was given further license to oppress the grumbling people.

Capitalism, fostered and fondled by the Government since the Seventies, brought about its logical concomitant — a city proletariat. We have seen how the emancipated peasants, unable to subsist on the miniature allotments granted them, and still less able to meet the heavy taxes imposed upon them, were forced to seek other earnings. Part of the peasants settled permanently in cities as factory-workers, drivers, etc.; while a large part of them went to the city for temporary work, gravitating back to the soil, and returning to their village as soon as they were in a position to maintain their land. The latter category has served as a link between the city workingmen and the village masses; the propaganda carried on in the city was thus disseminated in remote nooks among the peasants, always wishful for changes, always expecting good tidings "concerning soil."

The Socialist propaganda among workers began in the middle of the Eighties, when Plekhanov and other members of the "Black Partition" formed a party under the name of "Liberation of Labour." Marxian Social Democracy spread in the

³ *The Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. XII.

early Nineties, particularly in the large cities and in industrial districts. Sporadic strikes took place at various points, nearly all of an economic nature. Witte experimented with a Factory Law (1897), which limited the working hours to eleven and a half; the shrewd Minister had intended to appease the workingmen and to lure them into the arms of the patriarchal government. In 1898 a congress of various Socialist groups in Russia was held, which resulted in the formation of the Russian Social Democratic Workingmen's Party; its original aim was to eliminate all political problems from their propaganda, and to concentrate all the forces on the economic struggle. The strike movement spread over the country, reaching Krasnoyarsk, in Siberia.

At that time the Government made another experiment with the labour movement. Zubatov, Chief of Detectives in Moscow, obtained the consent of Grand Duke Sergey, Governor-General of Moscow, of General Trepov, Chief of the Moscow Police, and of Minister Plehve, for the organisation of a net of labour-societies, under the supervision and protection of the police. Zubatov's object was to assist the workingmen in their economic struggle, in order to withdraw them from the influence of political agitation and revolutionary propaganda. It was a dangerous game; the employers protested against the strike-propaganda of Zubatov's agents. One of the latter, Shaievich, organised a large strike in Odessa (1903), with the support of the local police; but the strike assumed such dimensions that neither Zubatov nor the police were able to control it, and it had to be put down with much bloodshed. The "Police Socialism" was discredited.

The Zubatov-affair discredited also the purely economic labour movement, showing as it did the possible results of such a non-political activity. The new organ of the Social-Democrats, the *Spark*, preached more vigorous class-propa-

ganda; at the congress of the party in 1903, a democratic republic was declared their ultimate goal.

The Social-Democrats ignored the peasant-question; in their eyes the transformation of the peasantry into a property-less proletariat was to be desired and worked for. The party that appealed directly to the peasants was that of the Socialists-Revolutionists, the heirs of the *Narodovoltzy*, of the Will of the People-traditions. Its organ, *Revolutionary Russia*, began to appear in 1900; it tried to reconcile Western Socialism with ancient Russian Communism; it advocated socialisation of the land, and its distribution among those who actually till it. The Socialists-Revolutionists made a successful propaganda among the peasants and among the idealistic *intelligentzia*; they appealed more to the Russian mind than the petrified Marxians. As heirs of the Will of the People, they accepted terror as a necessary means in the struggle with autocracy; alongside with the propaganda-group the party had a Fighting Organisation which was to carry out the sentences pronounced by the Central Committee. In 1902, twenty-one years old Balmashov, member of the Fighting Organisation, killed Minister of Interior Sipiagin. During the thirty months of Sipiagin's administration sixty thousand political arrests were made; Maxim Gorky was banished from Nizhni-Novgorod, Peter Struve and Tugan-Baranovsky — from Petrograd; hundreds of university students were exiled to remote provinces; the Telegraph Department was forbidden to forward telegrams to Lev Tolstoy; the press was enjoined from discussing 1,896 new subjects, in addition to those prohibited before.⁴

In *Revolutionary Russia* for May, 1903, appeared the following note:

"On 13th March, 1903, the Governor of Ufa, N. M. Bogdanovich, ordered the troops at Zlatoust to fire upon a

⁴ *The Russian Revolutionary Movement*, by Koni Zilliacus.

group of striking men. The crowd ran away, but the troops continued to fire. Twenty-eight people were killed, and about two hundred were wounded. Among the killed and wounded were many women and children. . . . On the 6th of May, by the order of the Fighting Organisation of the Party of Socialists-Revolutionists, two of its members shot and killed N. M. Bogdanovich, Governor of Ufa.”⁵

The terroristic activity of the Socialists-Revolutionists achieved its greatest popularity in July, 1904, when Sazonov assassinated the tyrannical dictator, von Plehve.

Throughout the reign of Nicolas II student-disturbances have taken place. They began as early as 1896, when the Petrograd students were forbidden to celebrate the annual university fête; the Moscow students resolved to express their protest against the Government by marching to the Vagankovo cemetery and having a memorial service performed for the victims of the Khodynka massacre.⁶ The marchers were

⁵ Quoted by James Mavor, in the 2nd vol. of his *Economic History of Russia*.

⁶ During the coronation of Nicolas II in Moscow, festivities were arranged for the masses on the Khodinsky Field. Through criminal mismanagement the people crowded in disorder, and when pushed back by the mounted police, struggling, screaming men, women, and children fell into deep ditches which had been dug around the field. The number of victims was estimated at four thousand. Grand Duke Sergey, Governor-General of Moscow, was naturally blamed for the catastrophe. On the same evening the Tzar was present at the ball given in honour of the French ambassador, and took part in the dances. In this connection K. Zilliacus quotes Robert G. Ingersoll's words written before the coronation:

“On reading the descriptions of the coronation of the Tzar, the processions, the ceremonies and the festivities, the ostentation and parade of the barbarian magnificence, the cloths of gold and the glittering of precious stones, I could not but think of the poor peasants, of the trodden-down, overworked, and half-fed millions, of the gloomy and ignorant masses who belonged body and soul to the Tzar. I thought of the shoulders that had been torn open by the knout, of the thousands of prisoners lingering in cells because they had dared to whisper something about liberty, of the heaps of human beings

driven by Cossacks back to the University; their names were taken by the police, and thirty-six of them who seemed to be leaders were arrested. On the next day the students gathered at the University, and asked the Rector to obtain the release of the prisoners; he refused and ordered them to disperse. As they disobeyed, four hundred and three students were imprisoned in the Provincial Gaol; one hundred and five of their number were subsequently banished to Siberia, and twenty-six were expelled from the University. Thus was inaugurated the policy of the new reign towards the youth of the country.

In 1898 Minister of Education Delianov died; his place was given to Bogolievov, an obsequious nonentity, whose only aim was to please Pobiedonostzev. In 1899 the Petrograd police flogged a number of students with knouts; the chief of police was rewarded by the Government. This atrocity was answered with a strike of thirteen thousand students throughout the Empire. The Tzar issued an ukase ordering the striking students to be forcibly enlisted in the army. At the same time numerous professors of liberal tendencies were dismissed from the universities of Moscow, Petrograd, and other places. In 1900 serious disturbances took place at Kiev. One thousand students held a meeting at which they discussed the demoralising policy of the Ministry of Education. The Rector appealed to the Authorities; the University was surrounded by Cossacks and police, under the command of General Novitzky of the Gendarmerie. Five hundred students were arrested; one hundred and eighty-three of them were drafted as soldiers, and the rest were expelled from the University. General Novitzky and other military men objected to that form of punishment, considering the army not a penitentiary, but the Rector, the

driven like cattle through the hopeless roads that lead to the hell of Siberia. The cannon did not thunder loud enough, and neither the pealing of bells nor the blare of the trumpets could drown the laments of the prisoners. . . . The coronation is a blemish on the nineteenth century. Long live the Russian people!"

Curator, and Minister Bogolievov upheld the measure. The Kiev affair provoked further disturbances at Moscow, Kharkov, and Petrograd; in every case the Cossacks attacked the protesting students, and flogged them mercilessly. It is characteristic that in Moscow and Kharkov workingmen took the side of the students and joined their demonstration. In Petrograd the students met in front of the Kazan Cathedral; General Kleigels, the City Prefect, attacked them with a force of Cossacks and police, who flogged them in front of the Cathedral and inside the church. Seven students (among them one woman) were killed; the number of wounded could not be established. One month later Bogolievov was killed by an ex-student, Karpovich. But the indignation of the public had not calmed down with the removal of the obnoxious minister; protests signed by mothers, by high officials, by authors, by persons of all ranks and professions, were showered upon the Government. At the same time street-demonstrations took place in numerous towns, arranged in most cases by workingmen who marched and shouted "*Doloy Samoderzhaviye!*"—"Down with absolutism!"

The atmosphere grew dense and suffocating. One felt the oncoming of a storm, and one wanted it to come and relieve the suspense.

II

WAR AND REVOLUTION

THE setback given to Russian diplomacy at the Congress of Berlin had kept Russia in an isolated position for a long time. Even the alliance with France seemed to be rather a purely financial transaction than anything else. The growth of Pangermanism, the increase of German influence at Constantinople and of Austrian influence on the Balkan Peninsula, appeared to check the traditional gravitation of Russian diplomacy toward the Near East. In 1898 the world was startled by the appeal of the Tzar to the Great Powers for a Peace Congress; Russia evidently had no aggressive intentions with regard to her western neighbours.

But the Russian expansion in Asia went on uninterruptedly. Since the beginning of the construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad, in 1891, the Government had its eyes turned eastward. An attempt was made to create a *Drang nach Osten* movement; Prince Ukhtomsky, editor of the *Petrograd News*, and companion of Nicolas II during his travels in the East as Heir to the Throne, eloquently urged his compatriots to look upon Asia as their natural home, endeavouring to prove that the Russian people were geographically and morally Asiatics. Russian diplomats got busy at Peking, negotiating concessions in Manchuria and Korea. The defeat of China by Japan, in 1895, and the occupation by the latter of Port Arthur and Korea, threatened to thwart the ambitions of the Government; but Russia was not in a position to resist, since the Siberian railway had not yet been completed, and the transportation of a sufficiently large army into Manchuria was

almost impossible. Russia succeeded, however, in inducing France and Germany to demand jointly the withdrawal of Japan from Port Arthur and from Korea. A number of important concessions on the part of China to Russia followed in rapid succession. In 1895 the Russo-Chinese Bank was opened, and one year later that bank undertook the construction of the Eastern Chinese Railway, which connected the Russian railways with the province of Kirin. In 1898 Russia leased the Liao-Tung peninsula, including Port Arthur, with the right to connect Port Arthur through Kharbin with Mukden, and Talien-Wan (later Dalny, renamed Dairen by Japan) with Newchwang. During the Boxer uprising of 1900 Russia occupied Manchuria, under the pretext of maintaining order, promising to evacuate the region in 1902. At the same time Russian capitalists (among them representatives of high circles) greedily exploited the timber region of the river Yalu; the independence of Korea was threatened by Russian encroachments.

Such, in brief, was the history of the Russian advance in the Far East. That this progress was thinly laid and artificial was proved by the rapidity with which Russia was deprived of her concessions, when she was encountered by a solidly organised nation, for whom the contest was a question of life or death.

The war with Japan interests us only inasmuch as it reflected the internal state of Russia, and by its consequences for the revolutionary movement within the Empire; for this reason we shall not describe its course in detail. As a matter of fact, for the people at large that war was a purely external event which did not concern them directly; the masses were led to slaughter for the imperialistic aspirations of the incapable Bureaucracy and for the capitalistic interests of greedy speculators.¹ The

¹ The attitude of the best part of Russia towards the war was voiced by Lev Tolstoy, the man who had been through his long life the pillar of fire in the gloomy reality of his country. In a letter to the

unrelieved defeats of the army, the surrender of Port Arthur, the disastrous collapse of the Baltic Fleet at Tsushima, the disorderly flight of the demoralised troops at Mukden — were calamities due not only to the lack of able commanders and strategists, to the lackadaisical management of such nonentities as the *bon vivant*, Admiral Alexeiev, Commander of Port Arthur, or as the “lazy Slav,” General Kuropatkin; not only to the fact that the Russian soldiers fought, to paraphrase Thiers’ saying, like lions led by asses, forced at times to employ the bayonet against their own officers who hid behind bushes; not only to the unprecedented corruption in all branches of the war-management, from the commissariat to the Red Cross department: those were details. *The war was an indictment of the whole régime*; it proved the utter rottenness of the bureaucratic order; it has doomed the Autocracy. Under no other form of government could have taken place such criminal overlooking of facts, such misrepresentation of the actual state of affairs, such absolute ignorance, unpreparedness, and backwardness, as under the Autocratic régime, where the fate of the country lay in the hands of one person, hoodwinked by a gang of corrupted, stupid bureaucrats. As an illustration I shall

London Times, published on June 27, 1904, Tolstoy denounced the Russian Government for its imperialistic policy, and thus characterised Nicolas II:

“The Russian Tzar, the same man who exhorted all the nations in the cause of peace, publicly announces that, notwithstanding all his efforts to maintain the peace so dear to his heart (efforts which express themselves in the seizing of other people’s lands and in the strengthening of armies for the defence of those stolen lands), he, owing to the attack of the Japanese, commands that the same should be done to the Japanese as they had begun doing to the Russians — namely, that they should be slaughtered; and in announcing this call to murder he mentions God, asking the divine blessing on the most dreadful crime in the world. *This unfortunate and entangled young man*, recognised as the leader of 130,000,000 of people, continually deceived and compelled to contradict himself, confidently thanks and blesses the troops which he calls his own for murder in defence of lands which he calls his own with still less right.”

quote from a report presented to the Tzar shortly before the war by Minister of War Kuropatkin upon his return from a visit to Japan and a "thorough" examination of the Manchurian situation:

"Japan at the present moment is reorganising her army and navy, and proceeding very slowly with this task. Japanese officers, though they have studied at our Academy and in German military schools, have not mastered the various workings of European tactics. They are still savage and untrained, and their army could not very well at present engage in any conflict with us. It is true that they are ambitious, and that the annexation of Korea is their earnest desire, but they have no means of satisfying that ambition. If we want to strike at their military or naval organisation, we could not select a more favourable moment than the present one, when everything is still in a state of chaos, and when Japan, having ceased to be an Asiatic nation, is nevertheless far from resembling a European one. As regards ourselves, *we are perfectly ready, and could in the space of thirteen days have four hundred thousand men on the Japanese frontier, which is three times as many as would be needed to repulse the army of our adversary. The war would be a simple military promenade, and no necessity could even arise of moving any of our troops from the German or Austrian frontier, or of diminishing the garrisons in Poland.*"

The world knows now that every statement in the above quotation proved to be utterly false. The "military promenade" cost Russia four hundred thousand men and nearly five and a half billion rubles;² by the treaty of Portsmouth Russia recognised the preponderating influence of Japan in Korea, agreed to the evacuation of Manchuria, and ceded to

² These figures are taken from Gregor Alexinsky's *Modern Russia*; Major F. B. Maurice of the British General Staff estimates the cost of the war to Russia as little less than one billion rubles, and two hundred and twenty thousand men.

Japan the Liao-Tung peninsula, including Dalny and Port Arthur, seven hundred and forty-five miles of the Chinese railway, and the southern half of the island Saghalin. Thus ended the grandiose adventure of Russian bureaucracy in the Far East.

Mr. Bernard Pares, one of the keenest observers of Russia, thus sums up the Russo-Japanese conflict:

"It is not every generation that has the privilege of witnessing with its own eyes one of the most momentous changes in the history of civilisation; yet we stand at the crisis of a whole era. The Russian Government had run away from Europe; it had plunged itself into the heart of Asia, and its advocates even maintained that Russia's mission in the East was justified precisely by the fact that Russia was morally, as geographically, a semi-Asiatic power. In this flight from the West she found even her Asiatic outlet blocked; the ambitions which stood in her way were those not merely of a Government, but of a whole nation; and this was precisely the one Asiatic nation which had taken its models of government from the West, and had proved capable of producing as good results. The triumph of Japan over Russia was not really a triumph of the yellow race, but a triumph of the West; and in the struggle the Russian Government, by the very formula of its reaction, was deprived of the effective support of the Russian people itself. Here, at this far corner of Asia, the Russian Government and the Japanese people fought out the battle between reaction and progress. The Russian Government was defeated by the West, which again confronted it in the Far East. It was inevitable that the triumph of the Japanese people should facilitate the triumph of the Russian people too. . . ."³

Synchronously with its crushing defeats on the fields of Manchuria and in the waters of the Sea of Japan, the Bureaucracy was being battered at home. Port Arthur, Liao-Yang,

³ *Russia and Reform*, by Bernard Pares.

Mukden, Tsushima, Portsmouth — served as nails hammered into the coffin of the anachronic despot; each catastrophe on the theatre of war was echoed with a fresh upheaval of the nation within the Empire. The general indignation could not be checked even by Plehve, although he continued to exercise his tyrannical dictatorship, and opposed any form of public initiative, even such an innocent activity as the *zemstvo* war-relief organisation. The bomb of Sazonov removed the powerful minister in July, 1904; this was the first heavy blow at the autocracy at home, and it was followed by more blows which were reacted to by concessions on the part of the Throne. In September, Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky was appointed Minister of Interior; he at once appealed to the public for "confidence"; it was an attempted repetition of Loris-Melikov's "heart-dictatorship." The press greeted the new note with enthusiasm, and by a hint from above the censorship suddenly ceased working: the most radical articles were passed unmolested. New publications appeared, frankly oppositional, and most of the old organs assumed a bold tone. The *zemstvoists* held a congress in Petrograd, with the tacit consent of Sviatopolk-Mirsky; its President, Shipov, endeavoured to restrain the Liberators from excessive demands, and in the end he was authorised to present to the Government eleven points of request, which included civil equality for all races and classes, inviolability of person and dwelling, freedom of speech, of press, of meetings and associations, of conscience, of public instruction, amnesty for political offenders, and finally — an assembly of representatives. On the last point sixty members demanded an assembly with legislative functions, while thirty-eight advocated a consultative body. The "eleven points" became the slogan of all liberals; they were accepted by many *zemstvos* and *dumas*, and embodied in addresses sent to the Minister of Interior. But the well intentioned Prince met with the opposition of Pobiedonostzev and the Grand Dukes, and his policy of "confi-

dence" had to come to a halt. Again the press was forbidden to discuss "harmful" subjects; penalties were inflicted on the radical publications. The tide of public opinion had risen too high, however, to be checked by prohibitive ukases. A long series of public banquets and meetings began; men of various professions met under the pretext of discussing their needs, and adopted the "eleven points," or more radical resolutions. It appeared obvious that all classes, all ranks and professions, were of the unanimous opinion that the old order of things had to go. Even the nobles declared themselves in favour of reforms; Marshal of the Chernigov Nobility Mukhanov, who was also President of the *zemstvo*, telegraphed to the Tzar the resolution of the Assembly, which was equivalent to the "eleven points." The Tzar remarked, on the receipt of the telegram: "Impertinent and tactless," yet shortly after he issued an edict, promising vague reforms for the peasants, *zemstvos*, workmen, press, courts, etc., to be carried out by the Ministers, i.e., by the very bureaucrats whom the country had unanimously condemned. The edict was followed by an official communication in which the reform-seekers were rebuked, the *zemstvos* and the press forbidden to discuss "irrelevant" questions, public meetings declared unlawful. New restrictions and oppressions were introduced.

On January 9, 1905, a new and formidable factor entered the liberation movement — the proletariat. The *intelligentzia* had been employing such moderate means as speeches and addresses, but the simple workingmen decided to act in a more direct manner: led by a governmental priest, Georgy Gapon, the Petrograd workmen marched with ikons and religious songs to the Winter Palace, with the intention of presenting a petition to the Tzar. The petition was composed in naive terms; here are some extracts from it:

"Sire,— We, workingmen and inhabitants of St. Petersburg of various classes, our wives and our children and our

helpless old parents, come to Thee, Sire, to seek for truth and defence. . . . We have been oppressed; we are not recognised as human beings; we are treated as slaves who must suffer their bitter fate and who must keep silence. . . . We are choked by despotism and irresponsibility, and we are breathless. . . . The limit of patience has arrived. . . .

“Sire, here are many thousands of us, and all are human beings only in appearance. In reality in us, as in all Russian people, there is not recognised any human right, not even the right of speaking, thinking, meeting, discussing our needs, taking measures for the improvement of our condition. We have been enslaved, and enslaved under the auspices of Thy officials, with their assistance, and with their co-operation. . . . All the people — workingmen as well as peasants — are handed over to the discretion of the officials of the Government, who are thieves of the property of the State, robbers who not only take no care of the interests of the people, but who trample these interests under their feet. The Government officials have brought the country to complete destruction, have involved it in a detestable war, and have further and further led it to ruin. We workingmen have no voice in the expenditure of the enormous amounts raised from us in taxes. . . .

“Sire, is it in accordance with divine law, by grace of which Thou reignest? Is it not better to die, better for all of us toiling people of Russia, and let the capitalist exploiters of the working class, officials, grafters, and robbers of the Russian people to live? This is before us, Sire, and this has brought us before the walls of Thy palace. We are seeking here the last salvation. Do not refuse assistance to Thy people. . . . Cast away from them the intolerable oppression of officials. Destroy the wall between Thyself and Thy people, and let them rule the country together with Thyself. Art Thou not placed there for the happiness of Thy people?

“. . . Russia is too great. Its necessities are too various

and numerous for officials alone to rule it. National representation is indispensable. . . .”

The petition put forth other “indispensable measures,” akin to the “eleven points,” with emphasis on economical problems. It ended thus:

“Here, Sire, are our principal necessities with which we come to Thee! . . . Order and take an oath to comply with these requests, and Thou wilt make Russia happy and famous and Thou wilt impress Thy name in our hearts and in the hearts of our posterity to all eternity. If Thou wilt not order and wilt not answer our prayer—we shall die here on this Square before Thy palace.

“We have nowhere farther to go and nothing for which to go. We have only two ways—either towards liberty and happiness or into the grave. . . . Let our life be a sacrifice for Russia which has suffered to the extreme limit. We do not regret this sacrifice. We willingly offer it.”⁴

The Tzar had left the Capital before the day set for the demonstration; his uncle, Grand Duke Vladimir, it is generally believed, took charge of the city, and ordered the troops to fire repeatedly at the unarmed workers who were peacefully marching towards their “Little Father.” The number of dead and wounded (among them women and children) is roughly estimated as one thousand five hundred. That memorable day is known among the people as the Bloody Sunday, or as Vladimir’s Day. At least in one respect the unsophisticated petition was correct: “their lives served as a sacrifice for suffering Russia.”

The Government had lost its head; like one who is drowning it undertook hazardous and contradictory measures, in the hope of averting the inevitable—the fall of the autocratic régime. General Trepov was transported from Moscow,

⁴ From Sviatlovsky’s *Rabocheie Dvizheniye v Rossii*. Quoted after J. Mavor’s *An Economic History of Russia*, pp. 469-473.

where he had distinguished himself as a ruthless police-master under the governor-generalship of Grand Duke Sergey, and appointed Governor-General of Petrograd and at the same time Assistant to Minister of Interior Bulygin, with dictatorial power over the Imperial police. Trepov had family traditions; it was his father who was shot at by Viera Zasulich in 1877 for having ordered political prisoners flogged. He lacked the cleverness of Plehve, and acted bluntly, gendarme-like. In his naive belief in force, he attempted to stop up the crater of the volcano with knout and sabre; he introduced wholesale oppressions, particularly directed against workingmen and liberals.

The workmen replied with continuous strikes and disturbances throughout the country, especially in the industrial regions; martial law was declared in Poland and in the Caucasus, and over all railways; the universities closed their doors voluntarily, and the Government resolved against coercing instruction. On February 4 Kaliaiev assassinated Grand Duke Sergey, by order of the Socialists-Revolutionists. As a result of Kaliaiev's bomb came the Tzar's rescript on the name of Bulygin, which included the following promise:

"I am resolved henceforth, with the help of God, to summon the worthiest men elected by the people for participation in the drafting and consideration of legislative measures."

The country, however, could not be pacified by empty promises. Grave disturbances continued; in the industrial districts the Social-Democrats organised political strikes and street-demonstrations. Still more effective and threatening was the activity of the Socialists-Revolutionists among the peasantry: whole villages (communes) rose in the provinces of Kursk, Oriol, Chernigov, Vitebsk, Liublin, Bessarabia, Podolia, Voronezh, Nizhni-Novgorod, in the Caucasus; in places the peasants took the law in their own hands, and appropriated the landowners' estate; they sent petitions which included political alongside with purely agrarian points.

The more moderate elements proceeded, in the meantime, to organise. The *zemstvos*, *dumas*, and various professional unions held meetings and discussed national problems. Professor Miliukov was very active in organising professional unions of all varieties—academicians, lawyers, physicians, clerks, teachers, authors, railway employ  s, cabmen, janitors, women, and even of officials and policemen. He finally succeeded in merging them all in a Union of Unions, a powerful body which might have played an important r  le in the subsequent events, had Miliukov been able to control its differing factions.

In March the Russian army was routed at Mukden; in May the Baltic fleet was destroyed at Tsushima. The demands of the public grew bolder. A *zemstvo* congress was held in Moscow, with the participation of Marshals of Nobility and *duma* members; it sent a deputation with an address to the Tzar. The deputation consisted of Prince Sergey Trubezkoy, F. I. Rodichev, Prince D. I. Shakhovskoy, I. I. Petrunkevich, Count P. A. Heyden, Prince G. E. Lvov, N. N. Lvov, F. A. Golovin, Prince P. D. Dolgorukov, N. N. Kovalevsky, U. A. Novosiltsev, Baron P. L. Korf, A. N. Nikitin, and M. P. Fiodorov; most of them had an established reputation as public workers of liberal tendencies, and many of them could boast of having suffered administrative penalties and Imperial reprimands for their "senseless dreams." Prince Trubezkoy, as the spokesman, described the situation of the country to the Tzar in plain words; surely this was the first direct and truthful talk that Nicolas II had heard. In the name of the *zemstvo* Trubezkoy asked for the summons of representatives of the people, equally elected by all classes, and for the abolition of the bureaucratic wall between the Monarch and the people. The address concluded with these words: "Do not delay, Sire. Great is your responsibility before God and Russia at this terrible hour of the nation's trial." Similar desires were

expressed in the name of the cities by the member of the Petrograd *duma*, M. F. Fiodorov. The reply of the Tzar is very characteristic, considering his coarse rebuke of the *zemstvoists* in 1896, and all his subsequent policy in regard to public opinion:

"It has pleased me to hear your speeches. I do not doubt, Gentlemen, that in your direct appeal to me you have been guided by the feeling of ardent love for your country. Together with you and with all My people I have grieved profoundly over the disasters which the war has brought upon Russia, and which we must further anticipate, and over our internal disorders.

"Dismiss your doubts. My will — the will of the Tzar — to summon representatives of the people — is unshakable. . . . You may tell this to all your neighbours who live on the land or in towns. I firmly believe that Russia will come out from the grave trial rejuvenated.

"Let there be established, as of old, union between the Tzar and all Russia, solidarity between Me and the men-of-the-land (*zemsky* men), which shall form the foundation of an order corresponding to the ancient Russian principles.

"I hope that you will assist me in this work."

The effect of the Tzar's speech was enormous, but it was immediately neutralised through the interference of the bureaucrats: the press was forbidden to discuss the matter freely, and the papers that dared print frank comments were penalised. The general unrest continued. The Union of Unions was getting more radical; it was joined by the Peasant Union which was largely under the influence of the Socialists-Revolutionists. In the same month of June the country was stirred by the mutiny of the battleship *Potiomkin* of the Black Sea fleet; the crew killed all the officers, threw two shells at Odessa, and sailed away to the shores of Roumania.

August the third a manifesto was issued announcing the es-

tablishment of a State *Duma* with consultative powers, of a very limited franchise. The tone of the manifesto was somewhat ambiguous, except that it reasserted absolutism. Here are some of its statements:

"The Empire of Russia is formed and strengthened by the indestructible solidarity of the Tzar with the people and the people with the Tzar. . . . Autocratic Tzars, Our ancestors, constantly had that in view, and the time has come to follow out their good intentions and to summon elected representatives. . . . While *preserving the fundamental law regarding autocratic power*, We have deemed it well to form a State *Duma*. . . ."

The manifesto was received with general dissatisfaction, but the majority of the nation resolved not to boycott the *Duma*, but to send representatives there with the view of founding a Constituent Assembly. A *zemstvo* congress met in Moscow, with the participation of various nationalities, and declared itself for a programme which was soon after embodied in that of the Constitutional-Democratic Party (Cadets).

The Government granted a semblance of autonomy to the universities which were to be managed by Rectors elected by the professors; their buildings were thrown open for public meetings. This measure illustrates the bewilderment of the Government; its contradictory tactics of that moment are astonishing. While the universities put into practice freedom of meetings and of speech, the press was tightly gagged. The country was throbbing in revolutionary convulsions; peasants continued to appropriate land and to burn landowners' estates, especially in the Baltic provinces where the masses wreaked vengeance on their hated masters, the German Barons. October was the month of big, significant strikes which culminated in the general strike, from the 7th to the 21st, approximately. The Moscow railways struck first; in ten days twenty-six thousand miles with seven hundred and fifty thousand em-

ployés of the railroads were involved. They were followed by street-railways, and by most branches of trade and industry; telegraph service was suspended, as well as postal. Soon the Empire presented isolated towns where all activity had stopped, where there was no light and a scarcity of food; only the Strike Committee was in possession of railway engines which they used for distributing communications and information among the strikers. It was an elemental passive revolution: the people refused to perform their every-day functions under the existing régime; the régime had to go. The Government faced bankruptcy and disintegration; it understood that the nation wanted definite concessions, and not vague half-measures. As a matter of fact, the general strike was purely political; the demand was for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, universal freedom, and civil liberties. Nicolas II capitulated; he dismissed the "evil genius" of Russia, Pobiedonostzev, appointed Witte Premier, and issued the famous manifesto of October 17, the substantial part of which was as follows:

. . . "We direct Our Government to carry out Our inflexible will:

1. To grant the people the immutable foundations of civil liberty, based on real inviolability of person, freedom of conscience, speech, meetings, and associations;

2. Without deferring the elections to the State *Duma* already ordered, to call to the participation in the *Duma* (as far as it is possible in view of the shortness of the time before assembling of the *Duma*) those classes of the population now completely deprived of electoral rights, leaving the ultimate development of the principle of electoral right in general to the newly established legislative order.

3. To establish as an immutable rule that no law can ever come into force without the approval of the State *Duma*, and that the elected of the people were secured a possibility for real

participation in supervising the legality of the acts of authorities appointed by Us."

The manifesto was received with general rejoicing; although the Strike Committee found it unsatisfactory, the people at large recognised the document as a renouncement of autocracy and the first actual step towards constitutionalism. The bureaucracy, however, did its utmost to cool off the national enthusiasm: it perpetrated massacres of Jews and *intelligentzia* throughout the Empire on October 18, the day following the issue of the manifesto. In Odessa alone the massacre continued four days, leaving about one thousand dead and five thousand wounded. The slaughter of the "enemies of the Tzar" was organised by the society of "True Russians," whose loyalty to the autocracy was fostered and bought by the higher bureaucrats; Trepov directed the massacres by telegrams. A clever cartoon appeared shortly after in one of the Petrograd satirical magazines, which excellently summed up the situation: Over the facsimile of the Tzar's manifesto of October 17 was stamped the impression of a bloody hand; the inscription ran: "His Majesty's manifesto was sealed and signed by General Trepov."

During the great October events there was actually no Government; the bureaucrats had lost their heads, and their only activity was demonstrated in such convulsive outbursts as the massacres. Premier Count ⁵ Witte had to dismiss Trepov who made himself particularly odious in Petrograd by his circular of October 14, in which he ordered the soldiers "not to spare cartridges" and by the massacres of October 18; his successor, Durnovo, as Minister of Interior, was hardly any better a bureaucrat. The Liberals, led by Miliukov, met during the strike in Moscow, and finally organised themselves into the

⁵ Sergey Witte, a *parvenu*, was made count after the disgraceful Treaty of Portsmouth. The opposition-press called him Count Portsmouthsky, or Count Semi-Saghalinsky.

Constitutional-Democratic Party; they were afraid of the revolution, and determined to support Witte, if he remained true to his promises, but the very fact of Durnovo's appointment eliminated all hopes for the constitutionalism of the Government.

The actual power during the month of October lay in the hands of the proletariat, particularly of the Petrograd Council of Workmen's Deputies, under the able leadership of Khrustaliyov. The Council was composed of delegates from every factory, elected by the workmen; from the beginning of the general strike it assumed control of the situation, and by its tactful management of the turbulent masses, by its dignified treatment of the difficult tasks which arose in the days of practical anarchy, the Council gained the unreserved loyalty and confidence of the people, and inspired the bureaucracy with respect and fear. Count Witte negotiated with Khrustaliyov as if with a dictator; appeals from various classes and organisations, even from remote places, came before the Council; other cities emulated Petrograd by founding local Councils of Workingmen's Deputies; there were formed also Councils of Peasants' Deputies, and even Councils of Soldiers' Deputies. During the strike the Council forbade the publication of any newspapers, except the *Bulletin of the Council of Petrograd Workingmen's Deputies* which was printed "by force" in various printing offices.

That the workingmen had little confidence in the manifesto of October 17 is seen from the resolution of the Petrograd Council, accepted on October 18:

"Pressed in the iron vise of the general political strike of the Russian proletariat, the Russian autocratic government has arrived at concessions. It has made an announcement about liberties, about the legislative power of the future State Duma, and about the intention to introduce into the Duma representatives of the working men and of the intelligent layers

of the people. But the fighting revolutionary proletariat cannot lay down its arms until the time when the political rights of the Russian people will be established on solid foundations, until there will be established a democratic republic, the best means for the further struggle of the proletariat for Socialism." The resolution further declared the demands of the workingmen, and ended thus: "In order to carry on the struggle for these demands, the Council finds it necessary to continue the general strike until the moment when conditions will indicate the necessity of a change in tactics."⁶ That change came on the 19th of October, when partial cessations of the strike in several cities, notably in Moscow, forced the Petrograd Council to declare the general strike at an end on October 21. In the announcement about it the Council called for further struggle, for the organisation of the working class armed "for a final fight for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly"; "the proletariat knows what it desires, and knows what it does not want. It wants neither the police-hooligan Trepov, nor the 'liberal' broker Witte—neither the jaws of a wolf nor the tail of a fox. It does not want a *nagaika* (Cossack whip) wrapped up in a constitution."

Witte sought in vain the support of the Liberals: he was generally mistrusted; it was felt that he was powerless against the still omnipotent Court-camarilla, and that at best he could introduce a patched up compromise between autocracy and a constitution. In the meantime a mutiny broke out among the sailors in Cronstadt; it had been poorly organised, resulted in disorderly rioting, and in the arrest of the leaders who were handed over to a court-martial. Martial law was soon de-

⁶ For information about the Petrograd Council I have used the *Istoria Sovieta Rabochikh Deputatov g. S. Peterburga*, a history of the Council written by its initiators and leaders. In many of my quotations I have followed, with very few changes, the excellent version of Professor James Mavor, in his *An Economic History of Russia*.

clared in Poland, in response to the Poles' demand for autonomy. The Council of Workingmen's Deputies declared a general strike (November 2), with the demands: "Down with death sentences! Down with field court-martials! Down with martial law in Poland!" To what extent the Government was terrorised by the proletariat may be seen from the proclamation of Witte, issued upon the declaration of the second general strike:

"Brothers-workmen! Go back to work, cease from sedition, have pity on your wives and children. Do not listen to evil counsel. The Tzar has commanded us to devote special attention to the labour question. . . . Give us time and everything possible will be done for you. Heed the advice of a man who is disposed towards you and wishes you well."

Not less characteristic is the reaction of the workmen to Witte's appeal. One factory upon the discussion of the proclamation announced its laconic resolution: "Read it and—struck." The answer of the Council ran as follows:

"The Council of Workingmen's Deputies, after listening to the telegram of Count Witte to his 'brothers-workmen,' expresses first of all its extreme amazement at the impertinence of the Tzar's favourite who takes the liberty of calling the Petrograd workingmen his 'brothers.' The proletarians are in no way related to Count Witte.

"The Council declares:

"1. Count Witte calls upon us to pity our wives and children. The Council requests all workingmen to figure out how many widows and orphans have been added to their ranks since the day that Witte was placed at the head of the Government.

"2. Count Witte is pointing out the benevolent attention of the Tzar towards the working class. The Council is reminding the Petrograd proletariat about the Bloody Sunday of January 9.

"3. Count Witte asks to be given 'time' and promises to

do 'everything possible' for the workingmen. The Council knows that Witte has already found time for delivering Poland into the hands of martial executioners, and the Council does not doubt that Witte will do 'everything possible' for the strangulation of the revolutionary proletariat.

"4. Count Witte calls himself a man disposed towards us and wishing us well. The Council declares that the working class is in no need of good will on the part of the Tzar's favourites. It demands a popular government, based on universal, equal, direct, and secret franchise."

The Government yielded more concessions. Finland was restored in her former liberties, and her Diet was summoned, for the first time since 1899. The redemption dues of the peasants were reduced by one-half for 1906, to be entirely abolished after January, 1907. A partial amnesty was granted for political prisoners. The press disregarded the censor, and published the most extremist articles. Agrarian disorders continued in the Centre, in the South, and particularly in the Baltic Provinces where the Letts rid themselves of the German Barons and declared a republic. Frequent mutinies in the army and navy occurred. The troops revolted in Siberia, notably at Vladivostok; Lieutenant Schmidt raised the revolutionary flag at Sevastopol, and engaged the fleet; military disturbances took place at Kiev, Bobruisk, Voronezh, Moscow, Yekaterinodar, Novorossiysk. The employés of the Postal-Telegraph Department were on strike, and the service was crippled for two months.

Yet it was felt that the revolution was losing ground. There was no longer the spontaneous union of all national elements, the general solidarity which had reigned in October. At the *zemstvo* congress held at Moscow in November a shifting to the right was noticed; the more moderate element, disturbed by the revolutionary excesses, particularly by the agrarian disorders, formed a separate party, under the name of Octobrists,

with the view of supporting the Government on the basis of the manifesto of October 17. Even the Cadets began to lean to moderation.

Among the proletariat itself there was no longer the former solidarity of fighting spirit; the general strike as a weapon became blunt. The November strike, declared by the Petrograd Council, was a failure; it lacked the three factors indispensable for the success of such a gigantic undertaking: fresh powers of the proletariat, unpreparedness of the Government, and public sympathy (such was the *post facto* opinion of the party leaders, e.g., of the Social-Democrat A. Lunacharsky). The Council was forced to call off the strike.

This disunion of the oppositional forces encouraged the Government to attempt a restoration of the fallen bureaucratic prestige. It began cautiously, testing the degree of resistance on the part of the revolutionaries. The arrest of Khrustaliyov, President of the Petrograd Council of Workingmen's Deputies, was reacted merely by a resolution of protest and election of a new presidium. The Government gained more courage. The committee of the Peasant Union was arrested in Moscow. Petrograd was declared under martial law. Draconic laws were issued against strikers. Public meetings were forbidden. The Council of Workingmen's Deputies, in conjunction with the Committee of the Peasant Union, the Committee of the Social Democratic Party, and the Committee of the Socialists-Revolutionists, issued a manifesto to the people; here are some extracts:

"The Government is on the verge of bankruptcy. . . . No one is sure of the morrow. The Government has wasted all the State revenues on the army and the fleet. There are no schools, and the roads are neglected. Troops throughout the country are disaffected, impoverished, and hungry. The Government has robbed the State savings-banks. The capital of small investors has been played with on the Bourse. The gold-

reserve of the State Bank is insignificant compared with the demands of the State loans and commercial transactions. . . .

"Only after the fall of the autocracy can a Constituent Assembly put an end to this financial ruin. . . . There is but one way out of this abyss — the overthrow of the Government, and the removal of its last weapon. We must take from it the last source of its existence — its financial revenue.

"The Government is issuing orders against the people as though Russia were a conquered country. We have decided not to allow the payment of debts contracted by the Tzar's Government, since it has openly waged war against the whole nation.

"Therefore we decide:

"To refuse payment of redemption instalments and all other fiscal payments.

"To demand in all payments of wages and salaries payments in gold, and for amounts of less than five rubles full weight of hard coin.

"To withdraw the deposits from the Savings-Banks and from the State Bank, demanding payment of all amounts in gold."⁷

The revolutionary manifesto of December 2 was printed in eight Petrograd newspapers; they were all suspended. One hundred more papers reprinted the manifesto; the Government refrained from persecution. Over a hundred million rubles of deposits were withdrawn from the Savings Banks in answer to the manifesto. On the next day the entire Council was arrested and imprisoned. The Strike Committee declared a general strike, the third in less than two months.

It was the final combat between the Revolution and the Government; either side staked all on the card; neither side knew the exact forces of the adversary. The trump, the "X,"

⁷ After Mavor's *Econ. Hist. of Russia*, and Nevinson's *The Dawn in Russia*.

was — the army. The result of the struggle depended on the side which the army would take. To the revolutionists and the Government alike it appeared probable that the mass of the soldiers, consisting as it did of peasants, workingmen, and oppressed nationalities, would join their fighting fathers and brothers; the numerous mutinies, the prevailing unrest, the declarations of many military-revolutionary organisations, naturally strengthened the *a priori* judgments of the more optimistic elements among the proletariat. On the other side, the Government, in the person of Minister of Interior Durnovo, considered the moment opportune for risking a decisive battle; the financial situation of Russia, especially its credit abroad, required the restoration of order; since the wavering, “fox-tail” policy of Witte had failed in pacifying the country, it remained to try the “wolf-jaws” method of Durnovo for crushing the revolution.

The third general strike was a worse failure than the second one. The working class was tired, exhausted — physically and morally. Petrograd replied faintly; only a few large factories struck. In a few places, in Saratov, in the South, in the Caucasus, in the Baltic Provinces, the revolutionaries responded, and attempted to overthrow the authorities. But the Government proved strong in its main citadel: the mass of the army proved inert, and by sheer inertia it obeyed the command of the officers and blindly exterminated the fighters for freedom. The last flash of the revolution, its grandiose finale where the romantic and tragic gravely mingled, was the uprising in Moscow. The Council of Moscow Workingmen’s Deputies decided to support the appeal of their Petrograd brothers, and the men of the First Capital proved more loyal to the cause, or perhaps more sentimental, than the sophisticated Petrograders. For thirteen days the Moscow revolutionists engaged the infantry, cavalry and artillery of the Government, commanded by Admiral Dubasov. Machine guns were hoisted on the tall

belfries of the numerous cathedrals to shell the clumsy barricades behind which were posted small bands of revolutionists armed with Brownings or Mausers. Naturally machine guns and magazine rifles proved the stronger; naturally the method which was effective in 1789 — the barricades — was doomed to be a romantic folly in the year 1905. The uprising was crushed with unnecessary cruelty. Batches of prisoners were executed without trial; houses and factories were bombarded and destroyed; the terrorised population was treated like a conquered enemy. Not satisfied with its military triumph, the Government sent the Semionovsky Guards as a punitive expedition into the Moscow region; the ill-famed Colonel Riman invaded the towns and railway stations along the Moscow-Kazan railroad to "punish" all suspects. He had an order from the higher authorities: "Have no prisoners; act without mercy." The order was carried out to the letter. An English observer who visited those unfortunate places shortly after the passing of the expedition, remarks: "The Guards distinguished themselves by their zeal and exultation in the slaughter; but considerable allowance must be made for them, because they had not been given a chance of slaughtering the Japanese, and like all brave soldiers they naturally pined for active service."

Durnovo had won the day. He was made independent of Count Witte, and freely proceeded with his policy of extermination. The Government appeared to be determined not so much on the restoration of the old régime, as on sheer revenge for the months of uneasiness; the people were to be punished for the few months of freedom which they had dared enjoy. The country was thrown at the mercy of punitive expeditions. The army, so miserably beaten in Manchuria, showed courage in cannonading unresisting villages, fusillading unarmed peasants and workmen, and instilling terror in the heart of the population. The atrocities committed by the soldiers in the

provinces of Saratov, Tambov, Courland, Georgia, and many others, remind one of the stories about the Turkish massacres of Armenians; the tragic difference lies in the fact that the Russian Bashi-Bazouks fired and flogged and outraged their own brothers and sisters, their true defenders and friends.

Russia was pacified. A calm as of a graveyard reigned over the terrorised towns and burned villages. Under such conditions the elections for the first *Duma* drew near.

III

THE "CONSTITUTIONAL" RÉGIME

IN the clamour of the Moscow uprising the country overlooked the issue of an important governmental act concerning the *Duma* elections. On the whole the decree of December 11, 1905, when compared with Bulygin's project considerably enlarged the franchise. But it was obvious that the "liberal broker" Witte schemed to assure a "desirable" body of representatives for the first Russian parliament. The elections were based on a system of classes or *curiæ*. The Government was confident of the loyalty of the peasants; with this view of securing their good will, the redemption dues as we have seen were reduced; besides, the belief was strong in the traditional love of the peasantry for their Little Father-Tzar. For this reason Witte endeavoured to create a strong peasant influence in the *Duma*; the peasants who possessed purchased land, and were therefore considered to be conservative, had the privilege of voting both in the peasant-curia and with small land-owners; peasants participated not only in the election of their own deputies, but also in that of deputies from towns and from landowners. The Government, as we shall see, was severely disappointed in its expectations. The manifesto of October 17 promised franchise rights for workingmen; but Witte created a peculiar workingmen-curia, attested by I. I. Petrunkevich as "the height of perfection from the point of view of Machiavellism." The workers, unlike other *curiæ*, could elect not deputies, but electors who were distributed among electors of towns and districts, and were thus drowned

in the majority of non-workers; there was practically no chance for them to elect a delegate from their own midst. The decree of December 11 enlarged the franchise of lodgers, however, which enabled many workers to vote as lodgers.

The oppression of the press, the suppression of associations and meetings, were conditions hardly favourable for normal elections. But the Government of Witte-Durnovo continued to "modify" the franchise in a definite direction. On February 20, 1906, the summons of the State *Duma* with definite regulations was issued. The State Council was reorganised as an upper chamber, of equal rights with the *Duma*; half of its members were appointed by the Tzar, and one-half elected from universities, commercial committees, *zemstvos*, the clergy, and the nobility. Thus against the *Duma* was put up a "citadel in which the bureaucracy and the upper classes would find sufficient support not only for a struggle with the national representatives, but for the annulment of its importance in the eyes of the people."¹ The *Duma* was not allowed to discuss the fundamental laws of the State (including its own constitution). Other limitations followed in rapid succession. Three days before the opening of the *Duma* a new decree was issued, defining the fundamental laws in such a way that powers of the House were rendered almost null. The Tzar was to retain the title of autocrat; he reserved the right of unlimited action in questions of war and peace, of international relations, of expenditures for the army and navy, of contracting loans in certain cases, of issuing laws during recesses of the *Duma*, of proroguing and summoning the *Duma*, etc. A number of laws were promulgated on the eve of the opening of the *Duma*, further limiting the freedom of the press, of unions, meetings, imposing severe punishment on strikers and "rioters," granting more power to the police, and so forth.

¹ I. I. Petrunkevich in *Pervaiia Gosudarstvennaia Duma*, a collection of articles by prominent Cadets, members of the first *Duma*.

In spite of all the machinations and stratagems on the part of the Government, the elections gave an overwhelming majority to the opposition. One should bear in mind that the Socialist and Radical parties boycotted the *Duma*, which fact explains the meagre number of Socialists in the first House. The Cadets were the best organised party, they numbered the strongest intellectual forces of the country, professional men — notably lawyers, and they proved stronger and cleverer than the bureaucracy, succeeding in carrying through their best candidates, men of established fame, as Petrunkevich, Rodichev, Lvov, Muromtzev, Vinaver, and other ex-Liberators. Miliukov was eliminated by the Government on the ground of his being subject to trial for his activity in the Union of Unions; but he remained the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party, and of its parliamentary group. Next to the Cadets in number and influence was the Labourite Group which consisted mostly of peasants, radically inclined, especially in the land question. The moderate elements were represented by sixteen Octobrists, led by Count Heyden and Stakhovich — both of them old fighters against the bureaucracy.

That the concessions of the autocracy were half-hearted was made clear even to the most optimistic elements, when in place of the dismissed ministry of Witte-Durnovo a new Cabinet was appointed by the Tzar from among well-known reactionaries. On April 24 the old bureaucrat Goremykin, predecessor of Sipiagin as Minister of Interior, was declared Premier; the most important portfolio — of the Ministry of Interior — was entrusted to Piotr Stolypin, who had distinguished himself as an uncompromising reactionary when governor of Saratov; as the head of the Ministry of Agriculture, the department that was to deal with the gravest problem — that of arranging the agrarian affairs of the country — was appointed Stishinsky, a large landowner whose hostility to the peasantry had been universally known; the post of Minister of Justice was given to

Shcheglovitov, a quondam Liberal who had sold himself to the bureaucracy and had degraded Russian justice more than any of his predecessors; the rest of the Cabinet were bureaucratic nonentities.

At last the historical day of the opening of the first Russian parliament came, on April 27, 1906. The goal for which Russia had struggled for a century, had sacrificed her best sons and daughters, was apparently achieved. Yet there was no rejoicing on April 27; the country still presented the appearance of a military camp; the echoes of the cannonading had not died away yet; the groans of the executed, flogged, and maltreated were still filling the air. To complete the oppressed feeling of the citizens, Petrograd resembled a besieged city on April 27: detachments of Cossacks and Guards rode up and down the streets, the bridges on the Neva adjoining the Winter Palace were closed, and the square before that Palace swarmed with troops. The Tzar received the members of the *Duma* with an insignificant speech which indicated no policy or programme.

On the way from the Winter Palace to the Tavrichesky Palace, which had been given over to the people's representatives, the members of the *Duma* had to pass by several prisons; through the iron bars came shouts: "Amnesty!" The same word greeted the deputies on their approach to the House; throngs of people crowded the adjacent streets, and defying the threatening military patrols, shouted laconically, reservedly, but persistently: "Amnesty!" The atmosphere was heavy; the sentiment of the crowd was shared by the deputies. After the necessary formalities of opening the *Duma* and electing a presidium, the battered *zemstvoist* Petrunkevich took the platform and voiced the general feelings, by demanding that the House request amnesty for political prisoners, before undertaking anything else. Indeed, it was grim irony for the representatives of the people to occupy their comfortable seats, while those who had fought for those seats and had forced the Gov-

ernment to yield them to the people — were behind prison bars and in Siberian tundras. At the moment of the opening of the "parliament" there were seventy-five thousand political prisoners!

The *Duma* worked out an Address to the Tzar, in which the chief demands of the people were put forth in reserved but forcible language; it demanded ministerial responsibility, as an elementary requirement for a constitutional order; abolition of the State Council; enlargement of the competence of the *Duma*; full civil liberties for all classes and races; abolition of capital punishment; expropriation of State and private land for the peasants; amnesty for those who had been imprisoned for political or religious convictions, or for agrarian disturbances. The President of the *Duma*, Professor Muromtzev, was to present the Address to the Tzar; the deputies hoped that the unanimity of their demands would produce an effect on the Monarch. But the Tzar refused to receive the Address; the President was informed through ordinary bureaucratic channels that he might mail the Address to the Imperial Chancery.

The Address was answered by Premier Goremykin in a haughty speech which was intended to teach the members of the *Duma* manners. He denied the *Duma's* right to discuss such questions as ministerial responsibility, the abolition of the State Council, or the enlargement of the *Duma's* competence. He declared the plan for land-appropriation "inadmissible," and insisted that the struggle with the disturbing elements was more necessary than granting civil liberties. It was clear that the Government was determined to deprive the *Duma* of any significant power. As Mr. Pares somewhat cynically remarked, the Emperor wanted a German parliament, while the *Duma* intended to be an English one. The subsequent sessions of the *Duma* were but a further development of the conflict between the people and the bureaucracy. Convinced of their impotence as far as legislative work was concerned, the deputies were

forced to limit their activity to criticism of the Government, in order to open the eyes of the nation to the real state of affairs. Some one defined that body of representatives as "the *Duma* of national wrath." The long suppressed indignation of the suffering, robbed, deceived, and down-trodden people found an outlet at last; for the first time the country and the whole world were given an opportunity of listening to the tale of national woe and degradation at the hands of an unscrupulous bureaucracy. Interpellation followed interpellation, the abuses of the administration were revealed day after day, while the Ministers employed meaningless phrases in reply.

The first *Duma* existed seventy-two days. The only bill carried through by both Chambers and sanctioned by the Emperor was the assignment of fifteen million rubles for the relief of the starving peasants. The final collision between the Government and the *Duma* came at the gravest point — the agrarian question. The Cadets and Labourites worked out a joint project for the appropriation of land for the peasants, and had intended to appeal to the people with an address recounting the struggle between the representatives and the ministers. The Court resolved to dissolve, or rather to disperse, the unpleasant body. Stolypin was appointed Premier in place of the wavering Goremykin. On July 8 the Tavrishesky Palace was surrounded with troops; the decree of the dissolution of the *Duma* was posted in the streets.

About two hundred deputies immediately met at Viborg, in Finland, and from there issued a manifesto to the people, signed by the President and by all the Cadets and Labourites present.

"To the people from the representatives of the people.

"Citizens of all Russia!

"By the ukase of July 8, the State *Duma* has been dissolved.

"When you elected us as your representatives, you instructed us to fight for land and freedom. In pursuance of your in-

structions and our duty we drew up laws to secure freedom for the people, we demanded the removal of irresponsible ministers who, infringing the law with impunity, have been crushing liberty. First of all, however, we wanted to construct a law for the endowment of the toiling peasantry with land, by way of appropriating for that purpose land belonging to the State, the Imperial family, monasteries, churches, and to private land-owners. The Government held such a law inadmissible, and when the *Duma* once more insistently confirmed its resolution regarding compulsory appropriation, it was dissolved.

“In place of the present *Duma* the Government promises to convene another one in seven months. For seven whole months Russia must remain without popular representatives, at a time when the nation is on the verge of ruin, and industry and commerce are undermined, when the whole country is in the throes of unrest, and when the Ministry has clearly proved its incapacity for satisfying the people's needs. Seven whole months the Government will act according to its own arbitrary will, and will fight against the popular movement in order to secure an obedient servile *Duma*; should it succeed in completely suppressing the popular movement, the Government will convene no *Duma* at all.

“Citizens! Stand up firmly for the trampled rights of popular representation and for the State *Duma*. Not a single day should Russia remain without popular representation. You have the means for obtaining it: The Government has no right, without the consent of the popular representatives, to collect taxes from the people, or to summon the people for military service. Therefore, since the Government has dissolved the State *Duma*, you have the right to refuse both recruits and money. Should the Government contract loans in order to procure funds, such loans, contracted without the assent of the people's representatives, will not be valid, the Russian people

will never acknowledge them and will not pay them. Until the convocation of the people's representatives do not give a copeck for the Treasury, nor a soldier for the army.

"Be firm in your refusal, stand up for your right as one man. No power can resist the united, inflexible will of the people. Citizens, in this forced, but inevitable struggle your representatives will be with you."²

The deputies who signed the Viborg-manifesto were sentenced to three months' imprisonment and deprived of electoral rights. The Labourites and Socialists were not satisfied with the appeal to passive resistance, and they issued two appeals—one to peasants and workers, and another to the army and navy—inviting the people to an armed uprising. With the exception of a few strikes and a few military uprisings (in Poltava, Sveaborg, Cronstadt, Revel) the country did not respond to the call of its representatives.

We may say that with the Viborg-manifesto the first act of the drama came to an end: the revolution was crushed, for a time at least. The indifference of the masses on one hand, and the inert loyalty of the army on the other, indefinitely postponed the overthrow of the bureaucratic régime. After the dissolution of the first *Duma* the autocracy resumed its former power, although it preserved a semblance of parliamentarism in order to throw dust into the eyes of foreign financiers; the fall of Russian securities on the European exchanges immediately after the dissolution of the *Duma* forced the Government to allow the elections for the second *Duma* go on according to the former electoral law. Stolypin rejected the demand of the "United Nobility," of the "Union of Russian Men," and other black organisations for a radical change in the electoral law, in order to secure a right majority in the House; the Premier still hoped to obtain desirable deputies through "administrative tactics." The pliable Senate issued some "interpretations"

² From Brianchaninov's *Rospusk pervoy Dumy*.

and "modifications" which disfranchised considerable classes of the population; the police were instructed to eliminate undesirable candidates, to assist the Right parties in every way and to close up meetings, whenever the orator seemed to "wander away from the subject"; the number of deported and exiled candidates was enormous; the party of the Constitutional-Democrats was refused legalisation by the Government, its members prosecuted and forbidden to assemble. The Holy Synod urged all priests to instruct their flocks in a reactionary direction.

At the same time Stolypin endeavoured to appease the peasants by various concessions; many class restrictions were abolished, State and communal land was offered for sale, freedom of leaving the community was granted. The most important agrarian law since the Emancipation Act was promulgated on November 9, 1906, permitting, and practically encouraging, any member of the village community to receive into private property the land under his cultivation. This measure dealt a death-blow to the ancient Russian institution — the *obshchina*, for years the pride and pet of the Government, of the Slavophiles, and even of radical thinkers, as Herzen, for instance. Stolypin intended to create a contingent of small landholders, on whose loyalty the Government might depend; besides, the experience of the revolutionary years had shown that the communal system was responsible for the fact that whole villages acted as one man in agrarian disturbances. The *Divide et impera* method was employed by Stolypin with regard to all classes of the population.

The Government tried to outdo the Ministry of Witte-Durnovo in its ruthless suppression of the opposition. Field Courts-martial with closed doors were introduced for the trial of offenders, political and ordinary; executions became an everyday occurrence. Administrative arbitrariness reached its utmost; death-penalties were inflicted without judicial proceed-

ings; in that year alone thirty-five thousand peasants were banished by the Administration.

In spite of the Government's efforts to manipulate the elections, the composition of the second *Duma* was more radical than that of the first. Professor Miliukov gives comparative figures of the party grouping in the first two *Dumas*:

<i>Parties</i>	<i>In First Duma</i>	<i>In Second Duma</i>
Extreme Right	?	63
Moderate Right (Octobrists, etc.)	38 (8%)	34 (7%)
Cadets	184 (38%)	117 (24%)
Polish "Kolo" ³	32	39
Left (Labourites, etc.)	85 (18%)	97 (20%)
Socialists	26 (5%)	83 (17%)
Non-party	112	22 ⁴

The people registered their increasing opposition to the Government by electing twelve more Labourites and fifty-seven more Socialists than in the first *Duma*; two hundred and thirteen deputies had been prisoners or exiles or in some other way victims of the Administration. The extreme Left entered the second *Duma* with the explicit purpose of using it as a national platform for revolutionary propaganda. The Cadets, on the other hand, had changed their tactics. "Not by storm, but by regular siege. . . . Not hopeless 'demands,' but a systematic effort to conquer the position occupied by the enemy. . . . No need to hurry: the conflict will be serious and lasting."⁵ To this day the Cadets have followed that programme. "Spare the *Duma*," has become their slogan. Recognising the limitations and legislative impotence of the Russian representative

³ The Polish *kolo*, or Circle, has presented a well-organised group in the *Dumas*. Its interests were frankly limited to Polish problems, in which it demonstrated considerable chauvinism and intolerance toward other races. In Imperial questions the *Kolo* has been bargaining with the Cadets and Octobrists; in the last two *Dumas* the Poles have definitely shifted to the Right.

⁴ From *Vtoraia Gosudarstvennaia Duma*, a collection of articles on the 2nd *Duma* by Kaminka and Nabokov.

⁵ P. Miliukov, *Vtoraia Duma*—articles on the second *Duma*.

system, the Cadets nevertheless find the *Duma* an excellent medium for the political education of the people, and an important stage in the development of Constitutionalism in Russia. They therefore tried to avoid useless conflicts with the Government, and determined to do as much practical work as conditions would allow; but conditions were such that conflicts were unavoidable, mainly because the Government desired them.

Stolypin entered the second *Duma* with the haughty mien of a conqueror. In reply to the numerous interpellations of the deputies, especially from the Left, in regard to the intolerable governmental persecutions and wholesale executions, the Premier calmly declared his programme: "First pacification, then reforms." There was no doubt that the *Duma* was doomed to dissolution, since it failed to form a yielding adjunct of the Government. The fact that the *Duma* existed for over three months was due largely to the diplomatic skill of the Cadets who endeavoured to keep the House safe between the Scylla of revolutionary outbursts on the part of the Left deputies, and the Charybdis of provocative onslaughts by the extreme Right, whose unscrupulous leaders were openly supported and encouraged by the Government. On June the first, Stolypin demanded of the *Duma* that it exclude all its Social-Democratic members and hand them over to the Government, on the pretext that they had been organising a military plot. The question was then referred to a committee for investigation. Without waiting for the result of the committee's work, a manifesto was issued on June 3, 1907, dissolving the *Duma*, in view of the fact that "its composition was unsatisfactory." The manifesto was accompanied by a change of the electoral law, which was justified by the following argument: "Only that power which conceded the first electoral law, the historic power of the Tzar, possesses the right to abrogate that law and to replace it by a new law, and as it was God who bestowed upon us Our power as Autocrat, it is before His altar

that We shall answer for the destinies of the Russian State."

The *coup d'état* of June 3 reduced the number of representatives from five hundred and twenty-four to four hundred and forty-two, at the expense of "non-Russian" regions; Poland lost twenty-three seats out of thirty-seven; the Caucasus, nineteen; Asiatic Russia, thirty-one; Turkestan was deprived of representation altogether. Special seats were created for Russians in places where their number was very small. Many classes and races were actually disfranchised. The principle of *curiæ* was further developed and so adapted as to insure the preponderance of large landowners as electors. According to G. Alexinsky, they constitute more than one-half of the total number of electors; "in other words," he says, "the Government has transformed the *Duma* into the organ of the landowners and the great capitalists." This crippled electoral law was further clipped by being handed over to the Minister of Interior and his subordinates, the governors, for "interpretation and elucidation."

The third and fourth *Dumas* were elected according to this electoral law. At last the Government could boast of an obedient, servile majority among the representatives of the "people." At first that majority was found in the Octobrist party, whose leader, Alexander Guchkov, endeavoured to support Stolypin; but the growing reactionism of the Government and its increasing departure from constitutionalism have alienated even the Octobrists, and the Ministry was forced to seek support among the extreme Right—unadulterated obscurantists and chauvinists. How little respect Stolypin had for the "constitution," even in its "modified" form is seen from the following incident. The Government brought before the third *Duma* a project about the introduction of *zemstvos* in six Western provinces on the basis of the Statute of 1890, with important changes, which insured a preponderance of Russian landowners in those regions, where Russians are in minority.

The project was approved by the *Duma*, but rejected by the State Council, on August 11, 1911. According to Article III of the Fundamental Laws, the project was to be considered invalidated, and withdrawn; but the Government employed a clever *coup*: it dissolved both Chambers for three days, and during that interval promulgated the law. The reopened Chambers faced an accomplished fact.

The "pacification" of the country continued with such rigour that citizens recalled with regret the régime of Plehve. Non-Russians were oppressed more ruthlessly than ever; the Jews were treated as pariahs, restricted even in those miserable rights which they had been enjoying before; their educational and professional opportunities were further restricted, and the Jew-Baiters in the *Duma* and in the press were encouraged by the Authorities in arousing anti-Semitism in the population by means of senseless accusations of the Jews in committing murders of Christian children for ritual purposes. The celebrated Beilis case held the attention of the world for two years; the process, which ended in the exoneration of Beilis, revealed the unscrupulous efforts of the ruling spheres to misguide justice and to popularise the belief in the blood-ritual of the Jews. Finland was once more deprived of her autonomy; Stolypin had the Chambers pass an All-Imperial Law, which brought Finland under the common law of the Empire. Alongside with increased centralisation grew the arbitrariness of local authorities, so that every province had an immense number of autocrats, from the governor to the policeman. The enormous rôle of espionage and *provocateurs* in political affairs was demonstrated in the revelation of the activity of Azev, who had been for years in the service of the Department of Police, while remaining an active member and leader of the Socialists-Revolutionists; he was responsible for the assassination of Plehve, Grand Duke Sergey, and many other terroristic acts. Stolypin defended Azev before the *Duma*. On September 1, 1911,

Peter Stolypin, the Russian Bismarck, as his friends and even some of his enemies called him, was assassinated by an agent of the secret police, Bogrov, in the presence of the Imperial family at a Kiev theatre.

The régime did not change under his successor, Kokovtzev, who as Minister of Finance had made himself famous by his declaration from the platform of the *Duma*: "Thank God, we have no parliament." Stolypin's formula: "First pacification, then reforms," was still in force as far as its first half was concerned. In 1913 the fourth *Duma* passed a resolution, stating that "the Ministry of Interior, retaining even after the restoration of peace, the conditions of exceptional regulations, arouses general dissatisfaction in the population and quite just feelings of indignation at the uncalled for repressions. . . . The *Duma* insists upon the earliest promulgation of broad reforms."

From 1906 to the end of 1913 there took place three thousand two hundred and eighty-two executions by trial; one should bear in mind that the Russian civil code admits no capital punishment, so that during the "constitutional" period military courts were called upon to mete out justice for the conquered people. Equally vigorous was the war of the Government against the press. During the days of freedom preliminary censorship was abolished, but the Administration retained the right to penalise publications. It is impossible to calculate the exact amount of money-penalties imposed on newspaper publishers during the "constitutional" years; here are approximate, considerably diminished, figures:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Number of penalties</i>	<i>Amount in rubles</i>
1906	16	15.525
1907	148	65 000
1908	120	82.200
1909	182	87.375
1910	243	60.150
1911	268	73.450

<i>Years</i>	<i>Number of penalties</i>	<i>Amount in rubles</i>
1912	317	96 800
1913	340	129.000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	1,634	610.275 ⁶

The condition of the universities was as deplorable as other aspects of Russian life during the period of Restoration. The school autonomy won in the fall of 1905 was nullified in a series of "modifications." In 1910 Minister of Education Schwarz brought a project before the *Duma*, by which he intended to restore the power of the Statute of 1884. His successor, Kasso, withdrew the project, but did not change the policy which was actually a reintroduction of Dmitri Tolstoy's system. The death of Lev Tolstoy in the fall of 1910 aroused student disturbances throughout the country, owing to the Government's prohibition of public demonstrations of mourning. In January, 1911, the Ministry of Education issued provoking circulars, forbidding any assemblies of students within the universities, and introducing severe punishments for disorders. The events of the late Nineties were repeated: the students struck. We should remember that, as Professor Vernadsky remarked, there had been no normal academic life in Russia since 1896. The University Councils tried to dissuade the students from the demoralising step, but the police rudely intervened and pushed the Rectors and professors aside. The pressure of the police forced the Rector of the University of Moscow, Manuylov, to resign; his action was followed by more than a hundred professors and assistants, among them such prominent lights as Prince Yevgeniy Trubetzky, Vernadsky, Shershenevich, Vinogradov, Kizevetter, and others. The oldest Russian university was thus outraged. Similar events took place in other places, notably in the Kiev Politechnicum. The Government of Stolypin appointed "desirable" deans and pro-

⁶ *Yezhegodnik gazety Riech*, 1912-1914. Yearbook issued by the Petrograd daily *Riech*.

fessors, and public instruction was once more forced by the boot of the policeman into "politically safe" ruts. The same policy, needless to say, was carried on in secondary and primary schools.

The demoralisation of the public during Stolypin's régime was shown in the increased neurasthenia among intellectuals, in excessive sexuality and mysticism both in art and in life, and in the rate of suicides. Between 1905 and 1909 there were more than forty-five thousand suicides in Russia. In Petrograd there were 427 suicides in 1904, 354 in 1905 (which decrease shows the mood of the people during the year of general upheaval); in 1906 — 532; in 1907 — 716; in 1908 — 1,408; in 1909 — 1,438. In Odessa there were 256 suicides in 1905 and 642 in 1908; in Moscow — 74 in 1906 and 614 in 1908. Most of the suicides were young; of one thousand cases in Moscow during 1908 and 1909 there were —

45	of the age between	8	and	14
381	of the age between	15	and	20
179	of the age between	21	and	25
134	of the age between	26	and	30
117	of the age between	31	and	40
73	of the age between	41	and	50

A typical motive of suicide is found in a letter of a twenty-year-old student in Odessa:

"To live as I would, is impossible now, and live as it is possible I cannot. . . . I cannot witness atrocities and suffering, cannot bear the complaints and the sobs of the oppressed, and at the same time feel my impotence to solace, however little, this horror that is life. And I am going out of life, for there is nothing to live for." ⁷

Despair and disparagement were natural consequences of the drama that took place in the first decade of the twentieth century. The national calamities, the national upheaval, the

⁷ Quoted by Alexinsky in his *Modern Russia*, from a report read at the Congress of Russian Physicians early in 1910.

brief triumph of the people in the autumn of 1905, the bloody bacchanale of the reaction under Durnovo and Stolypin, had probably not so grave an effect on the minds as the profanation of the ideal of popular representation. The blood that has been shed for a Constitution since the Decembrists was rewarded with a distorted form of parliamentarism, with a servile *Duma* which, instead of representing the will of the people, formed a convenient tool in the hands of the bureaucracy. In 1906 I. I. Petrunkevich wrote: "Popular representation in Russia can exist only when there will be a ministry responsible before the Duma, for its present struggle with the ministry cannot bring to any practical compromise. The ultimate result of this struggle will be either a *coup d'état*, the withdrawal of the constitutional charter of October 17 and the abolition of popular representation, or the complete victory of the latter and the establishment of a responsible and parliamentary ministry."⁸ One year later the party of Mr. Petrunkevich, the Cadets, put forth the slogan: "Spare the *Duma*"; its capable leader, Paul Miliukov, advocated moderate, "siege"-tactics. Five years later Mr. Miliukov, already an experienced member of the *Duma*, wrote: "The five years of the third *Duma* have sufficiently clarified the situation. In order to acquire one single right—to *exist*, the *Duma* had to become one of the wheels in the bureaucratic machine."⁹

Let us turn to the few gratifying phenomena in Russian life under the régime described. Among the useful measures undertaken by the Government in conjunction with the *Duma* was the increased budget of the Ministry of Education. In 1913 it reached 142,738,000 rubles, of which twenty-seven million rubles were assigned for secondary schools. The third *Duma* assigned for primary education over eight million rubles in addition to the budget-assignment of 1908, eight million in

⁸ *Pervaiia Gosudarstvennaia Duma*, p. 104.

⁹ *Yezhegodnik gazety Riech*, 1912, p. 94.

addition to the budget of 1909, and ten million to that of 1910. In spite of the Government's policy to suppress higher education, many private high-educational institutions sprang up; Professor Vernadsky places the number of such institutions at one hundred in 1913, not counting universities and Popular Courses, and the number of students—at one hundred and fifty thousand.

The Government has continued to put through the *Dumas* agrarian legislation of the nature outlined by the late Stolypin. The disruption of the "commune" has rapidly progressed; the peasants have been eager to become independent landholders, no matter how small their portion might be. An improvement in the cultivation has been generally observed, ascribed to the change of tenure. State lands were placed on sale, a systematic distribution of the peasants has been undertaken in order to avoid congestion in certain regions, important improvements have been introduced in peasant-migration.

Of the other measures carried through by the *Dumas* deserve notice the reform of local courts, which withdrew the judicial power from *Zemsky* chiefs, and restored it to courts of Peace, and the increase of the army budget. The Octobrist leader Alexander Guchkov fearlessly attacked the criminal negligence of the bureaucracy in matters of national defence, and cited a long list of Grand Dukes, nominal heads of military and navy departments, who should be dismissed. Although the Government disregarded public opinion, it undertook the reorganisation of the army and navy on a gigantic scale. The expectation of the *Duma* that some of its members would be invited to co-operate on the Committee of National Defence was not fulfilled: the great reform, which was to restore the prestige so disgracefully lost in Manchuria and at Tsushima, was entrusted to the same bureaucracy that was guilty in the recent disasters.

On the whole the economic conditions of Russia had greatly improved by the year 1914. In spite of the national calamities

and disruption of ordinary life, agriculture and industry showed astonishing signs of progress. There appeared a considerable class of large manufacturers, conscious of their power, and therefore defiant in regard to the disappearing nobility and to the bureaucracy; in recent years they have expressed themselves against the present order of government, which arrests the development of the country.

An interesting feature in the social life of the masses is the growth of co-operative societies. From four thousand four hundred and seventy-nine in 1905, their number has increased to nineteen thousand two hundred and fifty-three in 1911, to nearly thirty thousand in 1913, and to thirty-seven thousand in 1916. "Co-operatives" are formed in villages and in towns, for mutual loans, for joint acquisition of agricultural implements, cattle, etc., for production of oil, of dairy products, for the maintenance of a common store selling to members all necessities at cost price, and for similar purposes. One cannot overestimate the importance of the co-operative movement: it is the most powerful and effective organiser of the masses. Every "Co-operative" becomes the centre of local life; usually it opens its own House, where the members gather for discussions, lectures, readings. "Co-operatives" of a district try to form a union; this tendency to accumulate strength through unification of single nuclei has met with the opposition of the Government which, not without reason, sees in the Co-operative movement a prototype of the Union of Unions. Still frequent congresses of Co-operatives are held at various places. In 1913 the second All-Russian Congress of Co-operatives took place, and one thousand three hundred delegates attended.

The movement of trade-unions among workingmen has been greatly hampered by the Government. Every form of labour organisation has been looked on with suspicion; the labour press has suffered more than any other publications from administrative arbitrariness. Under such conditions it is natural

that the proletariat continued to express its demands in the form of strikes, economical and political. During 1913 and the first half of 1914 the number of strikes increased menacingly. During the visit of President Poincaré in Petrograd, in July, 1914, the workingmen were in the midst of a severe strike; their demands were political as well as economic. The grave situation was relieved by the declaration of war, when the drummed up patriotism had drowned all individual and class-motives.

IV

RUSSIA IN ARMS

BY the summer of 1914 Russia was permeated with discontent, somewhat akin to the state of minds in 1904. The Government was hopelessly discredited in the clumsily manipulated Beilis trial; its failure to gain the confidence of the people, and its continuation of the policy of repression irritated even the moderate elements. Various public bodies expressed resolutions condemning the Government for its narrow-sighted policy. Twenty-five leading Petrograd barristers were tried and sentenced to prison for a resolution protesting against the official accusation of Jews of cannibalism. At a banquet arranged in honour of the convicted, Bobrishchev-Pushkin, an Octobrist leader, voiced the public sentiment, when he said:

“Again we are in 1904. I see once more together Cadets, Octobrists, Social-Democrats. The Government has once more succeeded in uniting the entire Russian public, and in bringing back the mood of 1904. The moderates are the last to join you in your fight. Blessed be, however, even those who come at the eleventh hour — they too, deserve full reward. . . . When the ship is careening, all passengers must be of one mind. You must not reject the moderates, because the eleventh hour has come. Soon there will strike the midnight of the last dark day.”

We have already seen that representatives of big industries openly opposed the archaic order of things. Among the members of the *Duma* gloomy pessimism prevailed. V. A. Makla-

kov, a moderate Cadet, said to an interviewer: "Should I be asked, what my wishes for the *Duma* are, my answer would be: To perish with honour . . . rather than drag on a fruitless existence." Konovalov, vice-president of the *Duma*, stated that there was "no hope for the improvement of the Government's policy; the conflict will grow and deepen." Similar opinions were expressed by prominent Octobrist members like Baron Meiendorff, Shidlovsky, Count Kapnist.

A new phenomenon appeared in the year 1914—a "Right opposition." The conservative elements, the "United Nobility," for example, expressed great dissatisfaction with the Government, with the crimes and blunders of the "petrified bureaucracy." The nobility of Chernigov published a declaration about the "abnormalities of Russian life," the "reign of arbitrariness in spite of the numerous ukases and manifestoes promising the maintenance of lawfulness in the country."

As in 1904 and 1905, so in 1914, while the liberal and moderate elements attacked the régime with verbal denunciations, the proletariat protested actively, sacrificing its blood, freedom, and welfare. During the visit of President Poincaré, Petrograd saw barricades erected in various parts of the Capital, the tramways and some railways inactive, great public demonstrations and meetings held in the streets, collisions with the Cossacks and police, which resulted in many killed and wounded. Moscow, Riga, Nikolaiev, and other cities responded. A revolution seemed "inevitable" (opinion of Alexander Guchkov, former President of the *Duma*).

Within a few days the situation was absolutely transformed. The end of July saw the sudden deviation of Russian public opinion from questions of internal policies to one grave problem—the defence of the country from foreign aggressors. On July 20 (August 2) the Tzar issued a manifesto declaring war, which deserves reproduction as a tactful appeal to the national sentiments:

"We, Nicolas II, by grace of God Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, Tzar of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc.

"Declare to all Our loyal subjects:

"In pursuance of her historic traditions, Russia, sister in blood and creed of the Slav nations, has never remained indifferent to their fate. The brotherly feelings of the Russian people for the Slavs have reawakened with unanimous impulse and peculiar force these last few days, when Austria-Hungary presented to Serbia demands which were manifestly such as a sovereign state could not accept.

"Disdainful of the conciliatory and pacific reply of the Serbian Government and refusing the benevolent mediation of Russia, Austria hastened to resort to an armed attack which she opened by the bombardment of the defenceless city of Belgrad.

"Forced by these new conditions to take necessary measures of precaution, we gave the order that the Army and Navy should be placed on a war footing; yet, in Our care for the blood and wealth of Our subjects, We strained all Our efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the negotiations then in process.

"In the midst of these friendly relations Austria's ally, Germany, in spite of Our hopes that we should always remain good neighbours, and shutting her ears to Our assurances that the measures taken had no hostile intentions towards her — demanded the revocation of those measures, and upon Our refusal, suddenly declared war against Russia.

"It is now no longer a question of taking the part of a sister nation unjustly wronged, but of defending the honour, dignity, and integrity of Russia, and her position among the Great Powers. We firmly believe that Our faithful subjects, inspired with self-abnegation, will rise all as one man for the defence of the Russian soil.

"In the dreadful hour of trial, let intestine dissensions be forgotten, in order that the union of the Tzar with His people

may be yet more firmly consolidated, and that Russia, rising as a single man, may repulse the insolent attack of the enemy.

"With a profound faith in the righteousness of Our cause and humble confidence in Almighty Providence, We invoke in Our prayers the Divine benediction upon Holy Russ and Our valiant troops."

On the same day an ukase was issued for the convocation of the State Council and the State *Duma*. "In the midst of the heavy trials sent upon our country, we wish to be in perfect union with our people," said the ukase. The country greeted enthusiastically the unexpected constitutionalism of the Autocrat. True, at the opening of the extraordinary session of the *Duma*, Premier Goremykin (he had supplanted Kokovtzev not long before) explained that one of the reasons for the convocation of the Legislative Chambers was the desire of the Government to have measures for meeting war expenditures passed by the Assemblies.

The *Duma* presented an unprecedented solidarity of thought and action during the discussion of the situation. Only the Labourites and the Social-Democrats dissented, true to their party-traditions, and left the House when the declaration of the *Duma* was put to vote. Deputy Kerensky made a statement in the name of the Labour Group, in which patriotism was mingled with opposition to the Government. "Remember," he said, "that Russian citizens have no enemies among the working classes of the belligerents! Protect your country to the end against aggression by the states whose governments are hostile to us, but remember that there would not have been this terrible war had the great ideals of democracy, freedom, equality, and brotherhood been directing the activities of those who control the destinies of Russia and other lands. . . . Peasants and workers, all who desire the happiness and well-being of Russia in these days of trial, harden your spirit! Gather

all your strength, and, having defended your land, free it.”¹

In the name of the Constitutional-Democrats Paul Miliukov declared that all other questions must be put aside before the great task of defending Russia. “Our cause is a just cause. We are struggling to liberate our country from a foreign invasion, to liberate Europe and the Slav world from the Germanic Hegemony, to liberate the entire world from the intolerable yoke of armaments which never fail to increase, ruining peaceful workers and perpetually provoking fresh armed conflicts. In this struggle we are all one . . . we throw into the balance of conflict our firm will to vanquish the aggressor.”²

The *Duma* voted a resolution of confidence in the Government, “convinced that it had exhausted every means of maintaining peace compatible with the prestige of Russia as a Great Power,” and expressed its conviction that the people would rise united to the appeal of the Sovereign for the defence of the country. The nation responded with unprecedented unanimity; all parties, all classes, all races aligned themselves enthusiastically under the banner: “All for the war.” The Poles, the Jews, the Little-Russians, the Armenians, the peasants, the workingmen, the *intelligentsia*, put aside their grievances and differences, and declared themselves ready to sacrifice their blood and wealth for the defence of the country. With the exception of a small number of irreconcilable revolutionists who see in the defeat of Russia, the downfall of the autocracy, and in her victory the triumph of despotism, the majority of Russian Socialists have declared their support of the anti-German coalition. Such veterans of the revolutionary movement, as Prince Piotr Kropotkin, Georg Plekhanov, Lev Deich, Axelrod, Alexinsky, and others, have been urging their comrades to defer internal issues till after the war. Plekhanov, father of Social-

¹ From W. E. Walling's *The Socialists and the War*, pp. 192-193.

² From G. Alexinsky's *Russia and the Great War*, pp. 148-149.

Democracy in Russia, says in one of his appeals: "Now the Socialists of all countries must support every measure which may somewhat check the success of German Imperialism, that *bestia triomfante*, which presents a terrible menace to International Socialism."

There is an enormous difference between the attitude of the Russian people towards the war with Japan and its attitude towards the present war. In the first case the masses had to be driven like unwilling cattle, public opinion was opposed to the campaign, the Government was utterly isolated. In 1914, the declaration of war was greeted by the whole nation; not since 1812, when the invasion of Napoleon united all classes in an effort to repulse the enemy, has there been such a popular war in Russia, as the present. What are the reasons of the sudden transformation of the Russian sentiments?

The great problems that are being solved at present on the blood-soaked battlefields of Europe have not yet crystallised sufficiently to warrant impartial historical treatment. I shall therefore not enter into a discussion of the causes of the war, but shall merely indicate the prevailing attitude of the Russian *intelligentzia* towards the great conflict, and this attitude may be thus epitomised: "Germany is the bitterest enemy of Russia." Germany has been held responsible for the fiasco of Russian diplomacy at the Congress of Berlin, in 1878; the war with Japan has been ascribed to the personal influence of Kaiser Wilhelm who egged on the Tzar in his aggressive policy in the Far East, in order that the Teutons might have a free hand in the Near East; Germany made use of Russia's weakness after the war with Japan to force upon her a commercial treaty, in which Russian interests were so abused that the Government forbade the subject to be discussed in the press, and one publicist compared the treaty to a war indemnity; when in 1908 Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, in abrogation of the Treaty of Berlin, and in violation of the historical interests of Serbia,

Wilhelm's threat to appear "in shining armour" in support of his ally compelled the Russian Foreign Office to acquiesce in the perpetration of the injustice; finally, during the Balkan wars Germany and Austria did their utmost to thwart Russia's endeavours for a strong alliance of the small states, by sowing discord among the allies and by depriving Serbia of an outlet to the Adriatic.

Since the conclusion of the war with Japan Russia had been feverishly reorganising her army and navy, in response to Germany's gigantic increase of military expenditures. The third and fourth *Dumas* eagerly supported the Government's efforts to improve the army and navy, although the representatives of the House were refused participation in the work of reorganisation. The clash with Germany seemed inevitable, and the only question was whether Germany would give Russia and France time to get ready. Both Russia and France heartily welcomed, in the meantime, the change in England's traditional policy of "splendid isolation." Great Britain and Russia came to an understanding concerning Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet; the unofficial Triple Entente was growing in pace with the increase of Teutonic influence in the Near East, for the Pan-Germanistic dream about a straight diagonal line — Berlin-Bagdad,³ threatened the welfare of all the three nations concerned. For Russia in particular, a Germanised Constantinople would mean the end of her ambitions. Since Peter the Great an outlet into an ice-free sea has been the historical need of the Empire; Arkhangelsk in the North is frozen most of the year; Vladivostok is ice-bound three months, and is too remote, especially since Russian interests in the Far East received a serious check; the Baltic Sea is closed half a year, and is, besides, at the mercy of Germany; the Black Sea is of unstable use as long as the "key" is in the hands of Turkey, or, for

³ In the Eighties Bismarck spoke of the Balkan affairs as "not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier."

that matter, of any Power which may block the outlet into the Mediterranean.

Whenever Turkey was at war, Russian Southern trade suffered considerably. From the following data one may see the importance of the Straits of Dardanelles for Russian exports; the Turco-Italian and Balkan wars caused the fall in the export of 1912.

<i>Years</i>	<i>Value of the total export from Russia (in millions of rubles)</i>	<i>Value of the export that passed through the Straits.</i>
1903	1001	410
1904	1006	410
1905	1007	406
1906	1094	378
1907	1053	386
1908	998	345
1909	1427	565
1910	1449	565
1911	1591	568
1912	1518	433 ⁴

From the above data it may be seen that in the last decade an average of about thirty-seven per cent. of the total Russian exports passed through the Straits; but one should observe that the Dardanelles has a special importance for the export of the principal article of Russian foreign trade—cereals. More than ninety per cent. of the total export of wheat passed through the Straits, eighty-five per cent. of the barley export, ninety-five per cent. of the total export of manganese ore, eighty per cent. of the export of naphtha products, fifty-five per cent. of the export of iron ore, forty-five per cent. of the export of methylated spirits, etc.⁵

The grievances of the Russian people against Germany have

⁴ Data furnished by A. Raphaelovich of the Ministry for Commerce and Industry. Quoted by Professor J. Y. Simpson of Edinburgh in his *Self-Discovery of Russia*.

⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 202-203.

been not only of an economic and political nature. In the minds of the *intelligentzia* and of the oppressed masses the name of Germany, but particularly of Prussia, has been associated with the crimes of Russian bureaucracy. Since the middle of the eighteenth century — in fact, since Peter the Great — German influence has been preponderant in various fields of Russian life: at the Court, in the army and navy, among the higher bureaucrats, in commerce; German colonists have occupied some of the best land in the West and in the South. Any Russian schoolboy will give you a list of Russian tyrants and oppressors with such names as Buhren, Pahlen, Benckendorff, Berg, Plehve, Minn, Rıman, Kaulbars, or of such distinguished nonentities of the army and navy as Stakelberg, Stark, Stössel, Rennenkampf, Grippenbergr. The offer of Wilhelm II to lend his troops for the suppression of the Revolution was a widely spread rumour in Russia in 1905 and 1906; the reactionaries have always praised Prussian ways, and their organs have urged the Government to get closer to Germany and to break away from Jacobine France and treacherous England. A member of the Extreme Right in the *Duma*, during the discussion of a liberal project introduced by the Cadets, turned to the Left, and said threateningly: "If you accept this project, Wilhelm will come and teach you a lesson with his armed fist!"⁶

In a word, the war with Germany is in the eyes of the

⁶ As an upholder of the principle of "Divine rights" of kings, and an enemy of revolutions, Wilhelm pleaded with Nicolas not to defend Serbia. In his telegram to the Tzar, dated July 28, 10.45 p. m., the Kaiser said:

"Doubtless You will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment."

The *White Book*, Exhibit 20.

The whole Serbian nation was to be held responsible and severely punished for the murder of one prince, according to Wilhelm II.

majority of the people associated, rightly or wrongly, with the struggle against everything pernicious in Russia, against bureaucracy, militarism, and despotism. This explains the wonderful unity of all ranks and classes, of the *intelligentsia* and the masses, of the conservatives, liberals, and revolutionists, of the landowners, manufacturers, peasants, and workingmen — in the common purpose of defeating “Wilhelmism,” to use the expression of an old revolutionary. The alliance with France and England is another encouraging asset for the liberal minded Russians. Says Leonid Andreiev, the foremost contemporary Russian writer: “If the German be our enemy, then this war is necessary; if the Englishman and the Frenchman be our friends and allies, then this war is good, and its purpose is good.”

As these lines are written the war is still raging, embroiling more and more nations. It would be inadvisable to predict results or consequences of the conflict, but it is possible to venture an estimate of the effect which the war has already had on the internal life of Russia. One may say without exaggeration that it has had a salutary, rejuvenating, regenerating effect on the Russian people; the terrible trial, which the country is going through, has awakened, electrified, and stirred up the entire nation, even its most phlegmatic elements. The energy of the public, choked and suppressed for years, has burst forth, and swept aside restrictions and bureaucratic barriers. The Government was forced to sanction the wonderful activity of the All-Russian Union of *Zemstvos* and the All-Russian Union of Towns, in the care of sick and wounded, in the charge of refugees, in the provision of supplies for the army, and in the production of munitions. The vigorous demand of the people inspired the Government to carry out the greatest measure since the emancipation of the serfs — the prohibition of vodka.

On July 17 and 18, 1914, the sale of liquor was forbidden,

in view of the mobilisation, as a temporary measure. But the people made use of the occasion, and demanded the prohibition of the sale of alcohol for the whole duration of the war, and if possible, forever. On August 22 an ukase forbade the sale of liquor "till the end of the war," and six days later the Tzar telegraphed to the president of a Temperance Union that he had decided to suppress the sale of vodka by the State forever. The consequences of this measure can hardly be estimated; with the loss of an enormous revenue (six hundred and fifty million rubles annually), the State has acquired millions of better humanity, stronger physically and morally. Since the promulgation of the law sufficient time has elapsed for obtaining eloquent figures showing the results of the prohibition. Without quoting tiresome statistics, furnished by official and private investigators, by city mayors, chiefs of police, factory owners, hospital heads, prison governors, and so forth, we may state on the basis of those figures that the number of crimes has greatly diminished, the rate of suicides has fallen, also the rate of fires, of railway accidents, of absences on the part of employés, of penalties in factories. Among the positive effects of the temperance measure we should note the considerable increase in the intensity and productivity of labour, and the astonishing amount of deposits in Savings Banks. The official figures show the progressive increase of deposits in the State Savings Banks in 1914 (in millions of rubles): for August an increase of ten and one-tenth, September twenty-five and eight-tenths, October twenty-one and seven-tenths, November twenty-four and eight-tenths, December thirty-five and two-tenths. The official report for September, 1916, states the deposits for the year 1915 as five hundred and ten millions, and those for the first six months in 1916 as six hundred million two hundred thousand rubles; before the war the average yearly deposits amounted to fifty-five million.

But if the people have shown signs of vigour and activity since the war, the old bureaucracy has demonstrated its inability to learn anything or to change its corruptness and inefficiency, and its narrow chauvinism. The early promises of concessions for the Poles, Armenians, and Jews, were followed by an ukase almost wholly abolishing the liberties of Finland, by inhuman atrocities against the Jews, and by tactless restrictions against the Ruthenians or Ukrainians in conquered Galicia. The press was muzzled more effectively than in the darkest days of Nicolas I. But the greatest crime of the bureaucracy loomed up before the end of the first year of war, when the victorious Russian army was forced to retreat from Galicia, all the way from Cracow to Dvinsk, for the simple reason that they had no munitions. It appeared that Minister of War Sukhomlinov had misstated the degree of the army's equipment, and had exaggerated the amount of available munitions. Mikhail Stakhovich, member of the State Council and President of the *Zemstvo* Union, gave a horrifying description of the plight which the brave soldiers had to suffer on account of the criminal falsifications of the higher bureaucracy. He called the six hundred versts of retreat a *via dolorosa*, a duel between cannon and bayonets. The general indignation was the more intolerable since the public had no outlet: the press was gagged, and the *Duma* had not been convened for nearly a year. The Government finally yielded to the popular demand, and convened the *Duma* for July 19, 1915.

The first sessions of the *Duma* made one recall the "*Duma of National Wrath*"; again representatives of various parts of the country, of various classes and nationalities, delivered tales of woe and suffering, of incredible abuses and oppressions; again the ministerial policy was condemned for its lack of confidence in the people, for its misrepresentations and unpreparedness. The *Duma* accepted the resolution offered by

Count Bobrinsky, a member of the Right, which said in parts:

" . . . Recognising that the surest way to victory is the willing assistance of the whole population for the creation of fresh means of continuing the struggle, which demands the strength of internal peace and the forgetting of old political quarrels, as well as the benevolent attention of the authorities to the interests of all loyal citizens of Russia, without distinction of race, language or religion; believing that rapid victory can only be attained by the close union with the whole country of a Government enjoying its entire confidence; expressing the unshakable faith that the shortcomings which have hitherto existed in the provision of munitions for the Army will be immediately removed with the assistance of the Legislative Chambers and the great force of public opinion, and that those responsible for criminal omissions should pay the penalty, no matter what their position, the *Duma* . . ." ⁷

The Government seemed for a time to give ear to public demands. General Sukhomlinov was dismissed and subjected to trial. His successor, General Polivanov, consented to the suggestion of President of the *Duma*, Rodzianko, for the formation of a consultative committee of members of the *Duma* and the State Council, to co-operate with the Ministry of War. Prince Shcherbatov, a moderate Conservative, was appointed Minister of Interior. Samarin, a Conservative, supplanted the reactionary Sabler as Super-Procurator of the Holy Synod. The whole country mobilised itself for the war; industrial establishments were voluntarily transformed into munition factories. With fresh vigour and confidence the public offered itself for the national cause. But the Government changed its course once more.

Never before have there occurred such frequent changes in the Russian Cabinet as in the last year. One can hardly explain the unusual vacillation in the Court spheres; perhaps the

⁷ From the London *Times*, Aug. 2, 1915.

most plausible reason for the constant shifting of ministers is the lack of big men among the bureaucrats: with the death of Stolypin, Witte, and Durnovo, there remained obedient servants, but no leaders in the ranks of officials. At any rate, such departments as the Interior, Justice, Agriculture, have been changing their policy several times during the last year, to the confusion and exasperation of the country.

On August 25, 1915, an important political event took place: a Progressive *Bloc* was formed of the following parliamentary groups: Progressive Nationalists, Centre, Octobrists, Left Octobrists, Progressists, and Cadets, of the *Duma*, and the Academic and Centre Groups, of the State Council. The *Bloc* thus represents all shades of public opinion except the extreme Right and the extreme Left; it issued a declaration demanding the formation of a Government which would enjoy the confidence of the country, the reconciliation of nationalities and classes (specifying: Poles, Jews, Finns, peasants, workingmen), abatement of press restrictions, amnesty for political and religious prisoners, legislation drafted by both Chambers. One can observe how moderate those demands are in comparison with the demands of the first *Duma*; the declaration of the Progressive *Bloc* has served the same rôle as the "eleven points" of the *Zemstvo* Congress in the fall of 1904: various public bodies have been reiterating the same demands in resolutions addressed to the Government. At present the Progressive *Bloc* is the strongest and most numerous political organisation in Russia.

On September 3 the *Duma* was prorogued till November 1. The workingmen called a strike as a protest. In Moscow a congress of *zemstvos* and towns was held; it accepted a resolution demanding the reassembling of the Chambers, and the reconstruction of the Cabinet. About the same time a congress of Monarchists took place; it condemned the declaration of the Progressive *Bloc*, stigmatising it as akin to the revolu-

tionary demands of the year 1905. The Tzar thanked the congress for their loyal feelings. The convocation of the *Duma* was indefinitely postponed.

The year 1916 opened with a fresh change in the composition of the Cabinet. The old loyal servant of the autocracy, Goremykin, gave place to Stürmer, also a reactionary of long standing. The new Premier has succeeded in forming a nearly harmonious Cabinet, all its members being reactionary. Yet almost simultaneously with the appointment of the new Premier, the *Duma* was reconvened, under unprecedented auspices. The Autocrat of All Russia, Nicolas II, visited the House of Representatives in person, and delivered a significant speech, in which he emphasised the need of mutual confidence between the people and the ministers.

Among the important measures of 1916 was the income tax imposed most heavily upon large incomes. Thus, while there is a tax of only three per cent. on incomes of 800 to 900 rubles, and one per cent. on incomes 1800 to 2000 rubles, there is a tax of twelve per cent. on incomes of 390 to 400 thousand rubles, while on incomes over 400 thousand, there is a tax of forty-eight thousand rubles plus 1.250 for every ten thousand rubles.

Minister of Education Count Ignatiev is one of the few ministers to preserve his post for more than a year. He has carried through some radical reforms, such as opening of new universities and other schools, and the general improvement of technical instruction. He has been trying to facilitate the entrance of Jews into educational institutions. The most important change in the Cabinet took place on July 7, 1916, when Foreign Minister Sazonov was dismissed and supplanted by Stürmer who is also the Premier. Sazonov's liberal views in regard to the solution of the Polish question, judging from the comments of the Left press and from the rejoicing of the reactionary publications are supposed to be the reason of his

dismissal. One of Sazonov's last achievements was the formation of an Agreement between Russia and Japan, according to which the two countries promised mutual support in the affairs of the Far East against encroachment by other Powers.

The war is still on. Russia is being purged in a terrible crucible. Public consciousness is continually growing. All national forces—material and intellectual—are mobilised. Everything is wide-awake, astir, in motion. How will all this energy be directed after the war?

One need not be a prophet to foretell that the present order of things will have to disappear. The only citadel of the bureaucracy in 1905-1906—the army, has learned in this war an unforgettable lesson of the crimes of their rulers in Petrograd. And one may hope that in the last conflict between the people and the bureaucracy the army will prove to be the people's army.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(Note.—Professor Kornilov appends an extremely helpful list of references; unfortunately nearly all of them are in Russian. Those who read that language will undoubtedly make use of the original text. For the non-Russian readers I have compiled a list of books in English, French, and German, which, although not claiming completeness, seems to me to contain the most important works on the subject. Translator.)

GENERAL WORKS

- Baring, M. *The Russian People*. 1911.
Brückner, Alexander. *Geschichte Russlands bis zum ende 18 Jahrhunderts*. 1896.
Herzen, A. *Du développement des idées révolutionnaires en Russie*. 1853.
Kluchevsky. *History of Russia*, in three volumes. To the seventeenth century.
Leroy-Beaulieu, A. *L'empire des Tsars*. (Translated.)
Mavor, James. *An Economic History of Russia*. 1914.
Rimbaud, A. *Historie de la Russie*. 1886. (Translated.)
Skrine, F. H. *The Expansion of Russia*. 1903.
Thun, A. *Geschichte der Revolutionbewegung in Russland*. 1883.
Wallace, Sir D. M. *Russia. Revised edition*. 1912.

CATHERINE II

- Brückner, A. *Katharina die Zweite*. 1883.
Hermann. *Des progrès de la population en Russie*. In Series V of *Mémoires de l'academie des sciences*.
Herzen, A. *Mémoires de l'impératrice Catherine II*.
Masson, Charles F. P. *Mémoires secretes sur la Russie pendant les regnes de Catherine II et de Paul I*. 1863.
(Translated into English 1895.)

- Storch, H. *Historish-statistisches Gemälde des Russischen Reichs*. 1797-99.
 Terneux. *Diderot et Catherine II*. 1899.
 Waliszewsky, K. *Autour d'un trône*.
Le roman d'une impératrice. 1894. (Translated.)

ALEXANDER I

- Bernhardi, F. *Geschichte Russlands*. 1875.
 Czartoryski, Prince Adam. *Mémoires du, et sa Correspondance avec Alexandre I-er*. 1887.
 Fife. *History of Europe in the nineteenth century*.
 Golovnin, I. *Histoire d'Alexandre I*. 1859.
 Le Maistre, Comte J.-M. *Soirées de St.-Pétersbourg*. 1822.
 Monnard, C. *La Harpe. Notice biographique*. 1838.
 Schiemann, Th. *Die Ermordung Paul's*. . . . 1912.
 Schnitzler, I. H. *Histoire intime de la Russie*. 1847.
 Storch, H. *Russland unter Alexander dem Ersten*. 1803-1805.
 Tatischev, S. *Napoléon et Alexandre*. 1891.
 Vandal, A. *Napoléon et Alexandre*. 1891-1893.

NICOLAS I

- Custine, le Marquis de. *La Russie en 1839*.
 Dolgorukov, P. *La vérité sur la Russie*. 1860.
 Hermann, C. T. *Recherches statistiques sur la septième révision*, in series VII of *Mémoires de l'academie impériale des sciences*. 1820.
 Köppen. *Ueber die Vertheilung des Bewohner Russlands nach Ständen*, *ibidem*, series 6. 1843.
 Korff. *Avénement au trône de l'empereur Nicolas I*. 1857.
 Lacroix, P. ("Bibliophile Jacob") *Histoire de Nicolas I*. 1864.
 Lubomirski, Prince. *Mémoires d'un Page de Nicolas I*. 1890.
 Rousset, C. H. *La Guerre de Crimée*. 1877.
 Schiemann, Th. *Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I*. 1908.
 Schiemann, Th. *Die Thronbesteigung Nikolaus des I*. 1902.
 Tengoborski. *Etudes sur les forces productives de Russie*. 1851.
 Tourguenief, N. *La Russie et les Russes*.
 Tyrrell, H. *The History of the War with Russia*.

ALEXANDER II

- Avril, Baron A. d'. *Le Congrès de Berlin.* 1889.
 Dolgorukov, Prince P. *Des réformes en Russie.* 1862.
 Favre, L. *Histoire de la Guerre entre la Russie et la Turquie.* 1879.
 Golovnin, I. *La Russie depuis Alexandre II.* 1859.
 Laferte, V. *Alexandre II.* 1882.
 Leroy-Beaulieu, A. *Un homme d'état Russe (N. Miliutin).* 1884.
 Lisicki, H. *Le Marquis Vielopolsky.* 1880.
 Melnick, I. ed. *Russen über Russland,* 1906.
 Miliukov, P. *Russia and its Crisis.* 1907.
 Rawlinson, Sir H. *England and Russia in the East.* 1875.
 Trotha, von T. W. *Der Kampf um Plevna.* 1896.

ALEXANDER III

- Cordier. *Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances.* 1899.
 Daudet, E. *Histoire diplomatique de l'alliance franco-russe.* 1894.
 Flerowsky, N. *Tri politicheskaya systemy.*
 Hansen. *L'alliance franco-russe.* 1897.
 Leroy-Beaulieu, A. *La France, la Russie, et l'Europe.* 1895.
 Lowe, Charles. *Alexandre III.*
 Samson-Himmelstierna, H. *Russland unter Alexander III.* 1891. (Translated.)

NICOLAS II

- Alexinsky, G. *Modern Russia.*
 Alexinsky, G. *Russia and the Great War.*
 Brianchaninov, A. I. *Rospusk gosudarstvennoi dumy.*
 Brianchaninov, A. I. *Mezhdodumie.*
 Ivanov-Razumnik. *Istoria Russkoy obschchestvennoy mysli.*
 Kaminka, Nabokov. *Vtoraia Gosudarstvennaia Duma.*
 Kovalevsky, V. *La Russie à la fin du 19me siècle.* 1900.
 Kulchitzky, L. *Istoria russkovo revoliutsionnogo dvizheniya.*
 Kuzmin-Karavaiev. *Iz epokhi osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya.* I, II.
 Lokot, Professor T. V. *Politicheskaya partii i gruppy v Dumie.*

- Miliukov, P. *God borby.*
 Miliukov, P. *Vtoraia дума.*
 Muraviov, Minister. *Revolutzionnoie dvizhenie v Rossii.*
 Nevinson, H. W. *The Dawn in Russia.*
 Pares, Bernard. *Russia and Reform.*
 Pares, Bernard. *Reaction and Revolution in Russia* (in *The Cambridge Modern History*, v., VII.)
 Petrunkevich, Hessen, Muromtzev, et. al. *Pervaia Gosudarstvennaia Duma.* 1, 2, 3.
 Protzess *Sovieta Rabochikh Deputatov.*
 Simpson, Professor J. Y. *Self-Discovered Russia.*
 Struve, P. *Kriticheskia, zamietki ob eonomicheskom razvitii Rossii.*
 Svatikov, S. G. *Obshchestvennoie dvizhenie v Rossii.*
 Trotzky, Khrustaliiov, et al. *Istoria Sovieta Rabochikh Deputatov.*
 Tugan-Baranovsky. *Russkaia fabrika v proshlom i nastoiashchem.*
 Ukhtomsky, Prince E. E. *Puteshestvie na Vostok.* 1890-1.
 Urusov, Prince S. D. *Zapiski gubernatora.* (Translated: *Memoirs of a Governor.*)
 Vladimirov, V. *Karatelnaia expeditzia.*
 Walling, W. E. *Russia's Message.* 1908.
 Williams, H. W. *Russia of the Russians.*
 Zilliacus, Koni. *The Russian Revolutionary Movement.*
Yezhegodnik gazety Riech. 1912-1914.
 "Internal Reviews" for the last twenty-five years in leading liberal and radical magazines, notably—*Viestnik Yevropy*, *Russkaia Mysl*: single years, *Ruskoie*, *Bogatstvo*, *Mir Bozhiy*, *Sovremenny Mir*, *Russkiya Zapiski*.

INDEX

A

- Abaza, A. A., II: 204, 243, 250, 252
 Abdul-Aziz, II: 230
 Abdul-Hamid, II: 230
 Act, of February 19, II: 43, 44, 45, 46, 52, 55, 65, 66, 68, 74
Action, II: 191, 211
 Adrianople, II: 233
 Afghanistan, II 229, 270
 Agricultural Society, II: 85
 Aksakov, Constantine, I: 289, 292, 293, 306; II: 61
 Aksakov, Ivan, I: 253, 295, 302, 303, 305, 306; II: 11, 29, 61, 76, 83, 86, 99, 153, 189, 191, 195, 234, 235, 251, 252
 Alexander I, I: 52, 57, 62, 64-220, 223, 224, 225, 229, 230, 231, 232, 237, 238, 245, 260, 269, 283, 285, 293; II: 152, 160, 164, 285
 Alexander II, I: 231, 246, 263, 267, 293, 301, 310; II: 3-250, 260, 268, 275
 Alexander III, II: 240, 241, 249-271, 275, 279
 Alexeiev, Admiral, II: 295
 Alexinsky, Gregor, II: 296, 328, 341
 Amnesty, granted, II: 311; demanded, 320, 321, 350
 Amur, II: 227, 257
Annals of the Fatherland, I: 291, 301, 302; II: 192, 214
 Anti-Semitism, II: 329
 Andreiev, Leonid, 346
 Arakcheiev, I: 155, 170, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 186, 201, 211, 238, 242, 270; II: 139, 230
 Areopagus, 264
 Army, inertia of, II: 314
 Arseniev, K. K., II: 264
 Arzamas, 196, 239, 284
 Asia, II: 226, 229, 233, 293
 Asia, Central, I: 63, 171, 183, 220; II: 227, 228, 268, 269, 270
 Asia, East, II: 226
 Asia, South, II: 228
 Asiatic Russia (franchise), II: 328
 Assignations, I: 59, 108, 109, 170; II: 77
 Assignational Bank, I: 47
 Austria, I: 60, 61, 128, 138, 158, 159, 161, 163, 174, 253, 297, 300, 307; II: 233, 234, 269, 270, 271, 342, 343
 Axelrod, II: 341
 Azev, II: 329

B

- Bagration, I: 151, 152, 154, 156
 Bakunin, I: 289, 290, 303; II: 211, 212, 213, 214, 217, 219, 221
 Balkans, II: 233, 234, 270, 293, 343
 Balmashov, II: 289
 Baltic Provinces, II: 284, 305, 311
 Barclay de Tolly, I: 151, 152, 154, 155, 169, 170
 Barricades, II: 315, 338
 Barshchina, I: 27, 28, 53, 203, 254, 255, 262, 264; II: 13, 15, 19, 21, 36, 45, 50, 51, 52, 68, 197
 Battenberg, Prince A., II: 240
 Beccaria, I: 20, 23, 111

- Beilis, Case of, II: 329, 337
Bell, The, II: 22, 27, 38, 56, 60, 63, 65, 75, 79, 207, 208
 Benckendorff, I: 196, 239, 245, 247, 248, 249, 297; II: 242
 Berlin, Congress of, II: 233, 234, 293, 342
 Bestuzhev-Riumin, I: 204, 205
 Beverage reform, I: 274, 275
 Bezpopovtzy, I: 296
 Bibikov, I: 263; II: 5, 12
 Biblical Society, I: 187, 189
 Bielinsky, I: 289-293, 301-305
 Black Partition, II: 238, 264, 287
 Bloc, Progressive, II: 350
 Bloody Sunday, I: 301
 Bobrikov, Gov.-Gen., II: 285
 Bobrinsky, Count V., II: 349
 Bobrshchev-Pushkin, II: 337
 Bobruisk (military disorders), 315
 Bogolepov, Minister, II: 291, 292
 Bogolubsky, Prince Andrey, I: 8
 Bogrov, II: 330
 Bondage-question, I: 13, 14, 21, 65, 94, 102, 254, 255, 257, 258, 301; II: 10-56, 62, 78, 96
 Boyars, I: 13, 41
 Boxer Uprising, II: 294
 Bulgaria, II: 229, 230, 233, 234, 237, 240, 270
Bulletin of Petrograd Workmen's Deputies, II: 308
 Bulygin, Minister, II: 302, 317
 Bunge, Minister, II: 252, 254, 255, 256, 258, 260, 261, 267
 Buturlin Committee, II: 4, 6, 104
 Byzantium, I: 34, 39
- C
- Cadets (Constitutionalist-Democrats), II: 282, 305; foundation of party, 308, 312; in First Duma, 319, 322; declared illegal, 325; in Second Duma, 326, 327, 341
 Cantonists, I: 176, 190
 Carbonari, I: 197, 198
 Carol, King, II: 232
 Capitulation of autocracy, II: 306
 Catherine II, I: 23-49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 58, 59, 67, 68, 69, 72, 80, 81, 86, 90, 95, 97, 101, 104, 105, 111, 132, 143, 144, 179, 291, 199, 213, 214, 269, 283; II: 151, 152, 154
 Caucasus, II: 158, 210, 227, 285, 302, 328
Cause of the People, II: 211
 Censorship, Statutes, I: 160, 192; II: 55, 60, 62, 103, 105
 Chaadaiev, I: 285, 286, 287, 289, 292
 Chaikovsky, N., II: 215-221
 Chelnokov, II: 281
 Cherkassky, Prince, II: 15, 32, 40, 61, 195, 217
 Chernigov, zemstvo, II: 282; agrarian disorders, 302; nobility, 338
 Chernyshevsky, II: 7, 22, 27, 57, 58, 59, 72, 80, 82, 106, 207
 China, I: 171, 267; II: 293, 294
Citizen, The, II: 193
 Classicism, I: 281; II: 164, 166, 168
 Clergy, I: 33, 54
 Collectors of Russian Soil, I: 12
 Collegia, I: 43, 52, 90, 91, 95
 Colonisation, I: 24, 25, 104, 105, 108
 Committee, Code, I: 44; of December 6, I: 245, 246, 249, 258, 260, 280; Main, II: 34, 35, 37, 42, 43, 116, 118; of Ministers, I: 104, 109, 179, 180, 181, 242; II: 146; Secret, I: 259, 260; II: 17, 18; Scholastic, I: 189, 191;

Cadets (Constitutionalist-Democrats), II: 282, 305; foundation of party, 308, 312; in First

- Unofficial, I: 83-95, 109, 114, 246; II: 56
 Committees, set up by Witte, II: 282
 Compensation, see Redemption
 Constantine, Grand Duke (brother of Nicolas I), I: 23, 167, 205, 224-227, 231, 250; (brother of Alexander II), II: 30, 42, 43, 50, 168, 240, 250, 251
 Constantinople, I: 72; II: 293, 343
 Constituent Assembly, demanded, II: 305, 306, 313
Contemporary, The, I: 291, 301, 302, 303; II: 22, 27, 82, 83, 112, 169, 183, 184, 191, 192, 217
 Continental System, I: 66, 123, 125, 126, 128, 137, 140, 144, 147, 148, 183, 215, 216, 220, 223, 266; II: 137
 Co-operative movement, II: 335
 Councils of workingmen, II: 308-312
 Coup d'état, June 3, 1907, II: 328
 Course of paper-money, I: 108, 109, 125, 137, 182, 271; II: 12, 71, 78, 136, 137, 138, 139, 231, 232
 Court-camarilla, II: 309
 Courts-martial, II: 309; field-c. m., II: 325
 Crimean Campaign, I: 224, 252, 308, 310; II: 1, 6, 9, 136, 140, 146, 147, 148, 150, 154, 157, 226
 Cronstadt, mutinies, II: 309, 324
 Czartoryski, Prince Adam, I: 70-73, 83-91, 111, 116-118, 127, 160
Day, The, II: 76, 82, 105
 Decembrists, I: 198, 233, 235, 236, 239, 245, 260, 283, 289; II: 333
 Degaiev, II: 260
 Deich, II: 341
 Delianov, Minister, II: 91, 170, 174, 260, 261, 281, 291
 Depositki, I: 276, 277
 Derzhavin, I: 86, 93, 94, 97, 99, 102, 106, 128
 Diet, Polish, I: 165, 166, 193, 194, 202, 209, 211, 250
 Dnieper Russ, I: 8, 10, 11, 18
 Dobroliubov, II: 207, 211, 217
 Dolgorukov, Prince A. M., II: 42, 59, 60, 67, 69
 Dolgorukov, Prince Paul, II: 283
 Dolgorukov, Prince Peter, II: 283, 303
 Dolgorukov, Prince V. A., II: 113
 Dostoievsky, I: 308; II: 114, 191, 214
 Dubasov, Admiral, II: 314
 Dukhobory, I: 106, 294, 296; II: 265, 283
 Duma, State, II: 305, 306, 333
 Duma, First; elections, II: 317, 318, 319; met, 320; address to Tsar, 321; dissolved, 322, 323, 324
 Duma, Second; elections, II: 326; dissolved, 327, 330
 Duma, Third, 332, 333, 335, 337, 338, 347
 Duma, Fourth, II: 330, 334, 337, 338, 340, 341, 343, 348, 349, 350, 351

D

- Danilovich, General, II: 291
 Dalny, port, II: 294, 297
 Dardanelles, importance of, II: 344
Dawn, The, II: 191

E

- East-Chinese Railway, II: 294, 297
 Ecclesiastical Congress (Kazan), II: 284
Economical Indicator, II: 62
 Editing Commissions, II: 31, 33,

34, 35, 38, 39, 41, 43, 46, 47, 49,
50, 112, 137
Education, II: 89-95, 113, 116,
164-175, 261, 334
Electoral law, II: 305, 306, 317,
318, 324, 325, 327, 328
Eleven Points, II: 298, 299, 301,
350
Elizabeth, Empress, I: 26, 37, 44,
47, 51
England, I: 60, 61, 78, 85, 100,
107, 114, 116, 122, 123, 126, 137,
140, 146, 159, 161, 163, 170, 183,
219, 220, 231, 266, 307; II: 143,
227, 230, 233, 269, 270, 343, 345,
346
European Messenger, I: 98, 143,
285; II: 169, 264
Executions, figures, II: 330

F

Famine, of 1891, II: 281
Far East, II: 294, 297, 342
Fighting Organisation, II: 289,
290
Figner, Viera, II: 221
Finland, I: 23, 25, 123, 129, 136,
148, 151, 173, 206, 216, 219; II:
200, 285, 311, 329
Fletcher, Ambassador, I: 12
Forward! II: 72, 219
Fotiy, Archimandrite, I: 210, 242,
294
Forties, Men of, II: 6
France, I: 60, 113, 114, 128, 131,
134, 148, 149, 161, 216, 251, 252,
253, 299, 307; II: 293, 294, 295,
346
Free Agriculturists, I: 101, 102,
133
Free Economic Society, I: 187
Freemasonry, I: 163, 184, 196
French ideas, I: 37, 38, 39, 284,
289

Friend of Enlightenment, I: 99
Fundamental Laws, II: 318, 329

G

Gagarin, Prince P. P., II: 16, 43,
44, 112, 167
Gagarin, Prince A., II: 167, 181,
197
Galicia, retreat from, II: 348
Gapon, II: 299
Geok-Tepe, II: 269, 270
German Barons, II: 305, 311
German ideas, I: 39, 283, 284, 290,
291
German Imperialism, II: 341, 342
German preponderance, II: 345
Germany, I: 25, 104, 158, 159,
195; II: 270, 271, 294, 342, 363,
345
Giers, II: 269
Godunov, Boris, I: 16
Gogol, I: 302, 303
Golden Horde, I: 9, 10
Golitzyn, Prince A. N., I: 188, 189,
193, 210, 211, 225, 245, 246
Golitzyn, Gov.-Gen., II: 285
Golovin, II: 281, 283, 308
Golovnin, II: 92, 95, 104, 111, 112,
167, 168, 171, 172, 243, 252
Goncharov, II: 58
Gorchakov, II: 9, 84, 228, 231, 269
Goremykin, II: 319, 321, 322, 340,
351
Gorky, II: 289
Grand Dukes, influence of, II:
306; attacked in Duma, II: 334
Great Russian, The, II: 80
Grinevitzky, II: 247, 248
Gruzia, I: 142, 169, 171, 181, 182,
211, 270, 271, 272, 274
Guchkov, Alexander, II: 328, 334,
338
Guriev, Minister, I: 142, 169, 171,
181, 182, 211, 270, 271, 272, 274

H

- Hanfman, Hessie, II: 248
 Hegel, I: 286, 290, 291
 Herzegovina, II: 229, 230
 Herzen, I: 283, 289, 290, 291, 293,
 296; II: 7, 8, 56, 75, 79, 82, 83,
 207, 208, 213
 Hetæriæ, I: 197
 Heyden, Count P. A., II: 303, 319
 Hohenzollern, II: 270
 Holstein-Gotorp, I: 147
 Holy Alliance, I: 163, 187, 209
 Holy Synod, see Synod
 Hungarian Uprising, II: 1

I

- Ignatiev, Minister of Education,
 II: 351
 Ignatiev, Minister of Interior, II:
 154, 208, 232, 233, 252, 253, 254,
 257, 259, 260, 261
 Ikonobortzy, I: 296
 Income-Tax, II: 351
 India, II: 228, 229
 Industry, I: 21, 27, 67, 128, 183,
 184, 226, 267, 268, 269, 271, 273;
 II: 77, 78, 133, 134, 268, 286
 Ingersoll, Robert, II: 290
 Intelligentzia, I: 5, 34, 36, 37, 48,
 223, 279, 282, 285, 289, 302, 303,
 309; II: 22, 69, 72, 75, 76, 166,
 206, 207, 209, 210, 216, 289, 299,
 307, 342, 345
 Interregnum, I: 16; II: 23, 32, 123
 Inventory Regulations, I: 259, 263,
 264; II: 5, 18
 Italy, I: 60; II: 271
 Ivan Kalita, I: 9
 Ivan III, I: 9, 10, 16
 Ivan IV, I: 10, 16, 57

J

- January 9, petition of, II: 299-
 301

- Japan, II: 293-297, 352
 Jesuits, I: 163, 187
 Jews, I: 104-107, 118, 120, 206;
 II: 265, 284, 307, 329
 Judiciary reform, II: 101, 102;
 curbing of, II: 181-186, 187, 189

K

- Kaliaiev, II: 302
 Kankrin, I: 169, 186, 212, 214, 261,
 269, 270, 271, 272, 274, 275, 276,
 277, 278, 279, 309; II: 89, 136,
 138
 Karakozov, II: 106, 111, 112, 146,
 155, 163, 165, 179, 182
 Karamzin, I: 57, 98, 99, 113, 128,
 142, 143, 144, 156, 178, 191, 194,
 211, 215, 219, 226, 236, 237, 238,
 239, 241, 242, 243, 245, 253, 279,
 308
 Karpovich, II: 292
 Kasso, Minister, II: 331
 Katkov, I: 289, 290; II: 59, 60,
 86, 87, 106, 114, 165, 166, 169,
 170, 182, 183, 192, 224, 236, 251,
 252, 261
 Kaufman, General, II: 228
 Kerensky, Deputy, II: 340
 Kavelin, II: 27, 59, 75, 91, 92
 Kharbin, II: 294
 Khodsky, Professor, II: 120, 121
 Khodynka, II: 290
 Khomiakov, I: 284, 287, 292, 306,
 307; II: 190
 Khlysty, I: 296
 Khology, I: 17
 Khrustaliyov, II: 308, 312
 Kibalchich, II: 247, 248
 Kievite, *The*, II: 190
 Kireievsky, I: 284, 286, 287, 292
 Kiselev, I: 173, 174, 179, 260, 261,
 262, 263, 279, 301, 309; II: 117,
 118, 257
 Kishinev, II: 285

Kizevetter, II: 331
 Kleigels, General, II: 292
 Kluchevsky, I: 7, 8, 12, 13
 Kokhanov, II: 258, 259, 260, 261
 Kochubey, I: 72, 78, 83, 85, 86, 88,
 95, 103, 105, 136, 139, 173, 178,
 243, 245, 246, 249
 Kokoshkin, II: 277, 283
 Kokovtzev, II: 330, 340
 Kolo, Polish, II: 326
 Komissarov, II: 106
 Koni, A., II: 183, 189
 Korea, II: 293, 294, 296
 Korf, Baron M. A., I: 264, 304,
 306
 Korf, Baron P. L., II: 303
 Korolenko, II: 283
 Koshelev, I: 292, 306, 307; II:
 61, 144, 197, 243
 Kovalevsky, M., I: 13; II: 103
 Kovalevsky, N., II: 303
 Krivoshein, Minister, II: 281
 Kropotkin, II: 69, 81, 215, 217,
 218, 220, 341
 Krüdener, Baroness, I: 162, 163,
 187, 210
 Kuropatkin, General, II: 295, 296
 Kursk, II: 302
 Kutuzov, I: 118, 149, 150, 154, 155,
 156, 157, 158

L

Labourites, II: 319, 320, 322, 324,
 326, 340
 La Harpe, I: 42, 68, 70, 71, 73, 74,
 75, 77, 82, 87, 91, 115, 163, 164,
 229, 290
 Lamennais, I: 302
 Lancasterian Schools, I: 200
 Land, distribution of, II: 42, 43,
 44, 49, 50
 Land and Freedom, II: 221, 222,
 237, 238
 Landowners, see Nobles

Landowners' Journal, II: 62, 96,
 97
 Landownership, II: 119-122
 Lanskooy, II: 10, 14, 16, 22, 27, 67,
 97, 162, 184
 Lappo-Danilevsky, I: 31, 32
 Lavrov, II: 192, 210, 211, 212, 219
 Leibach, Congress, I: 202, 231, 285
 Leontiev, II: 165, 192, 261
 Letts, II: 311
 Levshin, II: 11, 13, 15, 17, 18, 22,
 29
 Liao-Tung, II: 294, 297
 Liberation, II: 283
 Liberation of Labour party, II:
 287
 Liberators, II: 283, 298
 Lipetzky, Congress, II: 237, 238
 Liquor, monopolisation of, II: 286;
 prohibition of, II: 346
 Lomonosov, I: 36, 111
 Loris-Melikov, II: 175, 239, 241-
 259
 Lovers of Nature, society, I: 196,
 197
 Lovers of Wisdom, society, I: 284,
 292
 Lunacharsky, A., II: 312
 Lvov, Prince G., II: 303
 Lvov, N. N., II: 303, 319

M

Magazine for Lovers, I: 99
Magazine of Russian Letters, I:
 99
 Magnitzky, I: 190, 192, 211, 237,
 242
 Maistee, de Joseph, I: 189, 190
 Maklakov, V. A., II: 337, 338
 Malta, Order of Knights, I: 55,
 60, 61
 Manchuria, II: 293, 294, 296
 Manifesto, Revolutionary, II: 312
 Manuylov, Rector, II: 331
 Martial law, II: 309, 312

Martinists, I: 38
 Masons, I: 38, 172, 196
 Mavor, James, I: 13; II: 272, 301, 309, 313
 Merchants, I: 30, 31, 34, 182; II: 77, 78, 79
 Merezhevsky, I: 42, 63
 Meshchersky, Prince, II: 193
 Metternich, I: 163, 164, 209, 217, 253
 Mezentzev, II: 236
 Mikhailovsky, N. K., II: 208, 211, 214, 267
 Military Colonies, I: 175, 176, 178, 201, 210, 213, 217, 237, 242, 247; II: 160
 Military disturbances, II: 311
 Miloradovich, I: 186, 201, 226, 227, 232
 Miliukov, P. N., I: 7, 12, 16, 38, 40; II: 123, 124, 129, 130, 131, 283, 303, 307, 319, 326, 333
 Miliutin, D. A., II: 157-171, 184, 189, 250, 252, 266
 Miliutin, N. A., I: 301; II: 28-40, 67, 97, 99, 118, 144, 153, 155, 157, 225, 243
 Ministers, Committee of, see Committee
 Ministries, establishment of, I: 91, 94, 95
Mnemozina, I: 284
 Molokane, I: 100, 294, 296; II: 283
 Monarchists, Congress of, II: 350
 Mongols, I: 8, 12
 Montesquieu, I: 20, 38, 101, 106
Monthly Writings, I: 37
 Mordvinov, Admiral, I: 87, 88, 89, 100, 128, 129, 140, 144, 181, 182, 187, 243, 244, 274
 Moscow, I: 8, 9, 12, 41, 42, 96; II: military disturbances, 311; uprising, 314; University ravaged, 331

Moscow Almanach, I: 293
Moscow Mercury, I: 99
Moscow Messenger, I: 284, 288
Moscow News, II: 165, 192, 193, 251
Moscow Observer, I: 99
Moscow Telegraph, I: 284, 285
Molloy, I: 38
 Mukden, II: 294, 298, 303
 Mukhanov, II: 299
 Munitions, lack of, II: 348; factories of, II: 349
 Muraviov, Alexander, I: 196, 197
 Muraviov-Apostol, Matvey, I: 197, 205
 Muraviov-Apostol, Sergey, I: 197, 202, 204, 228
 Muraviov, Mikhail (Imperial tutor), I: 69, 111
 Muraviov, Mikhail (Decembrist), I: 145, 199
 Muraviov, Gov.-Gen. of Amur, II: 226, 227
 Muraviov, M. N., II: 18, 23, 24, 42, 67, 111, 112, 118
 Muraviov, Nikita, I: 197, 200, 205, 207, 208, 219, 233, 236
Muscovite, The, I: 288, 292, 293, 307; II: 191
 Muromtzev, II: 281, 319; President of Duma, 321
 Mutual Guarantee, I: 9; II: 47, 254
 Myshkin, Ippolit, II: 217, 218

N

Nabokov, II: 283
 Napoleon I, I: 60, 61, 66, 114-171, 197, 215, 216, 217, 230
 Napoleon III, II: 9, 86
 Narodnichestvo, II: 191, 192, 206, 207, 209, 221, 223, 238
 Narodniki, II: 207, 211, 216, 219, 220, 221, 223, 235, 236, 238, 239

Narodovoltzy, I: 208; II: 238, 289
 Nathanson, Mark and Olga, II: 221

Near East, II: 293, 342

Nevinson, H. W., II: 313

Nicolas I, I: 181, 192, 212, 223-310; II: 1, 3, 4, 140, 153, 154, 160, 161, 162, 224, 226, 227, 242, 261, 266

Nicolas II, II: 272-352

Nicolay, Baron, II: 192, 252, 260

Niechaiev, II: 213, 214, 216

Niekrasov, II: 114, 192

Nihilism, II: 69, 83, 114, 163, 165, 166, 167, 168, 192, 209

Nobles, I: 20, 21, 30, 33, 34, 54, 136, 141, 155, 184, 185, 186, 255, 256, 257, 258, 264; II: 13-21, 23-40, 71, 73, 78, 97, 197-201, 208, 262, 267

Northern Messenger, I: 100

Northern Society, I: 205, 207, 208, 227, 243

Novikov, I: 38, 52, 196, 213

Novitzky, General, II: 291

Novoie Vremia (*New Time*), II: 193

Novorossiysk (military disorders), II: 311

Novosiltzev, I: 73, 78, 83, 85, 88, 89, 90, 111, 119, 127, 131, 160, 161

O

Obligatory redemption, II: 41, 79
 Obligatory, transitory period, II: 25, 26, 27, 28, 33, 35

Obrok, I: 21, 28, 103, 262, 240; II: 33, 35, 40, 41, 51, 66, 117, 118, 196, 197, 202, 253

Obshchina, disruption of, II: 325, 334

October 17, Manifesto of, II: 306, 317

Octobrists, II: 311, 319, 326, 328, 338

Odessa, II: 288, 304, 307

Ogarev, II: 75, 210

Old Servers, I: 77, 78, 79, 87, 90, 94

Osterman-Tolstoy, I: 152, 153

Ostsee Statute, II: 12

Osvobozhdeme, see *Liberation*

P

Pahlen (regicide), I: 74, 78, 79

Pahlen, K. I., II: 161, 185, 187, 189, 220, 242

Pale of Settlement, I: 100; II: 284

Panin, Nikita, I: 33, 51, 75, 78, 79, 80

Panin, V. N., II: 38, 39, 40, 43, 50, 167, 168

Pares, Bernard, II: 286, 297, 321

Paris, Treaty of, II: 9, 233

Paskevich, I: 233, 245, 264, 299, 300; II: 2, 32

Paul I, I: 27, 38, 50-63, 69, 70, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 96, 97, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 114, 128, 177, 214, 220, 224, 228

Pavlov, Professor, I: 283, 289

Pazukhin, II: 262, 263

Peasants, I: 14, 17, 21, 26, 28, 33, 53, 54, 185, 186, 254, 258, 259, 260, 264; II: 10-54, 286-289; disturbances of, II: 66, 305, 311; Concessions to, present reign, II: 311, 317, 325, 334; Union of, II: 304, 312

Peasants, Economical, I: 28; Fiscal, I: 28, 54, 102, 104, 211, 246, 260, 261, 262; Obligatory, I: 262, 263; II: 41, 46, 47, 253; Possessional, I: 28; II: State, I: 28; II: 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 257; Udielny, II: 116, 117, 118, 119

- Peace-Mediators, II: 67, 68, 69, 74
 Peking, II: 293
Periodical Publications, I: 100
 Permanent Council, I: 81, 85, 90, 94, 110
 Perovsky, Sophia, II: 220, 247
 Persia, I: 58, 62, 114, 123, 138, 140, 273
 Pestel, I: 197-219, 234, 236, 260, 283
 Peter, the Great, I: 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 24, 31, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 94
 Peter III, I: 32, 147
 Petersburg, I: 16
 Petrashevsky, I: 302, 304, 306
Petrograd News, II: 169, 193, 293
 Petrunkevich, I: 1; II: 236, 237, 242, 243, 283, 303, 308, 317, 318, 320, 333
 Pisarev, II: 166, 191, 192, 209, 210, 211
 Plehve, II: 242, 282, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 290, 298, 302
 Plekhanov, II: 222, 238, 287, 341
 Pnin, I: 99, 100
 Pobiedonostzev, II: 249, 250, 251, 252, 259, 260, 261, 265, 275, 276, 278, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 291, 298, 306
 Pogodin, I: 284, 288, 292, 293, 307
 Poincaré, President, II: 336, 338
 Poland, I: 8, 10, 15, 16, 72, 75, 105, 116, 120, 124, 147, 159, 160, 161, 163, 165, 167, 172, 173, 193, 205, 206, 211, 216, 219, 250, 267, 268, 272, 273; II: 9, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 200, 225, 265, 302, 310, 311, 328
 Polevoy, I: 284, 285, 303
 Police-Socialism, II: 288
 Poll-Tax, I: 17; II: 255
 Polishism, II: 172, 225
 Polivanov, Minister, II: 349
 Poltava (military disorders), II: 324
 Popovtzy, I: 296
 Population, growth of, II: 123-131
Polar Star, The, II: 8
 Port-Arthur, II: 293, 294, 295, 297
 Portsmouth, Treaty of, II: 296, 298
 Posen, M. P., II: 15, 26, 32, 33, 34, 40
Possessed, The, II: 114
 Possessional Factories, I: 183, 184, 256, 267; II: 132
 Potiomkin, Prince, I: 52; battle-ship, II: 304
 Potocky, Count Severin, I: 93, 97, 111, 139
 Press, conditions of, II: 55, 61, 62, 103, 104, 105, 186-194; penalties of, 330, 331
 Princes, dissensions of, I: 8, 12
 Proletariat, II: 287, 288, 289, 299, 301, 302, 306, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 314, 317, 318, 335, 336, 338
 Prussia, I: 68, 115, 117, 118, 120, 121, 124, 126, 131, 148, 158, 159, 161, 174, 253, 300, 308; II: 159, 168, 345
 Pugachov, I: 27
 Pushchin, I: 201
 Pushkin, I: 186, 239, 240, 284, 285; II: 269
 Pypin, II: 183, 184, 187, 192
- R
- Radicalism, II: 80, 81, 83, 106
 Radishchev, I: 35, 52
 Railroads, II: 78, 139-146, 268, 269, 286
 Rastopchin, I: 128, 155, 157
 Recruitments, I: 16
 Redemption, II: 25, 27, 28, 32, 33, 41, 45, 59, 71, 79

- Reform, results of, II: 123, 134
 Regliment, Peter's, I: 92, 93, 94
 Reiter, II: 114, 115, 137-178, 231-239
 Rescript, to Nazimov, II: 18, 20, 21
 Revel (military disorders), II: 324
Revolutionary Russia, II: 289
 Rhenish Confederation, I: 120
 Riman, Colonel, II: 315
 Rodichev, II: 276, 283, 303, 319
 Rodzianko, II: 349
 Romanovs, I: 41
 Rosenkreitzer, I: 38
 Rostovtzev, I: 228; II: 15, 16, 27, 28, 31, 32-38
 Roumania, II: 233, 270
 Rousseau, I: 38
 Runich, I: 101, 102, 190, 211, 237, 242
 Russia, consolidation of, I: 9, 15, 18, 23
Russia's Borderlands, II: 191
Russian Discourse, II: 60
Russian Justice, I: 205
Russian Messenger, I: 192; II: 27, 60, 83, 165, 192
Russian News, II: 193, 264
Russian Thought, II: 243, 264
Russian Word, II: 69, 82, 83, 112, 166, 169, 191
 Russo-Chinese Bank, II: 294
 Ryleiev, I: 201, 208, 227, 234; II: 16
 Rysakov, II: 247, 248
- S
- Sabler, Super-Procureur, II: 349
 Saghalin, II: 297
 Sails, II: 61
 Saltykov, I: 67, 179
 Saltykov-Shchedrin, I: 305; II: 192, 193
 Samarin, Yuriy, I: 289, 292, 295, 305, 306; II: 14, 29, 30, 40, 44, 61, 75, 152, 190, 191, 195, 225
 Samarin, Super-Procureur, II: 349
 San-Stefano, II: 233
 Sardinia, I: 307; II: 1
 Savings, during war, II: 347
 Sazonov, Minister, II: 351
 Sazonov, murderer of Plehve, II: 290, 298
 Schad, Professor, I: 185, 191
 Scharnhorst, I: 174
 Schauman, Eugene, II: 285
 Schelling, I: 283, 284, 286, 290
 Schilder, I: 51, 151, 178, 251
 Schismatics, I: 40, 41, 55, 107, 294, 295, 297; II: 221, 265
 Schmidt, Captain, II: 311
 Schwarz (XVIII c.), I: 38, 196, 213
 Schwarz, Colonel, I: 202
 Schwarz, Minister, II: 331
 Scythian Plan, I: 150
 Secret Expedition, I: 80
 Sectants, I: 105, 107, 293, 294, 296, 297; II: 221, 265
 Semionovsky Guards, regiment, I: 196, 197, 202, 209, 285; II: 315
 Senate, I: 42-45, 81, 86, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 135, 166, 214; II: 82, 174, 184, 188, 190, 324
 Serbia, II: 229, 230, 233, 270, 342
 Sergey, Grand Duke, II: 288, 290, 302
 Serving Class, I: 13, 16
 Sevastopol (Mutiny), II: 311
 Seven Years' War, I: 46, 47
 Shaiovich, II: 288
 Shakovskoy, Prince, II: 283, 303
 Shamil, II: 227
 Shcheglovitov, Minister, II: 319
 Shcherbatov, Prince, I: 33
 Shcherbatov, Minister, II: 349
 Shelgunov, II: 191, 192

- Shershenevich, II: 321
 Sherwood, I: 211
 Shevchenko, I: 306
 Shevyrev, I: 284, 288, 292
 Shipov, Dmitri, II: 281-283, 298
 Shishkov, I: 99, 128, 145, 155, 162,
 168, 172, 211, 242, 249, 279, 281
 Shuvalov, P. A., II: 113-115, 146,
 149, 164, 184, 187
 Siberian Railroad, II: 293
 Sipiagin, Minister, II: 289
 Skoptzy, I: 296
 Slavophiles, I: 284, 286, 287, 289,
 292, 293, 302; II: 59, 60, 61, 76,
 190, 191, 193, 194, 195, 231, 233,
 252, 260
 Slavs, settlement of, I: 7
 Socialist movement, II: 287-289,
 302, 304, 319, 324, 326, 327, 340,
 341, 342
Son of the Fatherland, I: 192, 195
 Southern Society, I: 196, 204, 205,
 211, 228
 Spain, I: 147, 160
 Speransky, I: 109, 110, 130-144,
 148, 154, 165, 166, 172, 178, 181,
 182, 190, 192, 195, 226, 237, 243,
 245, 246, 247, 253, 260, 270
Spirit of Journals, I: 185, 192
 Stakhovich, Mikhail, II: 319, 348
 Stankevich, I: 289, 290
 State Council, I: 136, 139, 141, 143,
 166, 178, 180, 182, 187, 201, 225,
 226, 232, 233, 260, 263; II: 43,
 44, 88, 93, 95, 98, 143, 154, 155,
 160, 161, 162, 166, 167, 168, 170,
 174, 181, 182, 186, 191, 240, 249,
 250, 254, 258, 264, 318, 329, 340,
 349, 350
 Stein, Baron, I: 161
 Steingel, Baron, I: 336
 Stepniak-Kravchinsky, II: 236, 278
 Stishinsky, II: 319
 Stolypin, II: 319, 322, 324, 325,
 327, 328, 329, 330, 334
 Storch, Academic, I: 25, 53, 97,
 106, 185, 230
 Strike Committee, II: 306, 307, 313
 Strike, General; First, II: 306,
 309; second, II: 310, 311; third,
 II: 313, 314
 Strike, of Postal-Telegraph em-
 ployés, II: 311
 Strikes, II: 288, 302, 305, 306, 336,
 338, 350
 Stroganov, I: 73, 82, 83, 85, 91,
 103, 109, 110, 127
 Struve, P. B., II: 124, 283, 289
 Student-disorders, II: 91, 92, 290,
 291, 292, 331
 Stundists, II: 283
 Sturdza, I: 189, 190, 191
 Sturmer, Boris, II: 351
 Suicides, figures, II: 332
 Sukhomlinov, Minister, II: 348,
 349
 Sumarokov, I: 37
 Suvorin, A., II: 183, 193
 Suvorov, General, I: 60, 61
 Suvorov, Gov.-Gen., II: 75, 92,
 113
 Sveaborg (military disorders), II:
 324
 Sviatlovsky, II: 301
 Sviatopolk-Mirsky, II: 298
 Sweden, I: 8, 11, 13, 18, 123, 138,
 146, 148, 149, 216
 Synod, Holy, I: 48, 225, 234; II:
 250, 260, 284, 325
 Szlachta, I: 161

T

- Tacitus, I: 101
 Talleyrand, I: 131, 132, 159
 Tariffs, I: 31, 59, 61, 107, 170, 182,
 183, 215, 220, 268, 269, 270, 271;
 II: 267, 268, 286, 287
 Tashkent, II: 227, 230
 Tatarinov, II: 88, 115

- Tatishchev, I: 36
 Taxes, I: 15, 17, 108, 141, 271, 272; II: 73, 76, 156, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 254, 255, 258, 286, 287, 351
Telescope, The, I: 284-287, 295
Tiding, The, II: 192, 193
 Tilsit, Peace of, I: 126; Treaty of, I: 126, 128, 129, 130, 137, 146, 159, 174, 215, 216, 218, 223
 Tolstoy, Dmitri, II: 112, 115, 161-175, 190-265, 281, 331
 Tolstoy, Lev, II: 283, 284, 289, 294, 331
 Tolstoyans, II: 284
 Trade-Union movement, II: 335, 336
 Trepov, Feodor, I: 113, 235; II: 288
 Trepov, Dmitri, II: 288, 301, 302, 307, 308
 Trepov, Alexander, Premier
 Trigoni, II: 248
 Triple Alliance, II: 271
 Triple Entente, II: 343
 Troshchinsky, I: 77, 80, 81, 109, 130
 Troubled Time, see Interregnum
 Trubetzkoy, S. P. (Decembrist), I: 201, 205
 Trubetzkoy, S. (Zemstvoist), II: 303
 Trubetzkoy, Y., II: 331
 True Russians, II: 307
 Tsushima, II: 295, 298, 303
 Tugan-Baranovsky, I: 31, 184, 266; II: 133, 289
 Tugendbund, I: 197, 199, 200
 Turcomen, II: 229, 269
 Turgeniev, Nicolas, I: 186, 196, 200, 201, 203, 205, 236; II: 101
 Turgeniev, Ivan, I: 305; II: 58, 75
 Turkestan, II: 227, 228, 328
 Turkey, I: 15, 18, 23, 43, 47, 121, 123, 124, 129, 138, 140, 146, 148, 149, 210, 250, 251, 252, 260, 274, 307; II: 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 343, 344
 Tver, I: 10, 12; Resolution of, II: 71-74, 276, 282
 Tyaglo, I: 15
- U
- Ukhtomsky, Prince, II: 293
 Ukrainophiles, II: 224, 235
 Ulozhenie, I: 82, 254
 Uniates, II: 226, 265
 Union, All-Russian, of Towns, II: 346
 Union, All-Russian, of Zemstvos, II: 346
 Union of Liberators, II: 283
 Union, Peasant, II: 304, 312
 Union of Russian Men, II: 324
 Union of Salvation, I: 197, 198, 199, 201, 204
 Union, Temperance, II: 347
 Union of Unions, II: 303, 304, 319, 335
 Union of Welfare, I: 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 227
 Unions, Professional, II: 303
 United Nobility, II: 324, 338
 United Slavs, society, I: 196, 205
 Universal Service, II: 159
 University, autonomy; granted, II: 305; Withdrawn, II: 331
 University Councils, I: 112, 187
 University Statutes, I: 112, 187, 282; II: 93, 261, 331
 Unkiar-Skelessi, Treaty of, I: 252
 Unkovsky, II: 24, 25, 36, 37, 60, 74, 186
 Uspensky, N., II: 207, 214
 Ussuriysk, II: 227, 257
 Uvarov, I: 185, 191, 195, 239, 249, 253, 279, 280, 281, 285, 286, 288, 304; his formula, II: 164, 275, 284

V

- Vagankovo Cemetery, demonstration, II: 290
 Valuiev, II: 42, 67, 68, 70, 74, 75, 97, 104, 106, 113, 115, 146, 155, 164, 167, 183-187, 202, 203, 240, 251
 Vannovsky, Minister, II: 171, 266
 Vassilchikov, I: 186, 196, 203, 211, 214, 245, 251
 Vassilkov, I: 204
 Vassily III, I: 10
 Vassily, Count, II: 279
 Velepolsky, Marquis, II: 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 225, 226
 Vellansky, I: 283
 Venevitinov, I: 284, 290
 Vernadsky, Professor, II: 331, 334
 Viatka, II: 282
 Viazemsky, Prince, I: 284
 Viazmitinov, I: 97, 192
 Viborg, Manifesto, II: 322-324
 Vienna, Congress, I: 159, 162, 253; II: 9, 148
Village Well-Being, II: 59, 61, 62
 Vinaver, II: 319
 Vinogradov, II: 331
 Vishnegradsky, I. A., II: 267, 281, 286
 Vishnegradsky, N. A., II: 94, 170
 Vitebsk, II: 302
 Vladimir, Grand Duke, II: 301
 Vladivostok (mutiny), II: 311, 343
 V Narod! II: 208
 Vodka prohibition, II: 346, 347
Voice, II: 169, 193
Voices from Russia, II: 62
 Voinaralsky, II: 218, 220
 Volkonsky, S. G., I: 198, 204, 205, 243
 Voltaire, I: 38
 Voronezh (military disorders), II: 311

- Vorontzov, A. A., I: 85, 86, 87, 116
 Vorontzov, M. S., I: 186, 216
 Vsevolod Big Nest, I: 8

W

- Walling, W. E., II: 341
 War, effects of, II: 346
Week, The, II: 192, 210
 Western heresies, I: 40
 Wilhelm I, II: 251, 270
 Wilhelm II, II: 271, 342, 343, 345
 Wilhelmism, II: 346
 Will of the People, II: 222, 238, 239, 245, 247, 260
 Winter Palace, I: 87, 94, 127; II: 240, 250, 299, 320
 Witgenstein, I: 151, 152, 197, 198, 199
 Witte, II: 268, 282, 286, 287, 288, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 314, 315, 317, 319

Y

- Yakushkin, I: 197, 198, 201
 Yalu, concessions, II: 294
 Yankovich de Mirievo, I: 37, 111, 280
 Yanson, Professor, II: 120, 202, 205, 206, 207
 Yaroslav, I: 206
 Yekaterinodar (military disorders), II: 311
 Yelena, Grand Duchess, II: 15, 30, 38, 243, 247
 Ypsilanti, I: 210
 Yushnevsky, I: 203, 204

Z

- Zamiatnin, II: 101, 114, 181, 182
 Zarudny, II: 101, 182
 Zasulich, Viera, II: 235, 302

- Zavadovsky, I: 81, 82, 110, 136
Zemsky Chiefs, introduced, II:
263; curbed, II: 334
Zemsky Sobor, I: 41
Zemstvo, II: 96-103, 143-148,
157, 171-180, 183, 194, 224, 235-
264, 276, 277, 278, 279, 282, 283,
298, 299, 303, 304, 311, 328
Zemstvo Congresses, II: 298, 303,
311, 350
Zemstvo-Constitutionalists, II: 283,
303
Zheliabov, II: 237, 246, 247
Zhukovsky, Vassily, I: 232, 242;
II: 3, 4
Zilliacus, Koni, II: 289, 290
Zlatoust, affair, II: 289
Zubaton, II: 288